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HISTORICAL TREATISES:! 



THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE REFORMATION. 

THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND PRACTICAL INFLUENCE 
OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 

THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE CONTINENTAL 
INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 



TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF, 

A. n: L. tiEEREN, 

KNIGHT OF THE GUELPHIC ORDER, COUNCILLOR AND PROFESSOR OF 
HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GOTTINGEN. 




OXFORD : D. A. TALBOYS. 

M DCCC XXXVI. 






THE LIBRARY i 

OF CaNGRESl 

WASHINGTOII 



PREFACE. 

The three Treatises contained in this volume, 
form, together with a Life of the Author, the 
first volume of the Historical Works of Profes- 
sor Heeren, published at Gottingen, in the year 
1821. The Life has been omitted from this 
translation, as belonging rather to a complete 
edition of an author's writings, than to such a 
selection as the present ; and the order in which 
the treatises stand in the original, has, from mo- 
tives of convenience, been changed: but in other 
respects, the fdrm of the volume above men- 
tioned has been pursued. The whole of it how- 
ever, has not been translated by the same hand, 
and it is feared that some difference of style 
may, on that account, be observable in different 
parts of the work. Owing to the same circum- 
stances also, considerable delay has occurred 
between the printing of the first two treatises, 
and of the third : to which must be attributed 
any incongruity which may exist between the 
dates mentioned in the notes of the Translator 
of the two former, and the date of the title-page. 
It is hoped, however, that, notwithstanding these 
circumstances, this volume will not detract from 
the high reputation, which previous translations 
from his works have deservedly acquired for 
Professor Heeren in this country. 

Oxford, Se^t, 1836. 



AN ENQUIRY INTO 

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

OE THE REEORMATION, 

BEING A PRELIMINARY ATTEMPT AT AN 

ANSWER TO THE QUESTION 

PROPOSED BY THE 

FRENCH NATIONAL INSTITUTE. 

WRITTEN IN THE YEAR 1802. 



TO THE READER. 

The following treatise was written in answer to 
a question proposed by the National Institute 
of France^ as the subject of a prize essay for 
July 1803 — viz. "What has been the influence 
of the Reformation on the pohtical position of the 
different states of Europe, and upon the diffusion 
of knowledge^? This question, in itself so in- 
teresting, attracted my attention the more be- 
cause the whole course of my studies have been 
directed towards it. I resolved therefore to at- 
tempt an answer to it ; but when I had nearly 
finished the first part, which regards the political 
consequences of the Reformation, I learned 
from my late friend Von Villers that I should 
have him for a competitor. Upon this I with- 
drew myself, and his essay, which proved the 
successful one, and of which several editions 
have been published, is universally known. 
In the mean time I committed my work to the 
press, even before the day appointed for sending 
in the essays, but confined it to the political part 
of the question. The sheets were forwarded as 
soon as printed to my friend, and he has himself 
remarked in his preface, that he made use of 



^ Quelle a et6 I'influence de la reformation sur la situation politique des 
differens Etats de 1' Europe, et sur le progres des lumieres ? 

b2 



iv TO THE READER. 

them in working out this portion of his subject. 
Any service which I may thus have rendered him, 
he amply repaid me four years after by under- 
taking the translation of my essay upon the 
Influence of the Crusades, which then ob- 
tained the prize at Paris. I have thought it 
right to preface these remarks ; partly, in order 
to show the relation in which my essay stands 
to that of my late friend ; partly, to excuse the 
style of the treatise, which could not from the 
circumstances assume the character of a scholas- 
tical and learned dissertation. 

It does not pretend to afford the learned his- 
torian anything new in the detail, but aims at 
presenting a variety and abundance of general 
views, which appear to me to be far from super- 
fluous, inasmuch as a clearer light may thus 
perhaps be thrown upon the history of modern 
Europe. 



AN ENQUIRY INTO 

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

OF THE REFORMATION. 

The great political changes by which the 
destinies of mankind are permanently affected, 
and which we are accustomed to call by the 
general name of revolutions, may be divided, as 
regards their origin, into two classes. The first 
includes those which are the work of single 
individuals, the slaves of passion, who have 
devoted their lives to conquest, and founded 
their greatness upon the ruins of the states 
which fortune has enabled them to overthrow. 
These may be termed purely warlike revolu- 
tions, as they assume that character from the 
first, and war is their immediate aim. 

Such were the exploits of Cyrus and of Timur, 
and of many other celebrated heroes, who, 
though at the head of civilised nations, have 
made conquest at once the first and last object 
of their career. Phenomena of this class may 
be highly interesting from their results, but in 
their origin they are less so, as they usually 
flow from one source, and that for the most part 
an unhallowed one — ambition. 

The second class is of a very different charac- 



6 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

ter, and may be best expressed under the joint 
name of moral and political, as its foundation is 
laid in the moral nature of man. Under this we 
range those revolutions which have been pre- 
pared by popular ideas, slowly spread, but finally 
become prevalent ; and which by the direct con- 
trast in which they stood to the existing order 
of things, could not but cause violent struggles 
and great changes in their passage from theory 
into practice. Like the stream which loses itself 
in the earth but a short way from its source, as 
if to accumulate its strength in secret, and breaks 
forth again a great river, these revolutions arise 
at moments when they are least thought of, and 
exhibit signs of strength which the most accurate 
observer could not have foreseen. These differ 
therefore from the former by being in the 
highest degree interesting, as well in their origin 
as in their consequences. Their general cha- 
racteristic is that they are prepared long before- 
hand, and by a process which can hardly ever 
be discerned. ^ — -They thus afford the practised 
observer abundant employment from the very 
first ; as it is not easy to discover their true 
origin, even though the immediate cause of their 
breaking out should be evident to the eye. They 
differ from the former also in this, that they seldom 
arise from one, but usually from many and dif- 
ferent sources, and these, becoming united, form 
a torrent which finally bursts through every bul- 
wark, and sweeps away whatever attempts to 
stem its course. 



OF THE REFORMATION. 7 

In order that ideas should become generally 
adopted and effective, they must be such as can 
be readily appreciated by the great mass of the 
people, and of sufficient interest to induce action 
as well as belief. Religion and politics are the 
only topics of this nature. Knowledge in its 
more difficult branches must always be confined 
to a limited number; nor do we ever read of wars 
caused between different nations by different 
systems of philosophy, although it may have 
chanced that some particular doctrines, by passing 
into popular opinions, have exercised an in- 
fluence over their dealings with each other. On 
the other hand the ideas of God and of our 
country are too deeply interwoven with our 
moral nature to allow of their being entertained 
merely as objects of reason, and not of the affec- 
tions also. In fact, the less defined they are, 
the greater influence do they appear to exercise ; 
and hence it is that they possess the power of 
acting like electricity, even upon the most in- 
formed minds, and impart energies to them 
which assume with ease the character of en- 
thusiasm, or even fanaticism. 

Ptehgious notions, it is true, do not seem to 
have a very near connection with political, but, 
even if the union of the state with its acknow- 
ledged forms of worship were less strict, these 
could seldom be overthrown without entailing 
the fall of more than can be originally fore- 
seen. 

Who shall define the channel of the torrent 



8 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

which has burst its bed, or who set hmits to the 
earthquake ? 

But however awful these shocks may be, it is 
by them more especially that the fortunes of our 
race are determined. — The moral, like the phy- 
sical world, owes its purification and its mainte- 
nance to the storms which sweep over it. — 
But centuries and their generations must pass 
away before the operation of them is so fully 
developed as to allow the dim eye of human 
intelligence to embrace and give judgment upon 
the full extent of their results. And when this 
time at length arrives, when the enquirer at last 
may fairly enter upon his task, what occasion 
could he select, on which it would be more 
becoming to feel diffident of his own powers, 
and to bear continually in mind that his horizon 
is at best but of scanty extent, and that to review 
the unlimited universe of the history of man 
belongs only to a Being himself illimitable ? 

Since the fall of the Roman empire made way 
for the erection of the states of modern Europe, 
this portion of the world has witnessed three 
revolutions such as w^e have described. The deep 
degradation of its inhabitants during the middle 
ages is chiefly attributable to the want for many 
centuries, of an impulse which might call the 
minds of men, and not merely their bodies, into 
activity. Hence that overwhelming barbarism 
which in the tenth and eleventh centuries 
threatened to extinguish the last gleams of civili- 
sation, till at the close of the latter the Crusades 



OF THE REFORMATION. 9 

were set on foot, and awakened the decaying spirit 
of mankind from the slumber which threatened 
to be its last. These expeditions, although 
fruitless in their immediate event, laid the found- 
ation of a new order of things in Europe. Owing 
to them the peasantry was freed, although nei- 
ther quickly nor universally, from the bondage 
of the feudal law ; and while the young Muse of 
the Knighthood was gathering boldness to utter 
its conceits in castle and hall, they gradually, by 
the commerce which they brought to Europe, 
were the means of establishing in her towns that 
class of free citizens, on whose prosperity the 
future fate of nations was to depend. 

After a lapse of four centuries Europe sus- 
tained a second and still greater change in the 
Reformation. And as this agreed with the 
former in the point of their common and imme- 
diate origin from religion, although both were 
undoubtedly of great political importance, it was 
reserved for our own age to witness a third 
species of revolution, which, springing immedi- 
ately from political ideas, obtained an immediate 
political tendency ; and which, when its results 
are fully developed, will perhaps furnish the his- 
torian of future times with even richer materials 
than cither of those which have preceded it. 

The National Institute, in requiring a develop- 
ment of the consequences which resulted to the 
political progress and general illumination of 
Europe from the Reformation, has chosen a sub- 
ject worthy of itself. It is a proposition which 



10 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

has never been satisfactorily answered, but which 
is now ripe for discussion. — Near three centuries 
have elapsed since that mighty change began to 
operate ; its consequences have developed them- 
selves in all their principal features ; the clouds 
of prejudice and passion, which at first float over 
an age of great revolutions, and deny a clear 
view to the observer of the time, have now been 
long dispersed ; and the historian must be con- 
tent that his own feeble vision should bear the 
blame, if it cannot embrace the wide prospect 
before him. 

The present enquiry is not directed to the 
consequences of the Reformation, as it affected 
the intelligence and civilisation of mankind — this 
subject is left to others. We shall simply in- 
vestigate the political results of that event as 
they affected Europe — and these we shall clas 
under two heads : the 1st. comprising the 
changes in particular states. The 2nd. those 
which were wrought in the social and political 
system of Europe. 

In an undertaking of this sort it is evident 
that the author must be prepared to lay aside 
the prejudices which his education, his country, 
and his religion, throw in his way — that he must 
resolve moreover not to sacrifice the truth, 
although known and acknowledged, to the 
brilliancy which invests what is new and para- 
doxical. — These I say are necessary and evident 
conditions.^ — -It is only as to the sense in which 
the term " Consequences of the Reformation" 



OF THE REFORMATION. H 

may be fairly used that any observation need be 
made. On this, however, the full attention of 
the reader is required, as it must necessarily 
determine the main features of our enquiry. 

The consequences of every event are partly 
immediate, partly mediate. 

The character of immediate consequences is 
that they must result of themselves from the 
very nature of a given event, and therefore be of 
the same stamp with it. The immediate conse- 
quences of a religious revolution can be con- 
cerned only with religion ; and therefore as re- 
gards the revolution we are here speaking of, they 
include nothingbutthe changes in doctrine or wor- 
ship of particular portions of the Christian Church, 

The mediate consequences of an event differ 
from the former in not flowing from the essence 
of that event, but in being produced by acci- 
dental relations, connections, and changes of 
circumstance, in such a way however, as that 
without the existence of that event they would 
not themselves have existed. 

It is at once evident that the sphere of the 
immediate consequences of every event must be 
comparatively much smaller than that of the 
mediate. But on this account a view which 
should be confined only to the former would be 
very partial — and although it may be urged that 
the chain of mediate consequences is endless, 
and therefore incomprehensible by the eye, since 
each operation gives an impulse to another and 
a new one — we must remember that the imper- 



12 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

fection of our nature imposes a limit, and by 
subjecting us to the thraldom of time, restrains 
our view to that which is already determined. 

Moreover we have a standard of easy applica- 
tion by which the degress of distance may be 
judged. Are all the circles which we form by 
throwing a stone into the water to be held un- 
certainly defined because those on the verge 
gradually escape the eye ? 

The influence of the Reformation on the poli- 
tics and intelligence of Europe belongs to the 
class of mediate consequences, and the National 
Institute by proposing such a question has 
shown the extent over which it is intended 
that our enquiries should spread. It could not 
escape the proposers of the question that its 
chief interest lay in this very point — that on this 
very account it must needs be a proposition, the 
answer to which would bring a special ray of 
hope to the age in which zc^e live. The distant 
results of every great revolution have deceived 
the expectations of the actors ; and there is per- 
haps no higher gratification to the historian than 
to follow out the wonderful perplexities of the 
thread of events on which the fortunes of our 
kind depend. Submitting to its guidance he 
wanders on as in a labyrinth, which, amidst rocks 
and precipices, often opens to his view a land- 
scape of surpassing beauty ; and wrapped in 
wonder he catches amid the storm of ages the 
voice of Him who tells us, " that His ways are 
not our ways !" 



OF THE REFORMATION. 13 

Lift up your eyes then ye whom in your turn> 
Fate has appointed to be the witnesses, the ac- 
tors, the victims, of a Revohition ! Ye who 
have lost a father, a brother, a friend, alas ! per- 
haps your all ! On the funeral piles of the Inqui- 
sition, on the battle-fields of Miihlberg, of Nord- 
lingen and Liitzen, innocent blood flowed as freely 
as our own age has seen it flow ! and yet the 
clouds at length dispersed, and the day-star 
shone down upon a peaceful and a better world.^ 
The horizon clears up now faster than then, and 
perhaps we ourselves may yet witness those 
better times which it was in that case the lot 
only of later generations to enjoy. 



Although the original tendency of the Re- 
formation was very far from political, the inti- 
mate connection, which, in those days subsisted 
between Church and State rendered it unavoid- 
able, that, as its influence widened, such a ten- 
dency should rapidly be acquired. It is true 
that at the commencement of the sixteenth cen- 
tury those relations were no longer in their full 
force, which during the preceding period had 
knit the whole of Western Europe as it were 
into one empire, composed of a number of 
princes whom the pope either held or claimed 
to hold, as vassals to the spiritual supremacy of 
his office. The temporal authority which had 
been established by Gregory the seventh was 
already broken down, not only by the disobedi- 



14 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

ence and boldness of many of these spiritual 
sons of the church, but, and that perhaps in a 
still greater degree, by the errors of the Roman 
see itself. A schism of seventy years (1378 — 
1449) at one period of which two popes, at an- 
other three, were busied in excommunicating 
each other, had rendered the Christian world 
disaffected, and had caused the assemblage of 
those general councils which asserted the fatal 
doctrine of their authority even over the head of 
the Church. But notwithstanding this. Church 
and State were far too closely interwoven 
throughout the Christian world, to allow of 
any change being wrought in the former which 
should not recoil on the latter. Although con- 
tinual opposition was made to the claims of 
the pope to be recognised as arbitrator in secular 
matters, still by the spiritual jurisdiction of his 
office, and in several other ways, he exercised 
many most important rights, without deny- 
ing which a Reformation could hardly even be 
imagined. x4s soon therefore as a measure of 
this kind was set afoot and began its necessary 
interference, the princes could not remain un- 
moved — neutrality was out of the question — and 
they were compelled to declare themselves either 
for or against it. In the latter case they set 
themselves in opposition to a party within their 
own dominions to which oppression would un- 
avoidably give a political character ; in the 
former they became the direct adversaries of 
the pope, and in this as in the other, the politi- 



OF THE REFORMATION. 15 

cal tendency of the Reformation was soon de- 
cided. 

The moment at which it assumed this form 
necessarily doubled its importance. When 
the Reformation broke out there was no longer 
any great moral interest which could influence 
politics and breathe into them a spirit of 
life. Italy it is true had been taught a more 
refined policy by the necessity of maintaining 
the balance among her states^ and this had 
spread even beyond the Alps, but under the 
hands of Ferdinand the Cathohc it had assumed 
the form of mere systematical deceit. The in- 
fluence which the nations of Europe had up 
to that time exercised by their representatives, 
upon their own affairs, began either to disappear 
entirely, or to become weak and unimportant. 
What shall we say of the Spanish Cortes under^ 
Ferdinand and Isabella, and still more under 
their successors ? What of the English Parlia- 
ment under Henry the eighth ? What of the 
assembly of the States-general in France under 
Lewis the twelfth ? All the threads of political 
power were in the hands of some few poten- 
tates who only abused their trust by spinning 
them into a web of wretched intrigue for the 
gratification of their own passions. — Whoever 
wishes for a proof of this, need only glance into 
the history of what passed in Italy at that time ; 
and especially at the senseless league of Cambray 
and its romantic consequences. 

The nations of Europe looked on unmoved 



16 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

while this game of vice and folly was played at 
their expense ; and this apathy was seasonably 
timed for their own more easy subjection to des- 
potism, as it accorded with the encreased means 
of tyranny which the treasures of the new world, 
then first discovered, put at the disposal of their 
masters. 

In order to awaken Europe from this moral 
slumber, there was wanted a neto and mighty 
interest which should exercise a common in- 

yfluence over both people and princes ; and 
in contemplating which the meaner spirit of 
cabal, till then most honoured, should be for- 

'^otten. Such an interest, both as to novelty 
and greatness, the Reformation created ; and 
we thus obtain the proper point of view from 

vwhich to estimate its political importance. In- 
stead of the vulgar impulses of selfishness. Reli- 
gion became the mainspring of politics ; and we 
soon find hardly any political interest which was 
not more or less a religious interest, hardly any 
political party which was not more or less a re- 
ligious one, nay hardly any war which was not 
in a greater or less degree a war of religion. It 
matters not how far philosophers may hold the 
doctrines for which men struggled to be right or 
wrong — the destinies of mankind depended 
upon their acquiring an interest in what was 
great and exalted ; and that religion is in prac- 
tical effect both great and exalted, even the 
atheist who scorns it in theory, must confess. 
It may be that with the new interest which was 



OF THE REFORMATION. 17 

here awakened, a host of prejudices and pas- 
sions, which in partial instances led to error, 
was awakened also. — But this hindered not the 
progress of the whole ! 

To require that the human race should advance' 
without interruption to its more perfect state, by 
the path which reason points out, is to mistake 
our nature, and to forget that we are not crea- 
tures of pure reason, but of reason mixed and, 
alloyed with passion. It is difficult for individual 
man to tread that path, but for the crowd, which 
only approaches its object by circuitous ways, 
it is impossible. 



FIRST PART. 

Development of the Political Influence of 
THE Reformation upon the Internal Rela- 
tions of the different States of Europe. 

GERMANY. 

It was natural that the state in which the Re- 
formation commenced should be the first to feel 
its consequences; but besides this, the internal 
condition of Germany was such as to make these 
consequences more violent here than elsewhere. 
The adherence of several of its princes to the Re- 
formed doctrines facilitated the organisation of a 
powerful party, which watched over their infancy, 
and prevented them from being crushed or set 
aside, in a manner which would have been im- 
possible in any country less divided within itself 
It is well known that the elector, Frederic the 
Wise of Saxony, the ruler of the state in which 
Luther came forward, was the first who did the 
Reformation this service, although he was soon 
followed by others. It was thus at once made 
an affair of state ; and by being soon after for- 
mally and openly treated as such, and brought, 
in 1521, before the diet of Worms for decision, 
it became so highly important in a political point 



POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, ETC. 19 

of view, that its very condemnation could only 
serve to make it still more so. 

At the time of Luther's appearance Germany, 
as a state, was little more than a cipher in the 
political system of Europe. Full of strength 
within, it was yet unable to apply its power. — 
Its constitution, formed upon 2)7^escription, was 
scarcely better than a chaos. Even though the 
Golden Bull (1356) had sufficiently determined 
the relations between the head of the empire 
and the chief of its princes, who could say what 
the mutual rights of the emperor and the re- 
maining states truly were ? The degree of 
authority which he should possess was thus 
commonly dependent upon the character and 
personal power of the emperor. Under the 
long reign of Frederic III., who slumbered 
away above half a century upon the throne, 
(1440 — 1492,) this authority was nearly anni- 
hilated ; and under that of Maximilian I., not- 
withstanding the new institutions, it was, as re- 
garded its own interests, but little augmented. 

On the other hand, there was not one of the 
remaining princes of Germany whose power was 
sufficient to command respect. They lived more 
like patriarchs than princes ; the ruler of a coun- 
try appeared to be little more than the chief 
proprietor in it. Moreover, there was scarcely a 
prospect that any house would be able to raise 
itself to sudden eminence. The undivided 
transmission of property was observed only in 
the electoral states : in the others, according to 

c 2 



20 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

custom, the lands of the father were divided 
among his sons; and, as their marriages were often 
blessed with even too rich an abundance, it was 
difficult for a single family to amass any great 
and secure possessions in land. This weakness 
of individuals necessarily rendered the power of 
the whole body inconsiderable. It is true the 
princes met at the diets to discuss their common 
interests; but Frederick III. had not even been at 
the trouble of once attending these meetings in 
person ; and his son, whose numerous projects 
required proportionate funds, came, for the most 
part, only to harass the states for supplies. In fact, 
if the impetuous advance of the hereditary foes of 
Christendom, who had for fifty years been se- 
curely settled in the east of Europe, had not fre- 
quently compelled the Germans to make common 
cause against them, there seems to be no reason 
why the bands of the empire should not have 
been wholly dissolved. 

It was the Reformation, and the Reformation 
alone, which suddenly breathed new life into 
this decaying body, and gave it the political im- 
portance which it has since possessed. Many 
of the German princes soon declared in its favour, 
(whether from conviction or on other grounds 
it matters not) ; while, on the other hand, the 
^^ new sovereign of the empire found it in 
accordance with his interests to condemn it. 
Charles V. soon discovered that in the advocates 
of the Reformation he had to deal with a party 
which was forming against himself ; and al- 



OF THE REFORMATION. 21 

though his original repugnance to the protestant 
doctrines, as they now began to be termed, may 
perhaps have been founded upon religious con- 
viction, yet the hatred v^^hich he entertained 
towards them soon became purely political. 
Charles V,, however, was not the man to 
allow himself to be blinded by passion ; it 
was to him only the groundwork of a project 
which soon occupied his whole attention, as 
far as it was directed to the arovernment of Ger- 

O 

many, and the design of which was to main- 
tain and increase the imperial pov/er by the sup- 
pression of the party opposed to him. As soon, 
however, as this party perceived their danger, a 
closer alliance, among the protestant princes and 
states, was the natural consequence. 

Thus, after the league of Smalcald (1530), 
both parties stood, prepared for war, awaiting 
the contest ; nor would this have been so long 
delayed, had not the emperor been engaged upon 
some other of his numerous undertakings. 
When, at length, a lapse of sixteen years had 
brought matters to the point he wished, and he 
fairly took the field (1546), the result showed 
that the courage of his opponents was not 
equalled by their abilities ; while the issue of the 
battle of Miihlberg (1547) seemed to exceed 
even his boldest hopes. He had scarce, how- 
ever, begun to enjoy the fruits of his victory, 
when the daring hand of a stripling tore from 
his grey head the laurels which a few days suf- 
ficed to lose, but which it had taken a life of 



22 ?Or,l'IM(^AL (!()NSK(JI]I<:NCIi:S 

labour to (-ollect ; uiul Mauiico, by tlui trcjity of 
Piipaii (l.^r^'i), (lis|)(;ll(!(l aJl the droanis oC am- 
bition in wincli (MinrU^s liad so loiifif rovcHlcid. 

Su(-li, in a few words, was tlic proi^rcss of 
events which occnncd in ihv. (Jcinnan cnnpirc at 
tliis momentous crisis, and whicli determined its 
rntin<! laJc. Hut even th(Mi (u'rmany liad ceased 
to b(; the (ilermany oC old(ni times. The new 
and mi}i;hty interest which had been awakened, 
])r()(hiced a, col-responding- chanjjje in the ])ohtics 
of tlie empire. Its piiiu-es liad h'arnt to estimates 
their powcM- ; they liad lound tlicmselvcs in a 
position which obli<j;-ed them to call it into ac- 
tion ; and, althonj^h the preliminary treaty of 
Papan, confirmed as it w;is by the subseqnent 
peace, conc^luded 155,5 at Ani^sbiu-gh, liad secured 
(upiaJ constitutional rights to both the new and 
the old })arty, it was impossible that they should 
relapse into their former indolence, and with it, 
into their former political nonentity. Althou^i^li 
the words of j)ea,ce were on men's lips, they had 
not put away resentment and distrust from their 
hearts ; the new energy which the Iveforniation 
had iin])arted to politics remaiiUHl in full force ; 
the Iwo i)arti(>s watcthed each oilier ready armed 
for a struggle ; or if they laid aside their weapons 
for a monuMit it was only to resume them upon 
the first ap])cvirance of danger. 

IV^sides this, the previous peace had been pro- 
cured too cluwply to allow of its being dural)le. 
Great revolutions are not to be decided by the 
struggle of a moment ; and more than this the 



OI f /IE REFORMATrOX, 28 

fortunate attempt of Maurice can hardly be con- 
sidered. Notwithstanding the peace, Germany 
resembled the sea while still heaving from the 
effects of a storm, and for a Jong time it re- 
mained under the influence of revolutionary 
feelings, which promised a new explosion at 
every moment; indeed, were it not for the ex- 
planation, which is afforded by the personal cFia- 
racters of the three immediate successors of 
Charles V., history could scarcely preserjt a 
more extraordinary phenomenon tljan tlje con- 
tinuance of this state of things down to tfje year 
]G]H, when the thirty years' war at lengtli 
broke out. 'J'he treaty of "Westphalia, which, 
concluded it, finally and fully decided the strife 
between the two parties, and gave to the Ger- 
man empire that constitution, which, down to 
our own times, has been considered tlie palladium 
of its existence. 

Thus to the Reformation and its consequences 
the German body owes the form uhich it has 
since assumed, and the vital spirit by which it is 
animated. It was scarcely conceivable that such 
a political body, comprising as it did so many 
and such different states, should for a length of 
time be kept in activity by any one common in- 
terest. For such a purpose v/hat point of union 
should we have been incUned to select ? A de- 
sire of aggrandizement, or at least of a pov.erful 
influence over the affairs of foreign nations ? 
Such a desire could not exist in a state which, 
although amply endou-ed with means of resis- 



24 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

tance, possessed scarce any of attack. — Perhaps 
a common commercial interest ? Germany had 
no sucli interest, nor could have, owing to its 
geographical position and its division into small 
states. There remains therefore but one — that 
which depended upon the necessity of a common 
resistance to attacks from without. History, 
however, shows, by abundant instances, that 
such causes are transitory, and that with them 
the interest they call up must pass away also ; 
and the history of Germany in particular has 
shown how easy the enemies of the empire 
found it to acquire friends in a state so com- 
posed ; and to make war upon Germans by the 
assistance of Germans. The internal union of 
tliis body of states was, therefore, nothing but a 
slow and lingering disease; which, while it main- 
tained a show of health in its subject, was on 
that account preparing it the more surely, either 
for total dissolution, or for subjection— it mat- 
ters not whether to its own superior, or to a fo- 
reigner — but in both cases for its destruction. 

It was only by a Spirit of Disunion that it 
could be fairly roused into life ; and this the 
lieformation produced by giving separate and 
peculiar interests to the Protestant and Catho- 
Vlic parties. It cannot be denied that it was im- 
jiossible accurately to foretell what the conse- 
quences of these divisions might be. The inter- 
ference of foreign powers in the contest appeared, 
as in fact it was, inevitable ; a concurrence of 
fortunate circumstances, however, averted the 



OF THE REFORMATION. 25 

consequences which were thus threatened, and 
that often more successfully than could have been 
expected. Moreover, if the separate interests of 
the two parties had been of such a nature as to 
render it impossible that they should become 
subservient to the interests of the empire, or, 
still worse, if they had been opposed to it, a total 
dismemberment might have been the result. 
Luckily, however, this was not the case ; nei- 
ther interest contained in itself any thing con- 
trary to the rights of the head of the empire, or 
of the individual states : they centered upon the 
subject of religion and the rights connected with 
it ; and, after abundance of feud and warfare, it 
was sufficiently ascertained by experience, that 
the establishment of the Corpus Evangelicorum 
— which did not receive its definite form till long 
after the thing itself had existed (1653) — tended 
to no irremediable division between the diet and 
the empire. On the contrary, the mutual watch 
which the two parties kept upon each other, and 
the constant attentiveness which they showed, 
often with good reason, sometimes in a degree 
almost ridiculous, to the slightest advances of 
their antagonists, afforded a warrant for the 
maintenance of the German Constitution, at 
least in its principal parts, which could certainly 
not have been furnished in any other way. From 
this more elevated point of view, all those dissen- 
sions, debates, and wars, which the Reformation 
produced in the interior of this body, appear in a 
more gentle light; they are reckoned only as the 



2G POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

means to an end ; and if it was the Reformation 
which at its commencement breathed new h'fe 
into the empire, it was the Preformation also 
which for a long time maintained this life and 
assured its political existence. 

AUSTRIA. 

The house of Austria — which of all the dy- 
nasties of modern times has lost and won the 
most — was the first to found its political schemes 
upon the disturbances of the Reformation. Fate 
presented it at this crisis with a prince who was 
superior to all his contemporaries in political 
talent, and at least equal to any of them in 
power. It requires abilities of a rare kind to 
make their possessor feel at home in a new order 
of things such as a revolution is apt to produce. 
A great genius alone is capable of rising above 
the routine of previous experience and custom, 
and of calculating the combinations by which its 
measures are to be directed. But however wil- 
ling we may be to do justice to the political ta- 
lents of Charles V., it was impossible that he 
should from the first be able to foresee the 
course which these violent revolutions would 
take, at least by any direct process of calculation. 
The relation in which he stood to the pope, as 
Protector of the Church, made him from the be- 
ginning an opponent of the Reformation ; but 
his political designs in Germany were not formed 
till he found in the league of Smalcald (1530) 



OF THE REFORMATION. 27 

a party armed in direct opposition to himself. 
The maintenance of the respect due to the ma- 
jesty of the empire required that this should be 
suppressed; but then its suppression^ even though 
the existing forms of the constitution should be 
observed, could hardly be effected without the 
introduction of absolute power into Germany. 
That this plan was frustrated, and in a way 
which no previous calculations could have de- 
termined, has been already observed ; but still 
the new doctrines were not the less important 
as regarded the organisation of the Austrian 
monarchy, even though it did not play a promi- 
nent part in the game. 

We may remark here, that in the hereditary 
duchy of Austria, the power of the reigning 
house became nearly absolute — while that of 
the states was reduced to a mere shadow — by 
the suppression of the protestant party under 
Ferdinand II. It derived also the great- 
est possible advantage from the use which it 
made of the religious disturbances in Hungary 
and Bohemia. The house of Hapsburg may 
thank the Reformation for the opportunities 
which it afforded them of converting both these 
states from electoral into hereditary dominions ; 
and of rearing in the latter an absolute sove- 
reignty on the ruins of their ancient national 
freedom. When the battle of Prague (1G20) left 
the rebeUious nation a prey to the tyranny 
of its conqueror, the moment was not let slip. 
It was robbed of its privileges, and Bohemia 



28 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

became in fact an hereditary kingdom^ although 
pohticians were still left to dispute whether it 
should be called electoral or not. 

The fate of Hungary, although not so immedi- 
ately decided, was not less owing to the religious 
disputes of the Reformation. The new doc- 
trines found so ready an admittance here, that 
the supporters of them soon formed a counter- 
poise to those of the older creed, and at length, 
by the peace of Vienna (in 1606) and the capi- 
tulation of king Matthias (1608), obtained not 
only the free exercise of their religion, but, by 
the latter event, equal political rights with them. 
The history of Hungary, however, has made it 
sufficiently known how little the collisions of 
party were put an end to by these concessions ; 
how little the promises made to the protestants 
were observed ; how advantage was taken of 
the excitement which prevailed to introduce fo- 
reign troops, and, notwithstanding all remon- 
strance, to maintain them in the country ; and, 
lastly, how systematically the most crying op- 
pression was practised, till it at length (1670) 
produced conspiracies, the extinction of which 
necessarily augmented the power of the govern- 
ment. The web of strife, however, was not yet 
broken off, and its meshes had so thoroughly 
entangled the protestant contests with those of 
Transylvania and the Porte, that it is almost im- 
possible to follow out the separate threads. 
The dealings with the protestants, however, evi- 
dently formed the groundwork of the tissue. 



OF THE REFORMATION. 29 

Preparations were thus gradually made for the 
step which was at length (1687) successfully 
taken, and the electoral kingdom became here- 
ditary. Nor were the advantages which Austria 
thus obtained the less important because Hun- 
gary has hitherto resisted, with tolerable suc- 
cess, all the attempts which have been made to 
overturn its remaining rights as a nation. 

However little cohesion, then, there may be 
between the different parts, in themselves so 
powerful, which compose this monarchy, it 
chiefly^bwes to the Reformation, and to the man- 
ner in which its consequences were applied, what- 
ever unity and internal stability it possesses. 
The late changes in Europe have encreased its 
power, both by extending its dominions, and by 
teaching it how to apply its resources. It has 
now '"^ no distant territory to protect ; but placed 
as it is in continual opposition to powerful ad- 
versaries, and deprived of the outworks which 
formerly guarded it, it must make the best use of 
those advantages to which the Reformation pre- 
pared the way, in order to maintain the proud 
station which it at present occupies. 

PRUSSIA. 

The foundation of the Prussian monarchy was 
one of the earliest works of the Reformation. 
It was doubtless beyond mortal power to foresee 

^ It must be remembered that this was written in 1802. Tr. 



30 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

that so noble a structure should ever be raised 
upon it. Such a result required a concurrence 
of fortunate circumstances^, and a taskmaster to 
guide the work, such as hardly any state could 
show within the annals of a like period of time. 
And yet the thing is so — without the Reforma- 
tion, Europe would have had an elector of Bran- 
denburgh, but no king of Prussia. In the be- 
ginning of the sixteenth century, Prussia was 
still under priestly dominion, being attached to 
the Teutonic order which had conquered it ; 
and which, with its grand master, continued to 
govern it. But scarcely had the new doctrines 
spread themselves, and pointed out a way by 
which spiritual princes might render their power 
hereditary, than Albert, grand master of the 
Teutonic order in Prussia, and a scion of the 
house of Brandenburgh, made the first success- 
ful attempt of this kind. 

As early as the year 1525 he secularised his 
dominions, and formed them into an hereditary 
duchy, though as a fief of Poland, and became 
by his marriage the founder of a line, of which 
the last female descendant, Anne, espoused John 
Sigismund, then electoral prince of Brandenburgh, 
and afterwards elector. When Prussia came 
into the possession of the electoral house of 
Brandenburgh, it was still a fief; but by the treaty 
of Wehlau (1657), and more fully by the peace of 
Oliva (1660), it was declared a sovereign princi- 
pality, and its feudal tenure was done away ; in 
1701 it was raised to a kingdom, and stepped. 



OF THE REFORMATION. 31 

or at least gradually advanced, into the first rank 
of European powers. 

Although the Reformation, however, was the 
means, as we have shown, of laying the first 
stone of the Prussian monarchy, it cannot be 
said that it conduced greatly to its farther 
erection, unless we are prepared to consider the 
acquisitions, which it made at the peace of West- 
phalia, as resulting from that event. 

The Reformation has, in fact, exercised a much 
smaller influence on the double part which 
Prussia has played in foreign policy, both as one 
of the powers of Europe, and as one of the first 
states in the German empire, than is commonly 
supposed. The causes of this may be sufficiently 
gathered from the short chronological sketch 
which we have just given. During the whole 
period throughout which the interests of religion 
continued to act as a mainspring in European 
politics — that is, down to the peace of West- 
phalia, and the time of Lewis XIV., the house 
of Brandenburgh was still too weak to exercise 
any decisive influence upon the German body, 
to say nothing of Europe at large. As it gra- 
dually after this acquired strength under the 
great elector and its two first kings, the Reform- 
ation, as we shall hereafter have to observe, lost 
all political power, and a new interest took its 
place. The second, and minor game, which 
Prussia had to play in the empire, was to main- 
tain the balance against Austria. But Prussia 
did not fairly become the rival of Austria till 



32 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

the conquest of Silesia by Frederick II., 
and their relative position was wholly unin- 
fluenced by religion. Besides, although Prussia 
or Brandenburgh was one of the most powerful, 
and finally the most powerful, of the protestant 
states, it cannot be considered as the head of 
that party. This pre-eminence belonged, as is 
well known, from the first, to Saxony ; and 
when Prussia became the more powerful of the 
two, the matter was no longer of consequence, 
since this party, although it retained the forms 
of one, was fast losing its essential character as 
such. 



FRANCE. 

It was chiefly from Switzerland that France de- 
rived its share of the Reformation ; and although 
it was thus influenced rather by the doctrines of 
Zwingle than those of Luther, yet the political 
sphere of these two reformers was so nearly the 
same, that it would be impossible to define that 
of the one without ascertaining that of the other 
also. In no other country of Europe, not even 
in Germany, had the Reformation been so 
speedily advanced as in Switzerland. The ener- 
getic character of these mountaineers leads them 
to a rapid decision ; and the more confined the 
ideas of a race of herdsmen may be, the more 
earnestly do they cling to those which they have 
once adopted. While in Germany the two 
parties were still engaged with capitulations. 



OF THE REFORMATION. 33 

the civil war broke out in the cantons (1530), and 
seemed to threaten a total dissolution of the con- 
federacy. Fortunately, however, a short struggle 
sufficed to produce a lasting peace ; and although 
the mutual hatred of the parties did not immedi- 
ately pass away, it was not again thought necessary 
to shed blood for its satisfaction. Bitter feelings 
gradually subsided ; public attention became di- 
rected to other subjects ; and the enviable fate 
of this country, which general opinion seemed 
to agree in considering holy and inviolable, re- 
moved it from a participation in the affairs of 
the rest of Europe, which might easily have lit 
up the flame of discord anew. 

The numerous relations which existed be- 
tween Switzerland and France, afforded peculiar 
facilities of access to the Reformation from this 
quarter ; could it have been expected then that a 
nation, which perhaps may be said to exceed all 
others in the quick perception of ideas, should 
long remain indifferent to it ? Francis I., how- 
ever, knew too well how much the kingly power 
had to fear from a party whose church principles 
were almost purely democratic, to allow of his 
encouraging it ; the oppression and persecutions 
of his son gave it consistency, and prepared it 
for resistance ; and when under his weak de- 
scendants it lent itself to the ambitious purposes 
of men in power, it assumed the character of a 
formidable opposition. The history of the 
bloody wars which were thus prepared, and 
which occupied the latter half of the sixteenth 



34 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

century, down to the edict of Nantes (1562 — 
1598), is so well known that we need not do more 
than allude to them ; the permanent influence 
which they exercised upon the political condi- 
tion of France, is, however, too important to be 
passed over. This influence may be con- 
sidered under two points of view, and these in 
apparent opposition to each other. It prepared 
the w^ay on the one hand for the absolute power 
of the king, and yet on the other it seems, even 
after the fall of its party, to have maintained a 
spirit of resistance in the nation. 

It is a common phenomenon in great mon- 
archies, that the power of the government does 
not become firmly established, and either wholly, 
or in great part, absolute, till it has undergone 
a struggle with some strong party in opposition 
to it. At the moment when such a party has 
been suppressed or disarmed, everything is open 
to the sovereign ; and even the remaining props 
of national liberty may be easily put aside. In 
France the government found such an opposition 
as we describe, in the party of the Hugonots. 
It is true that it was the government itself, 
which by its persecutions, its duplicity, and utter 
cruelty, converted a friendly sect into a party of 
political opponents. This cannot be denied — • 
the cry of death which was raised on St. Bar- 
tholomew's night, and echoes to all ages, is too 
strong an evidence of this ; but still an unpre- 
judiced observer must confess, that the founda- 
tion of any stable government in France must 



OF THE REFORMATION. 35 

needs have remained impossible, as long as this 
party continued to hold arms in its hands. 

The edict of Nantes had undoubtedly softened 
down their violence : — on such fearful storms 
as had here raged, a period of calm must 
at any rate follow — ; but the events which oc- 
curred after the murder of Henry IV. served 
to show how formidable the Hugonots still 
were. 

It was difficult for any great and effectual 
measures of government to be carried through 
without coming in contact with them ; for such 
a party cannot for any time exist without in- 
volving its own interests with the interests of 
the state, in such a multiplicity of ways as to 
afford abundance of real, or, what is in effect the 
same, imaginary points of excitement. The 
struggle which Richelieu maintained against the 
Hugonots was, therefore, a necessary struggle, if 
any permanent order of things was to be esta- 
blished in France : he wished to disarm but not 
to extirpate them ; and the condition in which 
they were left by the peace of Rochelle (1629), 
was such as in accordance with law, they ought 
to have been placed in ; although, at the same 
time, no one will pretend to extenuate the per- 
secutions in which the intolerance of subsequent 
governments led them to indulge, down to the 
revocation of the edict of Nantes. 

But in proportion as we find it easy to show 
the truth of our first remark, do we find it diffi- 
cult to adduce historical proof of the other, its 

d2 



36 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

apparent contradiction, viz. that the maintenance 
of a spirit of resistance in the people was owing 
to the Hugonot party. It is not, however, the 
less true on this account : for in the first place, 
we cannot doubt that such fearful disturbances 
as those which were caused by the rehgious dis- 
putes in France, must have left traces in the 
national character which could not easily be 
effaced. But, besides this, history has not left 
us without proofs. It is well known that, after 
the time of Richelieu, the spirit of opposition which 
had been raised, passed into the parliament of 
France. The degree of influence which the Re- 
formation exercised in this case cannot be clearly 
determined without lengthened details. But it 
would be difficult to deny such an influence al- 
together, since by the edict of Nantes the pro- 
testants were allowed a share in the counsel of 
this body — although their admittance is neither 
the only nor the principal source, to which we 
should seek to refer it. Of this, as of their other 
rights, the protestants were again deprived by 
the revocation of the edict ; but the spirit of the 
party was not destroyed by its suppression ; it 
acquired new life, with such modifications only 
as the change of times rendered necessary, un- 
der the garb of Jansenism. A full development 
of its progress is beyond the limits of this trea- 
tise ; but we may observe, that the history of 
literature shows plainly enough that this party 
derived warmth and vigour from the flame, which 
the learned disputes of the protestants and their 



OF THE REFORMATION. 37 

opponents had kindled in the theology of France. 
These debates were succeeded by others which 
produced the great catastrophe of our own day, 
and by which the Reformation and its pohtical 
consequences were thrown into the background ; 
but on that account became, in the full sense 
of the word, more peculiarly the property 
of history. 

ENGLAND. 

The Reformation was of still more importance 
to England than to France ; the new doctrines 
were triumphant here, as they were, and conti- 
nued to be, suppressed there ; and these two 
nations — the antipodes of each other in so 
many respects — were destined to a still wider 
difference by disagreeing on this point. The 
important consequences which resulted to the two 
countries, in their relation to each other, and to 
Europe in general, from this circumstance, be- 
long to the second division of our subject ; we 
have here only to consider the effects thereby 
produced upon England itself. 

The progress of the Reformation was of a 
pecuhar kind in this country, as we might ex- 
pect from its insular character. Henry VIII. 
viewed it only as a means of gratifying his pas- 
sions and serving his personal interest, and as 
such, in fact, he used it ; but a tyrant, who was 
guided by the whim of the moment, and incapa- 
ble of forming any permanent scheme, could not 



38 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

employ it with the abihty of Charles V. ; while 
by his supremacy, he exercised a more violent 
despotism over the conscience and opinions of 
his subjects than the pope would ever have 
dared to attempt. During the short reign of 
his son and successor, Edward VI. (1547 — 
1553), the Reformation was really introduced ; 
but as the bigoted intolerance of his sister 
Mary (1553 — 1558) again overturned the feeble 
and scarce completed edifice, it was reserved for 
the long and well conducted reign of Elizabeth 
(^1558 — 1603) to lay its foundation anew, and 
upon more secure ground. 

The Articles of belief in England were 
changed ; the supremacy of the Roman see 
was shaken off; but in other respects the 
framework of the hierarchy was left untouched. 
By the act of supremacy, renewed under Eli- 
zabeth as it had first been passed under Henry, 
the king stepped into the place of the pope ; 
and this supremacy was probably the chief ad- 
vantage which .accrued to the crown from the 
Reformation. In times when religion was so 
inseparably connected with politics, such un- 
limited spiritual dominion necessarily tended, in 
substance if not in form, to render the temporal 
power unlimited also ; and the " High Commis- 
sion" of Elizabeth gives a sufficient example of 
the uses to which it might be applied. Again, 
as the Head of the Church required instruments 
by which it might act as such, the existent hier- 
archy was left almost unaltered in its ancient 



OF THE REFORMATION. 39 

form. The episcopal church was thus esta- 
bhshed ; which received its definite rule of faith 
for the first time under Elizabeth, (1571.) The 
English church, therefore, was distinguished 
by the peculiarity of its organisation in retaining 
the higher spiritual orders — the archbishops and 
bishops — with seats and voices in the upper house. 
In this manner the hierarchy remained inter- 
woven with the constitution ; and the question 
which we are interested in answering here, re- 
gards the value and consequences of this insti- 
tution to the state. 

It was the belief, very naturally resulting 
from the king's supremacy, that the hierarchy 
would prove a firm support to the throne at its 
head, which preserved that body ; a belief which 
afterwards furnished the Stuarts with their fa- 
vourite maxim : " No bishop, no king." Ne- 
vertheless, the connection asserted in this sen- 
tence is by no means so directly evident as to 
make it unreasonable to enquire whether it had 
any truth at bottom, or was merely the product 
of fanaticism. 

The political power of the bishops, and their 
direct influence upon the state through the 
house of lords, is too insignificant to have been 
much relied on. If we are, therefore, to at- 
tribute any meaning to the above expression, it 
must be this : that by uniting the interests of 
the heads of the church with those of the 
crown, it was designed, that not only their sup- 
port, but that of the people itself, should be 



40 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

secured. The political importance of the bi- 
shops, therefore, depended upon their influence 
with the people. And, consequently, as soon as 
the schismatics had acquired strength, and formed 
themselves into a religious, and as such, into a 
political party, experience showed that the 
bishops, although nominally the props of the 
throne, were but a feeble support. They fell 
with it, and they were restored with it. 

As regards the general question, how far the 
hierarchy of a state may be called the safeguard 
of the throne, this must depend chiefly upon the 
spirit of the times ; since by it their influence over 
the minds of the people is determined. In times 
of religious fanaticism this may be very great, 
and the permanence of the throne may be inse- 
parably linked with that of the hierarchy. The 
progress of events, however, gradually dissolves 
these ties ; and the throne of Great Britain at pre- 
sent rests upon very different support from that 
of the hierarchy, which is neither important, 
nor inviolable, except as forming an integral 
part of the constitution. 

But if the Reformation on the one hand laid 
the foundation of an increase of the kingly 
power in England, it did not do this without 
creating a disaffected party on the other ; which, 
when the helm of state passed into a less ex- 
perienced grasp, was the means of raising a 
storm under the violence of which the throne 
gave way, and for a long time remained pros- 
trate. 



OF THE REFORMATION. 41 

In times like those such a Reformation as that 
in England, which was in a certain sense only 
half a Reformation, was necessarily a dangerous 
undertaking. A period of revolution will not 
submit to partial measures, because it is a period 
of fanaticism. What else then could be ex- 
pected, than that, in the eyes of the pure re- 
formers, the remaining framework of the hier- 
archy should be deemed an abomination ? That 
episcopalians and catholics should be held to 
differ in little except in name ? And when the 
Church of England was finally guarded about 
by limits which excluded all other communions 
from a participation, not only in it, but in the 
most important political rights, how could it be 
otherwise than that a contest should ensue ? 
Then, as the religious principles of the insurgents 
were purely democratic, what was more natural 
than that the fate of the hierarchy should include 
that of the throne ? 

Considered from this point of view the events 
of the English revolution, which are too well 
known to require any further notice, appear in 
their proper light, as one connected whole. 
With the restoration of the throne the dominant 
church was restored also ; but when, by the 
famous toleration act of William III. (1688), 
the penal laws against the dissenters were re- 
moved, they could no longer form a political 
party. With the catholics it was no doubt dif- 
ferent ; but their number in England was too 
small to cause apprehension. There may cer- 



42 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

tainly be times, and there have been in England, 
when the introduction of a Test Act may be ne- 
cessary ; but whether its continuance conduces 
most to security or danger, is a question which 
I shall leave others to answer. However this 
may be, the general interests of Great Britain 
remained inseparably connected with the Re- 
formation ; and by it, after one of the most won- 
derful revolutions of destiny, the throne was 
opened to that family under whose glorious do- 
minion England witnessed the appearance of 
what may, in every sense of the word, be termed 
her golden age. 

But while speaking of the mistress of the sea, let 
me be allowed to throw a glance upon that 
neighbouring island, which having been subject 
to her for centuries, has been deluged with 
blood, whenever it has dared to shake the fetters 
which bound it. While the Reformation spread 
its blessings, sooner or later, over other lands, 
Ireland appears to have been destined only to 
feel its curse. The wounds which it dealt here, 
were too deep to be scarred over ; and even 
since the efforts of a more liberal policy have 
been directed to their cure, it must be left to 
time to decide whether the means applied will 
be sufficient. 

Long before the Reformation, the inhabitants 
of Ireland had been expelled from part of their 
possessions by English colonists ; and a hatred 
of their conquerors had been engendered, to 
which the Reformation gave new vigour. The 



OF THE REFORMATION. 43 

Irish remained catholic, if for no other cause 
than that their oppressors were protestant. 

Being again pkindered of a considerable por- 
tion of their lands, when James I. sent over a 
new host of colonists, their disaffection was en- 
creased ; and dming the civil wars under the 
hapless Charles, a fearful insurrection broke out 
(1641), which cost above a hundred thousand 
of the protestants in Ireland their lives, and 
went near to exterminate them altogether. 

The civil war now raged for ten years without 
interruption, till it gave Cromwell a pretext for 
new acts of injustice, the real object of which was 
to reward his soldiers. Maltreated, plundered, 
and hunted into a corner of the island, the Irish 
saw three parts of their country in the hands of 
strangers. But even thus the measure of their 
unhappiness was not yet full. The same revolution 
which restored, and improved, the English consti- 
tution, and secured the national freedom, was to 
the ill-fated Irish a source of new persecutions, 
and of final subjection. When William III. had 
established his authority here with the sword 
(1691), the miserable remnant of their lands was 
torn from them by proscription ; and what was 
even worse than this, a legal despotism was soon 
after established, such as no other country of 
Europe has ever witnessed. By the statutes of 
Anne (1703), the catholics, as long as they ad- 
hered to their religion, were incapable of holding 
land either in freehold or lease, and were denied 
the means of public education. 



44 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

In other countries where the subject was the 
bondsman of his master, care at least was taken 
of him, and sustenance supplied. Personal 
freedom was left to the Irish, that it might be- 
come a burden and a curse to them. By an 
organized system of oppression, the people were 
reduced to a horde of brutal paupers ; and the 
consequences were such as might have been ex- 
pected. The Irish revenged themselves when- 
ever they could, and their revenge was that of 
barbarians, because they had been made such. 
It was in vain that under George III. a less inhu- 
man system of government began to improve what- 
ever still admitted of improvement ; in vain that 
the independence of America released Ireland 
from her commercial fetters (1782) ; a feeling 
of misery so long endured is not to be forgotten 
within a few years ; the traces of such deeply 
impressed barbarism are not wont to disappear 
in a single generation. 

The revolution of our own day found Ireland 
in that convulsive state into which it had 
been thrown by those of former times, and while 
still under this influence it was exposed to a new 
and bloody crisis, which was followed by the 
Union, in 1800. 

By this measure the two countries were formed 
into one state, and the Irish parliament incor- 
porated with that of Great Britain. It does not 
appear, however, that its beneficial results will 
be fully developed till the political equality of 
the catholics and protestants of Ireland shall 



OF THE REFORMATION. 45 

have been finally established, by the admission 
of the former into parliament^. 



THE UNITED NETHERLANDS. 

While other states were either shaken or new- 
modelled by the Reformation, there was one 
which was created by it. From the midst of its 
disturbances the republic of the United Nether- 
lands came forth like a bright star between the 
pauses of the storm ; while, by the mode of its 
origin, its fate became inseparably connected 
with the Reformation ; and its fall or mainte- 
nance dependent upon the fall or maintenance 
of protestantism. By the course of events, this 
republic was almost immediately involved in the 
most intricate windings of the general politics of 
Europe ; nay it was so placed as gradually to give 
them a new direction. Under this most inter- 
esting point of view we shall consider it in 
the next division of our treatise ; here we must 
be allowed to cast a glance upon the influence 
of the Reformation on its internal constitu- 
tion. 



*> It is now six years since the emancipation of tlie catholics — thus 
spoken of by Prof. Heeren twenty-seven years before it took place — was 
resorted to as a preferable alternative to civil war. Had it been the fiee 
giftofthelegislature, instead of beingextorted by the threat of rebellion, the 
merits of the measure might have been more fairly tried. As it is, however, 
the catholics of Ireland appear to have forgotten the measure itself in their 
triumph at the mode in which it was obtained, and instead of de- 
veloping, as our author hoped, the beneficial eifects of the Union, the pass- 
ing of the catholic relief bill is likely to prove the means of defeating it al- 
together. Tr. 



46 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

The founders of this state had, at first, no 
thoughts of forming a republic. In fact, how 
could such a project have arisen in an age when 
there were no republican ideas abroad in Eu- 
rope ? Their views were of far narrower com- 
pass ; they only sought the maintenance of their 
old rights and privileges, which were threatened 
by the despotism of Philip 11. , and especially by 
the introduction of the inquisition. 

Fifteen years were thus allowed to elapse from 
the beginning of the disturbances in 1566, before 
the Netherlanders formally shook off their alle- 
giance to Philip II. and put it beyond his power to 
end the quarrel by concession. Even then, how- 
ever, they had become so little accustomed to the 
idea of a republic, that they seemed to think it 
their immediate duty to look about them for a 
foreign master, requiring only that he should 
respect their ancient rights and privileges. First 
they applied to France, then to England— and 
it was only when Francis of Alenjf on had clearly 
proved his incapacity for such an office, and 
Elizabeth had on grounds of higher policy de- 
clined it, that they became republicans — merely 
because they had no other resource. Their old 
notions, however, appear still to have been their 
only guides ; and in pursuance of them they esta- 
blished that shapeless confederacy, in which 
they did not themselves clearly know who was 
the sovereign. The maintenance of the rights 
of the states in the several provinces was consi- 
dered the most important object to be attained ; 



OF THE REFORMATION. 47 

the central government formed itself as circum- 
stances allowed or required ; and the republic 
would have gained but little firmness from it, 
if amidst many and great deficiencies it had not 
possessed the one advantage of allowing free 
scope to the individual activity and genius of her 
great men. 

In such a state of things, the reformed reli- 
gion, although it was the main cause of the 
insurrection, and, when established as the na- 
tional mode of worship, the foundation of the 
republic, could exercise no direct influence upon 
its further organization. But as the whole exist- 
ence of this state was grounded on the Refor- 
mation, and as it was to religious enthusiasm 
that its citizens owed their heroic spirit, we must 
not be astonished that the bigotry of protestant- 
ism was nowhere else carried so far, or so deeply 
rooted as here. The consequence of this was, 
that the protestant clergy had much more easy 
access to the springs of public opinion in this 
than in any other country ; and thus acquired 
the means of exercising a considerable influence 
upon the affairs of the state ; — an influence of 
which the history of the repubhc affords but 
too many traces. The twelve years' truce of 
1609 had no sooner afforded a short period of 
repose, than the clergy were busy in lighting up 
the flames of party violence ; and arminians 
and gomarists persecuted each other with the 
same animosity as the protestants and catholics 
had in former times displayed. It is well known 



48 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

by what ties these rehgious differences became 
connected with poKtics^ and thus produced the 
first and bloody struggle between the party of 
the states and the orangists. No sooner was it 
apparent that the doctrines of Arminius found 
their chief supporters in the higher and more 
educated classes, and among the members of the 
states, than Maurice of Orange declared himself 
for the opposite and orthodox party, and at the 
head of the majority of the nation dared to bring 
Oldenbarneveld to the block (1619). 

Although it was religion, however, which gave 
a pretext to the parties for a commencement of 
the feud, with which the subsequent history of 
this state is almost exclusively concerned, the 
true cause must be sought elsewhere. It lay 
in the very groundwork of their constitution, 
and it is only by a full explanation of this — a 
task beyond our limits — that it can be clearly 
pointed out. 

SWEDEN. 

In the four kingdoms which, as long as Poland 
existed, formed the north of Europe, the politi- 
cal consequences of the Reformation displayed 
themselves in a very different manner. The 
most remote of these, by its situation, its reli- 
gion, and, more than all, by the barbarous con- 
dition in which it was, lay beyond the influence of 
the storm. Of the other three, one owed its exist- 
ence and its greatness — although transient — to 



OF THE REFORMATION. 49 

the Reformation — another^, its prosperity and its 
constitution — the third, dates its downfall from 
the same source. And thus we see that in the 
moral as in the physical world, what is deadly 
poison to one often proves the means of saving 
life in another ! 

At precisely this epoch, while the Reforma- 
tion was spreading in Germany with a rapidity 
which nothing could check, the north of Eu- 
rope had arrived at the political crisis which 
determined its future fate. The Union of Cal- 
mar, the parent of so much discord and warfare, 
was dissolved; and Gustavus Vasa restored (1 521) 
the throne of Sweden to its former independence. 
But notwithstanding his courage and the pro- 
gress which he made, and in spite of the favour- 
ble position in which he was placed by the 
insurrection in Denmark and the expulsion of 
his rival king. Christian II., he yet found himself 
in a situation which secured to him rather the 
name than the power of a king. It cannot be 
denied, however, that Gustavus Vasa ranks 
among the greatest princes of all ages. He 
was not simply acquainted with the common 
turns of policy by which mere intriguers attain 
their end ; but rising, as great men are wont to 
do, beyond the age in which he lived, he seems 
to have embraced ideas of public economy which 
may well excite our admiration, since, as they 
were then unknown to the rest of the world, 
they must have been the product of his own 
acuteness and ability. Even Gustavus Vasa, 



60 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

however, would scarce have found the resources 
with which his genius furnished him sufficient, 
had not the Reformation brought others to his 
assistance, upon which the foundations of his 
greatness may, in fact, be said to have rested. 
What, in truth, could the most talented prince 
have eiFected on a throne the income of which 
did not supply a third part of its necessary ex- 
penditure, and in a country where a powerful 
nobility stood side by side, with a still more pow- 
erful body of clergy, whose possessions had 
swallowed up the lands of the crown and which 
was likely to find that a native sovereign would 
not prove the best instrument for securing and 
extending its usurpations ? Under such circum- 
stances, a mind of even moderate capacity would 
have perceived that the Reformation afforded 
the best means of securing the stability of the 
government ; but the difficulty in this, as in all 
other cases, lay in the execution ; and here it 
was that the superior genius of Gustavus dis- 
played itself. Too weak in himself, he suc- 
ceeded in gaining over the nobility by the 
prospect of large acquisitions from the forfeited 
estates of the clergy ; and with this support he 
was enabled to meet the decisive crisis which 
was brought on at the diet of Westeras (1527), 
and which terminated in the submission of the 
clergy and the resignation of their estates into 
the hands of the king, to be disposed of as he 
thought fit. Conspiracies and tumults, set afoot 
in distant parts of the kingdom, remained the 



OF THE REFORMATION. 51 

only, and impotent means, by which they sought 
to avenge themslves. 

Thus the Reformation also established a new 
order of things in Sweden, though without 
taking from the clergy their rights as an estate 
of the realm ; and exercised a decisive influence 
upon the fate of this kingdom, and through it upon 
that of the north, and even for a considerable 
time upon Europe in general. There now 
wanted only the hereditary succession of the 
crown, which Gustavus Vasa likewise introduced, 
to put means at the disposal of the kings of 
Sweden, by which they might attain to a supre- 
macy of the North, which would in turn affect 
the rest of Europe. The Reformation, while it 
made them masters in the north, opened the 
way to them, as its champions, of acquiring the 
supremacy of Europe, Supported by their own 
genius, they played this exaggerated part for a 
longer time than the state of their resources 
would have led us to expect. The consequences, 
which resulted from this, will be more fully de- 
veloped in the part of our work which treats of 
the influence of the Reformation upon the 
political balance of Europe. 

DENMARK. 

The internal condition of Denmark bore, at this 
period, a great resemblance to that of Sweden. 
The nobles and priests were here also the ruling 
party, and gave to what was then an electoral 

e2 



52 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

kingdom, more the appearance of an aristocracy 
than of a monarchy. The dissokition of the Union 
of Cahnar, and the restoration of the Swedish 
throne, although considered as losses by Den- 
mark, were yet, as soon as the possession of 
Norway was secured to it, perhaps as great ad- 
vantages to this country as to Sweden itself. 

The kinsfs of Denmark had hitherto exhausted 
themselves in struggles, for the most part fruit- 
less, to secure their dominion over Sweden ; and 
the disadvantages of these wars were naturally, 
on that account, much greater to Denmark than 
to Sweden. By the dissolution of the Union of 
Calmar, the former was restrained within its true 
sphere ; and after a few ineffectual attempts to 
extend itself beyond this, it was taught to prize 
that golden mediocrity, the maintenance of 
which has ever since proved the palladium of 
Danish prosperity. 

The Reformation acquired its political im- 
portance in Denmark nearly in the same way as 
in Sweden. It was introduced very early, and by 
the confiscation of the estates of the clergy, gave 
the first opportunity of extending the power of 
the crown. But although Christian III. ac- 
complished this important object, the aristocracy 
was much less broken down in Denmark by the 
propagation of the new doctrines than it had 
been in Sweden, because it was here accomplished 
without the aid of a revolution. Moreover, the 
king was not only obliged to divide the estates 
of the clergy with the nobility, but to share them 



OF THE KEFORMATION. 5a 

very unequally. He received for his share, only 
the lesser half, the demesnes of the bishops ; 
and even from this a considerable portion was 
deducted for the purpose of pious foundations. 
The project of converting the electoral into an 
hereditary succession was not in those days to 
be for a moment entertained ; on the contrary, 
every change of government produced the ex- 
action of harder conditions from the king. 
Denmark remained, therefore, even by its con- 
stitution, much behind Sweden. That which 
was rapidly effected in Sweden by a revolution, 
was slowly prepared here by the spirit of the 
times. 

It required the enterprising reign of Chris- 
tian IV., and the decisive superiority of the 
middle orders over the nobility, to obtain the 
adoption of that constitution which Frederic III. 
(1660) introduced, under a rare combination of 
fortunate circumstances, and with still rarer 
success in the result. The only fundamental 
articles of it, were the hereditary succession of 
the crown, and the maintenance of the Lutheran 
religion as that of the state, 

POLAND. 

The difference between the language of Poland 
and that of the other countries of western 
Europe, appeared to offer an obstacle to the 
progress of the Reformation, which could not 
easily be overcome. The Latin language, how- 



54 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

ever, then almost universally adopted in writing, 
assisted the Reformation in this, as it did in many 
other difficulties ; and, during the latter half of 
the fifteenth century, although somewhat later 
than in the other countries which we have men- 
tioned, the new doctrines made steady and even 
bold advances here. Besides the evangelical 
communion, another, viz. that of the Socinians, 
was formally established in Poland, which, al- 
though it proceeded from the former, was not 
acknowledged by it, and was not openly tole- 
rated even in Germany. The majority of the 
nation thus separated itself, under the common 
title of dissenters, from the ancient church, 
which was not, however, thereby deprived of its 
political rights, in the undisputed possession and 
exercise of which it was allowed for a consider- 
able time to remain. 

¥/e might perhaps expect to find, that the in- 
troduction of this new body of ideas had assisted 
the march of national improvement, and that 
the rather, because the difference of opinion be- 
tween the socinians and the other evangelists, 
appeared to call for the exercise of faculties, 
which would naturally tend to the enlargement 
of the mind. But as the new sects here neither 
were, nor had, in the beginning, any occasion to 
become, political parties, they were wanting in 
that principle of activity which gave them life 
elsewhere : and the Reformation stood for no- 
thing more in Poland, than a change of some 
few abstract doctrines, which might be amply 



OF THE REFORMATION. 55 

debated upon without making the debaters either 
wiser or more enhghtened. There was here 
therefore a total absence of that wholesome fer- 
ment which the Reformation caused in other 
countries ; and which, finally, after the grosser 
parts had been worked off, produced an aggre- 
gate of pure truths and enlarged views. The 
great body of the people was thus much less en- 
lightened by the Reformation in Poland than 
elsewhere ; and it was on that account a very 
dangerous gift. The two parties hated while 
they tolerated each other ; and there only 
wanted a spark to set men's passion on fire, and 
kindle such a flame as could be extinguished 
only under the ruins of the state. 

This spark fell amongst them when Charles XII., 
a monarch of the Lutheran persuasion, invaded 
Poland as a conqueror, and formed a party in 
the country for the advancement of his own am- 
bitious designs. Although this faction consisted 
in a small part only of dissenters, it was suf- 
ficient that any of them supported it, to make 
their opponents consider the name of dissenter 
synonymous with that of a partizan of Sweden ; 
and the more confined their views, the more 
violent became the mutual hatred of the parties, 
which naturally pressed with greater force upon 
the supporters of Charles XII., as soon as he 
became incapable of defending them. 

After the diet in the year 1717, when the 
dissenters were first subjected to a spoliation of 
their public rights, the precedent was never left 



56 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

unemployed, even when there could be no longer 
question of a Swedish party in the state. The 
oppression of the dissenters now became a politi- 
cal maxim; and, under the skilful direction of the 
Jesuits, it was pursued so far as to leave them 
nothing besides the memory of their former ad- 
vantages, except fruitless petitions and com- 
plaints. 

Thus the storm was prepared here only after 
it had subsided in other quarters ; and the con- 
sequences were easily to be foreseen. In a 
country, the constitution and internal feuds of 
which had for a long time opened the way to 
foreign interference, these religious contests 
could not fail to be of fatal effect as soon as any 
neighbouring power learnt how to employ them. 
Catharine II. soon perceived the advantages 
which she might derive from them ; and under 
the pretext of 'protecting the dissenters laid the 
foundation (1766) of the Russian power in 
Poland. 

Shall I describe the further series of events, 
the consecutive scenes of that national tragedy ? 
Shall I recall the madness of the civil war, the 
insolence of the oppressor, the violation of the 
rights of the people, the persecutions, such as 
no nation has endured since the fall of Carthage? 
The cabinets of Europe have already too sore a 
testimony against them, in the cries of the vic- 
tim which they offered up in Prague as a sacri- 
fice to their unhallowed policy. 

The reader will rather turn his eyes in sorrow 



OF THE REFORMATION. 57 

from that desolating scene, and let them rest 
upon the cheering prospect which is presented 
by the restoration, even though partial, of this 
shattered state, and its establishment under a 
better constitution. 

THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF EUROPE. 

The countries which we have hitherto mentioned 
complete the sphere over which the revolution 
of the sixteenth century extended its influence. 
Bursting forth in Germany, the central point of 
Europe, it shook all around it with the violence 
of an earthquake. Still, however, there were 
countries in this quarter of the world in which 
its impulse could not be felt ; and it is the more 
interesting to examine these, because the Re- 
formation, if not positively important, was nega- 
tively so to several of them. 

While Russia, for the reasons which we have 
stated above, was uninfluenced by it in the east 
of Europe, Spain and Portugal were equally so 
in the west, and Italy in the south. The geo- 
graphical situation of these countries will not 
afford a sufficient explanation of this pheno- 
menon ; mountains and plains are no barriers to 
the progress of opinion. 

It is true, the strict vigilance of the Spanish 
government made it difficult for the new doc- 
trines to gain admittance there ; but in Italy the 
inquisition held out no such terrors as in Spain ; 
and who, moreover, will, in these days, doubt 



58 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

that all the bulwarks of spiritual and worldly 
policy are too feeble to restrain the current of 
ideas ? The causes of it lie deeper, and can 
only be explained by the individual characters 
of these nations. The old religion was one 
evidently designed rather for the feelings than 
the reason of its followers ; the new, while it 
rested everything upon a change in doctrinal 
points, and withdrew all that might affect the 
senses from its form of worship, appealed for its 
influence to the understanding, and despoiled 
both fancy and feeling almost wholly of their 
idols. It was suited to the north, but not the 
south. The calm and investigating spirit of the 
German nations found in it the nourishment 
which it required and sought for ; and hence 
the geographical limits of these, from the coasts 
of Scotland and Norway to the Helvetian Alps, 
formed in their chief extent the limits of the 
Reformation. The more vivid imagination and 
sensitive feelings of the people of the south, 
especially of the softer sex, found little to please 
them in its tenets. Who would seek to deprive 
the women of Spain and Italy of their Madonna 
and their saints ? The attempt would be a vain 
one, or, if successful, with these accessories of 
religion, their consolation and their peace would 
vanish also : 

Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis follv to be wise '^. 



<= (Ein wahn der uns begliickt 
1st eine wahrheit werth, die uns zu boden driickt.) 



OF THE REFORMATION. 59 

It was not, therefore, owing to the prohibitions 
of the government, but to the character of the 
nations themselves, that the Reformation found 
no support among them. Whether this was 
their gain or their loss can hardly now be 
a question. By their almost total exclusion 
from that great ferment of ideas, which in other 
countries of civilised Europe gave activity and 
life to the human intellect, they were thrown 
behind the general progress of this quarter of 
the world ; and thus, while the example of Po- 
land affords from amidst its ruins, a warning that 
patriotism and the most heroic spirit are but 
feeble supports to a nation, unless guided by 
national improvement, these countries teach the 
not less important truth, that it may not in the end 
prove so advantageous to a state to have escaped 
the storms of a revolution, as those who are the 
witnesses of it commonly believe. 



SECOND PART. 

Development of the Influence of the Re- 
formation UPON THE General Politics of 
Europe. 

The view which we have presented of the influ- 
ence exercised by the Reformation upon the in- 
dividual condition and constitution of nearly all 
the countries of Europe, will assist us in the 
more general consideration of its effects upon 
the politics of Europe as a body. 

The interests which it called into life continued 
for a century and a half to act as the mainspring 
of European politics ; and when, in the age of 
Lewis XIV. these gave way to others — those of 
commerce — their impulse was weakened only by 
degrees, and carried its operations even into the 
eighteenth century. 

I propose to consider this extensive subject, 
in its main features at least, under three points 
of view. 1st. As to the organisation of society 
in general. 2ndly. With regard to the political 
balance or mutual relations of the states. Srdly. 
As to commerce and the colonial system. 



POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, ETC. 61 

I. The effects of the Reformation upon the or- 
ganisation of society. 

It is impossible that an event of such great 
practical importance as the Reformation should 
have taken place without causing considerable 
changes in the constitution of civil society. The 
fall of the papal hierarchy was of itself sufficient 
for this in the countries which adopted the new 
doctrines. But there were other, and more dis- 
tant consequences, which were at first perhaps 
beyond the reach of calculation. 

The^r^^ and almost inevitable effect of the 
Reformation upon civil society in general, was, 
that Religion became a part of the constitutional 
basis of all governments. In the middle ages the 
catholic religion was universally dominant, but 
the constitution was nowhere expressly founded 
upon it ; there was nowhere a direct law that it 
should be the religion of the state ; that its 
rulers should acknowledge no other. Although 
dissenters were not tolerated, and heretics, as 
they were termed, were persecuted, this was no 
immediate affair of the state, but of the church 
and its superior ; if the state concerned itself in 
it, as in the case of the Waldenses in France, it 
was only at the desire of the latter. But when 
by the Reformation the interests of politics and 
rehgion became mutually involved, this condition 
of things was altered. 

In the countries which had embraced protest- 
antism, the new religion was almost universally de- 



62 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

clared to be that of the state ; not only were 
its professors alone allowed the free exercise of 
their rites, but many offices unconnected with 
religion, as well as the right of sitting in the 
assemblies of the nation, were confined to them ; 
in many it was made a necessary condition of ac- 
cession to the throne. 

The same thing took place in the catholic 
states ; and wherever the question was doubtful 
it was formally determined by treaties and ar- 
ticles of peace, which were often dearly pur- 
chased. 

It is true that the Christian religion is, by its 
doctrines, totally unconnected with politics. It 
merely inculcates submission to existing au- 
thority, and decides nothing, as to the constitu- 
tion of states, with preference of any particular 
form. Nor did any of the parties into which its 
advocates were separated by the Reformation, 
introduce the subject into their doctrinal canons; 
and although the more democratical church go- 
vernment of the Lutherans, and especially of the 
stricter sects, appeared to be favourable to re- 
publicanism, this had no necessary connection 
with the affairs of the state, nor could have, ex- 
cept under temporary circumstances. 

Experience has, in fact, abundantly shown, 
that the most absolute monarchy, as well as the 
freest republic, are alike compatible either with 
Catholicism or protestantism. The more un- 
philosophical, therefore, must that policy ap- 
pear which required that one or other of these 



OF THE REFORMATION. 63 

should form the basis of government, and thus 
breathed a spirit of intolerance into the nations 
of Europe, for which they have been obhged, 
even in our days, dearly to atone. Although 
heretics were no longer brought to the stake, 
was it not sufficiently degrading to be reduced 
into an inferior caste by the mere tenure of a 
few opinions? Was it not in the eye of reason more 
than strange that a man might or might not hold 
the lowest constable's office, in this place or that, 
according as he believed, or disbelieved, the doc- 
trine of transubstantiation ? An impartial ob- 
server, however, will attach less blame to those 
who established such institutions,' than to those 
who allowed them to continue without any ne- 
cessity. It is easy to perceive, that at the time 
of their origin they were the result of unavoid- 
able circumstances. As soon, and as long as 
religious parties combine a political character 
with their other and more peculiar one, it is 
under this character that the state must contem- 
plate them ; and the exclusion of religious dis- 
senters, if not from the state altogether, at least 
from all active share in its administration, may 
be a requisite security. But what was absolutely 
necessary at one time does not continue so for 
ever ; and we might therefore expect that the 
severity of these laws should have been gradually 
diminished, even though there might have been 
some hesitation in doing them away at once and 
altogether. 



64 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

And yet it needed a new revolution to induce 
the adoption of these views by several of the 
first nations of Europe, and among them, by our 
own. And will any one acquainted with the 
progress of events expect that even now this 
example will be followed by all ; even the new 
constitution of Spain strictly forbids the exercise 
of every form of worship except the catholic. 
There certainly exists no truth more simple, 
than, that every one is justly entitled to adore 
his God after his own manner ; and, that the 
state requires a religion, but not that it should 
be established as that of the state '^. The simplest 
truths, however, are those of which men are in 
general least easily convinced, because they are 
usually opposed to prejudices, and still more be- 
cause they clash with interests. But obstinately 
to refuse conviction even after they have become 
the prevalent ideas of the day, can be termed 
nothing else than to begin a contest with the 
spirit of the age, the issue of which will in all 
probability be fatal. 

A second and not less general political conse- 
quence of the Reformation was. The extension 
and increase of the power of the princes of 
Europe, 

We include this among the most general con- 

^ It is here that the real question arises. — If the state requires a religion 
can this be better secured than by an established church "! Professor 
Heeren seems to think that it can, but he has here treated the subject too 
vaguely to admit of our judging upon what grounds his opinion is formed. 
Tr. 



OF THE REFORMATION. 65 

sequences, because it displayed itself not only in 
those countries which adopted, but also in those 
which rejected, the protestant doctrines. 

In the former this increase of power was de- 
rived from several sources. In the first place, 
the revenues of the princes were undoubtedly 
augmented by the confiscation of church pro- 
perty. But, with the exception of Sweden, this 
augmentation could hardly exercise any consi- 
derable influence upon the great states of Eu- 
rope. This was partly owing to the character 
of the princes themselves ; and partly to the 
absence of all those general ideas on political 
economy by which it might have been turned to 
advantage. Henry VIII., who was the chief 
gainer, dissipated his large revenues without 
aim or method. In Denmark the kings were 
obliged to resign the better portion to their no- 
bility ; and the majority of the German princes 
were noble minded enough to apply the forfeited 
property of the church to the foundation of use- 
ful establishments, especially of those for public 
education. 

The fall of the hierarchy, however, was of 
itself sufficient to make way for an increase of 
power in the princes. From this time forth no 
exemptions could be claimed, no papal or epis- 
copal jurisdiction exercised within their do- 
minions, unless by their permission. Foreign 
interference, which had been so especially for- 
midable to the weaker princes, now ceased al- 
together, and they were left sole masters over 

F 



66 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

their own people. But the chief cause of their 
increase of power lay still deeper, and was com- 
mon alike to the catholic and the protestant 
princes. The increased activity which the reli- 
gious and political interests of the Preformation 
had called forth, necessarily tended to enlarge 
their sphere of action, even though there was no 
express provision to that effect introduced into 
the constitution. The influence of the Reforma- 
tion in this respect upon the German princes, 
and upon the empire, has been noticed above. 
No previous sovereign of England had possessed 
such absolute power as Ehzabeth; we have seen 
that the autocracy of the French monarchs was 
grounded upon the fall of the Hugonots ; while 
the national freedom of Spain may be fairly said 
to have owed its ruin to the continual wars in 
which its kings were engaged, as defenders of the 
ancient faith, and to the royal inquisition which 
they established. 

In this way the Reformation created a new 
order of things in Europe. Its princes, by be- 
coming masters of their own dominions, through 
the cessation of the feuds in which they had 
previously been engaged, found themselves in a 
situation to extend their views to other countries, 
and upon this foundation the subsequent struc- 
ture of European politics was raised. 

A tkkd change, of great importance to the 
condition of civil society, was brought about, in 
the protestant states at least, by the altered po- 
sition of the clergy. It is true, that even in these 



OF THE REFORMATION. 67 

countries they had by no means wholly lost 
their political influence. The Pteformation being 
in its fundamental character a doctrinal revolu- 
tion, and the first question, in the half political, 
half theological, disputes to which it gave rise, 
being as to the admission or rejection of parti- 
cular articles of belief, the divines became indis- 
pensable to the princes, and were frequently 
adopted as their counsellors, and even ministers, 
although with no direct title as such. It re- 
quires but a slight acquaintance with the history 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to be 
aware of the pernicious consequences which re- 
sulted, in many instances, from the blind enthu- 
siasm of these zealots, who were too frequently 
wont to consult their passions in the counsels 
which they gave. Still, however, an impartial 
judge will not deny that, on the whole, the cler- 
gy were brought nearer to their proper character 
of teachers of the people, by the Reformation ; 
and even in catholic states it can hardly now be 
doubted, that by the expulsion of the spiritual 
orders, especially of that of the mendicant-friars, 
a very considerable evil was removed. 

It is true that another order took the place of 
these immediately on their destruction, which 
like the growth of the ivy upon the oak, gradu- 
ally wound itself round almost every branch of 
the European system, and was even powerful 
enough to bend many of them to its purpose ; 
the society of the Jesuits, however, although it 
might not have arisen had the Reformation not 

f2 



68 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

taken place, yet owed its first progress to the 
missions in which it was concerned. Any at- 
tempt to point out the advantage which it 
afterwards derived from these, would be as vain 
as the expectation of those who believe that 
with the restoration of the order its former in- 
fluence would be restored. The great law of 
the material world — that "bodies once moved do 
not return to the same place under the same 
conditions " — is equally binding upon the politi- 
cal. But, besides these, there were other effects 
of the Reformation upon society, which although 
more distant were also far more important ; 
their visible connection with religion being, how- 
ever, slight, it must be judged of only by the re- 
sults. 

As it was the Reformation which first breathed 
a spirit of activity into men's minds, it was 
natural that this should be directed to subjects 
in immediate connection with it, and religion thus 
became the favourite topic of debate. But as 
with activity a feeling of independence and a 
fondness for enquiry were also produced, the 
powers which had been called into existence 
were soon engaged upon other pursuits ; the 
horizon had been expanded in every direction ; 
and amidst the freedom of opinion thus created, 
whatever bore upon civil society, its constitution, 
and perfection, became the subject of universal 
attention. In this, protestantism was undeniably 
far advanced beyond Catholicism. 

The great question, as to the relations in 



OF THE REFORMATION. 69 

which the government and the people should 
stand to each other, received its first practical 
answ^er in the protestant countries of Europe ; 
and amidst all the modifications which the 
forms of their constitutions assumed, it was in 
them for the first time plainly perceived that the 
interests of the rulers and the subjects are one 
and the same. Up to the Reformation these 
had been formally distinct in all the great states 
of Europe ; the people appeared to exist only 
that they might furnish taxes ; the government 
that it might indulge its caprices ; even the in- 
ternal policy of Lewis XII., although justly ap- 
preciated, was directed rather by his heart than 
his head, and remained in those times without 
imitators. But the Reformation, by restoring 
the freedom of men's minds, imparted to them a 
loftier character ; and laid the foundations of • 
that nobler political freedom, which may be as 
perfectly coexistent with the most absolute mon- 
archy as with a republic ; because it depends not 
upon the form of the constitution, but upon the 
spirit of the government and of the nation. The 
rejection of the maxim, that the people were to 
be considered merely as instruments, and the 
open acknowledgment on the part of the chief 
protestant princes, that they enjoyed their dig- 
nity solely for the advantage of the people, gave 
rise to that more perfect system of political eco- 
nomy, by which, as a general feature, the ma- 
jority of the protestant states have been distin- 
guished above the catholic. 



70 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

However absurd it would be to attempt to 
point out in the protestant religion, the causes 
of the erection of such governments as those of 
Great Britain and of Prussia, it is equally cer- 
tain that, without protestantism, such constitu- 
tions and such modes of administration could 
never have been formed. To it, in fact, belong 
the first vigorous exertions of which the human 
intellect became capable, when it had shaken off 
the fetters which had so long crippled and re- 
strained it. It is true, that these examples were 
not lost upon several of the catholic states ; but 
we may fairly say, that, when they discovered the 
need they had of such institutions, they resorted 
to their protestant neighbours as possessing the 
models which they should imitate. Did not the 
immortal Colbert form his views upon the policy 
which he saw pursued in the Netherlands ? Did 
not Joseph II. aim at rivalling the example set 
before him by Frederick the Great? Was not 
the progress of civil society among the small 
states of protestant Germany far beyond that 
of catholic Italy ? Was there, before the time 
of Leopold 11. , — who, by his institutions in Tus- 
cany, opened a path which the character of the 
nation has prevented it from pursuing, — was 
there, I say, a single state in Italy of which it 
could be said, that its mode of government had 
become sensibly improved ? It is in vain to 
seek an explanation of these phenomena in 
chance or in the character of the princes. The 
means of acquiring knowledge and experience 



OF THE REFORMATION. 71 

were too ample, the succession of princes too 
long, to allow of such solutions of the problem. 
It was protestantism which, although slowly, 
yet surely, shed these blessings over the human 
race. And if Great Britain has prevented the 
love of constitutional liberty from becoming 
wholly extinct ; and, by its victory over the ad- 
verse elements of society, has become the model 
upon which, with certain varieties, the states of 
the continent are at this moment forming their 
governments, has not all this been produced by 
the same cause ? Would Spain, even that Spain 
which most rigidly excludes protestantism, ever 
have received her new constitution without it ? 
And would not this very constitution have been, 
in all human probability, more usefully and ex- 
cellently framed, had the light of protestantism 
shone down undimmed upon her people ? 

II. Effects of the Reformation upon the mutual 
relations of the States of Europe. 

All other changes which the Reformation may 
have produced in the social condition of the 
nations of Europe, have reference to the exten- 
sion of their ideas, and are, therefore, beyond the 
limits of this treatise. We proceed, then, to the 
examination of our second question : viz. In 
what manner did it acquire an influence upon 
the mutual relations of the states of Europe ; or, 
in other words, upon the system of a political 
balance of power ? 

As this influence, however, was not always of 



72 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

the same importance, nor of the same kind, it is 
requisite to a clear view of the subject, that we 
should divide it into several periods. And we 
shall hereafter see, that, in almost every case, the 
middle and the end of the century afford data 
for our division; not merely in point of time, but 
according to distinctions in the subject itself. 
We shall thus have Jive periods, of which the 
first will embrace the times of Charles V. and 
Francis I., or the first half of the sixteenth cen- 
tury ; — the second, those of Philip II. and Eli- 
zabeth, or the latter half of the same century ; 
— the third, those of Richelieu and Gustavus Adol- 
phus, being that of the thirty years' war, or the 
first half of the seventeenth ; — the fourth, those 
of Louis XIV. and Wilham III., or the second 
half of that century ; — while the last, in which 
there is no need of accurate division, will take 
in the eighteenth century generally. 

FIRST PERIOD, 1517—1556. 

After the commencement of the sixteenth cen- 
tury, the states of Europe, by interweaving their 
interests, and by the aUiances and counter-alli- 
ances which were thus caused, formed a 2^olitical 
system in a much higher sense of the word than 
had been the case during the middle ages. The 
increase of civilisation, by creating so many new 
sources of excitement, necessarily causes a greater 
comphcation of relations among the states which 
it affects, and is of itself sufficient to produce that 



OF THE REFORMATION. 73 

character of unity, which gives an interest to the 
history of modern Europe. In an aggregate of 
states, too, such as the European, the jon^z- 
ciple of a balance of power became the more 
speedily developed, on account of the great 
differences of strength which existed amongst 
them. It was the immediate interest of all to 
prevent any single state from acquiring such a 
pre-eminence as would enable it to prescribe laws 
to the rest ; and in such a case the more unequal 
the power of the individual members, the more 
frequent are the alliances; and, consequently, the 
more complicated and firmer the mutual connec- 
tion of the states. In a system of this kind, the 
most powerful is taught, that the oppression or 
annihilation of a weaker state, but one which it 
finds an useful ally, is far from being a matter of 
indifference ; and thus states of the second, or 
even of the third order, become elevated to a de- 
gree of political importance which they could not 
otherwise attain ; and which is the security upon 
which their very existence depends. Mere sel- 
fishness must thus yield to policy ; and since the 
most gifted men of our own times have recognised 
the necessity of restoring, as far as possible, the 
shattered edifice which the storms of the revolu- 
tion shook to the earth, the author who treats 
of it can hardly venture to doubt that it is the 
only one worthy of an enlightened age. 

The Reformation, for a considerable time, exer- 
cised the principal influence upon the workings of 
this system, although it cannot be said to have 



74 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

been the original cause of its existence. The idea 
of a balance of power was spread over Europe, 
with other political notions, by the Italians, 
among whose states — perfectly independent as 
they were up to the end of the fifteenth century 
■ — it had been planted, watched over, and brought 
to maturity, and then again suffered to decay 
and become useless ; but the almost incredible 
vacillation, which the general policy of the first 
fifteen years of the sixteenth century shows to 
have prevailed, is an evidence that the science 
was as yet without sure foundations, and that 
the main principles of the practical politics of 
Europe were still undetermined. The history 
of no other era presents such a M^eb of projects 
and counter projects; of alliances and counter 
alliances; but it is not improbable that this very 
abundance was a token that the want of more 
secure principles was felt, while these were the 
only remedies which could be applied ; and thus 
the political system of that day may be likened 
to an unwieldy mass whose centre of gravity 
has not yet been ascertained. The sudden rise 
of the house of Hapsburg, by the union of the 
imperial throne and the most important Austrian 
possessions, with the Spanish monarchy, put an 
end to this vacillation. The character which 
France was destined to support in the general 
scheme of European politics, was now at once 
determined; the rivalry of Francis I. and Charles 
V. laid the foundation stone of the system of the 
balance of power ; while the policy of Henry 



OF THE REFORMATION. 75 

VIII., whose vanity was busied with the idea 
that he should be able to decide the strife be- 
tween the rivals, and the much more perma- 
nently important alliance made by Francis I., as 
early as 1530, with the Porte, gave it an extent 
which embraced Europe from one end to the 
other. Thus the emualtion of the two chief 
powers of the continent lent the first impulse to 
general politics, and has continued to influence 
them, although with occasional interruptions of 
its force. 

Down to the middle of the sixteenth century, 
the Reformation cannot be said to have inter- 
fered materially in determining the relative posi- 
tion of these great powers, or in advancing the 
political system of which we speak. The inef- 
fectual efforts of Francis I. to draw the members 
of the league of Smalcald over to his interest, 
hardly deserve to be noticed. But still, as even 
during that period the Reformation, in a certain 
degree, founded two new powers — Sweden and 
Prussia — which were destined afterwards to rank 
among the most important members of the Eu- 
ropean body of states, it thus prepared the way 
for a future development of the system. The 
new life which it breathed into the German em- 
pire was of much more immediate importance : 
for as the protestant princes were obliged to 
unite in opposition to the emperor and his sup- 
porters, a political balance was established, which, 
as we have before said, remained for a long time 
the principle of life upon which that body de~ 



76 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

pended, while it exercised a most decisive influ- 
ence upon the political system of Europe in 
general. Statesmen of enlightened views soon 
came to the conclusion, that the disturbance of 
the balance of power in Germany by the sup- 
pression of the protestant party, would afford 
the house of Austria an opportunity of acquiring 
the supremacy in that country, and thus entail 
the disturbance of the political balance of Europe 
itself ; this is amply proved by the share taken 
by Sweden and France in the thirty years' war, 
and, at a still earlier period, by the alliance be- 
tween Henry II. and Maurice of Saxony. 

The reason why the Reformation did not, and 
could not, acquire any immediate influence over 
the politics of Europe was evidently this, that 
neither of the great powers before-mentioned 
espoused its cause. Had Francis I. allowed it a 
free entrance into France, had the protestant 
doctrines become prevalent in that kingdom, 
then the limits of the religious differences 
throughout Europe would have decided those 
of the political. But as this was not the case, 
the rivalry between France and the house of 
Hapsburg afforded the Reformation no oppor- 
tunity of acquiring influence from the struggle. 
In order to make it the mainspring of European 
politics other circumstances were necessary; and 
these the latter half of the sixteenth century pro- 
duced. These may be easily seen in the Revo- 
lution of the Netherlands, and the Introduction of 
a new Ride of Faith into England. Both of these. 



OF THE REFORMATION. 77 

however, as well in point of time as of their re- 
action upon the rest of Europe, are so closely- 
connected that they do not admit of a separate 
consideration. 



SECOND PERIOD, 155G— 1603. 

No other event of this period acquired so 
rapid, so great, and at the same time so durable, 
an influence upon the general politics of Europe, 
as the Ptevolution of the United Netherlands. 

Its origin may be reckoned among the con- 
sequences of the Reformation. 

The limited abilities of Philip II. would not 
allow of his raising himself above the prejudices 
of his education and his age ; his pride and 
tyranny would not be satisfied with the use of 
any but violent means ; while his unwearied 
activity served only to fan the flame which it 
sought to extinguish. 

Thus he was himself the founder of the new 
republic, and here, as elsewhere, freedom was 
the child of despotism. 

From the very first this revolution acquired, 
not merely a political tendency, but one which 
was directed towards the general politics of 
Europe. The insurgents had to sustain a con- 
test with one of the first powers of Europe; and 
although an impartial historian cannot deny them 
the credit of having made good their own cause 
by their own strength, yet they were themselves 
very far from being convinced of the possibility 



78 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

of so doing, and believed themselves obliged to 
look around for assistance from without. By 
their dealings v^ith France and England — and in 
neither case were these dealings without results, 
(though more effectual in the latter than in the 
former)— the interests of the scarce-formed re- 
public became interwoven with those of the 
chief powers of Europe ; and born, like Minerva, 
with arms in its hand, like Minerva, too, it at 
once took its seat in the council of the gods. 

By the intervention of foreign powers in the 
Netherlands, a new political system was formed 
in the west of Europe. Had not France been 
occupied by its religious wars at home, which 
made it impossible for her kings, of themselves 
too weak, to take any effectual share in the dis- 
putes of other states, she would have found no 
difficulty in uniting the new republic with herself 
by secure ties ; as this, however, was not done, 
Elizabeth reaped the advantage of the situation 
in which her neighbours were placed. 

As she had herself restored the protestant re- 
ligion in England, and had founded her power 
upon its maintenance, her interests accorded 
with those of the Netherlands on this important 
point ; and an alliance between the two states 
might, under these circumstances, be naturally 
expected. But however much we may admire 
the prudence and moderation which Elizabeth 
displayed in this most brilliant portion of her 
reign, it was yet impossible for her fully to de- 
termine the ultimate consequences of her acts. 



OF THE REFORMATION. 79 

As the most powerful of the protestant 
princes of Europe, she was u.niversally con- 
sidered the champion of that rehgion ; while 
Philip 11. was, on the other hand, acknowledged 
as the defender of the catholic faith. Thus re- 
ligion and politics became more closely united, 
and the doctrine, that Catholicism was a sup- 
port of absolute power, while protestantism fa- 
voured the freedom of the people, although but 
partially true and not formally acknowledged, 
became gradually developed, and was adopted 
as the favourite maxim of more than one cabinet; 
nay, finally, cost the Stuarts their throne. The 
former of the two propositions it would be 
difficult to prove, while the latter is true only in- 
asmuch as a protestant party under a catholic 
government, might, by oppression, be rendered 
rebellious, and thus become dangerous to it. 

Thus, in the last half of the sixteenth century, 
the political system of Europe assumed a dif- 
erent form from that which distinguished it in 
the first. France and Austria were then the 
chief states of Europe, and the balance of power 
depended upon their emulation ; but as France 
was now occupied with its own internal dissen- 
sions, and Austria, its strength much diminished 
by the separation from Spain, was kept inactive 
by the incapacity of Rudolf II., Spain and Eng- 
land stepped forward in their stead. In the 
rivalry between the two former powers, religion 
had little to do ; in that of the latter, religion 
and politics were inseparably united. In the 



80 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

one case, every thing depended upon the forces by 
land ; in the other, the navy was of great import- 
ance, the army of hardly any : while from the 
defeat of the invincible armada, Europe dates 
the use of the term " Naval Powers", which, till 
then, the science of politics either did not admit 
at all, or understood but partially. 

Such were the elements of the new system of 
which the republic of the Netherlands became 
every year a more distinguished constituent. It 
soon attained to a separation from Spain, though 
such an act was far from its original design ; and 
quickly reached a degree of importance which 
rendered the assistance of any foreign power 
superfluous. But the path of fame upon which 
it entered was new to the ambition of Europe, 
whose nations gazed in wonder upon the goal to 
which it led. Even while its existence as a 
state was yet uncertain, this upstart power 
grasped the whole commerce of the world as its 
portion, and thus supplied itself with resources 
for a struggle which was longer and more 
desperate than that of Greece with Persia. 

Thus, in the midst "of the monarchies of Europe, 
arose a republic which first presented this 
quarter of the globe with the example of a com- 
mercial state supported by naval power ; and if, 
as we have shown, its rise may be attributed to 
the Reformation, to the Reformation also belongs 
the principle of life which commerce served to 
breathe into politics, after the direct influence of 
religion had expired. 



OF THE REFORMATION. 81 



THIRD PERIOD, 1603—1648. 

In the first half of the seventeenth century 
the system of a balance of power in Europe was 
both altered and extended ; the influence of the 
Reformation, however, far from being diminished 
during that period, showed itself in its greatest 
force. The death of Philip II. (1598), and of 
Elizabeth (1603), put an end to the rivalry 
of Spain and England, which had, in fact, been 
mainly founded upon the personal dislike which 
these crowned heads entertained towards each 
other ; and England, falling into the indolent 
hands of James I., was soon in a situation which 
precluded any effectual participation in the 
affairs of other countries ; while amidst the 
troubles which attended the reign of his un- 
fortunate son, it was totally shut out from 
them. 

On the other hand, France had recovered her 
internal security since the accession of the Bour- 
bons : and the judicious government of Henry 
IV. and Sully, had in a wonderfully short time 
healed up the wounds inflicted by the civil war. 
France then resumed her proper station in the 
political system of Europe ; her old jealousy of 
the Spanish-Austrian house revived of itself ; but 
in the schemes of Henry IV. it was considered 
only as the means to an end, only as the foun- 
dation of a new system by which Europe was to 
be remodelled. 



82 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

It is needless to dwell upon the celebrated 
project of an European republic ; the prosecution 
of which would either have wholly spared this 
quarter of the world a war of thirty years^ or, 
which is more probable, have accelerated its 
commencement. With the death of its author 
(1610) not only did this scheme pass away, but 
instead of rivalry with Spain a friendly con- 
nection was established ; and France, falling a 
prey to the petty factions of the court, sank back 
into a state of weakness and vacillation, which 
ended only when Richelieu (1624) laid his firm 
grasp upon the helm of state. 

But though the murder of Henry IV. pre- 
vented France from taking the first part in the 
great tragedy of which Europe was to be the 
stage, it yet delayed, although it could not 
wholly avert, the tragedy itself. The scene of it 
was already chosen, and as Germany during the 
thirty years" war obtained this melancholy pre- 
ference, its fate became connected with the des- 
tinies of Europe. 

The general point of view from which the 
origin of this war must be considered, has been 
given above. After the religious peace of Augs- 
burg — a peace /«r too easily obtained — the main- 
tenance of a balance between the two parties 
had become the constant object of German poli- 
tics. But, if we throw a glance over the internal 
affairs of the empire, from the date of that peace 
till the commencement of the great war, (1556 
— 1618,) we shall see, at once, how feebly order 



OF THE REFORMATION. 83 

was maintained. Among the articles of the 
peace itself, the reservatum ecclesiasticum^ , which 
the protestants did not acknowledge^, had laid a 
train to light up futm^e wars. But, besides this, 
there were ample opportunities for mutual com- 
plaint ; the old party could, with difficulty, bring 
itself to consider the new as possessed of equal 
rights with its own ; and, without tracing the 
proofs of it historically, we may feel morally 
convinced that the protestants were usually 
wronged. Hence religious grievances formed a 
standing article of discussion in the diets of the 
time ; and, had not the Turkish war occasionally 
compelled a temporary union, and directed 
public attention to other matters, peace could 
hardly have been so long maintained. The per- 
sonal qualities of Ferdinand I., and still more 
those of his worthy successor, Maximilian II., 
were of great effect in preserving quiet for a 
time ; but under the protracted and sluggish 
reign of Rudolph II., the materials of discontent 
accumulated so rapidly that the two parties 
stood, even then, in arms against each other. 
In 1608 the protest a fit union was formed, which 
caused, in turn, the organisation of the catholic 
league. 

In the mean time, however, the protestant 
party was so unfortunate, as to be divided against 



^ The reservatum ecclesiasticum respected the question, Whether the 
future freedom of religion should be extended only to the secular orders, or 
also to the ecclesiastical. — v. Heeren's Manual, vol. i. p. 73. Talboys, 
Oxford, 1834. Tr. 

g2 



84 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

itself. The religious separation of the Lutherans 
from the Calvinists had had its political influence 
in Germany as elsewhere ; and the jealousy, 
which existed between the electoral houses of 
Saxony and the Palatinate, especially after the 
latter had put itself at the head of the union, 
estranged the former from the common cause. 
If any balance of power, therefore, had before 
existed between the two parties, it was now at 
an end. But the greatest evil, by which the 
protestants were oppressed, was the want of a 
leader of sufficient power and ability to give 
firmness to their confederation ; for without this 
the first active measures of a party lead to its 
own dissolution. 

After the death of Maurice of Saxony, the 
protestants were not fortunate enough to reckon 
among their princes — certainly not among those 
who formed the union — a single man who joined 
the requisite talents with the requisite influence, 
even in a moderate degree, while the league 
was admirably provided with a leader in prince 
Maximilian of Bavaria. 

Thus the elements of disorder were scattered, 
not only throughout Germany, but in other 
countries, and especially in the chief of those 
which constituted the Austrian monarchy ; and 
when Ferdinand II., was named as successor to 
the throne (1617), it became evident from his 
known impatience of temper, that the crisis 
would be immediately brought on. No one 
could determine, however, where the first blow 



OF THE REFORMATION. 85 

would be struck ; — as it chanced, this was in 
Bohemia — but the war would probably have 
been the same in all material points had it oc- 
curred elsewhere. The fire of dissension now 
spread with fearful rapidity, and wrapped half 
Europe in its flames, which, after raging thirty 
years, were only partially got under ; their total 
extinction being delayed till eleven years later 
(1659). 

Although anything like detail relative to this 
war is wholly beyond our present limits, we 
must yet trace out the chief epochs in it, that we 
may thus show the extensive changes in the 
political system of Europe, of which, by means 
of it, the Reformation became the cause. 

We are by no means to imagine that the thirty 
years' war was, from beginning to end, conducted 
upon one plan, or even directed to one object. 
No one, in fact, could at its commencement, 
have anticipated either its duration or extent. 
The saying of Cato the elder, that, " war feeds 
itself," proved here, as elsewhere, unfortunately, 
too true. From time to time, and just as the 
flames appeared on the point of being extin- 
guished, some new interest would be called into 
action and revive them with fresh fuel. Never- 
theless, amidst all changes of affairs, and inter- 
mixture of political interests, religion formed the 
groundwork of the whole ; and the thirty years' 
war must, therefore, in a general view, be con- 
sidered as an effect of the Reformation. 

In its origin, it was merely a civil war, con- 



86 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

fined to the Austrian monarchy, and having for 
its object the subjection of the Bohemian insur- 
gents. This object was fully attained by the 
battle of Prague ; the war therefore might have 
appeared to be at an end. But the ease with 
which success had been obtained, led to new 
projects. 

The conquered party in Bohemia was in con- 
nection with the protestants of the empire, and had 
chosen a king in the person of the unfortunate 
•Frederic of the Palatinate, who was chief of the 
protestant union. This prince, deprived of his 
hereditary possessions, and under the ban of the 
empire, was now wandering as an exile, attended 
by two adventurers, and a handful of troops. His 
territory lay open for attack, and seemed to promise 
a secure booty. Not only his own incapacity, but 
also that of the other members of the union, had 
been so clearly proved, that it did not seem to 
require even another battle such as that of 
Prague, to annihilate the protestant party — es- 
pecially as it had already been weak enough to 
allow itself to be disarmed without opposition. 

It is probable, however, that the latter object 
may not have entered directly into the views of 
the emperor at that time ; but the more it could 
be brought forward the greater was his tempta- 
tion : and the more speedily he was opposed, the 
more confident became- the opinion that the 
supremacy of Germany was at stake. 

But about this time (1621) war broke out 
again in another country. After a twelve years' 



OF THE REFORMATION. 87 

truce between Spain and the Netherlands, 
Phihp IV., although but lately come to the 
throne, began the contest afresh. And this new 
war almost necessarily fed, as it was in turn fed 
by, the troubles in Germany. 

In this case, as in the other, religion was the 
cause of difference ; while the houses of Spain 
and Austria, which had long been estranged, had 
at the accession of Ferdinand II. become again 
so closely united that the interests of the two 
were now the same. The war, then, was carried 
on here and in Germany at the same time : but 
with its change of object it had acquired a higher 
degree of importance — the subjection of Bo- 
hemia was a matter which touched Austria 
alone ; that of Germany and the Netherlands 
was a subject of interest to all Europe. 

The interference of foreign powers in the 
German war, was naturally to be expected under 
these circumstances — and France, above all, 
must have found in its ancient rivalry with 
Austria abundant reasons for preventing the 
superiority, which the conquest of Germany 
would have given to that power. But then, 
France, until the ministry of Richelieu (1624), 
was under a divided government, and guided by 
no steady system of policy ; and even he was at 
first too much occupied with the internal affairs 
of the kingdom to take an active part. Still, 
however, he intrigued in the north of Europe : 
and it was he who animated Gustavus Adolphus 
to come forth as the avenger of the protestant 



88 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

cause, after the battle of Liitter (1626), had 
checked the attempt of Christian IV. of Den- 
mark to interfere in the affairs of Germany. 

This first participation of the north of Europe 
in the interests of the south and west, formed an 
entirely new feature in the European system, 
and was as important in its consequences as it 
was new. Up to this time the northern powers 
had formed a system of their own, which, partly 
owing to the Polish and Swedish wars — these 
being also caused by rehgious interests, which 
had become mixed with family feuds — had for 
forty years been firmly kept together ; between 
it and the rest of Europe, however, there had 
as yet been no permanent causes of contact. 

These the Reformation produced ; and by its 
means zi'as Europe for the first time framed into 
one political system. At a time when it was 
deeply felt that the maintenance of the balance 
in Grermany was extremely uncertain, the want 
of a northern power sufficiently formidable to 
oppose Austria became e^ddent. This part 
Sweden undertook, and thus arose a new order 
of things in European politics. 

There can be no doubt that Sweden was the 
state best qualified by its superior organisation, 
and especially by its possession of such valuable 
lands, as it in those days held, upon the Baltic 
or gulf of Finland, for the task which it under- 
took ; — nor is this less certain because the sequel 
showed that the extraordinary abihties of its 
king were of more consequence than its internal 



OF THE REFORMATION. 89 

resources. The splendid career of Gustavus 
Adolpluis ended early by his death at Lutzen ; 
and yet late enough to secure to Sweden its 
influence in the affairs of Germany, and at the 
same time in those of Europe. Even the changes 
caused by the fortune of war, had little effect 
upon the position thus gained ; especially when 
even Richelieu, after the defeat at Nordlingen 
(1634), ceased to be a mere spectator. From 
this time Sweden ranked among the first powers 
of Europe, and the famous treaty of Westphalia 
appeared to secure it in this place, by the im- 
portant possessions in Germany which were by it 
assigned to the Swedes. 

It has been often questioned whether Gustavus 
Adolphus, had he lived, would not have been fully 
as dangerous an enemy to the freedom of Ger- 
many as Austria was. The answer to this will be 
easy, if we suppose — what, in the case of such a 
prince, we surely may — viz. that he would have 
obeyed the dictates of sound policy. There was 
only one character by adhering to which Sweden 
could maintain itself in the superiority which it 
had attained — that of the head of the protestant 
party in Germany. As head of this party it had 
obtained the most decided influence over the 
affairs of Germany. As such it still stood forth 
as the state which opposed Austria. As such it 
was the natural ally of France — and, as such— a 
consequence of all these advantages — it main- 
tained its rank among the first powers of Europe. 
If such a supremacy as this — which might doubt- 



90 1H>L1TU\\L CX^NSF-QUENCES 

less be opprossivo to more than one slate of the 
Gevmau empire, since everything depemleil upon 
the luoJe in whieh it \vas exercised — it this. I 
say. is to be termed the annihilation ot the 
freedom of Germany, it musf necessariJi/ have 
been inchided in the scheme of Gnstavns Adol- 
phus. l>nt if he aimed at more ihnn this, he 
lumself marred the glorious character he had 
undertaken, and souj^'lit that >vhich he could not 
long liave held. The dominion of the weaker 
over the stronger, w hieh temporary causes pro- 
dnce. may last for a while, but it is against na- 
ture that it should be of long duration. It was 
impossible that (lermany should have been re- 
duced into a province by Sweden. 

The peace of >>"estphalia put an end to both 
the German war, and that in the Netherlands. 
This peace >vas prized more than any ever was 
before, and that ot'ten beyond its deserts. It 
caused. unJonbtedly. fhrvc important results : 
since, in the lirst place, it secured the constitu- 
tion of Germany, and with it the existence and 
the rights of both parties. In the second : it 
■in\ninv\\l a vecoi;'nition of the iiulependeuce of 
the republic o{ the miited Netherlands. And 
in the third : it determined the relation in which 
Sweden and France should severally stand to 
Germany. Nevertheless, however important 
these points may be. and with however nmch 
justice we may consider this treaty as the basis 
of the German constitution, such as it was up 
to the revolutions of our own day: too nmch 



OK I'lll': IJI'.FOHMATION. <)l 

is uiuloublcdly ascribed to it, whon, as oftcMi is 
the cavse, it is also ("onsideivd as tbc^ origin of tlio 
balance ()r|)()\vi>r in Mnropt'. It nmcr occnrrcd 
to the negotiators ol' tlic peace to regulate the 
general jirineiples of I']inoj)ean ]iolicy, nor indeed 
(U)uld it, since tlu^y bad no connnission so to do. 
The most inij)orta,nt and intricate^ relations ex- 
isting between the chief powers of Europe were, 
tluuc'fore, naturally U^Ct unc^xaniined, nay, in ]>art 
wholly unnientioncMl. 'V\\c war betwcuni Spaiu 
and France lasted fidl leu years niori\ down to 
tlu^ PyrcMiean ])eae(> ; tlve (pieslion AvIuUher 
Porhigal should UKiinlain its independcMU'e of 
Spain, was still longer doubtful. Not a thought 
even was bestowed upon the continental relations 
of iMiglaud, because in those days such n^lalions 
were not in existence ; whiU^ thosc^ of the east of 
l^.urope remained imdetermiued in their main 
features, (ill tlu* ])ea.C(^ of Oliva, which was twcdve 
years latcM- (!()()()). Although, therefor(\ we 
find the Westphalian peace treated in historical 
works as the origin of tlie balance of ])()wer in 
I'iUrope, this is only one of the uiauy instances 
which occur, of historians dealing with that as 
a gcncnd principle, which can be truly afUrmed 
only in a narrower sense. 

The lirst half, therefore, of the seventecMith 
century was the period dmnng which the political 
influence of the lleformalion u))on almost every 
part of the lau-o])ean ])()litical system was at its 
height, especially siuc(^ I'aigland was also in- 
volved, at this very time, in civil wars, caused 



92 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

by religious sects, and leading to the establish- 
ment of a national church ; and the party of the 
Hugonots was forcibly disarmed in France. 

But the springs of action in morals and in 
politics gradually lose their strength, like those 
in material mechanism : and this was the case 
with the Reformation. The proof of it we shall 
presently find in the history of the second part 
of the seventeenth century. 



FOURTH PERIOD, 1648—1702. 

The government of France is entitled to the 
credit of having been the first to raise itself above 
the narrow views to which the bigotry of the other 
powers confined them. Richelieu, by leaguing 
himself with Gustavus Adolphus — a cardinal 
with a protestant king — was the means of point- 
ing out to Europe that political and religious in- 
terests might be separately considered. 

The age of Louis XIV. caused the gradual 
spread of this opinion. His political schemes 
had little to do with religion, and the latter in- 
terest would at that time have wholly lost its 
influence upon the political progress of Europe, 
had not one of its chief states, viz. England, 
been still powerfully affected by it. The con- 
flict of factions, in whose causes of strife religion 
mingled with politics, had been too fierce in that 
country to allow the ferment to be stilled at 
once, even by the Restoration (1660) ; and the 
mad policy of the last Stuarts gave it too good 



OF THE REFORMATION. 93 

cause for continuance. For whilst the introduc- 
tion of cathoUcism appeared to them to promise 
that of absolute power, and was on that account 
their object, the nation, on the other hand, came 
to the firm conviction that the national freedom 
depended upon the maintenance of the protestant 
faith. The state of constant alliance in which 
Louis XIV. stood with both Charles II. and 
James II., gave this maxim a practical influence 
over the rest of Europe ; and thus Louis XIV. 
was forced, wholly against his will, to assist in 
raising William III., his most zealous opponent, 
to the throne of England, upon the fall of the 
Stuarts. 

If this occurrence may be considered as a 
consequence of the Reformation, it must also, to 
a certain degree, be considered the last by which 
it exercised a general influence upon the politics 
of Europe. This important change laid the foun- 
dation of the antipathy which has since existed be- 
tween England and France. But, although the 
Pretender was occasionally used as a bugbear to 
England, it was fed by means very different 
from those supplied by religion, whose place was 
now occupied by commerce. And as the re- 
public of the united Netherlands has ever since 
attached itself to England, the naval powers 
formed, in the scales of Europe, the principal 
counter-balance to the great influence of 
France. 

Even in the German empire, where the in- 
fluence of religion upon politics might have been 



94 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

chiefly expected to remain in force, it now died 
away ; and a very different result was in pre- 
paration, from what the most prescient sooth- 
sayer could have foretold at the time of the 
Westphalian peace. The schemes of conquest 
nourished by Louis XIV., and the renewed ag- 
gression of the Turks, (who, fortunately, had 
been engaged against the Persians in Asia, 
during the thirty years' war,) put Germany in 
such a position as to oblige the two religious 
parties to lay aside their quarrel, although they 
retained their hatred to each other. Thus the 
pressure of circumstances caused alhances in which 
religion had no share ; and some of the most 
powerful protestant princes might be seen uniting 
their arms with those of the emperor, in order to 
oppose themselves, at one time, in the west, at 
another, in the east, to the enemy who pressed 
in upon them. The just apprehensions which 
had been caused by the superiority of Sweden, 
began to fade away of themselves, after the 
battle of Fehrbellin (1675). The profusion of 
Christina, and the wild projects of her successors, 
had exhausted the kingdom ; and although the 
wonderful abilities and extraordinary under- 
takings of Charles XII. enabled him, for a 
season, to raise the spirit of the nation even 
above its natural pitch, and to fit it for unheard- 
of exertions, yet, even at that time, it was suffi- 
ciently evident that a country so little favoured 
by nature, must needs be left behind amidst the 
growing prosperity of the rest of Europe. But 



OF THE REFORMATION. 95 

though Sweden was thus on the dechne^ there 
was another state in the north of Germany 
which was destined to supply, aye, and more 
than supply, its place in the politics of Europe.. 

It has been pointed out above in what degree 
the Prussian monarchy owed its origin to the 
Reformation ; but, though this power may in a 
certain sense be said to have succeeded to the 
influence of Sweden, yet there was a marked 
difference in the mode in which this influence 
was exercised upon the political system of Eu- 
rope. While the latter kingdom, owing to its 
unfavourable geographical position, and the scan- 
tiness of its resources, could not possess any 
great influence over that system, except under 
a confluence of fortunate circumstances, the in- 
fluence of Prussia, as soon as the kingdom at- 
tained a certain degree of strength, necessarily 
became far more firm and lasting. 

Up to this time, there had been wanting in 
the machinery of Europe, a state which might 
keep the north and south securely together. 
This was supplied by Sweden for a time, but 
owing to the causes above remarked, it could 
not long maintain such a position. Prussia, 
since its accession to the first rank of European 
powers, has been enabled, by its situation as a 
country, extending alike to the east and the west, 
to supply this want. And the spread of its do- 
minions in both those quarters makes it probable 
that it will continue to do so. 



96 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

FIFTH PERIOD, 1800. 

The causes, owing to which, the Reformation 
had begun, even in the last century, to lose its 
political influence, are evident from what we 
have already said ; and the same causes, joined 
to others still more powerful, operated in a still 
stronger degree during the period which we are 
now to consider. As we are taught, generally, 
by the nature of things, that springs of moral 
action retain their vigour for a certain time, and 
then begin to relax, so we learn from history 
that, once lost, such energies can never be re- 
stored. They operate by means of the immedi- 
ate relation in which they stand to the prevalent 
opinions of the day ; and, as these, according to 
the laws of our nature, are subject to constant 
although gradual changes, the energies depen- 
dent upon them must be so likewise. 

The age of Louis XIV., especially the first 
half of it, down to the peace of Nimeguen, had 
so much to attract the eye, that amidst the 
crowd of new and important occurrences, which 
presented itself to the attention and the admira- 
tion of the French, the views of that nation 
could not but be greatly extended. And, al- 
though the estimation, in which matters of reli- 
gion were held, cannot, on the whole, be said to 
have decreased, yet, as art and literature became 
more flourishing, their productions divided pub- 
lic attention. 

What occurred in France, occurred gradually 



OF THE REFORMATION. 97 

in the rest of civilised Europe ; and it became 
every day better understood that there were 
other objects, besides those of rehgious contro- 
versy, upon which men's minds might be en- 
gaged. We must be careful, however, not to 
push this assertion too far. The spirit of into- 
lerance had, owing to the causes above ex- 
plained, become too deeply impressed upon the 
minds of the European nations ; and, for a long 
time to come, not only maintained its influence 
upon private life, but showed itself without dis- 
guise in the administration of their internal 
affairs. The revocation of the edict of Nantes 
(by which Louis XIV., in spreading the industry 
and skill of French artizans over the rest of 
Europe, unintentionally repaid it, in some de- 
gree, for the evils which his wars had caused,) 
gave proof of what we say, in France ; while the 
famous clause which was added to the fourth 
article of the treaty of Ryswick, Louis XIV. also 
provided a new cause of dissension between the 
catholics and protestants in Germany, the oper- 
ation of which was for a long time perceptible. 
But, powerful as might still be the influence of 
this destructive spirit, in the manner which we 
have now described, it as undoubtedly ceased 
to interfere with the mutual relations of the 
different states, and the higher system of politics 
upon which these depend. It was from the 
higher regions that the clouds of prejudice first 
disappeared, but a long interval elapsed before 
the sun of knowledge was strong enough to 

H 



9S POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

drive them out from those beneath. In the 
mean time it was chiefly from individual cir- 
cumstances, as they arose, that politics received 
their direction. 

While the enterprises of Louis XIV., and the 
wealth amassed by the successful trade and 
manufactm-es of the Dutch, had, diuring the last 
period, assigned different spheres to religion and 
to politics, the vacant succession to the throne of 
Spain gave rise, at the close of the century, to a 
new source of interest ; and one so great and 
important, that the whole of western Europe 
was occupied by it for nearly fifteen years. 
During the same, and even a longer period, a 
war of equal fury was carried on in the east, by 
which that quarter of Europe was subjected to a 
complete revolution of affairs. A power of the 
first rank was forming itself here, which could 
have nothing ta do with either the catholic or 
the protestant interest, since it belonged to 
neither of the two parties — and the glorious 
career of Eugene and Marlborough, of Charles 
and Peter, presented a scene so different from 
any that Europe had hitherto beheld — the diu-a- 
tiou of it was so long, and the impression which 
remained from it so deep, that it was impossible 
to return to the opinions by which pohtics had 
previously been governed. The position of al- 
most all the powers of Emrope was thereby 
wholly altered ; and this change, joined to the 
mediocrity of talent displayed by most of the 
resrents and ministers who immediatelv sue- 



OF THE REFORMATION. 99 

ceededj caused an uncertainty in general politics 
which, from 1720 to 1740, was not unlike that 
which characterised the first sixteen years of the 
sixteenth century. There was the same abund- 
ance, and the same change of alliances and 
counter-alliances — France united itself with Eng- 
land, and Austria made the recognition of the 
Pragmatic sanction the chief object of her 
policy ! But in all this religion had no share ; 
the hereditary enmity of France and England 
seemed to be lost in their alliance ; and a 
trading company to the East Indies was con- 
sidered of far higher importance than any theo- 
logical dispute. To put an end to these con- 
tinual changes in the politics of Europe there 
was wanted the genius of some great man, who 
should possess sufficient independence to act for 
himself, and sufficient strength to make his 
plans effective. This want was supplied by 
Frederic II. The treaty of Breslau (1742) laid 
the foundation of a new system for the main- 
tenance of the balance of political power in 
Europe, of which Prussia and Austria were the 
chief members, while France, by siding first with 
the one and then with the other, degraded her- 
self to the rank of a second-rate power. 

The difference in rehgion between the two 
monarchies had, however, no influence in this ; 
even in the German empire, where the irritation 
of the two parties was most likely to continue, 
it gradually disappeared ; and everything went 
to prove that religion had lost its power as a 

h2 



100 rOianCAT. CONSEQUENCES 

spring ot" action in politics, and could be misap- 
plied ior the purposes of taction at utmost only 
in a nation which, like that of the Poles, had 
taken no real share in the beneticial progress of 
political knowledge. 

It thus became possible that Europe should 
be shaken by a new and mighty revolution, in 
which religion had no fm'ther share than that 
the necessity of its existence in the ditierent 
states became the more evident, the greater the 
efforts which were made to destroy it. And 
linally, that very country, among the foremost of 
whose ancient constitutional principles was that 
o{ the greatest possible maintenance of religious 
equality among its classes/ when it was lately 
engaged in changing its form of government, 
seems to have thought that an incidental notice 
at the close of the discussion was sufficient for 
matters the consideration of which would for- 
merly have been its first care ; nay, it is possible 
that they might not have been alluded to at all, 
had they not been connected with other ques- 
tions which still retained their importance. 

III. Ejects of the JReformiUiofi upon Commerce 
and the Colonial Si/stem. 

The third point of view in which we have to 
consider the political effects of the Reformation, 
is that which regards the iutluence exercised by 
it upon trade and the colonies. Perhaps, at 
first sight, this influence may appear so distant, 
as hardly to be considered within the circle of 



OF THE REFORMATION. loi 

our enquiry ; but we shall easily succeed in 
showing how imperfect it would be should we 
pay no attention to this subject. 

The Reformation created the republic of the 
United Netherlands, and, through it, the trade 
of Europe with the whole world. But, however 
clear this truth is, it may perhaps be objected to 
it that commerce would have spread without the 
assistance of the Reformation, since the passage 
to both Indies had been previously discovered, 
and both Spain and Portugal had already set 
the example. But, putting aside the fact, that 
what might j)£Thaps have happened, cannot enter 
into our estimate, thus much still appears cer- 
tain, viz. that without the Reformation trade 
would have made much slower progress, and 
might perhaps never have been brought to that 
height which it has really attained. It needed 
that bold and enterprising nation which sprang 
from the necessity of the circumstances in 
which it was placed, and which, regarding com- 
merce only as the source of its freedom and its 
existence, devoted itself to the pursuit with all 
the energy which it could command. 

After the year 1595 the Dutch speedily, and 
in all quarters, surpassed those who till now had 
governed the Indies. The prosperity of Portu- 
gal was already checked by its unfortunate union 
with Spain (1580 — 1640) ; and the narrow 
policy upon which the colonial trade of Spain 
itself was conducted, rendered it impossible that 
any general system of commerce should spring 



102 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

from it. On the other hand, how rapid was the 
progress of this trade in the hands of the Dutch; 
and how much more rapid even might it have 
been, had it been freed at the right moment 
from the fetters of monopoly ! May not this, 
however, which must be allowed as regards the 
Dutch, be also fairly alleged, although in a less 
degree, of the English ? Was it not during the 
reign of Elizabeth that the Drakes and Howards 
of England unfurled her flag upon the most dis- 
tant seas? Was it not the spirit of protestantism 
which gave them the victory over the invincible 
armada, and thus enabled them to lay the foun- 
dations of that dominion of the seas, and that 
svstem of universal commerce^, to which no 
previous ages ever offered a parallel ? Finally, 
was it not this spirit which animated the free 
maritime towns of Germany, and raised them to 
an eminence, which even in the times of general 
revolution secured to them the respect of the 
first powers of Europe ? We may reason, there- 
fore^ as we choose upon the progress which com- 
merce would have made zrifkout the Reformation, 
but this much must always be admitted, \iz. that 
to the Reformation it owes the speed of its 
gTOwth, and the form which it subsequently 
assimied. 

The Colonies are so closely connected with 
commerce — having been founded with a \-iew to 
its convenience — that they appear hardly to re- 
quire any separate mention. If we have shown 
that without the Reformation there would have 



OF THE REFORMATION. 103 

been no Dutch East India trade, there would 
without it have been no colony at the Cape or 
at Batavia. I am the more willing, however, to 
leave all further prosecution of this enquiry to 
the writers of commercial history, because it 
might easily lead me to the consideration of 
questions foreign to my present purpose, and 
even expose me to the imputation of wishing to 
attribute to the Reformation consequences too 
remote to be traced. Nevertheless, the Re- 
formation had so immediate an influence, in an- 
other way, and in another quarter of the globe, 
upon the origin and progress of a colonial state, 
now flourishing and mighty, and which appears 
destined in future centuries to guide the com- 
merce of the world, that I cannot pass over this 
circumstance in silence. Who were those exiles 
who set themselves down upon the coasts of a 
new world, in the forests of North America, be- 
cause in that older land from which they came 
they were not suffered to worship their God 
after their own fashion ? Were they not, to the 
amount perhaps of four-fifths of their number, 
men banished across the ocean by the disturb- 
ances caused by the Reformation in England ? 
It is true that these plantations were founded 
during the reign of Elizabeth, but it is a no- 
torious fact in history that the stormy period of 
the Stuarts was also the period of their first 
prosperity. 

But with their religious freedom the colonists 
brought also the seeds of their political inde- 



104 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, ETC. 

pendence, which once planted in the soil of 
America must have sprung up, and sooner or 
later borne fruit — and this, perhaps, even with- 
out such advantages as were thus afforded it. It 
is of the nature of colonies — and in this consists 
their immense importance to mankind — to set 
in motion a new mass of political ideas. In a 
new country beyond the sea, all cannot be as 
it was in the old. In the case of America, 
therefore, even had its connection with the 
mother country been more close than it was, the 
ultimate result would probably have been the 
same — we know, however, that its dependence 
upon England did not long continue firm ; we 
know that each of the provinces had already 
formed its internal constitution upon principles 
so purely repubhcan, that when they threw off 
their common allegiance, they possessed the in- 
estimable advantage of having no further revo- 
lution to undergo, and scarce any, except the 
central government to form. 

Thus the political consequences of the Re- 
formation spread themselves even beyond the 
ocean: and, thus it is an undoubted truth, that 
without the Reformation there would have been 
no free states of North America ! Reader, look 
beyond the Atlantic, to that new world where 
Europe is represented in its young and vigorous 
offspring ! then look back to Luther and Tetzel 
— and then attempt, if thou darest, to foretel 
the effect of revolutions ! 



A SKETCH OF THE CONSEQUENCES 

OF THE REFORMATION AS IT 

AFFECTED PHILOSOPHY. 

A Lecture delivered at the Jubilee of the 
Reformation. 

[The following lecture was delivered in Latin 
by the author when acting as Dean of the Fa- 
culty of Philosophy at the jubilee of the Refor- 
mation, on the second of November, 1817; at 
the desire of his friends, however, it was trans- 
lated by himself and published in the "Reforma- 
tions Almanac" of 1819. The place and occa- 
sion of its delivery prevented a fuller develop- 
ment of the subject ; it is, therefore, given only 
as a supplement to the above treatise.] 

If it should appear strange or incongruous to 
anypresent that the Faculty of Philosophy should 
not only claim a solemn interest in the celebra- 
tion of this day — a day, consecrated to the recol- 
lection of that reformation of our faith which 
was begun three hundred years ago — but should 
further demonstrate it by a public act ; they 
will cease from their astonishment when they 
more fully consider tlie many and great benefits 
which are owed to it, not only by theology, but 



106 CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFORMATION 

by all those sciences which tend to develope the 
faculties of mankind. For the principle which 
we are accustomed to admit as true, in all great 
revolutions, whether of our own, or of earlier 
times, viz. '"that their progress and operations 
have proved much more extensive than the ori- 
ginators of them proposed, and that they could 
by no means be confined within the limits which 
these prescribed to them," — this principle may 
with equal certainty be applied to the Reforma- 
tion. — It is true, indeed, that, even with regard 
to single events, it is often difficult for the histo- 
rian to ascertain the causes from which they pro- 
ceed : but now, after the lapse of three centuries, 
our position has become such, that we may, with 
confidence, give judgment upon those general 
consequences which have resulted from so great 
a change. These, however, have been so well 
explained by several distinguished writers that it 
would be thought superfluous to trace them out 
anew ; we shall, therefore, confine ourselves to a 
shght consideration of that part of its influence 
which was exercised upon philosophy. 

It cannot be supposed that it would enter 
into the plan of the reformers — men occupied 
more with things appertaining to God than to 
man — to found new systems of philosophy. Still, 
however, they perceived that philosophy stood 
in no less need than theology of being purified 
from the subtleties of the schoolmen ; and the 
man most impressed with this, was one whose 
memory is immortal, and whom we justly place 



AS IT AFFECTED PHILOSOPHY. 107 

next after Luther — Melancthon. " I desire/' 
says he in his discourses, " a sound philosophy ; 
not those empty words to which nothing real 
corresponds. For only one system of philosophy 
can be allowed, and that must be the least so- 
phistic, and must pursue the true method." 
These are, in truth, golden words of thine, Me- 
lancthon, and of which one might well say, that 
they had been written for our times ! But the^ 
papal authority once shattered and broken, the 
tie once dissolved which had bound philosophy 
so closely to the doctrines of the church — how 
could it be otherwise than that its progress, like 
that of religion, should be more free and uncon- 
strained ? To endeavour fully to trace this ou^ 
would require too much digression and be alien 
to this place and occasion ; but we may be al- 
lowed to point out that which the annals of 
philosophy most clearly show, viz. that it has 
shed a new light upon those countries alone, in 
which religion was cleared of its errors by the 
reformers. Among the Spaniards, and in other 
nations to whom these were denied all access, 
the doctors of the schools still reign trium- 
phant ; and we in vain look among them for a 
Leibnitz, a Hume, a Locke, or Kant, and others, 
who like these opened out the fountains of a 
purer philosophy. Can this be a mere acci- 
dent ? Or must we not rather admit that it re- 
sulted from the nature of the Reformation ? Lest, 
however, any one should still doubt, we will en- 
deavour in a few words to show more plainly 



lOS CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFORMATION 

the advantages which philosophy owes to the 
Reformation. 

We may fairly begin by laying it down that 
the reformers caused it to be thought allowable 
to speculate freely as to God, and what appertains 
to Him. We are willing to admit that questions 
touching the divine nature and substance (as the 
phrase ran) were frequently proposed by the 
schoolmen^ and answered in a v^ariety of ways ; 
but whoever reads their works must allow that 
they sought much more frequently to exercise 
their ingenuity in subtle and often impertinent 
questions, than to propose any thing worthy of 
the majesty of the Godhead. For as they w^ere 
obliged to keep themselves within the limits 
prescribed by the church, in order to avoid the 
charge of heresy, what else could be expected 
than that they should lose themselves in curious 
and idle investigations. On the other hand, the 
propagators of the reformed faith although they 
took, and rightly took, the holy scriptures as the 
foundation of theology, yet by no means re- 
quired that philosophy should rest upon the 
same grounds. A wide field was, therefore, 
opened to its enquiries ; and thus it became 
possible for that system of knowledge to be 
founded and to be developed by the genius of 
gTeat men, to which we rightly give the first 
place among philosophical systems — viz. that of 
natural theolog-ii, which, settins: out from the idea 
of a supreme Being, undertakes to prove that 
there is a God : that He exists independently of 



AS IT AFFECTED PHILOSOPHY. 109 

the world : and that He is the cause of the exist- 
ence of the world. How excellently Melanc- 
thon has treated this subject will be acknow- 
ledged by those who consult his work on physics, 
in which the proofs of God's being and of his 
government of the world, (which have been 
more fully illustrated by philosophers of later 
days,) are to be found clearly and evidently set 
forth. And, though amongst more modern en- 
quirers there may be some, who have not only 
used, but abused the freedom procured them 
by the heroes of the Reformation, and thus ei- 
ther lost themselves in atheism or advanced far 
towards it, yet it is an acknowledged truth that 
the abuse should not vitiate the use ; while the 
writings of those men, to whom not only their 
own but subsequent times have assigned the 
first rank among philosophers, afford proofs 
that their speculations upon the nature of the 
Godhead were pursued in a modest and reverent 
spirit. 

In the company, or at least in the train, of 
this better method of thinking and speaking of 
God and religion, came that improved philoso- 
phy of human life, which forms the subject of 
our second assertion. That the schools of the 
sophists of those days should, by their undivided 
attention to logic, have wholly excluded practi- 
cal philosophy, was naturally to be expected. 
This practical philosophy rests upon enquiries 
into the nature of man ; it must be shown what 
the disposition of our nature and its powers are : 



no CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFORMATION 

what suits, what is repugnant to it, and conse- 
quently, what is to be desired, and what shunned. 
It must be enquired what seeds of virtue or vice 
are implanted in us ; what is the nature of our 
passions, what the method of controlling them ? 
Finally, in what consists true happiness, what the 
object of our life should be, and how we may 
ybest attain it ? Now, although the princes of 
Greek philosophy had reasoned admirably upon 
all these topics, although they had been treated 
of by Aristotle, whose name was for ever in their 
mouths, yet the schoolmen cared little for them 
and sought their reputation only in useless dis- 
putes. 

There can be no doubt, therefore, that it was 
not till the light of the Reformation had arisen, 
that a system of practical philosophy, really de- 
serving of the name, could be formed ; especially 
as regards that branch of it, which is rightly 
considered the most important — the philosophy 
of moral conduct. Here, too, Melancthon first 
broke the ground in his " Elements of Ethics," 
which appeared at Wittenberg in the year 1550 ; 
and in which he forsakes his usual adherence to 
Aristotle, and after refuting the doctrines of Epi- 
curus and the stoics, defines virtue to be the 
obedience of the will to such rules of action as 
are in practical accordance with the commands 
of God. It is hardly necessary to remark that 
no other branch of philosophy has been culti- 
vated with greater diligence or success among 
the more enlightened nations — the Germans, the 



AS IT AFFECTED PHILOSOPHY, 111 

French, and the Enghsh ; a point upon which we 
may justly pride ourselves, since none is more 
adapted to the nature and wants of men. Time 
and place forbid the enumeration of the writings 
of those immortal authors, especially those of 
Great Britain, who have treated of it ; of whom 
we may say, as the Greeks did of Socrates, that 
by their means philosophy has been called down 
from heaven to walk upon the earth. 

The Reformation may, therefore, justly claim 
the credit of having applied philosophy to the 
improvement of morality; and, generally, of 
having brought it back to the common purposes 
of life. It was no longer wasted upon the solu- 
tion of problems, which required acuteness per- 
haps, but which, to use Melancthon's expression, 
had no correspondent realities. It did not, how- 
ever, confine itself within the limits of private 
life, but having once emerged from the gloom of 
the schools into the light of day, undertook the 
improvement of public life. The example was 
set in Great Britain, and speedily followed else- 
where, of discussing those most important ques- 
tions which relate to the constitutions of states, 
their administration and government ; and out 
of this we have seen a new and improved order 
of things proceed, not only in Europe, as in 
Great Britain, the Netherlands, and elsewhere, 
but even beyond the ocean, in America, where 
the seeds of new constitutions were sown, and 
are now in the perfection of their growth. To 
trace this out, however, is the province of his- 



112 CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFORMATION. 

tory ; for my part I conceive that I have suffici- 
ently proved the proposition from which I set 
out, and to which I return : viz. That by those 
who follow the banners of philosophy, the day, 
which we are now celebrating, must be accounted 
a festival — a festival dedicated to events which 
have procured us that without which there can 
be no philosophy, and no true enjoyment of life 
— " The right of thinking as ive 'will, and of speak- 
ing as we think" 



ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND 

PRACTICAL INFLUENCE 

OF POLITICAL THEORIES, AND ON THE 

PRESERVATION OF MONARCHICAL 

PRINCIPLES IN MODERN 

EUROPE. 



ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, 

AND PRACTICAL INFLUENCE OF 

POLITICAL THEORIES, ETC. 



If we except the last ten years of the past cen- 
tury from our review^ we shall find that the 
states which composed the political system of 
modern Europe, were constituted without any 
reference to general theory ; they arose for the 
most part out of the feudal system, and gra- 
dually accommodated themselves to the circum- 
stances which new times and new events pro- 
duced. It would therefore be idle to expect that 
any, even the most perfect of them, should cor- 
respond with an abstract theory of government. 
The spread of intellectual acquirements, how- 
ever, produced in several of these states an at- 
tention to political reasonings, and these in turn 
led to speculative systems, and schemes of new 
constitutions. The influence of the latter began, 
long before the disturbances of our own day, to 
exercise a political influence, and this at last be- 
came so great that it has been customary to at- 
tribute those violent revolutions which caused 

i2 



116 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

the ruin of more than one existmg government, 
to these very speculations. 

The questions which I propose to examine 
are " How the spirit of enquiry with regard to 
distinctions in the forms of government, first 
arose in modern Europe ?" '' How this became 
the source of political reasoning ?" " How this 
again formed the base of abstract theories ?" 
" 'SMiat practical influence the latter exerted 
generally : and what in particular upon the late 
revolutions T' '^Vith these another, and that of 
the highest practical importance, becomes na- 
turally associated, viz. ''What is requisite for the 
maintenance of the monarchical principle in con- 
stitutional governments .'" In this case the enquiry 
will be directed only to the '' constitution," not 
to the administration, of " power in the different 
states" — no thinking man, however, can regard 
this subject with indiflerence : I only hope that 
the mode in which it is treated may be equal to 
its importance ! 

It might at first sight appear as though a re- 
ference to actual history would be a superfluous 
labour — speculation, it may be urged, arose of 
itself, and was independent of reality. "SMiy then 
turn to it for assistance ? We shall soon, how- 
ever, perceive that this was not the case : and 
that, if the spirit of political speculation did rise 
above the politics of the day. it was from the 
latter that it derived its origin, and that it never 
became wholly independent of them. These 
questions, therefore, will admit of no other so- 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. ll7 

lution than what may be obtained by connecting 
them with history, and drawing om* answers, in 
part at least, from it. 



In order to create a spirit of pohtical specu- 
lation it is necessary that there should be some 
outward stimulant, as well as a considerable 
degree of philosophical education in the people 
among whom it is to arise. 

The external causes which induce thought 
and argument on these subjects, are struggles, 
when such take place, with regard to the forms 
of the constitution. The neighbourhood of va- 
rious states governed in various manners, with 
the relations and contrasts between them — and 
above all, the formation of new states by colo- 
nisation. 

If to these qualifications, habits of philoso- 
phical enquiry of a higher order be added, should 
men have taught themselves to rise from the 
particular to the general, from facts to principles, 
the path is opened for political speculation. 

It was thus that it arose and perfected itself 
among the Greeks, where external causes were 
so many and so various. — And in support of this 
view its opposite was sufficiently proved during 
the middle ages, thoughout which it was impos- 
sible that any traces of such speculations should 
appear. — The feudal systems, strictly so called, 
admitted of no free citizenships, and allowed no 
varieties of government. — That which was dig- 



118 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

nified by the name of freedom, was in general 
nothing but a contest of the nobihty against 
their princes, which if it failed, begot a despotism ; 
if it succeeded, was the signal of club-law and 
anarchy. 

Amid such scenes as these, there was little 
room for political speculation, even if the total 
absence of philosophical ideas had not rendered 
it impossible. 

Among those countries in which it might have 
been expected to give the earliest signs of life, 
Italy was undoubtedly the first ; all the ordinary 
causes appear to have united here — a number 
of small states arose near each other — republican 
constitutions were established — political parties 
were every where at work and at variance ; and 
with all this, the arts and sciences were in the 
full splendour of their revival. 

The appearance of Italy in the fifteenth cen- 
tury recalls most fully the picture of ancient 
Greece. And yet in Italy political theories were 
as few, as in Greece they had been many ! a re- 
sult both unexpected and difiicult to explain. 

Still, however, I think that this phenomenon 
may be in a great part accounted for, if we re- 
member that there never was a philosophical sys- 
tem of character or influence which prospered 
under the sky of Italy. No nation of civilised 
Europe has given birth to so few theories as 
the Italian — none has had less genius for such 
pursuits. — The history of the Roman philoso- 
phy, a mere echo of the Grecian, proves this of 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 119 

its earlier ages, nor was it otherwise in its 
later. 

At the revival of science Plato and Aristotle 
were the chief and only guides, and even when 
the trammels of this superstition had been broken 
through, Italy produced no original minds whose 
life and works formed an era in philosophy. — If, 
then, speculative science in general made no 
great advance here, we cannot reasonably expect 
that that part of it which has reference to politics 
should have made any, since, from its very na- 
ture, it must be one of the last branches which 
are put forth from that stock. 

This incapacity for theory, however, had the 
effect of directing the Italians more immediately 
to practice, and they were considered the deepest 
and most accomplished politicians of Europe. — 
But as they held diplomacy to be an empty 
name, unless it included cunning and intrigue, 
they by this view offered another impediment to 
a right cultivation of the subject. 

Their highest principles of policy were no- 
thing better than a collection of maxims, and 
these never ripened, nor could ripen, into a 
science. -The only writer of that period who 
need be mentioned here, is Machiavel ; and his 
works afford the strongest confirmation of what 
we advance. — His " Principe," and his " Dis- 
corsi sopra Livio%" are full of reasoning such as 

* [This critique appears to have escaped M. Artaud in his laborious 
treatise on the life and works of the Florentine secretary. But to judge 
from the manner in which he has met some similar observations of 



120 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

we have described, the result partly of his his- 
torical studies, partly of his own experience ; 
and they contain sufficient evidence that a prac- 
tical attention to history was in force at this 
period, and that the Italians were likely enough 
to prove good historians, but not great theorists. 

The first quarter of the sixteenth century wit- 
nessed the breaking out of the reformation. I 
have endeavoured in a former treatise to prove 
the fact, and point out the manner of its 
acquiring a political tendency ; I have also 
followed up its practical results. That, by its in- 
fluence on Germany, on the Netherlands, on 
England, and, for a considerable period, on 
France, it became the origin of political freedom 
in Europe, can be a matter of doubt only to 
those who '' having eyes, see not ;" and this 
once admitted, it will not be difficult to show 
that the same causes led to its being the origin 
of political speculation also. 

Meantime, however, we must remember, that 
the very essence of the reformation, and the 
first direction of its power, rendered it impossible 
that this should be the case, either immediately, 
or even mediately, without some interval of 
time — the activity to which it aroused the human 
intellect was exerted then, and long after, upon 
subjects wholly unconnected with political spe- 
culation. It is not necessary to dwell upon this 

Raumer, it is one to which Machiavel's most ardent admirers can hardly 
object. See Machiavel, son Genie et ses Erreurs, par M. Artaud, vol. ii. 
p. 490. Tr.] 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 121 

point here, for who can be ignorant, that for a 
considerable time rehgious controversies, and 
those alone, were capable of exciting general in- 
terest ? Still, however, all this being admitted, 
it cannot but seem strange, that the great prac- 
tical influence which the reformation exercised 
upon the constitution of the various states, 
should have been so partially and so slowly fol- 
lowed by any attempt at theory on the principles 
of their formation. 

I do not speak of Germany — here the point 
in dispute was the relation which should exist 
between the states and the emperor, and, as 
immediately connected with it, that between the 
protestant and the catholic parties — and this the 
sword decided. 

But the state in which such views might have 
been first expected, was the republic of the 
United Netherlands. — The reformation called 
that state into existence — the banner of liberty 
was there formally displayed — republican maxims 
were those chiefly adopted and cherished — the 
state itself became deeply involved in the general 
politics of the day, and knowledge was at the 
same time busy among its members ; and yet 
the speculative part of government was left al- 
most wholly untouched ! 

The causes of this, however, will soon become 
evident if we look to the main object of the 
revolution by whose means that state was 
formed — innovations in the constitution were 
the last things it had in view — it struggled 



122 OX THE RISE. PROGRESS, ETC. 

rather to maintain and assert the old rights and 
privileges of the states ; necessity alone induced 
the Netherlands to shake off their allegiance to 
the king of Spain ; that accomplished, they 
turned to seek other masters, and the states 
finally became republican, merely because they 
could find none. Was it likely, then, that 
political theories should spring up here, where 
no new schemes of government called for their 
interference ? 

In the mean time, however, the republic had 
a long struggle for independence to maintain. — 
It came in various contact with foreign powers, 
and was more or less connected \vith the great 
wars of the time. 

Though no questions, therefore, were raised 
as to the different forais of the constitution, yet 
it was impossible but that some should arise 
as to the mutual rights and relations of 
states. 

This subject received the attention of one of 
the repubhc's greatest citizens, and produced the 
famous work of Hugo Grotius '•' De Jure Belh et 
Pads." 

Ir is true that this treatise led its author into 
some researches, respecting the natm"al rights 
of man, and the principles on which they are 
founded, without which he thought he could not 
attain to a just ^iew of his subject. But the theoiy 
of civil government could gain httle from a work 
devoted to another and separate enquiry : while 
the manner in which this enquiry itself is con- 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 123 

ducted^ is by no means attractive to readers of 
our own time. 

Grotius was more a man of learning than a 
philosopher, and he has encumbered his work 
with a mass of historical and philological re- 
search, which could not possibly turn to its ad- 
vantage. — Still, however, it must rank among 
the highest efforts, not only of his own, but of 
all subsequent times; for it was no mean ad- 
vantage to point out that there is, or at least 
that there ought to be, a law of nations. More- 
over, the great name which Grotius had acquired, 
and which associated him, not only with the 
most ditinguished men of learning, but, as a 
statesman, with the princes and courts of his 
day, secured his principles an admittance into 
the circle in which they were most likely to ob- 
tain a ready practical influence^. 



'' [The following defence of Grotius is interesting, as coming from the 
pen of the late sir James Mackintosh : and it will be the more appre- 
ciated as the pamphlet from which it is taken is now rarely to be met 
with. 

" Few works were more celebrated than that of Grotius in his own days, 
and the age which succeeded. It has, however, been the fashion of the 
last half century to depreciate his work as a shapeless compilation, in 
which reason lies buried under a mass of authorities and quotations. This 
fashion originated among French wits and declaimers, and it has been, 
I know not for what reason, adopted, though with far greater moderation 
and decency, by some respectable writers among ourselves. As to those 
who first used this language, the most candid supposition that we can 
make with respect to them, is, that they never read the work 3 for if they 
had not been deterred from the perusal of it by such a formidable display 
of Greek characters, they must soon have discovered that Grotius never 
quotes on any subject till he has first appealed to some principles ; and 
often, in my humble opinion, though not always, to the soundest and most 
rational principles. 



124 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC, 

The treatise " De Jure Belli et Pacis" may, on 
the whole, be considered as a fair earnest of what 
the spreading intelligence of the day might 
eventually produce. 

The religious distm'bances and wars of the 
Hugonots in France took place at the same time 
as the establishment of the republic of the 
Netherlands, and appear to have been much 
more calculated to excite a spirit of poUtical 
speculation. 

It was question here not only of preserving 
what w^as old, but of forming what was new. 

But another sort of answer is due to some of those who* have criticised 
Grotius, and that answer might be given in the words of Grotius himself^ 
He was not of such a stupid and servile cast of mind, as to quote the 
opinions of poets or orators, of historians and philosophers, as those of 
judges from whose decision there was no appeal. He quotes them, as he 
tells us himself, as witnesses, whose conspiring testimony, mightily 
strengthened by their discordance on almost every other subject, is a con- 
clusive proof of the unanimity of the whole human race on the great rules 
of duty, and the fundamental principles of morals. On such matters poets 
and orators are the most unexceptionable of all witnesses ; for they address 
themselves to the general feeling and sympathies of mankind ; they are 
neither warped bj' system, nor perverted by sophistry ; they can attain none 
of their objects ; they can neither please nor persuade if they dwell on 
moral sentiments not in unison with those of their reader : no system of 
moral philosophy can surely disregard the general feelings of human nature, 
and the according judgments of all ages and nations. But where are those 
feelings and that judgment recorded and observed "! In those very writings 
which Grotius is gravely blamed for having quoted. The usages and laws 
of nations, the events of historjr, the opinions of philosophers, the senti- 
ments of orators and poets, as well as the observation of common life, are, 
in truth, the materials out of which the science of morality is formed ; and 
those who neglect them are justly chargeable with a vain attempt to phi- 
losophise, without regard to fact and experience, the sole foundations of 
all true philosophy." — .4 Discourse on the Studu of the Law of Nature and 
Nations, etc. p. 17. Tr.] 



* Paley, pref. to Moral and Political Philosophy, (to whom we may 
add Prof. Heehen, in the passage of the text.) 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 125 

The Hugonot party, if it never actually esta- 
blished a republic, was yet much more inclined 
to republicanism than the insurgents of the Ne- 
therlands. — But then the times of civil war are 
not the times of quiet contemplation, and of 
theory; and as the tumult became more wild, the 
pursuits of literature gave way wholly to vi- 
olence and bloodshed, or, if they still attracted at- 
tention, it was only for purposes of theological 
debate. 

Still, amidst these disturbances, one writer 
made his appearance, who attracted too much 
notice to be lightly passed over — This was John 
Boding the author of a work " De Republica ;" 
he was not only a man of learning, but took a 
share in the transactions of the time, and spoke 
in favour of the Hugonots, whose rehgion he had 
from the first embraced, at the diet of Blois. — This 
did not, however, prevent him from being much 
esteemed by Henry III., with whose brother, 
Francis of Alen^ on, he was still more intimately 
connected. 

As a political writer he claims a distinguished 
place ; indeed, few have surpassed him in philo- 
sophical distinctness of ideas, or in a general, and 
at the same time accurate, acquaintance with 
the constitutions both of ancient and modern 
times. The whole course of his enquiry bears 
a certain resemblance to that pursued by Aris- 



<: JoHANNis BoDiNi, De Rep. lib. vi. first published in French 1576, but 
revised, enlarged, and translated into Latin by himself 1584. Bodin was 
born 1529, and died 1596. 



120 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

totle, but he is far from being a servile imitator, 
and it is undeniable that he materially advanced 
the science of government. 

Some of its most important principles he was 
the first to embrace and define. He begins 
from a conception of the state as ''a number 
of families, whose common concerns are directed 
by a supreme power, justly exercised." The 
supreme power consists in " the right of making 
laws, and seeing that these are executed"^." We 
here find the germ of that principle of the dis- 
tinction between the two powers (the legislative 
and the executive) which owes its full and 
careful development to later writers. He was 
the first who asserted the " Indivisibility" of the 
the supreme power or sovereignty," (Majestas), 
from which he argued that the common opinions 
with respect to mixed governments, rested upon 
entirely false grounds, since these are impossible 
without a separation of the sovereignty. He 
has defined more accurately the limits of what 
we term " absolute monarchy (regia potestas)," of 
"despotism," and of "tyranny," than any^ sub- 
sequent writers. He has the great merit of 
having put in a clear light one of the most im- 
portant truths of government, and one to which 
he was himself much attached, (viz.) " That the 
form of the constitution will not afford any direct 
argument as to the spirit in which a state is go- 
verned, and that the latter may be very re- 

•1 De Repiihiicd, lib. ii. p. 275. « lb. lib. ii. p. 275. 

' lb, lib. ii. p. 313. sq. 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 127 

publican in a state which is properly mon- 
archical^, as well as despotic under the forms of 
a republic." Finally, he was the first who, 
carefully avoiding to set up any perfect ideal 
constitution, which he would every where apply, 
gave a full explanation of all the circumstances 
of climate and of national peculiarities, whether 
mental or bodily, which ought to be considered 
in framing the constitution of a state''.' 

This division of his work would do no discre- 
dit to Montesqueiu himself, whose precursor, 
and that no unworthy one, he was. 

Notwithstanding these and other undeniable 
merits, and in spite of the approbation which it 
drew from the best of his contemporaries \ Bo- 
din's work did not attain to that practical influ- 
ence which it deserved. 

The seed which he scattered fell upon a soil 
as yet too little prepared to receive it, and the 
observation before made, that political specula- 
tion can never support itself except in connec- 
tion with philosophy, is here remarkably esta- 
bhshed. The nation was not yet ripe. 

The state of France, during the seventeenth 



e lb. lib. ii. p. 305. sq. '' lb. lib. v. p. 767. sq. 

' [Although Bodin may be deservedly praised for the adoption of the 
two last points, and for the expansion of the former of them, he is indebted 
to Aristotle's Politics for the sound philosophy by which they are dis- 
tinguished. Aristotle, it is true, has drawn a picture of the government 
under which he imagines the greatest happiness may be obtained, but he 
has expressly stated what previous conditions are necessary to its formation, 
and how unfit it would be for a society in which these were wanting. Tr.] 

^ [The testimony of De Thou and others may be found under the arti- 
cle Bodin, in Bayle. Tr.] 



128 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

century, was not such as to lead us to expect 
the requisite maturity. As soon as the Hugo- 
nots were suppressed, or at least disarmed, 
Richelieu laid the foundation of the absolute 
power of the crown, and Louis XIV. confirmed 
it without any further resistance from the peo- 
ple. Even if a spirit of political enquiry had by 
chance arisen among individuals, where was it 
to find means of increase ? Surely not among a 
people who not only submitted without a mur- 
mur to the fetters which were imposed upon 
them, but who went so far in their greediness 
for fame rather than freedom, as to be proud of 
the chains they wore. 

We must, therefore, turn to another land, to 
one in which, by the concurrence of more fortu- 
nate circumstances, the theory of civil govern- 
ment became fully developed, and acquired a 
great practical influence — an influence moreover 
exerted rather to preserve than to destroy — I 
mean to England. 

It might be mentioned here almost without a 
rival, were it not that Geneva, the smallest state 
in Europe, makes its pre-eminence in this re- 
spect, somewhat doubtful. 

The progress which the theory of government 
made in England is mainly attributable to the 
circumstances of that country, and to understand 
these we must give a cursory glance at the his- 
tory of its constitution. This was at first a 
branch of the great feudal system, which was 
the origin of most of the European governments 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 129 

and which had been introduced in its full rigour 
by William the Conqueror in 1066, when he took 
possession of England. The feudal customs fell 
into disuse here^ as elsewhere, for the vassals 
were not slow in taking advantage of the circum- 
stances of the times, and even under the imme- 
diate successors of the Conqueror obtained con- 
siderable privileges, which, by degrees, ripened 
into a formal warrant of their liberties, and were 
embodied in Magna Charta (1215). 

It was not, however, the armed opposition 
which the nobles offered to their sovereign, for 
this was of much more frequent occurrence in 
other countries : nor was it the growth of a mid- 
dle order : nor yet the representation of this 
order in parliament, which gave to the British 
constitution its pecuhar character ; for all these 
phenomena are to be found alike in the French 
and Spanish histories. The causes of it lay 
i?i the different shape which rank assumed in Eng- 
land, compared with other countries, in the variety 
of relations which existed belween the nobles and 
the commons, atid by means of which it became 
possible to constitute the Lower House in such a 
form as it afterwards assumed. 

We might expect that a subject, which has re- 
ceived so much attention from the best writers, 
should be clearly understood, but it neither is, 
nor indeed ever will be. 

The early history of the British parhament, 
especially during the thirteenth century, when its 
limits were first defined, is more scantily supplied 

K 



130 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC, 

from original documents than can well be be- 
lieved. And yet this ought not to astonish us if 
we remember that in England, as in other coun- 
tries of Europe during the middle ages, no insti- 
tution of any note arose at once and from a pre- 
concerted scheme, but that they were all of 
gradual formation, and dependent on the changes 
of men's wants and circumstances. Thus many 
things which afterwards became of the highest 
importance were very far from being, or, at 
least, from appearing so, at first : and it was 
consequently impossible for the chroniclers of the 
day to perceive the advantage of recording them. 
We must be content, therefore, to receive such 
accounts of the British parliament as we have 
of the other institutions of the middle ages. 

The separation of the higher from the lower 
nobility took place in other countries of Europe 
as well as in England, but in no other country 
did the latter so entirely unite with the mid- 
dle orders, as to rank with them in one house, 
and become thus wholly distinct from the peers. 
But if the question be proposed, as to How the 
separation of the upper and lower nobles actually 
took place ? if it be asked How it happened that 
the inferior nobles sent deputies chosen from the 
counties instead of appearing in person ? When 
this first became customary ? When the towns 
first returned members ? (not when they are 
first noticed by the chroniclers as having done 
so). — And, lastly. When and how the deputies 
from the counties became united in one body with 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES, 131 

those from the towns ? — We can only say that 
the most careful enquirers into British history 
can give nothing but probable surmises on the 
subject, and are totally unable to support their 
opinions by any historical references. This ge- 
neral uncertainty will be at once evident to any 
one who will examine the various and very dif- 
ferent accounts which are given by English 
historians of the origin of their constitution. 
Some, and those of the first rank, have not 
scrupled seriously to assert, that the early Britons 
brought their liberties with them from the forests 
in which they dwelt ! 

Without going more deeply into these ques- 
tions, which would be here misplaced, it is suffi- 
cient to remark, that the British constitution had 
received the impress of its most important cha- 
racters long before England could boast of any 
degree of political liberty superior to that en- 
joyed by other states. It had its upper house 
composed of the lords spiritual and temporal, 
and its lower house composed of members for 
the towns and counties — but what was this great 
parliament, not only before the time of the 
Tudors, but even under their dominion, except 
an instrument of command, which Henry VII. 
and VIII., and their successor Elizabeth, knew 
most excellently how to apply to the furtherance 
of their own designs ? 

Here, again, we have a palpable example how 
little we may argue from the form to the spirit 
of a government ; meantime, however, this form 

k2 



132 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

was more perfect than could be found elsewhere, 
and it needed only a confluence of fortunate 
events to give it life, and breathe sentiments of 
freedom into the people. 

This the reformation effected. — Not only by 
it was the religion of the land altered, but its 
political greatness, under the reign and guidance 
of Elizabeth, securely founded. By this great- 
ness^ the spirit of the people became awakened ; 
but as it did not proceed immediately from the 
constitution, it was necessary that the latter 
should receive a shock, nay, for a time, a total 
overthrow, before it could be fully appreciated, 
and by being restored, and at the same time 
indissolubly connected with religion, could be 
looked up to as the palladium of British free- 
dom. 

The history of the troubles which produced 
the civil war, which overturned the throne, and 
which terminated with the restoration, are suffi- 
ciently known, and require barely to be alluded 
to. The only question in connection with which 
they have any interest here, refers to the pro- 
bable causes of their having been more favourable 
to the development of political speculation than 
the disturbances of any other country, and that in 
such a degree as to have produced and matured 
some of its noblest fruits. 

The obvious reason of this, in my opinion, is, 
that the troubles and wars in England were not 
brought about, as in other countries, merely by 

' See the treatise On the political consequences of the Reformation. 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 133 

practical grievances, but that they depended, from 
the first, upon theoretical points of dispute, which 
necessarily led to more extended enquiries. 

Thus, when the Stuarts mounted the British 
throne (1603), they brought with them a maxim 
which was preserved and passed from father to 
son as an heirloom, and which James I. was im- 
prudent enough to assert upon every occasion, 
even in open parliament, viz. '' That the kingly 
power emanated for God — that it was therefore 
absolute, or if not actually so, that it ought of 
right to be so — that what were termed the 
" rights" of the people and the parliament, were 
not properly so called, but merely grants and 
privileges, which had been allowed to them by 
the crown, and which the crown might therefore 
resume as easily as it had bestowed them." 
These principles, however, were in direct oppo- 
sition to the ideas which the reformation had 
rendered current, and which had more par- 
ticularly obtained with the presbyterian and 
puritanic parties, then rapidly spreading in Eng- 
land, and which from the form of their religious 
government were inclined to carry republican, 
and even democratic, principles into the govern- 
ment of the state. Elizabeth had entertained 
no less exalted an idea of her power than the 
two first Stuarts, in fact she had exercised it 
with more freedom than they : but then she had 
avoided what the pedantic folly of James I. led 
him to indulge in, and had not brought her 
maxims before the public, and thus made a com- 



134 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

mon talk of matters, which the interest of princes 
should teach them to conceal as the mysteries 
of their craft, the " Arcana dominationis." 

These principles, and the collisions between 
the king and the parliament, which resulted from 
them, formed the train which lighted up Eng- 
land with the flames of civil war. They brought 
Charles to the scaffold, and overturned the 
throne. But even when the restoration had 
caused a seeming tranquillity, the fire still 
smouldered in its ashes. The restoration was 
rather the work of party spirit, and of a passing 
change in public opinion, effected by the ex- 
perience of anarchy and the despotism of the 
sword, than of calm and well exercised reason. 

The opportunity which then presented itself 
of amending the defects of the constitution 
passed by unemployed. And Charles II. re- 
ceived the crown on the same doubtful under- 
standing of its authority, as that on which it 
had been held by his ancestors. Would that 
he had been as worthy of it even as his unfor- 
tunate father ! As it was, he adopted the very 
principles which cost the latter his life, while he 
enhanced their tendency to despotism by his 
own disposition to enforce them. The attempt 
of his brother to introduce tyranny and priest- 
craft, and the consequences of his folly, need 
hardly be alluded to. 

Every circumstance of the time — the con- 
tinued disturbances — the party distinction of 
whigs and tories in which they ended — the 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 135 

rapid growth of literature under Cliarles II., all 
conspired to advance political speculations to 
the utmost. — But as these speculations pro- 
ceeded immediately from the practical affairs of 
life, it was unavoidable that they should carry 
some traces of their origin along with them. 
The questions chiefly debated were those to 
which the transactions of the day naturally led, 
and the decision of which was invested with a 
direct practical importance. All these questions 
may be reduced under one head, viz. Whether 
the kingly power should be absolute or not ? or, 
what was considered equivalent. Whether the 
sovereignty belonged to the king or to the 
people ? On such a subject as this, no one, 
who bore the least affection to his country, 
could remain wholly without interest : we must 
not therefore be astonished at the earnestness 
with which the dispute was carried on. 

It would appear almost incredible to any one 
unversed in the writings of the time, to what an 
extent the assertors of the kingly power pro- 
ceeded, and on what grounds they sought to 
rest their claim. One of these must be here 
mentioned, who, it is true, has long sunk into 
the oblivion which he deserved, but who must 
not be passed over in this place, as his treatise 
entitled " Patriarcha, or the Natural Power of 
Kings™," served as a whetstone on which the great 



•" It forms part of The Political Discourses of Robert Filmer, Bart. 
London, 1682. 



136 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC, 

writers of the opposite side sharpened and im- 
proved their wits. It was to the extravagant, 
and in some degree ludicrous tenets of Fihner 
and his school, that the cause which they ad- 
vocated chiefly owed its fall. For, as they de- 
rived the kingly power immediately from God, 
they were forced into historical deductions for 
their proof. They had recourse, therefore, to 
the sacred annals : but as, unfortunately, the 
kingly power does not there date beyond a par- 
ticular era, they fell back upon the patriarchs, 
and asserted boldly that Abraham and Noah, 
and lastly, that Adam himself had been kings. 
In order to make this good they endeavoured 
to show that the kingly power proceeded from 
the paternal, and that, accordingly, kings, being 
the fathers of their people, might exercise as un- 
restricted an authority over them as fathers over 
their children. But as all children, by the very 
fact of their birth, become subjected to the go- 
vernment of their father, it follows of course that 
no man can be born free : and again, as the pa- 
ternal authority has been transferred to the 
kings of the earth, all men come by their birth 
under this absolute power, and are in fact born 
as a sort of property and appendage to it. By 
these steps Filmer arrived at the conclusion that 
the most absolute despotism is fairly founded, 
and as such he defended it, asserting that both 
the persons and goods of the subjects are no- 
thing more than the property of the prince, with 
which he may do as he pleases ; that on this ac- 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 137 

count every opposition of the subjects is open 
rebellion, and that in no possible case can a 
king be deposed from his authority. 

The absurdity of these propositions, which be- 
came inevitable as soon as the attempt vs^as made 
to deduce the kingly power historically from 
God, would probably have decided the fate of 
the theories to which they belonged, even with- 
out any attack from without. But amongst the 
supporters of absolute power, another writer 
appeared, who may claim his rank vsdth the first 
thinkers of all ages, and who defended his opinion 
with very different weapons from those of 
Filmer — that writer was Thomas Hobbes. Of 
his philosophical works those which are here 
referred to are his treatise '' De Give" and his 
" Leviathan."" 

External causes may, to a certain degree, have 
induced Hobbes to come forward as the cham- 
pion of absolute power. He not only belonged to 
the royal party, but was tutor to Charles H. 
when an exile in France. Nevertheless, this in- 
fluence most assuredly did not extend further 
than to give his mind a turn of thought natural 
to the events of the time, and to his own peculiar 
circumstances. We should do him great injus- 
tice, were we to suspect him of fawning or hy- 

i> The " De Cive" forms the third division of his Elementa Philos. 
The "Leviathan," sive de materia forma et potestate civitatis, is only a fur- 
ther development of it. 

Hobbes was born 1588, and died 1679. His Elementa appeared first in 
1650, and the Leviathan 1651, in the time of Cromwell. His works were 
first published in 1668 in a perfect form. 



138 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

pocrisy. His character is much more that of a 
logical and consistent reasoner of the highest 
order, who never advanced a proposition which 
he for a moment doubted that he could establish 
in its fullest sense. 

Hobbes is remarkable for having been the 
first who sought to ground the theory of go- 
vernment upon natural right, and what is termed 
" the state of nature." This notion of a " state 
of nature," from which men are supposed to 
have advanced into civil society, (however dif- 
ferently it may have been entertained,) has formed 
the basis of all subsequent speculations, down 
to the time of Rousseau ; and from the inde- 
finiteness of the idea which it introduced, has 
contributed not a little to perplex the theory of 
government. 

If by " the state of nature °" we are to under- 
stand the condition of men who are not formed 
into one community, and who do not acknow- 
ledge the relations of civil life, it cannot be 
denied that nations have existed, and still exist, 
in this condition. But in order to determine 
the limits between the state of nature here un- 
stood, and the civil community to which it is 
opposed, we must have a clear idea of what that 
civil community implies. 

Now theorists usually define the latter as con- 

° [For a further examination of this juggling phrase I cannot do better 
than refer the reader to Mr. Lewis's Remarks on the Use and Abuse of some 
Political Terms. London, 1832. Doctor Ferguson's Essay on the His- 
tory of Civil Society, contains many beautiful and just observations on the 
true meaning of the words. Tr.] 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 139 

stituted by the possession of sovereignty, whe- 
ther exercised by the whole body, or by a few, 
or by one of its members. This definition, how- 
ever, is of httle practical use in the study of his- 
tory, for there are many nations to which it 
would apply, and yet of whom it would be hard 
to say that they form a state, and live in civil 
society. All the great pastoral tribes are, or at 
least were, in possession of sovereignty as inde- 
pendent nations ; and this sovereignty was exer- 
cised by the heads of particular famihes among 
themselves ; and yet no one would argue that the 
Calmucs, or the Kirgisian and Arabian Bedouins, 
form what is properly termed a state (Civitas). 
This, in fact, if we use the word in its common 
historical sense, can only be constituted by a 
people, whether great or small — which possesses 
and permanently inhabits one particular country ; 
or in other y^ox^'S,, fixed places of abode and pos- 
sesssions in land form the second necessary quali- 
fication of every state, in the practical sense of 
the word. The reason of this is, that the whole 
institution, or assembly of institutions, which we 
term a state, attains its development and appli- 
cation only by property in land. The first, 
though not the only object of a state, is the se- 
curity of property : now, although moveables are 
just as much property as land, yet it is only 
where the latter has been appropriated that the 
right of property attains to its full importance: 
and not only this, but the necessity of defining 
its different forms by laws is then for the first 



140 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

time perceived, because land is, from its nature, 
the only permanent object of this right p. 

Although a state, then, may be conceived in 
theory to exist without property in land, yet in 
reality the one can never exist without the other ; 
and it is the neglect with which this fact has 
been passed over, that has mainly contributed 
to give to political systems that character of 
visionary speculation, which must in all theories 
attend the omission of such points as are neces- 
sary to their practical application. 

A sufficient proof of this is furnished by the 
notion of a " state of nature," and the uses to 
which it has been put. 

For if this imaginary condition be opposed to 
civil society, and the latter can only exist where 
there are fixed abodes and landed property, we 
must conclude that all nations unprovided with 
these are living in a state of nature. From this 
it follows, that " the state of nature" embraces 
under it all those conditions which may be 
imagined to exist before the institution of civil 
society. But as among these there are marked 



P £Thus, in early times, the law of England seems to have taken no cog- 
nizance of moveable property, but to have confined itself to " things that are 
in their nature more permanent and immoveable, as lands and houses, and 
the profits issuing therout." And although commerce, by the vast increase 
of moveable property which it has caused, has naturally induced great 
changes in the legal contemplation of it, yet the distinction even in name 
between " real" and "personal"' property, the different laws of descent 
which they follow, and the greater solemnities requisite to the transfer and 
devise of the former, compared to what are imposed by law upon the latter, 
show the secondary place which moveables still occupy. See Blackstone, 
Com. B. II. c. xxiv. Tr.] 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 141 

gradations^ gradations which cannot escape the 
merest tyro in history, the only conception of 
" the state of nature" at which we arrive, is nega- 
tive ; that is, it excludes what does not belong 
to it, without defining what does : it excludes 
" civil society," but it does not define the posi- 
tive condition which the term " state of nature" 
is intended to denote. 

This consideration, however, did not once 
enter the minds of our theorists. Each contem- 
plated his own state of nature as something posi- 
tive, and gave such a description of it as best 
pleased himself. No wonder, then, that there 
should be a little variety in the picture ! — Hobbes 
conceived the first design. 

According to him, men in the state of nature, 
live in continued hostility to each other. When 
in this condition, they are all equal, since they 
have a mutual right to make war upon, and even 
to kill each other. They all have the will to 
commit injuries, and therefore scruple not to do 
so — a war thus arises of all against all, and the 
danger becomes universal, as the weaker must 
ever yield to the stronger.— It is natural, mean- 
time, that some protection should be sought 
against these dangers ; nay, it is evident that 
neither individuals, nor even the whole race of 
man, could suffice to keep up a war at once uni- 
versal, and in all probability eternal — men per- 
ceived this, and on this account forsook the state 
of nature, and formed themselves into civil 
society, which is therefore the offspring of fear. 



142 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

On this hypothesis, the instabihty of which is 
apparent from what we have before said, Hobbes 
constructed his pohtical theory. The second 
step he took led him into a new hypothesis. — 
Out of this state of nature it would have been 
impossible to advance without some specific 
agreement : and hence arose the principle, since 
considered so important, that '' the state is founded 
upon a compact "i." 

This compact consisted in a general agree- 
ment of alP to submit their private will to the 
will of one — it matters not whether this be one 
individual, or one assemblage of persons — whose 
will should thus become the will of all. Who- 
ever procures his will to be thus respected, pos- 
sesses the sovereign power and majesty : he is 
the prince, the others are his subjects. — As soon, 
therefore, as the sovereignty is thus entrusted to 

1 [The idea that the state is founded upon a contract, cannot be said to 
have been originated by Hobbes, although he was perhaps the first who in 
modern times made this the only and necessary commencement of society. 
Hooker, who died half a century before the Leviathan was published, (but 
whose EccL Polity, although constanly referred to by Locke, appears to have 
escaped the notice of Prof. Heeien, ) holds very express language to that effect. 
" So that in a word, all public regiment, of what kind soever, seemeth 
evidently to have arisen from deliberate advice, consultation, and compo- 
sition between men, judging it convenient and behoveful ; there being no 
impossibility in nature, considered by itself, but that men might have lived 
without any public regiment." Eccl. Polit. i. He also speaks of " times 
wherein there was as yet no manner of public regiment." lb. It is 
also distinctly laid down in the Parliamentary Declaration of 1648 : 
" They (the parliament) suppose it will not be denied that the first institu- 
tion of the office of a king in this nation was by agreement of the people, 
who chose one to that office for the protection and good of them who chose 
him, and for their better government, according to such laws as they did 
consent unto." Tr.J 

■■ De Cive, v. 6. Submissio voluntatum omnium unius voluntati. 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 143 

the ruler, all private will is at once submitted to 
him. — He is in no wise bound by the laws which 
the others may prescribe — he unites in himself 
the supreme executive and legislative authority', 
and is therefore in every way absolute, inviolable, 
and irresponsible. — Moreover, the power which 
has been granted to him cannot ever be revoked, 
for as soon as the nation has transferred this, 
it no longer constitutes what, morally speaking, 
may be termed one person, but exists only as an 
aggregate of individuals. 

It is true that the original act may have 
settled the sovereignty either upon one man, or 
upon a certain number, or even on the greater 
part of the people. And thus Hobbes would 
not by his theory exclude either an aristocracy 
or a democracy, provided either of these forms 
were pure and absolute. But then he wished 
also to prove that a monarchy is far preferable 
to the other two, and thus he became its advo- 
cate, not only generally, but in its most un- 
limited character of despotism. Mixed consti- 
tutions he held to be ijjso facto absurd, since 
they imply the division of the sovereignty, which, 
according to him, is a contradiction of terms. 

These are the principal opinions of Hobbes, 
who may without doubt claim to be considered 
as the founder of political speculation in modern 
times — none of his predecessors had treated the 



s Impeiium absolutum, De Give, vi. 13. Hobbes has no general term 
for the executive power, he characterises it according to particular acts 
of the sjovernment. 



144 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

subject with so much acuteness and power of 
reasoning. He rose above common experience, 
and having once estabhshed his theory of a 
state, he guarded it well about. His system 
rested upon these three positions: 1st. The su- 
preme power is indivisible : 2nd. The supreme 
power may be transferred : 3rd. When trans- 
ferred its unity must be maintained. 

The converse of the second of these (viz.) that 
the supreme power is intransferable, was at a 
later period advanced by Rosseau, who was thus 
unavoidably led to consider a democracy as the 
only just form of government. Hobbes, on the 
other hand, attained by his view to the most 
unlimited monarchy and aristocracy, without, as 
we have said, wholly excluding democracy. The 
only condition on which he insisted, was that 
the form, whatever that might be, should be 
simple and unrestricted. 

The high character which belongs to Hobbes 
among the political writers of his day, might 
lead us to expect that he should have ac- 
quired great practical influence. This, however, 
was not the case ; and it may partly be ac- 
counted for by the fact, that the constitution of 
his own country was formed upon wholly dif- 
ferent principles from those which he advocated. 
But even among the supporters of absolute 
kingly power, he was not usually appealed to 
as their best defence. Filmer, whom we have 
before spoken of, although immeasurably infe- 
rior to Hobbes, yet attained to much greater 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 145 

authority ; in fact, he was singled out by the 
best champions of the opposite party as the 
worthier enemy of the two. The reason of this 
appears to be, that Filmer's work was in much 
better accordance with the prevaihng spirit of 
the time than that of Hobbes. The latter so 
far excelled his age in method and power of ab- 
stract reasoning, as to stand alone and unappre- 
ciated. Again, Filmer had interwoven religion 
with his politics, and quoted the Bible for ex- 
amples and authority ; and as this was then the 
prevalent tone, we, can understand how his so- 
lemn trifling came to attract more attention than 
the philosophical arguments of Hobbes. 

It would be superfluous to dwell upon other 
and less known writers, who came forward in 
support of absolute power, as the theory of poli- 
tics was very little advanced by them ; and it is 
far from my intention to give a literary history 
of the science, I prefer passing at once to 
the advocates of free constitutions who appeared 
at this time in England ; and among these more 
especially to Algernon Sidney, and John Locke. 
Both had for their immediate object a reply to 
Filmer, but neither was content with his dis- 
comfiture. Algernon Sidney * was one of those 
characters which the disturbances of a revolu- 
tion are so apt to produce. From his earliest 
youth he was an enthusiastic adorer of republi- 

t He was born 1622, and beheaded 1683, on a charge of high treason, 
which could not be substantiated. Under William III. this judgment 
was reversed, and his innocence solemnly acknowledged. 

L 



146 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

can freedom ; and the circumstances amidst 
which he Hved, served amply to encourage a 
spirit which persecution only confirmed. For 
many years he wandered in exile, and when at 
length he returned to his native country, it 
was to be condemned without cause, and die 
upon the scaffold. His own often rehearsed 
motto, 

Manus haec inimica tyrannis 

Ense petit placidam sub libertate quietem ; 

gives a truer history of his opinions and charac- 
ter than any longer story could tell. 

Sidney wrote his famous '"' Discourses on Go- 
vernment" in answer to Filmer, and this polem- 
ical design teaches us at once that we are not 
to expect from them a regular system of poli- 
tics. Moreover, he had no natural turn for 
speculative pursuits ; and his philosophy of go- 
vernment consisted in a few favourite maxims, 
which he sought to prove alternately by abstract 
reasoning and reference to history. The first 
position of Filmer's which he attacked, was that 
in which he deduced the kingly power from God. 
He argued that so far from this, God had com- 
mitted the choice of their government entirely 
to mankind. It is, therefore, in strict accordance 
with nature, that nations should rule themselves, 
or at least choose their own rulers. 

All '' magistratical power " then, if rightly de- 
rived, must be derived from the people; and the 
government must be instituted with a view to 
the advantage of the governed, and not of the 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 147 

governors. The amount of power which is en- 
trusted to the magistracy, depends upon the 
people who make that trust : and as every na- 
tion has a right to establish its own form of go- 
vernment, so every nation has a right to alter 
or do it away at will. It is clear that these 
principles would admit of a monarchy as well as 
of a constitution ; but although their author does 
not wholly reject the monarchical form, he takes 
no trouble to conceal his preference of repub- 
licanism, the advantages of which he endeavours, 
often feebly enough, to prove. It is evident 
from this short abstract, that the theory of 
government gained very little at the hands of 
Sidney. He ranks, however, among the most 
spirited defenders of liberty, and his unjust fate 
has rendered his memory sacred. With regard 
to his work, which could only be published 
after his death, in the reign of William III., we 
may fairly say that his name has done more 
for it than it has done for his name ; it never 
has been forgotten, but it has never taken a 
place among the classics of his country. This 
indeed the form of it would not permit, for 
while its polemical interest necessarily expired 
with the short lived reputation of Filmer, there 
was nothing in the vagueness and unphiloso- 
phical arrangement of its parts which could 
supply the deficiency. 

If Algernon Sidney then did contribute, and 
assuredly he did, to awaken a spirit of freedom 
among his countrymen, it was rather by his life 

l2 



148 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

and death than by any thing that ever came 
from his pen. 

John Locke ", of whom we have now to speak, 
requires a very different notice. He is to be 
reckoned among those who have acquired, and 
still continue to exercise, a great national in- 
fluence ; for whatever opinion we may entertain 
of his powers of thought, it is undeniable that to 
him England chiefly owes the direction of its 
philosophical pursuits. 

Those of his writings with which we have here 
to do, are his two treatises of governments 
The first of these, as its title denotes, was in 
answer to Filmer ; but the second goes further, 
and being an attempt to establish the general 
theory of government, bears more directly upon 
our subject. 

In it Locke proceeds, as Hobbes had done, 
from " the state of nature ;" but the vagueness 
which we before attributed to the idea of such 
a state, is at once shown by the very different 
picture which he gives of it from that sketched 
by Hobbes. The latter had asserted that, in 
*^ the state of nature" every man was in con- 
tinual warfare with his neighbour. Locke, on 
the other hand, imposes upon men in this state 
a natural law, by which they are bound ahke to 

" He was born 1632, spent a portion of his life abroad, especially in 
France, and died 1704. 

^ Two treatises of government. In the former, the false principles and 
foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, bart., and his followers, are detected and 
overthrown. The latter is an essay concerning the true original extent 
and end of civil government. 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 149 

provide for their own safety, and to abstain from 
injuring that of others. By the same law, per- 
sons who may have suffered injury are permitted 
to exert themselves in self-defence, and to re- 
taliate so far as at once to procure reparation to 
themselves and to prevent the aggressors from 
any renewal of their attacks. In spite, therefore, 
of his own doctrine, with which he combats Fil- 
mer and Hobbes, that all men in the state of 
nature are free and equal, he allots to every one 
a degree of power over his neighbour sufficient 
to punish the transgressors of the natural law, 
and thus to maintain its authority. 

This view of the state of nature reduces it to 
a condition in which men are under no govern- 
ment but that of reason. Such a condition may 
certainly be imagined, but until men learn to 
shake off the passions, which at present hold a 
divided sway with reason, and become wholly 
devoted to the latter, it can never be realized. 
While if it were, we may ask what necessity 
there would then be for any government at all ? 
That it would be necessary, however, Locke de- 
clares, and that because where every man is 
judge in his own cause, it is impossible that he 
should act without being prejudiced by his own 
interest. 

The most important advantage which resulted 
from the enquiries of Locke, was the assertion 
of universal freedom and equality as the birth- 
right of mankind, in opposition to the tenets of 
Filmer and his followers with respect to the 



150 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

dependence, and even slavery, which they held 
to emanate from the paternal authority. Locke 
therefore was the first who advanced the doc- 
trine of the natural rights of ma^, in as far as 
these are maintained by personal freedom, and 
the security of property, w^hich he was at much 
more pains to define and establish than any of 
his predecessors had been. 

As Locke made the state of civil society to 
proceed from that of nature, by the act of sur- 
render, according to which every man resigned 
his individual right of punishing the violators of 
the natural law into the hands of a public and 
acknowledged officer; it follows, of course, that 
the constituents of a state should be all free 
men, and that personal freedom should be an 
essential condition of the union. Locke, how- 
ever, was not content with this, for the whole 
tenor of his work is directed to show that the 
British constitution is strictly in conformity with 
the general principles of government, and there- 
fore a just and reasonable form. He thus in- 
troduces, beyond the personal freedom on which 
he openly insists, the condition of political free- 
dom, or participation in the legislature. The 
origin of a state presupposes the voluntary agree- 
ment of all those who are to become members 
of it ; these, by uniting themselves, form a po- 
litical body ; and this body must be directed by 
the will of the majority, or else remain ineffi- 
cient. As each individual, therefore, must submit 
his own opinion to that of the majority, which 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES, 151 

thus becomes the legislative power, this power 
is supreme, whether the constitution be of one 
kind or another, whether the power be trans- 
ferred into the hands of many or of a few. It 
must, however, be distinguished from the execu- 
tive, which is subordinate to the other, and has 
for its object the observance and fulfilment of 
the laws. 

In pursuing this scheme Locke was led to en- 
quire more particularly into the distinction be- 
tween the legislative and executive powers, and 
the principles which he thus established, form 
another and essential cause of gratitude to him 
as a political theorist. No writer before him 
had so distinctly separated these elements of a 
constitution from each other, or ascertained so 
closely both their several characters and mutual 
relation. But whilst he was busied in claiming 
a superiority for the legislative over the execu- 
tive, and in securing the exercise of it either 
wholly, or in part at least, to the people or their 
representatives, he was thus gradually preparing 
his way to the maxim, that no constitution is to 
he considered a right one in which the legislative 
and the executive powers are not lodged in differ- 
ent hands. In an unlimited monarchy, therefore, 
where the two powers are united in the ruler 
without control, the proper relations cannot be 
established, and the prince is to be regarded as 
occupying the same position towards his sub- 
jects as that which every man held towards his 
neighbour in the state of nature. 



152 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

This development of the doctrine of a dis- 
tinction of powers in the state, was absolutely 
necessary to complete the theory of govern- 
mentj and Locke cannot be denied great merit 
for accomplishing it, as well as for pointing out 
the advantages of a free constitution. He thus 
prepared the ground which subsequent writers, 
however little they otherwise agreed with him 
in principle, yet made use of to establish their 
own. But then, on the other hand, he did not 
foresee the consequences to which his doctrines 
might lead; for although there can be no doubt 
that the legislative and executive powers ought 
to be considered as se2mrate in theory, yet how 
far they ought to be sei^arated in 'practice, is a 
wholly different question. 

An entire separation of the two in practical 
politics can never be accomplished — nor indeed 
did Locke ever intend it — he assigned the prince 
a share in the legislative, and thus differed from 
Hobbes by admitting a mixed constitution, while 
the latter rejected all division of the sovereignty, 
and admitted only the pure forms. Notwith- 
standing this, however, the theoretical distinction 
of these elements led to the maxim that they 
ought to be separated as much as possible in 
practice ; and thus the way was opened to most 
serious errors. Subsequent experience has un- 
fortunately shown that anxiety on this point is 
any thing but unfounded, and if we examine 
the evils which have resulted from it, we 
shall be obliged to confess, that no theory ever 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES, 153 

produced so much mischief by being misunder- 
stood as this. 

As far as England was concerned, however, 
the principles of Locke needed no qualification, 
and we can easily understand how they should 
become the text book of the nation. That se- 
paration of the executive and legislative powers 
which he required, was here in force, for al- 
though the king had a share of the latter, it was 
yet essentially in the hands of the parliament. 
Those maxims which were considered by the 
people as most sacred and most important, viz. 
that no taxes should be imposed except with 
the consent of their representatives, that all 
men's rights were equal in the eye of the law, 
and the like, were definitely expressed by Locke ; 
and thus his theory corresponded in all its es- 
sential points with what actually existed. This 
accordance alone would have secured Locke a 
very great authority; but besides this he was 
acknowledged as the first philosopher, and one 
of the most classical writers which the nation 
possessed ; and his work thus became current, 
if not among the mass of the people, at least 
among the well informed and educated part of 
it. There were other circumstances also which 
tended to spread his influence, and especially 
the fact that several of the most eminent 2^'f^(^^c- 
tical statesmen of Great Britain, we need only 
mention Chatham as one — recognised his prin- 
ciples upon every occasion in parliament ; and 



154 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

thus added to his character for abstract philo- 
sophy that of the surest practical discernment. 

The general consent of a great and intel- 
ligent nation, which has produced so many 
of the most profound philosophers and ablest 
statesmen, is always entitled to our attention ; 
nor have we the remotest wish to take from the 
undoubted merits of Locke : but we may observe 
that the almost bhnd respect which was paid to 
him, has been one of the causes of that abate- 
ment in the study of political science, which to 
a certain degree still continues. — To argue 
against Locke has been considered as an infallible 
proof of disaffection to the constitution. 

Nevertheless, England has since his time had 
many political writers, and those of the first 
order, but their pursuits have received a dif- 
ferent direction, and have been changed from 
enquiries as to the rights and forms of govern- 
ment, into questions of political economy. — 
Men's opinions on constitutional points, as far 
as these are practically concerned, have be- 
come settled, partly by the constitution under 
which they hve, and partly by the writings of 
Locke. On the other hand, the more evident 
relations of government and the new wants 
which have been continually arising, were calcu- 
lated to draw general attention to political eco- 
nomy. And as under the Stuarts the theory of 
government owed its rise to the revolutionary 
times immediately preceding, so the circum- 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 155 

stances of later days naturally led to the theories 
of political economy. It does not belong to our 
plan to mention the great writers who have ap- 
peared in this department. From them Europe 
has gained its whole knowledge of the science, 
and their influence, far from diminishing, must 
continue to increase. 

However highly we may estimate the services 
which Locke rendered to the science of civil 
government, it was unavoidable that a theory 
which had reference only to one particular state, 
should be partial and incomplete. This will be 
at once evident if we apply his principles to 
other countries, which we are, to a certain degree, 
accustomed to consider among the best governed 
of Europe. 

According to him, none of those states in 
which the power of the prince is unlimited, i. e. 
in which the legislative and executive powers 
are united in his person — admit of any approach 
to civil society, properly so called — in fact, they 
present nothing but slavery. These expressions 
must of course be taken with some degree of lati- 
tude, but the theory which seeks to confine the 
idea of a state within such narrow limits, cannot 
be reconciled with actual history. 

If states, such as Denmark and Prussia, are 
not even to deserve the name of states, if their 
constitutions are not for a moment to be con- 
sidered rightful constitutions, we must be al- 
lowed to suspect, that the fault lies rather in the 
theorists, than in the states themselves. And 



156 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

so in truth it does ; Locke, like all his prede- 
cessors, and his successors down to Kant, adopted 
for his foundation the division into monarchy, 
aristocracy, and democracy. But as long as this 
division prevails, no theory which is founded 
upon it can be secure. And one of the chief 
reasons of this is, that the important distinction 
between unlimited monarchy, as far as this re- 
sults from the union of the two powers, or as it 
is better termed autocracy, and despotism, cannot 
be drawn. Hence these two forms, although 
essentially different, are continually mistaken for 
each other ^. 

While outward circumstances were thus ad- 
vancing the theory of politics in England, Geneva 
presented a similar, and yet a very different ap- 
pearance. This small state deserves to be 
reckoned among the most remarkable in Eu- 
rope, and from its immense influence upon the 
practice of politics attracts the attention of the 
historian more than many other states which 
far exceed it in size. From a curious assem- 
blage of circumstances, speculation on the science 
of government attained to a degree of vigour 
here, which was not equalled in any other part 
of Europe, and which at once produced its con- 
sequences — some cheering and beneficial; others, 
alas ! dangerous and destructive. 

The names of Calvin, and Servetus, of Vol- 

y In order to avoid repetition I must refer my reader to what I have said 
on this subject, in my Historical Researches, African Nations, vol.ii. App. 
IV. p. 413, of the English translation. 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 157 

taire, of Rousseau, and Necker, bring a throng 
of recollections to the mind ; but in order to 
obtain a full view of the subject with which 
they are connected, we must bestow a passing 
glance upon the position and history of Geneva 
itself. 

The geographical situation of this town un- 
doubtedly contributed to produce a collision of 
ideas, such as could not easily take place else- 
where. Placed upon the borders of France, 
Italy, and Switzerland, it enjoyed a degree of 
intellectual prosperity to which each of the 
neighbouring states contributed its share. Still, 
however, the peculiar character of Geneva was 
determined by the development of its internal 
relations. To this the reformation mainly con- 
tributed — for on their conversion to its principles, 
the Genevese (1533) expelled the bishops, who 
had till then been, in a certain degree, their 
rulers ; although, as in other places, a municipal 
constitution had gradually been formed to re- 
strain them. From that time Geneva maintained 
its independence, notwithstanding the attempts 
of the princes of Savoy : and the goods of the 
clergy, which had been confiscated, were applied 
to the foundation of that university, which has 
since reckoned so many distinguished men 
among its members. In the mean time, it was 
reserved for John Calvin, who established him- 
self here as a reformer, to enable Geneva, by his 
single efforts, to turn the reformation to such 
account, as regarded its poKtical importance, as 



158 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

could never have been hoped for vv^ithout his 
assistance. 

This extraordinary personage, a Frenchman 
by birth, and as much endow^ed with vigour and 
activity as he was furnished with learning, was 
chosen to fill the professor's chair ; and not only 
acquired great political importance by the influ- 
ence which the rigid church discipline, established 
by him at the reformation, secured to himself 
and to the clergy, but became, as a general re- 
former, the head of that party which took its 
name from him. 

Of this party Geneva naturally became the 
chief resort, and from it they spread themselves 
in all directions, and especially towards France, 
where, under the name of Hugonots, they caused 
disturbances from which the most sanguinary 
civil wars took their rise. But, besides the pre- 
sence of Calvin, there was another reason for 
the religious importance of Geneva, and one of a 
more enduring character. 

The new doctrines were nowhere else taught 
in the French tongue ; and thus Geneva neces- 
sarily became the school of the French reformed 
clergy, and, by extending its sphere, involved itself 
more deeply in general politics. 

To these circumstances Geneva was consider- 
ably indebted for the features which so peculiarly 
distinguished it — but not to these alone. — The 

o 

manner in which its internal relations were es- 
tablished was of no less influence. In the same 
year as that in which Calvin settled at Geneva 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 159 

(1536), a change was wrought in the constitu- 
tion of this state upon which its future charac- 
ter depended. The municipal constitution, as 
far as it had been formed under the bishops, was 
purely democratical. The citizens' assembly 
(Conseil general), which included every house- . 
holder who enjoyed the rights of citizenship, de- 
liberated upon all important matters, and elected 
annually, from its own members, four chief 
officers, or syndics, who were obliged to give an 
account of their proceedings to the assembly. 
To these syndics it had, for a considerable time, 
become customary to join assessors, whose 
number had gradually been increased to twenty- 
five, and the body thus formed was called the 
smaller council, (Petit conseil.) Causes which 
will not admit of being historically proved had 
induced the addition of other assessors to the 
smaller council. The number of these was (in 
1526) fixed at two hundred, but afterwards 
amounted to two hundred and fifty ; and thus 
the great council (Grand ^ conseil) was formed, 
in which the smaller council had seats and voices, 
and of which it formed the select committee. 
- It was naturally to be expected that when the 
bishops were expelled, and the state thus became 
wholly free, these institutions should not only be 
preserved, but should acquire a much greater 
importance than before. Up to that time how- 



'■' We must not confound the great council (Grand conseil) with the 
Conseil general, or citizens' assembly. 



160 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

ever, the members of both councils, as well as 
as the syndics, were annually chosen by the ci- 
tizens' assembly, and could, therefore, be only 
considered as delegates of the latter. 

But in the year 1536, at a moment when ge- 
neral attention was fully occupied by matters of 
religion, it was carried, that the trvo councils, the 
great and the small, should re-elect themselves 
annually, subject, however, to an enquiry into 
the conduct of their members. 

It was very difficult at that time for the citi- 
zens to perceive the consequences of such 
changes : they could not, however, but show 
themselves. In the midst of a democracy the 
seeds of an aristocracy had been sown, the 
growth and prosperity of which there was scarce 
any thing left to control. 

The two councils had a common interest; 
they naturally became permanent bodies — natu- 
rally I say, for what could be more natural than 
that the annual election should, when it was 
thus left to themselves, become an empty form ? 
A slight acquaintance with the course of affairs 
in small states will tell us, moreover, that this 
aristocracy could not avoid becoming an aris- 
tocracy of particular families. Meanwhile, how- 
ever, it lasted for a considerable time without 
becoming a cause of dissension ; and for that 
reason was able to establish itself the more 
firmly. The continued attempts of the dukes of 
Savoy to subdue Geneva also contributed to 
divert the attention of the citizens, and at the 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. ici 

same time to create a spirit of unity, which the 
last ineffectual effort in 1602, the well known 
escalade, served greatly to confirm. 

While there was yet no great disparity of pos- 
sessions, while strangers were freely admitted to 
the full rights of citizenship, and while those 
connections were kept up between the upper 
and lower classes which were established by 
sponsorship, (a tie which may not unaptly be 
compared to the patronage of the Romans,) dis- 
turbances were not much to be feared. But all 
this became changed, when at the revocation of 
the edict of Nantes (1685), a host of Hugonots 
fled from France to Geneva. From that time 
the rights of citizenship began to be more spar- 
ingly imparted, and the Genevese formed them- 
selves into distinct classes by the separation, 
among the citizens themselves, of the " Citoyens," 
or elder citizens, (whose family had possessed that 
right for four generations,) from the new citizens, 
or " Bourgeois,'' and among the mere inhabitants, 
of the '^ Hahitans" from the after settlers or " Na- 
tifs :" and with this distinction of classes arose 
also a distinction of rights. The new trades 
which the refugees imported with them, pro- 
duced a great increase of wealth ; and men's 
minds became more at leisure for the considera- 
tion of political questions. In 1707 the contest 
between the aristocracy and the democracy fairly 
commenced, and was from time to time renewed 
in a manner which furnishes the most instructive 
commentary on the struggles of the patricians 

M 



162 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

and plebeians in Rome, with which it agreed as 
well in other points, as in the fate of its martyrs — 
its Fatio, Micheli, and others. The historical 
details of these events do not belong to our plan, 
but it is well worthy of attention that they fre- 
quently arose upon questions closely connected 
with the theory of politics, which was then as- 
suming a new form. 

In none of the other and larger states of Eu- 
rope were those difficult points, regarding the 
sovereignty of the people, the limits between the 
legislative and the executive, and so forth, dis- 
cussed so practically as in Geneva. — It presented 
the curious spectacle of a small, almost the 
smallest free state of Europe, preserving in the 
midst of the great monarchies by which it was 
surrounded, so striking a resemblance to the 
republics of antiquity, as to furnish a commen- 
tary on them, such as the whole continent besides 
could not supply. But there is another point 
on account of which it is still more remarkable^, 
viz. the interference of several of the greater 
states, especially of France, with its internal 
affairs, and the manner in which that interference 
was conducted. Almost all the ministers who 
had charge of the foreign affairs of France — 
Fleury and Choiseul under Louis XV. — Vergue- 
nes and Necker under Louis XVL — took a very 
great and active interest in the politics of Gene- 
va ; but notwithstanding the immense disparity 
of strength, their interference was always cautious 
and respectful, to a degree which could have 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 163 

been necessary only towards a much more impor- 
tant state. And even when, in extreme cases, it 
became unavoidable for the support of one or 
other of the parties, that troops should be ad- 
vanced upon Geneva, still its independence was 
never violated. Indeed the eighteenth century 
may claim as a phenomenon peculiarly its own, 
the instance of an army furnished by three 
powers, France, Sardinia, and Switzerland, and 
assembled before the gates of a town, not for the 
purposes of conquest, but solely with a view of 
restoring by its presence the tranquillity of the 
town itself. No political system which has not 
for its foundation a sacred respect for property 
and a desire to maintain the balance of power 
can present such scenes ! 

Whilst these repeated disturbances, and the 
cautious interference of the great powers which 
they produced, gave to Geneva an importance in 
the eyes of Europe which no other state of the 
same rank could boast, they were also the cause 
of its becoming the central point of speculations 
on the theory of government. It affords a strik- 
ing example of the power which the freedom of 
a republican constitution possesses to awaken a 
spirit of general enquiry, while it at the same 
time shows that the spirit thus roused will natu- 
rally attach itself to the subject of politics, should 
these lie more immediately within its reach. 

But besides its form of government Geneva 
had another advantage in the identity of its lan- 
guage with that of France. By this means it 

m2 



164 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

derived full benefit from every step which the 
latter made : all the new ideas which arose in 
France obtained immediate circulation there. 
And thus^ before we come to '"the citizen of 
Geneva/' whose influence on the theory of poli- 
tics was so extensive, we must first cast a glance 
upon the progress which speculations of this na- 
ture had made in France. 

The age of Louis XIV. had not been by any 
means favourable to them^ but under his succes- 
sors they had fairer scope. The spirit of the 
nation received a sudden impulse from the hand 
of one, who in respect of the attention which he 
excited, became to the French what Locke was 
to the English. He and Locke, however, held 
such different views with regard to the existing 
constitutions of their own countries that this is 
the only point on which a comparison will hold. 

Before Montesquieu, the French nation pos- 
sessed no writer on political subjects whom they 
esteemed sufficiently to consider an authority ; 
but no sooner had the " Esprit des Loix" ^ ap- 
peared, than it obtained so great an influence as 
to render all attacks upon it ineffectual except 
in furthering its success. In these days, how- 
ever, we may ask what the real worth of this 
book is, and what has been effected by it ? 

The whole of Montesquieu's work emaciated 

from the study of history. It is true that he does 

not deserve the praise of having earned by these 

studies the name of a general historian : they 

* It was first published in 1748. 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 165 

were too confined for that. He had studied the 
history of Rome deeply, that of Greece with 
much less attention ; of that of the other na- 
tions of antiquity he knew hardly any thing. 
His acquaintance with the east, a quarter full 
of importance to his enquiries, was confined to 
what a few books of travels could supply. Of 
the histories of the middle and modern ages, 
those of France had interested him most, those 
of Germany and England next. The limits of 
his historical studies were therefore extremely 
narrow; but yet they embraced that diversity 
which was requisite for his purpose ; and, more- 
over, he had pursued these studies in a spirit 
such as none of his predecessors could boast, 
not even Machiavel, who, as the founder of 
practical history among the moderns, might 
otherwise claim a place beside him. 

The object of Montesquieu was to attain by 
the study of history to a knowledge of the very 
essence of states and political constitutions — to 
distinguish the peculiarities of each form; and 
thus to deduce maxims for the administration 
of the different branches of legislature under 
different constitutions. 

His field was therefore of boundless extent 
and proportionate abundance ; but then the sub- 
jects which it embraced possessed of themselves 
the highest practical interest, and had they been 
treated with only moderate ability, the first at- 
tempt on so large a scale could not have failed 
to attract the reader. How much more, then. 



166 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

when they were m the hands of a man so gifted 
as Montesquieu ! Indeed, interesting as we have 
declared the subjects to be of which he treats, 
it was not to them, but to his manner of treating 
of them, that his work owes the great and per- 
manent sensation which it produced. The me- 
thod which he adopted of giving no finished de- 
scriptions, but of only hinting as it were by out- 
line : of never exhausting his subject, and yet of 
saying so much on it in so few words : of busy- 
ing not only the reason by philosophical argu- 
ment and definition, but the imagination by the 
pictures which he often substituted in their 
room — above all, those hghtning flashes of ge- 
nius which perhaps bhnd as often as they illus- 
trate — all this was admirably calculated to se- 
cure him assent and admiration among a people 
such as his own. 

His work contained inexhaustible matter of 
thought for those who wished to think ; whilst 
those who were too indolent for such exertions 
might console themselves with the belief that 
they had gathered from it an abundance of ready 
made thoughts, and these of the brightest descrip- 
tion. 

This exuberance of genius, however, was un- 
accompanied by a true philosophical spirit. The 
mind of Montesquieu was well adapted for de- 
riving shrewd remarks from experience ; but for 
all matters of speculation, as far as that consists 
in the definition and distinction of abstract ideas, 
he was almost totally unfit — nay, he does not 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 167 

even seem to have once felt the want of it ! The 
very first pages of his v^^ork show, what has be- 
fore been justly objected to him, that the author 
of the Spirit of the Laws was incapable of de- 
fining rightly what laws are ; and it is evident 
throughout that he had not a clear notion of 
the first principles of the science of government. 
If any one should think these expressions un- 
just, he had better attempt to derive from Mon- 
tesquieu's own words an idea of the essential 
character of the different kinds of government, 
of despotism, aristocracy, democracy, etc. This 
formed the very foundation of his scheme, and 
yet if we examine it, we shall not wonder at any 
uncertainty or weakness which we meet with in 
the superstructure ''. 



•> It was not without due consideration that I first published my opinion 
of a writer of such high authority, and one whose real merits I fully ac- 
knowledge. I repeat it now with greater confidence, as his last French 
reviewer has fully confirmed it, in his admirable work, Commentaire Cri- 
tique sur VEsprit de Loix, par Le Comtf. Destuth De Tracy, 1812; 
translated, with notes, by professor Morstadt, Heidelberg, 1820. 

The French translator of this treatise, in my Melanges Historiques, 
Paris, 1820, has endeavoured to soften down this criticism, by stating in 
his note, what I am most ready to admit, viz. That I have only considered 
the state of science, and not the circumstances of the time. These, how- 
ever, do not appear to me to have much to do with an opinion as to the 
progress of the theory. 

[The following passage is the first sentence in Montesquieu's ' Spirit of 
Laws :' — " Les loix dans la signification la plus etendue, sont les rapports 
necessaires qui derivent de la nature des choses : et dans ce sens tons les 
fetres ont leur loix ; la Divinite a ses loix, le monde mat6riel a ses loix, 
les intelligences superieures a I'homme ont leurs loix, les bStes ont leur 
loix, I'homme a ses loix." Now, objects widely different, though bearing 
a common name, are here blended and confounded. Of the laws which 
govern the conduct of intelligent and rational animals, some are laws im- 
perative and proper, and others are closely analogous to laws of that de- 



168 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

But although the general theory of govern- 
ment gained so little from Montesquieu, al- 
though his whole work could pretend to be no- 
thing more than an assemblage of maxims, the 
justness and applicability of which it was left to 
the reader to determine, it did not on that ac- 
count work less effectually. It contained, in 
the first place, an inexhaustible treasure for the 
practical study of history ; and although there 
are many single opinions and assertions in which 
we may not agree with Montesquieu, yet his 
labours served sufficiently to point out the ad- 
vantages which might be derived from the study 
of history, as well as the manner in which these 
pursuits should be directed in order to attain 
them. Besides this, it derived great influence 
upon the spirit and way of thinking of the peo- 
ple of France, from the occurrences of the time 
at which it appeared. During the regency of 

scription. But the so called laws which govern the material world, with 
the so called laws which govern the lower animals, are merely laws by 
a metaphor. And the so called laws which govern or determine the Deity, 
are clearly in the same predicament. If his notions were governed and 
determined by laws imperative and proper, he would be in a state of de- 
pendence on another and superior being. When we say that the actions 
of the Deity are governed or determined by laws, we mean that they con- 
form to intentions which the Deity himself has conceived, and which he 
pursues or observes with inflexible steadiness or constancy. To mix these 
figurative laws with laws imperative and proper, is to obscure, and not to 
elucidate, the nature or essence of the latter. The beginning of the pas- 
sage is worthy of the sequel. We are told that laws are the necessary re- 
lations which flow from the nature of things. But what, I would crave, 
are relations'! What, I would also crave, is the nature of things ? And 
how do the necessary relations which flow from the nature of things differ 
from those relations which originate in other sources? The terms of the 
definition are incomparably more obscure than the term which it affects to 
expound." Austin, on Jurisprudence, p. 191, Th.J 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES 169 

the duke of Orleans, as well as after the succes= 
sion of Louis XV., the most shameless corrup- 
tion pervaded the whole government ; the main 
cause of this was usually held to be the sys- 
tematic suppression of the national freedom, the 
remains of which were occasionally perceptible 
in the struggles with the parliament ; while it 
ought, with much more truth, to have been at- 
tributed to the state of morality, especially among 
the higher orders, to which no constitutional 
forms could have offered an impediment. The 
favourite maxims of Montesquieu were thus 
readily appreciated by the spirit of the day — his 
unrestrained attachment to mixed constitutions, 
especially that of Great Britain, could not fail 
to procure him a host of supporters. He met 
public opinion half way^ — was it astonishing then 
that he should be received with so much ap- 
plause ? 

The spirit of political discussion was fairly 
awakened by him among his countrymen, never 
again to be lulled to rest, and from that time 
forth legislation, and the best modes of adapting 
it to the end proposed, became one of the sub- 
jects to which thinking men chiefly turned their 
attention. Montesquieu, therefore, contributed 
largely towards including it in the subject-mat- 
ter of philosophy, although his own enquiries 
proceeded from the study of history, and not 
from the philosophy of the day. 

In fact, of all those men who were at first 
distinguished, as they are now branded, with the 



170 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

name of philosophers, not one had attained to 
any eminence in France till long after Montes- 
quieu had began to busy himself on his ' Spirit 
of Laws".' 

With all the imperfections and deficiencies of 
his work, Montesquieu has the merit then of 
having directed men's enquiries into the paths of 
experience. From the diffusion of his principles 
reform indeed might have been expected, but 
not revolution ; for although he was the enlight- 
ened supporter of a limited monarchical consti- 
tution, he had not on that account endeavoured 
— even in France — to shake the foundation upon 
which the existing order of things had for so long 
rested. He was far from desiring general po- 
litical equality ; on the contrary, he maintained 
that under a monarchy, the leading principle of 
which ought, according to him, to be honow, 
the existence of a nobility is requisite, to pre- 
vent despotism on the one hand, and the tyranny 
of the people on the other ; nor did he ever re- 
ject the clergy as an estate of the realm, although 
he wished some restriction of their privileges, 
especially with regard to their jurisdiction \ If, 
therefore, the idea of a monarchy limited by re- 
iwesentation of the people, became cherished by 
the greater part of the people of France, as the 
result of the first national assembly proved to 
be the case, this must be mainly attributed, next 

^ According to his own account, Montesquieu was occupied for twenty 
years on tliat work. See the end of his preface. 
^ Esprit des Loix, ii. cap. 4. 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 171 

to the example supplied by England, to the work 
of Montesquieu. That this very national assem- 
bly, however, far outwent the intentions of Mon- 
tesquieu, by laying down the principle of uni- 
versal political equality, need not, after what we 
have said, be any further insisted upon. 

And this brings us back to the point from 
whence we started, viz. a review of the theorists 
of Geneva, and especially of him whose work be- 
came the text book of revolution. How far it 
was adapted to this purpose, how far the princi- 
ples practically applied, were really contained in 
it, is a point well worth our determining. But 
in order to gain a just view of the '^Contrat 
Social," we must first bestow a glance upon its 
origin. 

The " Contrat Social" originated in a manner 
directly contrary to the " Esprit des Loix" — the 
latter was the result of experience, supplied by 
the study of history ; the former was the pro- 
duct of imre speculation, which Ptousseau had 
been led to apply to politics from his earlier en- 
quiries as to the origin of a disparity among 
mankind. Nevertheless, however abstract the 
studies of Rousseau may have been, it is very 
certain that the theory of government which he 
entertained, could have been entertained by none 
but " the citizen of Geneva ;" not that the prin- 
ciples which he advocated were those which ob- 
tained a practical influence in Geneva, but if 
any speculative thinker had set himself to mould 
the opinions favoured by the democratical and 



172 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

opposition party, into a political system, and to 
establish them upon philosophical grounds, such 
a work as the '' Contrat Social" must inevitably 
have been the result. It requires a very slight 
acquaintance with this treatise to perceive that 
Rousseau had continually before his eyes a small 
and free state, as being, in fact, the only one 
in which his principles could, to their full extent, 
become applicable. We may therefore justly 
say, that had it not been for the political pro- 
gress of Geneva, the ^'Contrat Social" would 
never have been written. While, on the other 
hand, the already great, although indirect, in- 
fluence of this little republic upon the practical 
politics of Europe, became by it immense. 

It was not Rousseau's design, as it was Mon- 
tesquieu's, to produce a rich collection of political 
rules and maxims, scientifically arranged — he 
sought rather to establish the general principles 
of government upon a philosophical foundation. In 
accordance with the object of our present work, 
it must be shown how he accomplished this, and 
more especially, how, in so doing, he diverged 
from the paths of his predecessors, and was thus 
led oiF to a different conclusion. 

Rousseau, although he differs from both 
Hobbes and Locke in his description of it, pro- 
ceeds, like them, from a " state of nature," out 
of which he supposes men to have advanced into 
civil society by a voluntary contract. This con- 
tract, however, is not concluded between the 
people and their rulers, but between the different 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 173 

members of the commmiity itself, and must, as 
no man has a natural right over his fellow, be 
the result of unanimous agreement. This "pacte 
social" has no other object than to procure social 
institutions, under which the power of all may 
be exercised for the protection of the persons 
and property of each. Each individual, while 
he thus associates himself with all, being yet ■' 
under the authority of none but himself, and thus 
as free as before. All the articles of the con- 
tract may be reduced to this one : that every 
man resigns himself and his rights, without 
reserve, to the society ; or, in other words, 
that he puts himself and his person under the 
direction of the will of the community. In this 
manner the society forms itself into a moral per- 
sonage, or a body which, as such, is entrusted 
with sovereignty, and becomes the sovereign. 
This sovereignty, however, is nothing but the 
exercise of the will of the community, and, as 
such, is not only intransferable, but also, as a 
natural consequence, indivisible. 

But as the exercise of the will of the com- 
munity is effected by legislation, the legislative 
power must of necessity be lodged with the 
people — the people, then, is sovereign ; and, as 
its sovereignty is intransferable, can never cease 
to be so. This power cannot be exercised in 
any other way than by assemblies of the people, 
in which every man gives his vote, and the vote 
of every man is as good as that of his fellows. 
The idea of popular representatives as exercising 



'^ 



174 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

the sovereignty of the people is an absurdity, 
since that sovereignty cannot be transferred. 
Representatives, so called, can be nothing more 
than agents, whose resolutions must be submitted 
to the people for ratification. When this social 
contract was estabhshed, all who took a part in 
it were free, and of equal rights. And the main- 
tenance of this freedom, and this equality, is ne- 
cessarily the object of all legislation, as without 
it society could not exist. 

The equahty here meant, however, does not 
require that all power, and all property, should 
be absolutely equal : but only that the power of 
no man shall be sufficient to commit violence ; 
and that the wealth of none shall be so great as 
to enable them to buy others; the poverty of none 
such as to induce them to submit to being bought. 

But as the state, in its corporate capacity, not 
only wills, but acts, there must be an executive 
as well as a legislative power. This requires a 
government, i. e. a body interposed between the 
sovereign and the subject®. This government, 
however, is nothing more than a committee ap- 
poitited by the sovereign people, the establishment 
of which does not require, or even admit of, a 
mutual contract, inasmuch as it is in perpetual 
dependence on the sovereign power. As regards 
its constitution, it may consist of one, or more, 
or all ; from which variety the three forms of 

^ That is, the people may be considered both as sovereign (inasmuch as 
they make laws), and as subject (inasmuch as they obey them). Sove- 
reign and subject here apply to the same persons in two different relations. 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 175 

monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy have 
arisen^ — although the last of these, considered 
as an executive government, is an absurdity. On 
the whole it appears to be best that this power 
should be lodged in the hands of one ; but then 
it is impossible that great monarchies should be 
well governed — and besides, an hereditary mon- 
archy has very great disadvantages. 

These are, according to Rousseau, the general 
grounds of all government. We shall now find 
little difficulty in remarking the points on which 
he differed from his predecessors, Hobbes and 
Locke. 

With Hobbes, Rousseau agreed in founding 
political society upon a contract : but then 
Hobbes supposed this contract to be between the 
community and its own constituted authorities, 
and that it was a. contract of absolute subjuission, 
by which it transferred the sovereignty without 
reserve. The original contract of Rousseau, on 
the other hand, was only between the individuals 
who by that act established civil society; be- 
tween these, again, and the government there 
was not, nor could there be, any agreement, as 
it consists only of commissioners, deputed by 



f Rousseau was, as far as I know, the first writer who felt, although he 
did not fully explain, the double meaning of the word democracy ; viz. as 
signifying either a form of constitution, or a form of government. 

I must refer, on this subject, to my treatise already mentioned. See 
above, p. 156, note y. 

As a form of government Rousseau considered, and rightly, that a demo- 
cracy is absurd. 

As a form of constitution it was precisely what he sought to establish. 



176 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

the sovereign people. Thus the several routes 
of Hobbes and Rousseau separated at the first 
step, and that with no prospect of reuniting, as 
they w^ere directed towards two opposite marks: 
that of Hobbes to unhmited monarchy, that of 
Rousseau to the absolute power of the people. 
The two are alike only in this point, that both 
tended to despotism, although Rousseau has the 
advantage in phrase, for the despotism of a mob, 
blinded by its own passions, may still retain the 
honourable title of liberty, while it is denied to 
the single tyranny advocated by Hobbes. It 
would be useless to pursue further our com- 
parison between them, as their points of differ- 
ence are sufficiently perceptible. 

With Locke, Rousseau proceeded a few steps 
further before he separated from him. He as- 
serted with him the original freedom and equality 
which the defenders of unlimited monarchy de- 
nied. And consequently he agreed with him 
also in making the social state to proceed from 
a contract among freemen. 
/ Security of person and property was held by 
I both to be the chief object of civil union. And 
they both agreed in considering the legislative 
power as peculiarly belonging to sovereignty — 
that sovereignty being by either ascribed to the 
people, or bulk of the society. But then, accord- 
ing to Locke, the sovereignty might be trans- 
ferred — according to Rousseau it is zoliolly in- 
transferable : according to Locke it might be 
divided among different parties — according to 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 177 

Rousseau it must remain undivided in the hands 
of the people. At this point, then, the two paths 
separate, and it is easy to see the conclusion to 
which that of either necessarily led — Locke ar- 
rived at the Representative System and a limited 
Monarchy, by the union of which the legislative 
power, although partially shared by the prince, 
is mainly in the hands of the representatives of 
the people : Rousseau could not, according to 
his principles, admit any form but imre Demo- 
cracy, as far as that consists in the legislative 
functions being exercised by the whole body of 
the people without any transfer to representa- 
tives, or any participation of other powers in the 
government. 

I trust that these observations will suffice to 
explain the chief points which characterise the 
several political systems which we have exam- 
ined, and to distinguish them from each other. 
All that can be accomplished by pure specu- 
lation towards laying the foundations of civil 
society, and determining the best methods 
for its constitution appears to have been 
achieved by these three authors. Hobbes and 
Rousseau take their place at either extreme — 
the one in support of the total transfer of the 
sovereignty into the hands of the regent — the 
other to assert that the sovereignty is wholly 
intransferable by the people whose right it is — 
whilst Locke holds a middle course between 
the two. 

It remains that we should consider these sys- 

N 



178 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

terns, especially that of Rousseau, with regard to 
their practical applicat'ion. 

They all three proceed from a contract, which, 
as founded on the supposition that it was framed 
by a people who never, till then, had constituted 
a state, neither has, nor ever could have taken 
place. All the three, then, thus at once forsook 
reality, and struck into paths which threatened 
new dangers at every step which carried them 
away from it. The political principles of liobbes 
were, however, less exposed than those of the 
other two, because the absolute power which he 
sought to establish upon rightful grounds, cares 
little for such support, and can maintain itself 
without it. Moreover, the course of events in 
his own country deprived them alike of authority 
and of practical adoption there. 

The doctrines of Locke, on the contrary, had 
for the most part been already applied in England, 
and only had the effect of supplying other coun- 
tries with philosophical reasons for that attach- 
ment to the British constitution which had become 
almost universal throughout Europe previous 
to the late revolutions. As a contrast to this, 
the system of Rousseau floated like Aristophanes' 
City of the Birds, free and without support in 
the air. For while Rousseau asserts that the 
will of the community is always just, and has for 
its object the general good of the community, 
he is undoubtedly right that the common will, 
as far as it is the result of pure reason, will be 
directed towards that which is best for the com- 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 179 

munity. But then, this common will must re- 
main to all practical purposes an empty vision 
unless it has some organ by which it may be 
clearly and surely expressed. This Rousseau 
would have done by the voice of the assembled 
people itself, but he neither can, nor does deny 
that this method is often fallacious, or, to use 
his own words, that the will of all does not al- 
ways express the common will. The people 
may be often deceived and led astray, and Rous- 
seau knows no expedient against it, except — that 
we ought to be on our guard ^. 

None, then, of these metaphysical speculations 
on government can be said to have done much 
for the practical application of the science. But 
even if we were disposed to agree with Rousseau 
as to the organ by which the Common will is to 
be expressed, no great harm would be done, for 
his system could not possibly take effect in a 
state of any considerable size. By denying all 
transfer of the sovereign will to representatives, 
he requires, at the outset, that there should be 
general assemblies of the people which must be 
convened upon every occasion ; and it is easy to 
see that, however readily this might be accom- 
plished in small towns and their adjacent terri- 
tory, it would be wholly out of the question in 
larger states — nay, Rousseau himself declares 
that these can only be formed by federations of 
the smaller. If, therefore, that party in France, 
which looked upon his writings as their standard, 

§■ This important chapter is to be found in the Contrat Social, ii. 3. 

N 2 



180 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

had wished to act consistently, there can be no 
doubt of what his fate would have been had he 
been then alive. As an opponent of the repre- 
sentative system, which they established to its 
full extent, and as a supporter of federative re- 
pubhcs, which according to their principles was 
a capital crime, he would have been doubly des- 
tined to the guillotine ! 

Nevertheless, Rousseau's influence upon the 
revolution was incalculably great ; not in the 
sense of his being the originator of it, for that 
would be a short-sighted view, but inasmuch as 
the direction which the revolution took, was in a 
great measure determined by him. Some great 
name, some high authority was required ; several 
of his ideas were, therefore, taken up — that of 
the sovereignty of the people — of general free- 
dom and equality — and that of the greatest pos- 
sible separation of the legislative and executive 
powers — and were made the foundations of the 
new system. It was no doubt Rousseau, who 
first expanded and perfected these notions, al- 
though he did not originally propose them ; but 
even if he had desired the total overthrow of ex- 
isting things in order to establish his own system, 
(and there is no reason to accuse him of such a 
wish), he would never have tolerated a imrtial 
application of it. This was to abuse not to use, and 
it would be unjust therefore to make him answer- 
able for it. 

Nevertheless, however willing we may be to 
acquit Rousseau of any design of causing revo- 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 181 

lutions, yet it cannot be denied that not only 
those which Europe has experienced since his 
time, but those which threaten it still, may be j 
traced to the principal maxim upon which his/ 
system rests. i 

This maxim is the sovereignty of the people. | 
The danger with which it threatened the prac- 
tice of politics did not, however, consist in the 
maxim itself, for the soveretgnty may doubtless 
be in the hands of the 'people. It was rather in 
Rousseau's belief that this sovereignty may be 
associated with monarchy. The boundary line 
between monarchy and republicanism was thus 
wholly effaced, and the way prepared to errors 
for which Europe has already in part atoned, 
and still atones most dearly. It might surely 
have been thought that after the science of go- 
vernment had been treated of for centuries, after 
it had been laid down upon every occasion, that 
monarchy and republicanism are forms of go- 
vernment in direct opposition to each other, it 
might have been thought, I say, that the pecu- 
liar character of each would have been fully un- 
derstood, and their limits distinctly marked — 
but when a philosopher, such as Rousseau, either 
does not know, or pays no attention to this ; 
when the practical policy of whole nations, and 
of their representatives, is carried on without 
any respect to it, — we have a right to conclude 
that either these lines have never been clearly 
drawn, or (w^iich amounts to the same thing in 
practice) that they have in time become forgotten. 



182 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

And yet there could not be a moment at which 
such an error would be more fatal than the 
present. We have no longer to consider mere 
speculation and theory, the question which con- 
cerns us is one of fearful practical importance. 

Europe, after having apparently escaped from 
the dangers of democracy, is on the verge of 
seeing either monarchical republics, or republics 
under the name of monarchies, occupying the 
chief places among her states. I hold these to 
be more formidable dangers even than those 
from which she has escaped. Of the comparative 
advantages of monarchies and republics Jiothing 
general can be asserted. It is possible to live 
happily or unhappily in either, according to the 
turn w4iich events may take. But we may be 
sure that a nation (with individuals we have 
nothing to do) can never be happy in a pseudo- 
monarchy or a pseudo-republic, because such a 
form of government is contradictory to itself. — 
The history of Poland, as it was, affords at once 
a warning and an example ! 

We wish, therefore, either for actual mon- 
archies, or actual republics. Now the European 
political system has been for centuries mon- 
archical. All the chief states received the name 
of monarchies, and were so in reality. 

The free states belonging to it were of the 
second or third rank. Nothing, therefore, short 
of the most violent revolutions could be sup- 
posed capable of changing this character into its 
opposite. 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 183 

What, then, is the boundary between the 
two ? We know only one, and that must be 
determined by the 'possession of the sovereignty or 
chief power. The essential distinction of mon- 
archy consists in this being held by the prince — 
that of a republic in its being possessed by the 
people, or a certain portion of them. A re- 
public, as well as a monarchy, has but one chief 
officer, but then the relation in which this officer 
stands to the people is very different in the two 
— in a monarchy he is above, in a republic he is 
helow, the people. In the former he is'' prince, or 
sovereign, (whatever title he may bear ;) in the 
latter he is magistrate. Common parlance, 
which is generally the echo of sound reason, has 
long drawn this distinction ; it is only by the so- 
phisms of theorists that it became confused. 
The kings of France and England have the name 
of sovereigns, and are so. The president of 
America and the landammann of Switzerland 
neither receive the title, nor are they sovereigns. 

But this '^ holding of pozc^er over the people" 
this sovereig7ity of monarchs, what does it, and 



•> It would appear, however, that we have authority against us on this 
point in Frederick the Great, who called himself " a Servant of the State, 
who had his duty to perform like others." — Nevertheless, Frederick was 
undoubtedly master in his dominion, and it is impossible to be at once 
master and servant. Had he chosen to follow out this idea, the truth, and 
the falsehood contained in it, would have been easily shown. 

He was no doubt a servant in a moral sense of the word, since, as a man, 
he was subject to the law of conscience, which obliges alike princes and 
servants to do their duty ; but in a political sense he was not so, as he did 
not serve the state but rule it. For the rest, Frederick knew very well the 
distinction between himself as king, and Washington as president. 



184 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

what does it not essentially imply ? For it is 
only by an accurate answer to this question that 
we can determine what is essentially necessary 
to the support of the monarchical principle in 
existing states. 

It implies, in the first place, that the prince 
should possess his dignity independently of the 
people : in other words, that the crown should 
be hereditary and inviolable. Elective kingdoms, 
where the election is only in favour of the indivi- 
dual, and not of his heirs, are not true monarchies. 
Whoever is chosen merely as regards his own 
person, is by the very act of his election sub- 
jected to the people, whatever prerogatives may 
be formally assigned to him. — Whoever is chosen 
merely as regards his own person, may also be 
deposed by his electors, however differently it 
may stand upon paper. 

It is otherwise with those who are elected to 
an hereditary crown. 

Such cases may occur by the actual extinction 
of the reigning house, by abdication, and so 
forth, where there is no one who has an heredi- 
tary claim. There are accidents which no hu- 
man power or wisdom can prevent, and on the 
occurrence of which, the best means which pre- 
sent themselves must be adopted, and thus elec- 
tion is often the only, or at least, the most reason- 
able expedient. But then, if the power bestowed 
by election, be made hereditary, the person who 
receives it is at once raised above the people or 
the electors, as the possession of the throne is 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 185 

then no longer a prerogative of the person but 
of the dynasty. The name of elective mon- 
archies has therefore been very justly restricted 
to those in which every vacancy of the throne is 
filled up by election. That such states are the 
most unhappily constituted, both as regards them- 
selves and the other states with which they 
unite in forming a political system, the history 
of all times will show. Fortunately for Europe, 
elective monarchies have — with the exception of 
the papal government, the mode of election to 
which hardly entitles it to the name — entirely 
disappeared from its system ; and with them the 
danger of those general wars with which the va- 
cancy of the kingly throne of Poland, or the 
imperial one of Germany, was wont to threaten 
the continent. 

The inviolability of the sovereign, i. e. the 
principle that he is not in person accountable, 
and cannot, therefore, be brought to punishment, 
is implied, as a matter of course, in true mon- 
archies : for who in such monarchies is able 
to call him to account ? But if this should be 
included as an article in any of our new consti- 
tutions, it would be either superfluous or absurd; 
superfluous in a true monarchy — absurd in a fic- 
titious one, where the sovereignty is reserved to 
the people, for it would be a contradiction to 
exempt a delegate from being accountable to 
his superiors. Nor is it any secret that, notwith- 
standing all written declarations and assurances, 
there is always in such states a way open for 



186 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC, 

the deposition, imprisonment, and even execu- 
tion of the prince. 

The idea of sovereignty further imphes, and 
that necessarily. That in all affairs of the state, 
nothing shall be done either without or contrary 
to the will of the sovereign. Where this is not 
the case, he ceases to be sovereign (supremus). 

By this essential condition, which indeed re- 
sults from the nature of the thing, we ascertain 
the relation in which, under constitutional mon- 
archies, the sovereign must stand towards the 
people or their representatives ; and we are en- 
abled to draw the line of demarcation which must 
not be passed if the s.overeign is to remain such. 

Constitutional monarchies are those in which 
there is a jmjyular power, generally called the 
Chambers, which represent the interests of the 
people in the councils of the prince, without, 
however, opposing his interests, as it is too cus- 
tomary to imagine they do — the interests of 
both being the same — viz. the prosperity of the 
state. 

This power not only advises, but joins with 
the prince in deciding ; still, however, it must 
be in some manner dependent upon him if he is 
to remain sovereign, and be a prince not in 
name only but in reality. Upon the relation, 
then, in which the prince stands to the chambers, 
the maintenance of the monarchical principle 
chiefly depends, and we must, therefore, consi- 
der what rights ought in this respect to be se- 
cured to him. 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 187 

In speaking of the Chambers we here under- 
stand that both, or at least one of them, is to 
consist of deputies chosen by the people. It is 
doubtless more in favour of the throne that the 
assembly should consist of two chambers, one of 
which should be composed of members not 
chosen by the people, but possessing their seats 
either by right of birth or by appointment of the 
sovereign ; but it cannot be shown that this is 
generally necessary. Sometimes, indeed, cham- 
bers of peers are neither necessary to the throne 
nor any support to it, nay, France has lately 
shown by example that a powerful opposition 
may be formed in them. 

The division into two chambers affords greater 
security, however, against party decisions, and 
makes it more difficult for factions to be formed 
and their interests preferred to those of the 
state. It is necessary, however, that the two 
chambers should not have two interests, and that 
the members of the one should not possess any 
privileges which are burdensome to the other, 
for without this, unanimity cannot be expected 
between them. 

The rights of the prince in his relation with 
the chambers, as far as these proceed from the 
definition of sovereignty, may be reduced into 
three classes, viz. Those which have reference 
to outward form — those which have reference 
to the subject matter on which his power is to 
be exerted — and those which regard the share 
which the prince is to take in the councils of 



188 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

the nation, and the mfluence which he is to ex- 
ercise over tiiem. 

As regards the outward forms , the idea of so- 
vereignty requires that the chambers should be 
in strict subjection to the prince. These out- 
ward fo7mis are the barriers which are to protect 
the crown from the inroads of the chambers. 
They should be determined by the charter of 
the constitution, and it should be incumbent on 
the prince to maintain them in full force. 

The chambers are not to assemble without, 
or in opposition to, the will of the sovereign. 
They are to be opened by him, to be prorogued, 
and to be closed by him; and he must at all 
times possess the right of dissolving the existing 
chamber, and of calling for a new election of its 
members. When chambers assemble, prorogue, 
adjourn, and dissolve of their own authority, the 
assembly takes place at once witliout the will of 
the prince and will very soon be held in opposi- 
tion to it. Again, a chamber which cannot be 
dissolved by the prince is independent, and su- 
perior to him. He has no means of escaping 
from its tyranny if it should form itself into a 
faction, and no opportunity of discovering whe- 
ther it represents the wishes of its constituents, 
or stands in direct opposition to them. It is 
only by a new election that this can be certainly 
determined. It is requisite, therefore, not only 
for the interests of the prince, but for those of 
the people also, that he should have the power 
of dissolving the chamber of representatives. 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 189 

In regard to the subjects which are to be dis- 
cussed by the chambers, we may remark at once 
that all the foreign affairs of the state are to be 
beyond their jurisdiction, and appropriated to 
the prince. In treating with other states the 
prince must be considered as the representative 
of his own, otherwise they cannot deal with him 
with any safety ; should it be done only " sub 
spe rati/' they will no longer consider him as 
sovereign, but as the delegate of a superior 
power. The maintenance of the monarchical 
principle requires, therefore, according to our 
views, that not only all treaties of commerce and 
alliance, but that all declarations of war and con- 
clusions of peace, should be absolutely in the 
hands of the prince. This, however, does not 
by any means exclude the chambers from de- 
bating upon foreign policy, and from giving 
their opinion either in praise or blame of the 
measures which the government may have 
adopted. 

How far such proceedings may be advisable is 
a question with which we have nothing to do, as 
it does not bear upon the maintenance of the 
monarchical principle. 

The sphere of the chambers, then, as a body, 
sharing the power of ultimate decision with the 
prince, is confined to the internal affairs of legis- 
lation and taxation. In these there is no third 
party concerned : but in the dealings between 
the two the monarchical principle is sustained 
by the veto, which must be allowed uncondition- 



190 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

ally to the prince. In compliance with the 
favourite notion of the sovereignty of the people^ 
frequent attempts have of late been made to 
restrict the veto, by determining that the prince 
may refuse his approval once, or even twice, but 
that after this the law shall be valid without it. 

It is evident that this arrangement is wholly 
incompatible with the principle of monarchy, 
and, moreover, absurd in itself. It is incompat- 
ible with monarchy, because it assumes that a 
law may pass without the will of the sovereign. 
It is absurd, because there can be no reason why 
the monarchical principle should not rather be 
done away with at once, than after the lapse of 
two or three years. 

There is no doubt that the use of the veto is 
an evil in each case to which it is applied, be- 
cause it presumes that there is a difference be- 
tween the prince and the chambers : but even 
though it should become, as in England, a mere 
form, it is yet important that the prince should 
possess the right, since circumstances may render 
it valuable. 

It remains that we should consider the rela- 
tions in which the prince stands to the chambers 
with respect to the influence which he should ex- 
ercise over them. The monarchical principle re- 
quires that the prince should have the right of 
introducing measures into the chambers ; he is 
to possess, in technical language, the right of 
the initiative. But the question which arises is, 
whether this right is to be confined to him alone. 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 191 

whether he is to be the only source of legisla- 
tion, or whether the members of the chambers 
are to be allowed a share in it ? 

Under the stipulation that the prince is to re- 
tain the power of approval or rejection, it does 
not appear necessary that the initiative should 
be wholly reserved to him ; while to refuse it to 
the chambers would entail the contradiction of 
denying the representatives of the people all 
opportunity of expressing its wants. This ob- 
ject, however, may be obtained by requiring that 
the chambers should be obliged to sue the go- 
vernment under certain forms, for permission to 
introduce a measure, so that the latter only 
would retain the formal right. And this institu- 
tion would possess the further advantage of 
throwing great obstacles in the way, if not of 
wholly preventing, all dissensions between the 
prince and the chambers. It is not, however, 
the object of this enquiry to ascertain what may 
best suit the peculiar circumstances of different 
nations. 

If the monarchical principle requires that the 
prince should have the power of introducing 
measures into the chambers, it follows of course 
that he must also possess the means of con- 
vincing the chambers of the expediency and ne- 
cessity of his proposals, and of inducing the 
adoption of them. He must, therefore, possess 
an influence in the chambers, since motions 
must be made in favour of these measures, and 
they must be supported in debate. This cannot 



192 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC, 

be better done than by the ministers who are 
the natural organ of the prince. The ministers, 
therefore, must have seats and voices in the 
chambers, whether as ministers or as elected 
members, does not matter. Nothing is more 
mistaken than the restriction of the ministers in 
the chambers, or their exclusion from them, in 
order, as it is said, to prevent the government 
influence from becoming too great. It is only 
from a false belief that the government and the 
chambers are in natural hostility to each other, 
that such regulations could proceed : but if the 
prince and the chambers are to communicate 
with each other, through whom can it be better 
effected than the ministers who originate the 
proposals, and must, therefore, best understand 
their intention ? 

We need hardly mention that the monarchical 
principle requires that the prince should have 
the power which every private person has, of 
choosing his own servants and advisers, and of 
dismissing them at will. It appears, in fact, 
almost incredible that this right should ever have 
been disputed. Chambers which claim the dic- 
tation of the servants and counsellors of a prince, 
not only invade the province of government, but 
by that act declare their prince for ever in- 
capable, and range themselves in a faction, 
whose object is to silence every voice but their 
own. 

We have thus, according to our plan, traced 
out the relations which should exist between 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 193 

princes and their chambers, if the monarchical 
principle is to be maintained. The further de- 
velopment of them we leave to politicians. But 
if any one should think that too much is here 
allowed to the sovereign, I would refer him to 
Great Britain' as a proof that all these conditions 
may be fulfilled and the rights of the prince 
maintained without infringing the liberties of the 
nation''. This will be an answer, at least to 
those who desire a true monarchy and not a re- 
public. In that state a fortunate concurrence 
of circumstances has for ages been at work in 
forming the constitution. It is not, therefore, 
in the situation of the continental states which 
have to provide themselves with a constitution 
for the first time, and the question cannot be 
there asked which has been asked here : viz. 



» [How far recent events may have changed the constitution of Great 
Britain, and made it inconsistent with the conditions prescribed by Pro- 
fessor Heeren, the reader may himself determine. One point appears to 
be generally admitted, if not so generally lamented, viz. that by the de- 
struction of the government boroughs the crown must henceforth be limited 
in its choice of ministers to such men as the constituent bodies of the 
country may, for the moment, be willing to return to parliament. And 
yet perfect freedom in this respect is, by Professor Heeren, considered so 
essential to the idea of monarchy, as scarcely to call for remark. See 
above, p. 192. Tr.] 

^ The author trusts that he will not, on this account, be supposed to 
wish for the introduction of the entire British constitution into the states 
of the continent. He is well aware of the impossibility of this. And even 
if it were possible, he is by no means inclined to think it desirable. A di- 
versity and multiplicity of constitutions is the inseparable condition of our 
political, and with it of our general, improvement. But this should not 
prevent us from deriving some practical hints from so great and prominent 
an example ; due regard being of course had to the situation in which we 
are placed. To deny that any thing from thence is applicable here, would 
be as absurd as to assert that every thing is so. 

O 



194 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

From whom is this constitution to corned The 
answer to the question itself is simple. From 
the sovereign power. In monarchies, therefore, 
from the princes. In republics, from the people 
or their representatives. The only difficulty 
which attends it has arisen from an attempt to 
apply the notions which the writers above-named 
entertained on the origin of states, to the pre- 
sent time. An application of which they will 
by no means admit. All those writers suppose a 
" state of nature," out of which men advanced 
into civil society : but in none of the countries 
which desire the establishment of a constitution 
does such a state exist. In every one of them 
there is an existent sovereign : from whom but 
him ought these new institutions to proceed? 
It is only by assuming with Rousseau that even 
in monarchies there is a dormant sovereignty of 
the people, which may upon any occasion be 
awakened and become active, that this right can 
be denied. 

But although, according to our views both 
expediency and justice require that these new 
institutions should proceed from the existing 
authority, yet this by no means implies that the 
princes may not be assisted in planning them by 
a body of advisers, even though that body should 
be popularly constituted. This much, however, 
I believe to be necessary for the maintenance of 
the monarchical principle, viz. that such a body 
should have the power of advising, and that 
only. 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 195 

Experience of recent date has shown the con- 
sequences of greater concessions ; the universal 
acceptance of a constitution by the voice of the 
people, can never be any thing but an empty 
form, and the regular establishment of it by 
the states may be easily shown to bring greater 
dangers than a concession of it by the so- 
vereign. 

Were it possible, within the German confede- 
ration alone, to come to an agreement on the 
boundary hne which should be drawn under 
the new constitutions between the rights of the 
prince and of the states, were the points which 
we have stipulated for above, assumed as matters 
of course, the rest would consist chiefly of local 
modifications which could easily be determined 
by common consent'. 

' [At the congress of Vienna it was provided that representative con- 
stitutions should be adopted by the federate states of Germany. But the 
article (the 13th of the Act of Confederation) was so vaguely worded as to 
admit of almost any latitude of meaning ; and accordingly different expo- 
sitions of it were made and supported by different princes ; many of which, 
as may be believed, tended to the continuance of their own authority. 
See Russel's Germany, i. 106. The list, however, of those states whose 
rulers have either adopted or had thrust upon them the liberal meaning of 
the article, is now pretty large, and embraces Bavaria, Wirtemberg, Hano- 
ver, Baden, the Grand Duchy of Hesse, Brunswick, Nassau, Mecklen- 
burg, Saxe Weimar, etc. Of these, Saxe Weimar was the first to receive 
the boon, although from Russel's amusing description its value does not 
appear to have been very fully appreciated by the people. 

All these constitutions (to quote the words of Heerea himself, in the 
new edition of his Manual) " Notwithstanding many modifications, in re- 
spect both of the organisation and the greater or less publicity of their 
transactions, have hitherto coincided in the following points : 1st. The 
monarchical principle has every where been upheld, in the mode of con- 
ferring constitutions by the rulers, and by a just determination of their 

o2 



196 ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, ETC. 

The voice of those who demand constitutional 
governments is become too loud to be silenced 
without danger. But at the same time there is 
no doubt but that expectations are entertained 
which no change in the forms of the states 
themselves can satisfy. 

Those who have speculated upon the forms 
of constitutional government^ and set up new 
maxims of their own, ought at the same time to 
have learnt to estimate those forms at their true 
value. They should have shown what they 
admit of being, and of producing. But in reject- 
ing this course, in giving themselves up without 
reserve to their metaphysical speculations, they 
have originated and constantly kept up the error, 
that every thing depends upon these forms ; and 
that from them, and not from the spirit of the 
government and of the administration, the wel- 
fare or ruin of states must proceed. And thus 
it has become more and more customary to con- 
sider the state as a machine ; and whilst men 
speak of the tnach'me of state, they have fallen 
into the dangerous mistake of supposing that 
this macJdne may, like any other, be taken to 
pieces and put together again at will. 

They forget that not only mechanical but 

rights in relation to the states. 2ndly. The assembly of the states consists of 
two chambers. 3rdly. To these is allotted their proper part in the legisla- 
tion, especially with regard to taxation." 

The 13th article, therefore, does not appear to have been wholly inopera- 
tive ; but it must be remembered that the act which contains it, also con- 
tains provisions for the Diet of Frankfort. Tn.J 



OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 197 

moral powers are at work in it ! What are state 
forms themselves beyond any other empty forms ? 
What more are they — if I may be allowed a si- 
mile, not perhaps sufficiently exalted, but yet 
most applicable — than the track in which the 
chariot wheels are to run ? It certainly is not 
a matter of indifference how this track is formed, 
for if it be even and easy, the motion will be so 
also — if it be uneven and rough, the checks will 
be more frequent, and some improvements will 
be required. If it be wholly useless, it must be 
given up ; but be it ever so good, are we thereby 
assured that the chariot will continue in the 
track ? Will the track alone be sufficient to re- 
strain it ? This depends rather upon the steeds 
who draw, and the charioteer who guides. 

But to drop all metaphor — no forms will be- 
nefit a state, unless the government and people 
be moral and enlightened. And as to devising 
any which shall contain the warrant of its own 
stability, this would be even more absurd than 
to endeavour the discovery of a perpetuum mo- 
bile which should maintain its own impulse for 
ever. 



HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 

OF THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE 

CONTINENTAL INTERESTS 

OF GREAT BRITAIN. 



HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 

OF THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE 

CONTINENTAL INTERESTS 

OF GREAT BRITAIN. 

The political system of Europe is greatly and 
beneficially modified by containing within it an 
insular state, which by its extent, and the use 
to which it applies its domestic resources, main- 
tains its rank among the leading powers. How- 
ever great the resemblance which may exist 
amongst the cultivated nations of Europe in 
points of civilisation, religion, and language, the 
insular character of such a state necessarily gives 
rise to certain peculiarities, which cannot be 
effaced. The barriers which nature has inter- 
posed between it and the rest of the world, 
almost certainly produce a feeling of indepen- 
dence among its inhabitants, which may not only 
be in the highest degree useful to themselves, 
but may also serve as an example to others ; 
and that in our quarter of the world it has done 
so, is sufficiently proved by the history of mo- 
dern Europe. Moreover, the existence of such 
a power gives greater security to the political 
system to which it belongs, against the occur- 
rence of a revolution, which would at one blow 
annihilate the whole : since the situation of such 



202 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

a state will either altogether exempt it, or at 
least enable it more easily to escape the shock. 
But the peculiar importance of such a state to 
the whole system, consists in the necessity which 
its own maintenance imposes, of becoming a 
naval power ; and thus rendering it impossible 
that land forces alone should decide the su- 
premacy. In every system of states, the pre- 
eminence of one over the rest must eventually 
ensue, (especially when there is a considerable 
difference of power among the members,) if the 
preponderance depend upon land forces alone. 
Even the expedient of the balance of power, 
however carefully planned, will prove but a weak 
security against the occurrence of some favour- 
able opportunity by which the state whose re- 
sources, or the talent of its leaders, or both, 
have rendered it the strongest, may be enabled 
to take that power into its own hands which in 
the common course of affairs will at some time 
or other lead to oppression and tyranny, al- 
though it may not at first assume so decisive a 
character. The rise, therefore, of one or more 
naval powers, by providing that in the poHtical 
balance no single interest shall have the pre- 
ponderance, is of itself most beneficial to the 
whole ; and the more so, because from the very 
nature of such a power it cannot itself become 
dangerous to the independence of the rest. But 
to the reflecting observer, the existence of naval 
powers acquires its chief interest from the con- 
sideration that they can only result from an 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 203 

advanced state of civilisation. Barbarians, it is 
true, will fit out ships for piracy ; or if they are 
sufficiently powerful, for the purpose of convey- 
ing their armies into foreign countries and sub- 
duing them ; but a naval power, in the true 
sense of the word, arises only from a participa- 
tion in the commerce of the world, and has for 
its proper object the protection of its shipping 
and its colonies in distant seas. This presup- 
poses, therefore, that both shipping and colonies 
are already in existence ; and as they cannot ex- 
ist except under a high state of civilisation, it 
follows that without such, there cannot be a 
naval power. The history of modern Europe 
affords an indisputable proof of this ; for it de- 
monstrates clearly and decidedly that the ad- 
vance of political civiHsation, and the decrease 
of ambitious dreams and plans of universal mon- 
archy, correspond with the gradual formation of 
naval powers and the growth of their influence 
upon the political balance. 

The policy of a naval power as such, must 
necessarily have some peculiarities; but much 
more so, when this power occupies, like England, 
an insular position. We should undoubtedly be 
taking a very partial view, were we to found 
upon this peculiarity in its geographical situa- 
tion a system of politics, the rules of which such 
a state should be supposed invariably to follow ; 
for as long as it stands in various relations to 
other states — as long as their fortunes are an 
object of interest to it, and more especially as 



204 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

long as it is a member of a political system, it 
will be compelled according to the variation in 
these circumstances, to vary its own maxims of 
policy. But the relations in which an insular 
state stands to those of the continent, may ne- 
vertheless be reduced to certain general classes, 
which have reference to as many distinct inter- 
ests ; and this arrangement seems here to be 
the more important, since in an historical de- 
velopment of the British continental interests, 
each of these classes comes, at certain periods, 
under consideration. 

We may distinguish four distinct interests by 
which, notwithstanding its geographical separa- 
tion, an insular state may become politically 
bound, as it were, to the continent. 1st. The 
interest of independence .and security. 2nd. 
The interest of trade and commerce. 3rd. The 
interest of aggrandisement, by conquest on the 
continent. 4th. The personal and family in- 
terest of the rulers. 

With regard to the two last of these classes, 
I have nothing general to say ; for they are in 
themselves sufficiently intelligible ; and in the 
case of England, the former does not exist ; 
while as to the latter, no one doubts that the 
agreement or disagreement of the family with 
the national interest, is the only rule by which 
its value can be determined. But the two first 
classes require a more minute examination, not 
only separately, but also in their mutual relation 
to each other. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 205 

It is most ungrounded to suppose that be- 
cause an insular state is supported by a navy, it 
is therefore to take no share in the political 
transactions of other states. It is certainly by 
its navy rendered more secure, but by no means 
perfectly so. Even with numerous fleets it is 
not always possible to cover widely extended 
coasts ; and when it is besides necessary for 
such a power to defend many and distant pos- 
sessions, on the preservation of which its ex- 
istence, or at least its wealth, depends, the diffi- 
culty is greatly increased. It is true, an insular 
power has not much to fear from the growth of 
one which is powerful only by land ; but on the 
other hand, the danger is doubly increased when 
this power is also a naval power, and as such 
copes with it. In this relation stood France 
and England to each other. The proximity of 
their situations, the contiguity of their foreign 
possessions, the national hatred which for cen- 
turies had received constant nourishment, neces- 
sarily produced a rivalry such as does not and 
could not exist elsewhere. 

But when such an insular power is at the 
same time a commercial state, there becomes 
connected with the political interest, a commer- 
cial one, which will not permit continental rela- 
tions to be neglected. This commercial inter- 
est can have no other object than keeping open, 
and as much as possible enlarging, the market 
for the disposal of its merchandise ; and from 
this necessarily follows a closer alliance with 



206 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

those nations who will encourage or promote 
such disposal. Prudence forbids indifference to 
the fortunes of these allies ; and thus arises of 
itself the connection between political and com- 
mercial interests. But notwithstanding the truth 
of this^ it cannot be denied that this connection 
has in modern politics been frequently consi- 
dered as more binding than it really is. It is 
sufficiently proved by experience, that the pro- 
gress of commerce depends immediately on the 
wants of the buyer and the interest of the seller. 
Pohtical relations may impede or promote, but 
they can neither create or destroy it. In coun- 
tries where the means of communication are, as 
in Europe, so various and so easy, commerce 
will find a channel even in the hottest wars, and 
under the severest restrictions. Where demand 
exists on one side, and the love of gain on the 
other, they easily overcome or evade the im- 
pediments thrown in their way by governments. 
The experience of modern times has thrown 
much light upon the connection of political and 
mercantile interests ; it has shown that if they 
cannot be wholly separated, neither are they so 
closely related as they were held to be in times 
when it was thought that the course which com- 
merce should take, might be prescribed by mer- 
cantile treaties, or mercantile interdictions. 

Independently of these causes, there is yet 
another ground which renders it impossible for 
an insular power, which occupies a prominent 
place in a political system, to be indifferent to 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 207 

the proceedings of other states ; a ground, which 
in the eyes of a practical poUtician, is certainly 
far from unimportant — the maintenance of its 
station and dignity as a member of that system. 
In a political body like that of modern Europe, 
where such unwearied activity prevails, where 
so many energies are constantly at work, any 
seclusion from the common affairs, even when 
of no immediate importance to it, would, to a 
powerful and leading state, be the unavoidable 
commencement of its decline. In proportion as 
such a state contracts its sphere, that of its rival 
must necessarily expand; while the one loses, 
the other gains ; and how desirable soever the 
maintenance of peace may be, the remark is not 
without its value, that power increases only 
through a struggle, and that a long peace pur- 
chased by such politics as these, often proves a 
very dangerous blessing. 

The history of Europe has furnished many 
useful examples in this respect ; but none more 
so than that of the United Netherlands. Its 
active interference in the politics of Europe cost 
this state many heavy sacrifices, and even re- 
duced it to the brink of destruction. After the 
peace of Utrecht, it embraced the opposite prin- 
ciple, and has maintained it as steadily as it has 
been able. But from that period began its de- 
cline, and the internal causes of its fall worked 
thenceforth with a certainty proportionate to 
their undisturbed development. An absolute 
monarchy, which chiefly depends upon the ge- 



208 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

nius of the ruler, is much more calculated to 
outlast a long period of peace ; although even 
here symptoms of decline are usually visible. 
But in a state with a republican constitution, 
whether combined with monarchy or not, other 
causes step in, which, under such circumstances, 
must almost necessarily prove detrimental. The 
times of peace are here generally the times of 
factions ; which, although they may not directly 
bring on a civil war, do not the less gnaw at the 
very heart of the state. An active participation 
in foreign affairs, on the other hand, is well cal- 
culated to avert the internal fermentation ; it 
affords a subject of common interest to all ; 
whereas men's political opinions invariably be- 
come divided when they turn only upon their 
domestic relations. 

This, however, will not, it is hoped, be under- 
stood as a defence of rash and general inter- 
ference in foreign politics and wars. Between 
such thoughtless interference and indolent apa- 
thy, there is a medium which is fixed by the 
interest and the strength of the power con- 
cerned ; and it is of the observance of this me- 
dium that we are now speaking. In order not 
to exceed it, the statesman must have not only 
clear and fixed notions respecting the real in- 
terests, but also respecting the extent of influ- 
ence which the state possesses, of which he 
guides the helm ; and the latter of these seems 
no less difficult to attain to than the former ; 
for the delusions of pride and self-conceit are to 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 209 

the full as dangerous as those of ambition and 
self-interest. 

These considerations may serve as an intro- 
duction to the following inquiry, which has for 
its aim, an historical development of the con- 
tinental interests of Great Britain, during the 
last three centuries. The task which I pro- 
pose to myself, is to give in chronological ar- 
rangement, a review of the hnks by which the 
political and mercantile interests of England 
were bound up with those of the continent ; 
and to examine how they became united, and 
how loosened. Unconnected and transient re- 
lations, such as sometimes arose in the course 
of great wars, do not come under our consi- 
deration ; those only, which were lasting, de- 
serve our attention. The history of the con- 
tinental interests of Britain can be clearly view- 
ed only, by considering it according to the 
periods in which it was subject to its principal 
changes. We must therefore take the follow- 
ing: — 1. The period from Henry VII. to Eliza- 
beth. 2. That of Elizabeth. 3. That of the 
Stewarts, down to WiUiam III. 4. That of 
William III. and Anne. 5. That of the house 
of Hanover, down to the commencement of the 
French revolution. 6. The period from this, 
down to the restoration of the political system 
of Europe, which the revolution had destroyed. 



210 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

FIRST PERIOD. 

FROM HENRY VII. TO ELIZABETH, 1484—1558. 

Even during the middle ages, England had 
taken a very active part in the affairs of the 
continent, by her wars with France, and her 
endeavours to conquer that kingdom. The 
marriage of Isabella, daughter of Philip the 
Handsome, with Edward II., — a marriage in so 
many respects unfortunate, — had laid the found- 
ation of these contests, since Edward III., the 
offspring of this union, grounded his claims to 
the French throne, in opposition to those of the 
house of Valois, upon his maternal descent. A 
series of wars ensued, which for a long time 
were as fortunate for England, as their conse- 
quences in the middle of the 15th century were 
fatal. The political interest which connected 
England with the continent, was therefore at 
this period only one of conquest. In times when 
the principles by which politics were directed 
were as yet coarse and unrefined, and when the 
love of conquest was the sole spring of action, 
such plans were possible, although even then 
there were evident indications, that a lasting 
subjection of France to England was nothing 
but a dream. Since the year 1450, the English 
had been excluded from France, but the bare 
title of king of France was not all which Eng- 
land retained. Political ideas, so deeply rooted 
as these were, are not easily got rid of; and the 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 211 

result shows, that they were active in England 
throughout the whole of this period, since every 
opportunity was eagerly seized, which held out 
the least chance of carrying them into execu- 
tion. Brittany was at that time under the rule 
of its own dukes, in whom, as they were almost 
constantly embroiled with the kings of France, 
England found allies within France itself; and 
had not this position of affairs been altered, by 
the extinction of the male line (1488) and the 
subsequent union of the heiress Anna with 
Charles VIII., the consequences of it would 
probably have been long felt. Besides, whilst 
Calais remained in the hands of the English, it 
was imagined that they possessed as it were the 
gate of France, by which they might enter as 
often as they thought fit. 

But even in the reign of Henry VII., England 
obtained by family connection an interest in the 
continent. Arthur, son of Henry VII., married 
Catharine, daughter of Ferdinand the Catholic ; 
and upon his death, while still a youth, she be- 
came the wife of his brother, afterwards Henry 
VIII. 

During the reign of Henry VII., these rela- 
tions could not have any important conse- 
quences, because he purposely avoided, as much 
as possible, all interference in foreign transac- 
tions, in order to secure his own throne. Once 
only he crossed over to Calais with an army, to 
please Maximilian I., when he was deprived of 
his betrothed bride, Anna, the heiress of Brit- 

p2 



212 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

tany, by Charles VIII., who thus laid the found- 
ation for this important acquisition ; but al- 
though the English interest was, by this circum- 
stance, exposed to imminent danger, it was more 
a financial, than a military expedition. For 
600,000 crowns Charles VIII. purchased the 
treaty of Estaples (1492); in a few weeks Henry 
returned home, and the alliance between Eng- 
land and Brittany was for ever dissolved. 

But during the reign of his son and successor, 
Henry VIII. (1509 — 1547), the conseqences be- 
came, on this account, the more striking. When 
he ascended the throne, Italy had by the league 
of Cambray, become the centre of European 
politics. England, from her position and other 
circumstances, could derive no benefit whatever 
from taking a share in the proceedings in Italy ; 
nay, her neutrality must have given her the ad- 
vantage over France, while this state was fruit- 
lessly expending its strength in attempts at con- 
qests. But the family connection with Spain 
was now employed by his father-in-law, Ferdi- 
nand the Catholic, for the purpose of involving 
Henry in these transactions. 

When the league of Cambray fell to pieces, 
and out of it arose the holy league against 
France, Ferdinand joined himself to it, in order 
to find an opportunity of seizing Navarre. He 
fully estimated the advantages which would pro- 
bably result to him from the interference of 
Henry, whom he flattered with the hope of be- 
ing able to enforce his old claims to Guienne. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 213 

He obtained his object ; Henry VHI. quarrelled 
with France, and when he had done so, his 
father-in-law and his other alhes forsook him, 
and after a fruitless invasion of Picardy, he put 
an end to this war, which had exhausted the 
crown treasures left hira by his father, by a 
peace (1514) intended to be confirmed by the 
marriage of his sister to Louis XH. 

An interest so entirely misunderstood as this 
had been, and only raised by the craftiness of a 
false friend, could not be otherwise than tran- 
sient. But the times soon changed ; and when 
Louis XH. and Ferdinand (1516) left the stage, 
at nearly the same time, and Francis L and 
Charles V. stepped into their places, new rela- 
tions arose, which became, or at least seemed to 
become, much more important to the conti- 
nental interests of Great Britain, The new rivalry 
between the French and Austrian-Spanish houses, 
first laid the foundation of the system of a ba- 
lance of power, and four bloody wars between 
Charles and Francis were the result. 

Under these circumstances, it was very natu- 
ral, that the idea should arise in England, that 
she was able to turn the scale in these wars. 
And what can we conceive so well calculated to 
flatter the vanity of Henry VHL, as to consider 
himself the umpire of Europe ? And indeed he 
seemed to have many means in his power for 
accomplishing this object. If he embraced the 
side of Charles, he could easily injure France, 
since the possession of Calais made it easy for 



214 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

him to land troops on the French coast ; and if 
he joined the party of Francis, he could, in the 
same manner, make an incursion into the Fle- 
mish possessions of Charles V. We cannot, there- 
fore, be surprised, that he really assumed this 
character ; but he acted it so badly, that it led 
to no results ; and by casting a single glance 
into history, we shall easily discover why it did 
not. When the contest between Francis I. and 
Charles V. first began, in the year 1521, and 
both monarchs strove for the friendship of 
Henry, it was for a time uncertain which side 
he would join, until at length Charles succeeded 
in winning over cardinal Wolsey, by promises 
and flattery. Through him the king was also 
gained. But still the war in Picardy was only 
a subordinate transaction, and its results could 
be of no great importance. The melancholy 
fate of Francis I. at Pavia (1525) brought Henry 
to his senses. He now began to fear, that his 
ally might become too strong ; he therefore for- 
sook him, and after the peace of Madrid, by 
which Francis bought his freedom at the ex- 
pense of conditions which he had no intention 
of fulfilling (1527), he even went so far as to 
unite himself with his former enemy. But at 
the commencement of the second war, he volun- 
tarily disabled himself; since he was induced, by 
commercial considerations, to concede to the 
emperor the neutrality of the Netherlands, the 
only point in which he was capable of doing 
him any injury. The consequence was, that he 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN 215 

gave his ally no assistance, and as his attention 
was engaged during the war, by religious mat- 
ters, and the question of his own marriage, he 
appeared wholly to have forgotten the important 
part which he was to play, and took no share 
in the third war between those two monarchs, 
which was concluded by the ten years' armistice 
of Nice (1538). But when the fourth broke out 
(1541), he formed a close alliance with Charles, 
not because he then feared the power of France, 
but because he wished to gratify his own capri- 
cious humours. The compact which he con- 
cluded with Charles V., is a striking example of 
the politics of that time ; the conditions show 
that there was no intention they should be ob- 
served, because their observance was impossible. 
Henry VIII. desired nothing less than the 
French crown, and in order to conquer the 
whole of France, he went to Calais with an in- 
significant force, while Charles invaded Cham- 
pagne. But the allies fell out amongst them- 
selves ; Charles concluded a separate treaty at 
Cressy (1544), and left his ally to get out of his 
difficulties as he best could ; Henry was con- 
tented with the promise of an annual payment, 
which, on the other side, there was no intention 
of discharging, although Boulogne % which he 
had taken, was left in his hands as a pledge for 
eight years. 

From all this it is clear, that the pretended 

=* This, during the reign of his son, was recovered by France, on the 
payment of a much smaller sum than had been originally stipulated. 



216 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

maintenance of the balance between the two 
great powers of the continent, in these times, 
existed only in name. A monarch, who was 
ever the slave of his inclination, and the tool of 
those by whom he was surromided, was incapa- 
ble of adhering to a firm line of politics ; and this 
remark applies with equal truth to his minister, 
cardinal Wolsey, who was not less guided by 
his passions than his master. It might have 
been expected, that the new interest created 
under Henry VIII. by the Reformation, might 
have caused a connection between England and 
the continent ; but the conduct of Henry ren- 
dered this impossible, notwithstanding the share 
which he took in these transactions. As long 
as he claimed the supremacy, and only ex- 
changed the power of the pope in England for 
his own, without tolerating the protestant doc- 
trine, the adherents of which he persecuted, 
there could be no union between him and the 
protestant princes of Germany ; and the attempts 
which he made to attain this object were neces- 
sarily fruitless. 

Under the government of his son and succes- 
sor, Edward VI., the political connection with 
the continent was not in any way strengthened ; 
it was, on the contrary, made apparent, that the 
ties by which, under Henry VIII., England had 
been united to the continent, had arisen, not 
from any national interest, but from the caprices 
of that king. Although, during this reign, the 
Reformation was introduced into England, that 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 



217 



country was not involved in the great crisis, by 
which the condition of the protestants of Ger- 
many was determined, although so fair an op- 
portunity of its becoming so was offered by the 
alliance of Henry II. of France and Maurice, 
against Charles V. But upon the premature 
death of Edward, and the succession of his sister 
Mary, England was brought into a new connec- 
tion with the continent, and one which might 
have had the most fatal consequences, by the 
union of Mary and Philip 11. of Spain (1554). 
It is true, the parliament took all possible pre- 
cautions, but had there been any children of the 
marriage, Philip's unwearied activity might easily 
have overcome these difficulties. Even as it 
was, the political relations of England were af- 
fected by it. When Philip II., soon after his 
succession, saw himself compelled (1557) to a 
war with France, he contrived by his personal 
influence with his wife, to make her a party 
to it. The result was the loss of Calais, the 
only remains of the old conquests of Britain in 
continental France''. Calais was taken by the 
French in 1558, and at the time was consi- 
dered a most serious loss ; but in reality it was 
a gain to England. It was this that chiefly 
tended to dispel the old visions of conquest in 
France, which had so often been the occasion 
of undertakings against that country, although 
the impracticability of the design might long 
have been discovered. 

•> The islands of Guernsey and Jersey she still retains. 



218 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

From what has been said, it is clear that, al- 
though England during this period occasionally 
interfered in the affairs of the continent, the 
British continental interests were not as yet be- 
come national interests ; they existed only in the 
family connections of the reigning houses, or in 
the old claims of the kings of England upon 
France : that is to say, in an idea which had 
already outlived its own strength. For her in- 
dependence, England had then little to fear from 
either France or Spain, since Italy was the prize 
for which these powers were contending ; and if 
there had been any apprehension that they might 
hereafter become dangerous, it would have been 
most natural to permit them to wear out their 
strength against each other. It remains there- 
fore only to inquire, how far the interests of 
England during this period may have been in- 
volved in those of the continent by its commer- 
cial transactions. 

As England was then wholly without colonies 
which might give her the produce of distant 
parts of the world to convey to other markets, 
and as her domestic industry was too confined 
to produce any considerable means of com- 
merce, it is easy to see that her trading inter- 
est at this time could not enter into the most 
remote comparison with that which arose in the 
subsequent periods of her history. The great 
commercial revolution for which the ground was 
laid by the discovery of America and the East 
Indies, in the beginning of this period, — the only 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 219 

one which furnishes an epoch in the general 
history of trade, — was not entirely without its 
influence upon England; for as early as 1497, 
John Cabot sailed on a voyage of discovery to 
North America, and others followed him ; but 
those discoveries, although made with the con- 
sent were without the support of the govern- 
ment ; and during this period led to no advan- 
tageous results. 

But, in the mean time, the wool which Eng- 
land produced, and which was exported partly 
in a raw and partly in a manufactured state, 
was of so much importance that it was not en- 
tirely without influence upon her continental 
policy. From the twelfth century, the breeding 
of sheep (which was afterwards greatly improved 
by the introduction of the Spanish breed, in the 
reign of Edward IV.) had been the principal 
employment of the English farmer ; and after 
continuing to export it raw for a considerable 
period, cloth manufactures were at length in- 
troduced. The nearest market, and that to 
which English wool was first carried, was in the 
Netherlands, the manufacturers of which de- 
pended for their prosperity upon the trade ; and 
hence arose a connection which existed not 
merely in the caprice of the sovereign or the 
minister, but in the real interests of the nation. 
Even in this period it had some political con- 
sequences ; for when Henry VIII. declared war 
against Charles V. in 1527, the discontent of 
those engaged in this business, compelled the 



220 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

king to make a separate treaty for the neutrality 
of the Netherlands. The sequel of this inquiry 
will show, that as the connection with this coun- 
try was one of the oldest, so it has always re- 
mained one of the firmest links of the British 
continental interests. Besides the trade with 
the Netherlands, England found a market for 
her wool in the north-eastern countries of Eu- 
rope, in Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, and Nor- 
way, and even in Russia. This trade was for 
some time carried on only by the vessels belong- 
ing to the Hanseatic league ; which, as it is well 
known, had one of its commercial establish- 
ments in London. But the English began to 
try all means in order to bring it into their own 
hands, and thus differences arose ; which how- 
ever ended rather in piracy, and that of the most 
cruel kind, than in formal wars. If the power 
of this league, however, had not been already 
so much on the decline, that Elizabeth was en- 
abled to deprive it of its commercial privileges in 
England, these circumstances might have had a 
much greater influence upon the continental 
politics of this country, than actually was the 
case. 

These are the ties, which under the first four 
Tudors, connected England with the continent 
of Europe. They were all of the most deli- 
cate and frail nature ; and for the most part 
detrimental to England. But it was reserved 
for the last monarch of this house to create a 
firmer and better connection ; and in the history 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BTITAIN. 221 

of the continental interests of England, her reign 
undoubtedly constitutes a distinct and very im- 
portant period. 

SECOND PERIOD. 

PERIOD OF ELIZABETH, 1558—1603. 

In the whole history of the British continental 
interests there are, properly speaking, only two 
periods which form general epochs — that of 
Elizabeth, and that of William III. However 
great may have been the claims advanced by 
her arrogant father, it was only under Elizabeth 
that England raised itself to the first rank among 
nations. During this reign it first learnt its 
power and the proper sphere of its action ; the 
old visions of continental conquests vanished 
away ; all the family connections by which Eng- 
land had been united with the continent were 
dissolved ; and in their place arose relations of a 
very different character, produced by neither 
private interest nor vain projects of aggrandise- 
ment. Elizabeth has the merit of having made 
her private interest subservient to that of her 
nation, or at least of having united the two, 
whilst her predecessors were guided solely by 
the former ; and this, notwithstanding the cun- 
ning and deceitfulness sometimes displayed in it, 
forms the principal feature of her glorious reign. 

Her first undertaking was the introduction of 
Protestantism into England ; and this deter- 
mined not only the internal relations of her 



222 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

kingdom, but became for a long time the true 
foundation of the foreign interests of Britain. 

A change of rehgion was in itself an. affair of 
the people, and not of the government alone. 
Elizabeth, in yielding to the wishes of a large 
majority of the nation, founded a real and uni- 
versal national interest ; but at the same time 
one which affected the government. And as the 
Reformation implicated England in the politics 
of the continent, it is at once evident that this 
connection must have been closer than any 
could have been before. It now for the first 
time became possible, that a real continental in- 
terest should arise, at least if we understand by 
this one which is not merely the personal in- 
terest of the ruler, but also that of the people. 
Such a connection was now, by many circum- 
stances, rendered unavoidable. 

About the time when the Reformation was 
introduced into England, the religious interest" 
was also in a great degree a political one. The 
maintenance of the constitution rested directly 
on Protestantism ; and it could not escape the 
observation of the queen, that the fall of that 
religion would have involved her own. She was 
forced, therefore, to become its defender, but 
circumstances made it impossible that she should 
confine herself to playing that part at home. 
England, (for Sweden had not yet taken a de- 
cided part,) was the first leading power which 

•^ See above, Political Consequences of the Reformation, second period ; 
page 78. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 223 

had declared for the Protestants ; and Elizabeth 
was therefore considered as the general sup- 
porter, if not the head, of the party; a character 
which she could not refuse without endangering 
her own interests. Then as Spain was at this 
time governed by Philip II., the most deter- 
mined of the defenders of the old doctrine, a 
man too whose pride Elizabeth had wounded 
by the refusal of his hand, the antipathy which 
sprung up between these two powers, became 
an almost necessary consequence. But, again, 
it was this very antipathy which laid the found- 
ation of the greatness of England. The reli- 
giou.s interest now involved that of independence 
and political existence ; and England, in enter- 
ing the lists against the first power of the time, 
was under the necessity of either raising herself 
to eminence, or abjectly submitting to be crushed; 
the choice lay between victory and destruction. 
That this relation between England and Spain 
could last thirty years (1558 — 1588) without 
breaking into open war, while at the same time 
Elizabeth never, during this long period, made 
a single sacrifice of her real interests, is un- 
doubtedly the most splendid proof of her superior 
political ability. But in the mean time, other cir- 
cumstances arose on the continent, which very 
much strengthened the connection with Eng- 
land ; namely, the war of the Hugonots in 
France, and the revolution in the Netherlands. 
And although one of these ties was broken off 



224 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

even during the reign of Elizabeth, the other 
seemed to be permanently established. 

When the disturbances began in the Nether- 
lands, there were three reasons why England 
should take part with the insurgents. It has 
been mentioned, that the Flemish provinces were 
the principal market for the disposal of British 
produce '^, and even on this account England 
could not be indifferent to their fate. This, 
then, was one reason for interference. The se- 
cond regarded the religious interests which they 
had in common. The struggle which was here 
beginning, was one against religious tyranny; if 
the protestant creed was victorious in the Ne- 
therlands, its maintenance in Germany and Eng- 
land was also secured ; but in both countries 
this was more than doubtful, if Spain succeeded 
in stifling it there. The third reason was, that 
the loss of the Netherlands would be a blow to 
the Spanish power, which must eventually prove 
fatal to it, and insure success to England in the 
rivalry which had now commenced. 

For these reasons Elizabeth took a share in 
the Flemish disturbances ; and this share was 
advantageous not only to her, but to the nation. 



•1 Even at the beginning of the troubles in 1564, an attempt to prevent the 
importation of English cloths, occasioned disputes which were terminated 
only by a provisional arrangement. See Rapin, in whose work may also be 
found an account of the trade between England and the Netherlands. Its 
whole value is put at twelve millions in gold, (quere, what dollar ?) of 
which the exportation of cloth alone from England amounted to five 
millions. Vol. viii. p. 308. ed, 1729. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 225 

She did not do more however than give them 
scanty subsidies, and permit her subjects to 
serve as volunteers in their army. She wished, 
as it appears, to avoid, if possible, a war with 
Spain; and she well knew, that the scanty as- 
sistance she gave, was best calculated to de- 
velope their powers, and thus to obtain her prin- 
cipal object. 

It was only in 1585, that she made a formal 
treaty with them, by which, in consideration of 
the money which she had advanced, and the 
troops which she supplied, three of their ports 
were pledged to her, and a place in the council 
of war, then existing, was promised to her am- 
bassador ; at the same time, however, she de- 
clined the proffered sovereignty over these pro- 
vinces. These and other well known circum- 
stances led to a formal quarrel with Spain, and 
the interests of England and the Netherlands, 
in respect to this power, became inseparably 
united. The destruction of the invincible ar- 
mada (1588) freed England at once from all 
apprehension of the Spanish power ; and now 
Elizabeth had no longer any wish to put a stop 
to a war, the circumstances of which were fa- 
vourable not only to the security, but also to the 
greatness of her empire. 

If we consider the whole conduct of Elizabeth 
towards the Netherlands, we shall plainly dis- 
cover what her intentions were. That this in- 
fant state, just liberating itself from thraldom, 
would advance with such gigantic strides to- 

Q 



224 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

even during the reign of Elizabeth, the other 
seemed to be permanently established. 

When the disturbances began in the Nether- 
lands, there were three reasons why England 
should take part with the insurgents. It has 
been mentioned, that the Flemish provinces were 
the principal market for the disposal of British 
produce '^, and even on this account England 
could not be indifferent to their fate. This, 
then, was one reason for interference. The se- 
cond regarded the religious interests which they 
had in common. The struggle which was here 
beginning, was one against religious tyranny; if 
the protestant creed was victorious in the Ne- 
therlands, its maintenance in Germany and Eng- 
land was also secured ; but in both countries 
this was more than doubtful, if Spain succeeded 
in stifling it there. The third reason was, that 
the loss of the Netherlands would be a blow to 
the Spanish power, which must eventually prove 
fatal to it, and insure success to England in the 
rivalry which had now commenced. 

For these reasons Elizabeth took a share in 
the Flemish disturbances ; and this share was 
advantageous not only to her, but to the nation. 



•^ Even at the beginning of the troubles in 1564, an attempt to prevent the 
importation of English cloths, occasioned disputes which were terminated 
only by a provisional arrangement. See Rapin, in whose work may also be 
found an account of the trade between England and the Netherlands. Its 
whole value is put at twelve millions in gold, (quere, what dollar ?) of 
which the exportation of cloth alone from England amounted to five 
millions. Vol. viii. p. 308. ed. 1729. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 225 

She did not do more however than give them 
scanty subsidies, and permit her subjects to 
serve as volunteers in their army. She wished, 
as it appears, to avoid, if possible, a war with 
Spain; and she well knew, that the scanty as- 
sistance she gave, was best calculated to de- 
velope their powers, and thus to obtain her prin- 
cipal object. 

It was only in 1585, that she made a formal 
treaty with them, by which, in consideration of 
the money which she had advanced, and the 
troops which she supplied, three of their ports 
were pledged to her, and a place in the council 
of war, then existing, was promised to her am- 
bassador ; at the same time, however, she de- 
clined the proffered sovereignty over these pro- 
vinces. These and other well known circum- 
stances led to a formal quarrel with Spain, and 
the interests of England and the Netherlands, 
in respect to this power, became inseparably 
united. The destruction of the invincible ar- 
mada (1588) freed England at once from all 
apprehension of the Spanish power; and now 
Ehzabeth had no longer any wish to put a stop 
to a war, the circumstances of which were fa- 
vourable not only to the security, but also to the 
greatness of her empire. 

If we consider the whole conduct of Elizabeth 
towards the Netherlands, we shall plainly dis- 
cover what her intentions were. That this in- 
fant state, just liberating itself from thraldom, 
would advance with such gigantic strides to- 

Q 



226 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

wards the greatness which awaited it : that it 
would not only outstrip Spain, but, by engross- 
ing the commerce of the world, would even sur- 
pass England itself, and oblige that state to 
strain every nerve, in order to supplant its rival : 
all this did not occur to her, nor was it pro- 
bable that it should. She fancied that she was 
raising up a state, which could exist only under 
the protection of England, and would therefore 
never be able to act in opposition to the British 
influence. She wished to establish her supre- 
macy here, as she had done in Scotland, and 
would gladly have done in France. This man- 
ner of extending her power, was as much studied 
by Elizabeth as it was by Philip II.; but she 
knew how to play her game more secretly, and 
calculated the chances better. It could not be 
otherwise, however, than that the mutual rivalry 
between England and Spain, (on which now de- 
pended the balance of Europe,) should produce 
these struggles : the territory which one side 
gained, was lost by the other ; and each there- 
fore was compelled to endeavour, not only to 
maintain, but also to add to its possessions. 

The turn which the affairs of the Netherlands 
took during this reign, must have tended still 
more to strengthen the ties between them and 
England. The Belgic provinces, it is true, were 
restored during the war to the Spanish domi- 
nion, and the Batavian alone maintained their 
independence ; but even while the war was 
raging, all manufactures and trade had been 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 227 

transferred from the former, which were the 
constant scene of action, to the latter, which suf- 
fered infinitely less ; and since in these Protest- 
antism finally triumphed, they became connected 
with England by religious as well as mercantile 
interests, and common enmity to Spain remained 
the watchword of both nations. 

The relations in which Elizabeth stood to- 
wards France, were much more complicated ; 
and she could hardly herself have been aware, 
how far they would lead her. The protracted 
hopes of marriage which she held out to Francis 
of Alencon, the presumptive heir to the crown, 
and which, even allowing for the feelings of her 
sex to the degree which her history requires, it 
could never have entered into her plans to fulfil, 
were the veil under which she concealed her 
true designs. The religious wars, which com- 
menced in 1562, had lasted but a short time, 
when she began to support the Hugonots by 
intercession, by money, and by volunteers ; and 
this she continued to do, without openly break- 
ing off her amicable relations with the govern- 
ment. It would be difficult to find a parallel to 
the political game which she played here, and 
which surpassed in subtlety even that carried on 
by her in the Netherlands. It was impossible 
to know how these wars might terminate, but 
here too her rivalry with Spain formed her chief 
inducement to act as she did. As Philip II. 
supported the league in order to further his own 
views, she opposed him by siding with Henry of 

q2 



228 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

Navarre ; and when this prince came into quiet 
possession of his throne, she joined him in the 
war against Spain, which, as concerned France, 
was terminated by the peace of Vervins (1598). 
But the pacification of the Hugonots by the 
edict of Nantes, and the death of Phihp, which 
happened in the same year, were of themselves 
sufficient to destroy this interest, the very nature 
of which was but transient. 

These were the principal supports on which 
rested the continental interests of England during 
this reign ; but the great and manifold develop- 
ment of the powers of the nation during the 
same period, had also an influence upon them 
which must be the less neglected in proportion 
to its greater permanency. 

It was during the time of Elizabeth that Eng- 
land first learnt for what she was destined, and 
became acquainted with her proper sphere of 
action, since it was then that she laid the found- 
ation of her universal commerce and navigation, 
although it was not till a later period that the 
structure was brought to perfection. The rivalry 
with Spain chiefly conduced to this ; and as the 
possessions of that nation extended over the 
most remote parts of the earth, England was 
not wanting in the courage requisite to seek and 
encounter its enemies on the most distant seas. 
In this manner were the seeds of many branches 
of British commerce, which attained their per- 
fection long afterwards, sown, since England 
now sought to appropriate to herself her own 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 229 

carrying trade, which hitherto had been chiefly 
in the hands of foreigners. While she was seek- 
ing a north-eastern passage to India, arose her 
commerce by way of Archangel with Moscow, 
and even Persia. Thus originated the share 
which she took in the Newfoundland fisheries, 
which afterwards became of such immeasurable 
importance. Thus, too, the first trial of the 
African slave trade. It was thus that the 
Hanseatic league was deprived of its privileges 
in England, and British ship-owners got the con- 
tinental trade into their hands. Thus, too, were 
made the first, although ineffectual attempts, to 
colonise North America. Thus was England 
even then induced to turn her attention to the 
commerce with India by the way of the Cape of 
Good Hope ; and as early as the end of this 
reign (1600) the old East India Company was 
established, although as yet there were no im- 
portant possessions in those parts. Thus many 
discoveries were made, and to this it is owing 
that Drake made his successful voyage round 
the world. 

Most of these new branches of commerce 
were, it is true, so inconsiderable at that time, 
that they could not be fairly regarded as pos- 
sessing direct political influence. Commercial 
wars, strictly speaking, had not as yet arisen ; 
but the importance of trade in general began to 
be more sensibly felt. To this it must be added, 
that with the commerce and the navigation of 
England, her naval power was also extended. 



232 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

deep-rooted sentiments of his family. His theory 
respecting the high dignity and unhmited power 
of royalty, determined his religious creed, which 
was confirmed by the feelings which in his youth 
had been roused in him by the fate of his mo- 
ther. He hated the puritans from the bottom 
of his heart, because he scarcely considered them 
in any light but that of rebels. He professed 
that he belonged to the episcopal church, be- 
cause to be king of England it was necessary 
that he should do so, but his very first speech 
in parliament declares in such plain words that 
Cathohcism, (excepting the doctrine of the papal 
supremacy, which was detestable to him from 
its limiting the regal power,) was the religion of 
his heart, that it could not but destroy once 
and for ever the confidence of the nation in 
their king ^. 

An immediate reaction upon the continental 
policy of England could not but ensue, and even 
at the commencement of the reign of James I. 
it showed itself in two ways ; in the peace with 
Spain, and in the transaction between that power 
and the Netherlands. In 1604 James I. con- 
cluded the war with Spain which Elizabeth had 
so determinately carried on, by a peace with 
Philip HI.; in which no single advantage was 
gained for England, and the Netherlands were 

^ This speech, like the rest of those composed by the king himself, forms 
a curious document illustrative of English history. It contains the seeds 
of that harvest of misfortunes which the Stuarts afterv^ards reaped. One 
might almost say that the evil genius of this family, which drove it blindly 
from one fault to another, had inspired the king with iti 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 233 

left to their fate. How far the conditions of 
that treaty were favourable or unfavourable to 
England, made but little difference ; with this 
peace expired that rivalry with Spain, which 
under Elizabeth had been the soul of British 
politics. On this rivalry was founded the great- 
ness of the nation ; through it her naval power 
had developed itself; and it supported the con- 
fidence of the other protestant states of Europe 
and the supremacy of England. It is clear also, 
that the change in these relations produced a 
corresponding one in the whole course of foreign 
policy pursued by England, and the firmest, and 
under existing circumstances the most natural, 
connection between her and the continent was 
broken. 

The second occasion, when the change in the 
political system of England became apparent, 
was the negotiation which the Netherlands en- 
tered into with Spain, respecting the recognition 
of their independence in the year 1607. This 
period was of incalculable importance to Eng- 
land, which had so long fought the same battle 
as themselves. With what activity would not Eli- 
zabeth have applied the negotiation to her own 
advantage, so as to take the whole credit to 
herself, and to attach the new state to England, 
by unstrained but yet secure ties ! But thoughts 
like these did not enter into a head like that of 
James I. According to his sentiments, the Ne- 
therlands were nothing more than rebels to their 
sovereign, and thus even in the midst of the 



234 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

negotiation, he acted in so contradictory a man- 
ner, that no one knew what his designs were, 
becaiise he did not know himself. The conse- 
quence was, that at length no one noticed him, 
and Henry IV. obtained the influence which 
Elizabeth would have secured to herself. 

This apathy and indolence which James I. 
concealed under the name of love of peace, 
would have completely broken up the relations 
between England and the continent, had they 
not been renewed by family circumstances. The 
care of making a suitable marriage for his son, 
which, according to his notions, could only be 
with the daughter of a king, carried him into 
negotiations, which characterise more perhaps 
than any thing else, the perverseness of this 
eccentric king. A Spanish princess was to be 
the wife of his son and future successor ; a 
catholic, therefore, a descendant of that family 
and of that nation, who, both by religious and 
political interest, were the hereditary foes of 
England. Thus James I. was indifferent to 
risking his own interest, that of his son, and of 
his country, for the sake of gratifying a caprice, 
which found a ready support in his prejudices. 
This is not the place for reviewing this extraor- 
dinary negotiation, in which Spain had the ad- 
vantage during seven years (1617 — 1624), of 
leading the weak monarch according to her own 
views, and which, when at length it failed, was 
the occasion of a war, by engaging in which, the 
luckless Charles took the first step towards his 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 235 

ruin. But during the progress of these nego- 
tiations, the marriage of Ehzabeth, only daugh- 
ter of James I., had created new continental 
relations, which had a considerable influence. 
In 1612 she was married to Frederic V. Elector 
of the Palatinate, who, in 1618, assumed the 
crown of Bohemia, which, as well as his own 
family possessions, he lost by the battle of 
Prague and its results. If James I. had taken 
an active part in the German war, it would 
never have been laid to his charge, that he bar- 
tei'ed the interest of the empire for that of his 
daughter. For the first was here concerned as 
well as the latter ; the interest of Protestantism 
was at stake, and this more especially, because 
in 1621, the war between Spain and the Nether- 
lands was renewed. But here too James I. 
played a double part. He did not approve of 
the undertaking of his son-in-law, because he 
considered the Bohemians as rebels, and yet he 
would willingly have seen his daughter a queen. 
But the close connection between Spain and 
Austria made' the policy of interference still 
more questionable ; for if he had decided on 
coming forward, a threat from Spain of break- 
ing off the negotiations for the marriage of his 
son, would have made him as undecided as ever. 
Hence the melancholy part which he took in 
this eventful period. An idle show of assistance 
was all that his son-in-law received from him. 

But if James I. thus betrayed the continental 
interests of England, this neglect brought its 



236 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

own punishment, and that a severe one. The 
power which, under his predecessor, had turned 
the scales in the pohtical balance of Europe, 
now sank into such insignificance as almost to 
become the ridicule of Europe. Our inquiry 
thus far has shown, that the relations between 
England and the continent were as yet very 
simple, when compared to those of later times ; 
and yet her history, even under James I., clearly 
shows that a neglect of her continental interests 
is with her the signal of decline. 

It is true, that the reign of his ill-fated son 
began with a twofold war, with Spain and with 
France; but the first arose from the failure of 
the scheme of marriage, and was founded only 
on family interests ; the other aimed at the de- 
fence of the Hugonots in France, who had 
been disarmed by Richelieu, and therefore the 
support of rehgion might be supposed to be 
involved in it ; but the real cause was hatred of 
that minister ; while both were carried on in so 
weak and spiritless a manner, that they only 
served to embroil Charles I. with his parliament. 
Although Charles took some share in the affairs 
of Germany and of the Palatine family, it was 
so inconsiderable, that it led to no results ; and 
it was very evident that he was induced to it, 
not so much by religious or national, as by 
family interests. The true continental interest 
of England was left out of sight ; and when the 
storm in his own country began to gather, he 
had no time to give any attention to foreign 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 237 

affairs, and England remained as it were isolated 
in the European system, until Cromwell (1649) 
had possessed himself of the helm of state. 
The government of that bold usurper is distin- 
guished, not only by a more active interest in 
the transient affairs of the continent, but also 
for the lasting consequences which resulted 
from it. The stormy times of the revolution 
had roused a power in England hitherto un- 
known ; almost every one who was capable of 
it had carried arms, and the spirit of faction had 
created moral energies, which can be brought 
into action only at such periods. To this must 
be added the fact, that, notwithstanding the 
troubles of the times, the navy had not been 
neglected either by Charles I. or his father. He 
had most scrupulously applied the sums granted 
for its support, and England, as a republic, stood 
both by land and sea in a more formidable atti- 
tude, than she had done as a monarchy. 

The private interest of the protector made it, 
no doubt, requisite that he should take an active 
part in foreign affairs, as well to afford vent to 
the excitement at home, as to give splendour to 
his reign ; but, independently of this, a new in- 
terest had been springing up, which, in progress of 
time, rapidly increased, and gradually gained a 
greater influence upon the relations between 
England and the great powers of the continent, 
namely, the colonial interest. 

With the East Indies, England had, it is true, 
for some time carried on a considerable trade. 



238 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

but as yet it had no territorial possessions, and 
was confined to a few scattered factories. But 
even these akeady furnished occasions of quar- 
rel with Holland and Spain, whose jealousy 
would suffer no strangers to gain a footing 
there ^ But, properly speaking, the first colo- 
nies of the English were on the coasts of North 
America, and the West Indies ; and they owed 
their origin chiefly to political and religious in- 
terests. Bands of malcontents wandered across 
the ocean, and sought beyond its waters a free- 
dom or security, which they either did not, or 
imagined they did not, find at home. Thus 
arose the numerous settlements in several of 
what are the United States, and in 1623, and 
1624, in Barbadoes, St. Christopher's, and some 
of the smaller islands, which the Spaniards had 
riot thought it worth their while to occupy. 

These foreign possessions always continued 
in a certain state of dependence on the mother 
country, although this relation received different 
modifications. The mother country was there- 
fore under the obligation of defending them, 
and as this was especially necessary against the 
continental powers, the colonial interest natu- 
rally became a mainspring in the continental 
politics of England. This state of things was 
at first caused by the absurd pretensions of the 

f Particularly in the year 1623, at Amboina, where the Dutch mas- 
sacred the English colonists in a horrid manner, under pretence that they 
were engaged in a conspiracy ; and also took the small island of Poleroon 
from England. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 239 

Spaniards, who, as the first discoverers of the 
new world, claimed the exclusive possession of 
it, and the sole right of trading in its seas. 
These claims were not relinquished even in time 
of peace ; and although after the treaty of 1604 
.these settlements obtained a little more peace, 
and therefore prospered better, the Spaniards 
exercised occasional acts of violence and cruelty, 
which sufficiently proved that they had no in- 
tention of resigning their claims, and aff'orded 
at least one of the grounds which determined 
Cromwell to chastise them, when he declared 
war against them in 1655. 

The whole system which the Protector adopt- 
ed in regard to continental politics, is very com- 
prehensive and complicated, and therefore not 
easy to include in one view^. His whole go- 
vernment show how important he considered it ; 
and although we cannot deny that private feel- 
ings and objects influenced his measures, still it 
is clear that his main object was to make it a 
means of increasing the commercial navigation 
of England. The consequences of it were, the 
two foreign wars which he carried on ; viz. that 
with Holland (1652 — 1654), and that with Spain 
(1655—1657). 

Whatever other circumstances may have had 
their influence in the former of these, it was in 
reality a commercial war, and the first in which 

s This is the part of Cromwell's history in which Hume has been the 
least successful. He omits the mention of all those leading principles of 
his policy, which the slightest glance at it will display. 



240 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

England had engaged. The relation in which 
she stood to the West Indian colonies, where 
the Dutch were in possession of nearly all the 
commerce of the British islands, and more espe- 
cially that of Barbadoes, led to the passing of 
that famous Navigation Act, which not only se- 
cured to the mother country the whole trade of 
the colonies, but also forbade the introduction of 
European produce in any ships but those of the 
country from which it came ; and thus gave the 
death blow to the extensive carrying trade of 
Holland. This Act was therefore little less than 
a declaration of war. The relations between 
the two states, however, had undergone a great 
change. Holland had all but secured the mo- 
nopoly of the commerce of the world, and Eng- 
land if she wished to have any share of it, could 
not avoid entering into a contest such as Crom- 
well engaged in. The dispute which arose re- 
specting the rights of the flag, unimportant as 
it may appear, displays in a remarkable manner 
the rivalry of the two nations; but that Eng- 
land by persisting in the Navigation Act, laid 
the foundation of her naval power, requires no 
proof. 

The war with Spain, with the assistance of 
France, exercised a twofold influence upon the 
interests of Britain. In the first place, the con- 
quest of Jamaica (1655) secured for ever the 
colonial interest in the West Indies. Until that 
time England possessed only a few of the smaller 
Carib islands, and that by sufferance rather than 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 241 

by any power of her own. It was the intention 
of Cromwell to wrest St. Domingo from the 
Spaniards^ and thus to make England mistress of 
the West Indies. In this he did not succeed ; 
but the conquest of Jamaica, which although at 
that time of no moment, became in a few years 
a flourishing English colony, compensated for 
the disappointment ; and as the demand for 
their produce increased, the West Indian colo- 
nies gradually became of such importance to 
England as necessarily to influence, and that in a 
material degree, her relations with other nations 
which already had established, or were on the 
point of establishing, settlements in those islands. 
A second result of this war was the renewal of the 
scheme of conquests on the continent. It was 
the intention of the protector to gain possession 
of the sea-port towns, and perhaps of the whole 
coast of the Spanish Netherlands ; and France 
was obliged to pledge herself beforehand to re- 
sign to England the places which it was pro- 
posed should be taken, viz. Dunkirk, Mardyk, 
and Gravelines ; and in this manner the two 
former really came into the possession of the 
English. But his views were yet more exten- 
sive. He wished to gain also the principal ports 
in the North sea and the Baltic ; and the treaty 
with Sweden (1657) was intended to prepare the 
way for this''. At this period Charles X., the 

•' According to Hume, he entered into this alliance with Sweden from 
mere zeal in the protestant cause. Nevertheless, according to the seven- 
teenth article of the treaty, he retained the right of disposing of all fort- 

R 



242 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

warlike successor of Christina, was planning the 
formation of a great northern monarchy by the 
conquest of Poland and Denmark. The pro- 
tector promised him support, and expected in 
return the possession of Bremen, of Elsinore, 
and Dantzic. But a longer life would have been 
requisite to carry out these plans than fell to 
the lot of Cromwell ; the possession of Jamaica 
and the Navigation Act, (Dunkirk being sold to 
the French in 1662,) remained the only perma- 
nent memorials of his protectorate. 

However extensive therefore were his views 
of continental policy, it is clear that but few of 
them were carried into execution. But when 
the Stuarts were restored to the throne (1660) 
the old prejudices of their family came back 
with them, and under the existing circumstances 
became still more dangerous to England than 
they had been in the reigns of James I. and his 
son. It was at this period that Louis XIV. 
raised his power in so sudden and formidable a 
manner as to disturb the peace and independence 
of all his neighbours. In order to carry out his 
plans, the concurrence of England was indis- 
pensable ; and although at his first attempt 
England took part in the alliance which brought 
about, or seemed to bring about, the peace of 
Aix-la-Chapelle, (1668,) it is well known from 
history that Charles II. and his venal ministers 
soon became so wound up with the interests of 

resses taken from the Danes ; which surely cannot have been wholly dic- 
tated by zeal for the protestant cause. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BTITAIN. 243 

France that they even took part in the war for 
the subjection of Flanders to France, although 
that event v^as evidently opposed to the interests 
of Britain. The hope that with the aid of 
France he should be able to overturn the con- 
stitution and the established religion, and thus 
attain unlimited power, was the talisman by 
which Louis led this abandoned monarch to em- 
brace his interests ', and induced him, as well as 
his brother and successor, to continue in them. 
It would be in vain, during the reign of princes 
who were guided only by their passions and their 
prejudices, to look for fixed principles of policy ; 
a revolution was necessary to establish these 
upon a new foundation. 



FOURTH PERIOD. 

WILLIAM III. AND ANNE (1689-1714). 

We now come to the period which is undoubt- 
edly the most important in the history of the 
modern continental politics of England, namely, 
the period of Wilham III. The merit of having 
laid the foundation of those continental interests 
which have lasted to our time, belongs undoubt- 
edly to him. In the time of Elizabeth, as we 
have shown, it was Protestantism which deter- 
mined the relations between England and the 
continent. It is true that this spring of action 

' The conditions of the secret alliance with France (1670) as quoted 
by Hume, put this point beyond dispute. 

r2 



244 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

operated more powerfully, and for a greater 
length of time, here, than in any other European 
state ; so much so, that it displayed considerable 
strength even under William III. ; but as it be- 
gan about this time to relax in other states, the 
same necessarily became the case before long 
in England ; and here as elsewhere it could only 
be maintained for a short additional period by 
the local or family circumstances of the reigning 
house. Some other powerful inducement was 
therefore requisite, in order that the participation 
of England in the affairs of the continent should 
rest upon higher grounds than the personal con- 
nections and inclinations of the monarch. This 
new spring of action, which has continued down 
to the latest times the soul of British policy, 
was the rivalry with France, a principle which 
was then established for ever. England since 
that time has scarcely ever entered into any po- 
litical connections with the continent which have 
not either mediately or immediately proceeded 
from this source. This rivalry has been one of 
the mainsprings of European politics, and the 
more partial the view which is often taken of 
this circumstance, the more necessary it is that 
we should consider it in its real bearings. 

The rivalry of these two great powers was 
undoubtedly the cause, partly of the origin, 
partly of the extension and of the prolongation 
of several of the great wars which have deso- 
lated not only Europe, but even the most re- 
mote parts of the earth. Considered in this 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 245 

light, we may well excuse the opinion which 
refers to this rivalry, as to one of their chief 
causes, the manifold evils which in these times 
have happened to mankind ; but it is undoubt- 
edly a false estimate which would assert that 
these evils, undeniable as they are, outweigh the 
advantages which have sprung from the same 
source. A more extensive view of history in 
general will lead us to a very different result. 

What is the rivalry of nations but the spur, 
aye, and the most effectual one, to prompt them 
to the development of their powers ? What else 
therefore than the mainspring by which they 
are urged to the attainment of that state of ci- 
vilisation for which they are by their capacities 
and circumstances fitted ? The progress of whole 
nations is in this respect the same as that of in- 
dividuals; nor can it be otherwise, since it is of 
such that they are composed. As amongst indi- 
viduals it is emulation which ripens youth into 
manhood, so it is also amongst nations ; and it 
would probably be in vain to search in history 
for an example of a nation which became great 
without the impulse of rivalry. The Greeks 
would never have been the first nation of their 
time, had it not been for their victory over the 
Persians ! Never would Rome have been mis- 
tress of the world, had it not been for the strug- 
gle with Carthage ; and Carthage would have 
been without a Hamilcar and a Hannibal, had 
she not been the rival of Rome. Nay, even when 
she was mistress of the world, and seemed to 



246 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

stand without a rival, Rome would scarcely 
have outlived the first century of our era, had 
not the contest with the Germanic nations, which 
finally subdued her, then upheld her in her 
place. And does not the history of modern 
Europe present an equal number of examples ? 
Have not Spain, France, and the Netherlands 
raised themselves since the sixteenth century by 
their mutual rivalry ? Was not the rivalry be- 
tween the catholic and protestant parties the 
life of the German confederation ? Would Peter 
the Great, would Frederic IL, have reached their 
height of power, if the one had not had Swedes, 
the other Austrians to engage with ? And yet 
in none of these instances has national rivalry 
done so much as in the contest between England 
and France. It was this which drew out the 
noblest qualities of both nations — it was this 
which preserved that love of freedom and inde- 
pendence which is founded on patriotism — it 
was this which kept alive the most lofty feelings 
of the human race — it was this which not only 
brought to perfection the civilisation of these 
nations, but also planted the seeds of European 
refinement in the most distant parts of the globe ; 
and thus what in the eyes of short-sighted mor- 
tals was frequently considered the source of 
misery and calamity, became in the hands of 
Providence the means of producing and diffusing 
the perfection of our race. 

And thus, by taking this view, we escape that 
partiality which in any less exalted one is un- 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 247 

avoidable. If we place ourselves in the position 
of either of the two nations, we shall never be 
able to form a judgment which will not be ac- 
cused of partiality by the other ; but if we take 
this higher ground we shall easily escape the 
reproach. It is not necessary to deny that er- 
rors have been committed, or to gloss over past 
acts of injustice. We grant that from that ri- 
valry have sprung many evils ; but in this we 
only recognise a confirmation of the universal 
law, that beings so imperfect as we are can never 
attain to the great and good without alloy, be- 
cause we require the impulse of our passions 
before we can put forth the whole of that power 
with which nature has endowed us. 

When William III. was placed on the throne 
of England, this rivalry was already existing be- 
tween the nations, although not between the 
governments ; and even the animosity between 
the nation and the government affords proof of 
this. The religious influence was still in full 
force in England, because the nation was con- 
vinced of its connection with liberty and inde- 
pendence. But other causes were added to 
strengthen this rivalry by the spirit of the go- 
vernment of Louis. His conquests must have 
excited the attention of England the more from 
their being directed against both the Spanish and 
the United Netherlands. The independence of 
the latter depended immediately upon the fate of 
the former, and we know that the connection 
between the United Provinces and England was 



248 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

SO close, that even the wars of Cromwell and 
Charles II. had interrupted it only for a time. 
But France was becoming a more dangerous 
neighbour to England, as she now took a place 
among the leading naval powers; and the rivalry- 
was yet more inflamed by the commercial and 
colonial system created by Colbert. During the 
reigns of the two last Stuarts the commerce of 
England had advanced simultaneously with the 
extension of her colonies '^ ; its importance was 
now fully felt ; and a neighbouring nation which 
in this point sought to equal, if not to excel her, 
could not be regarded with indifference. But 
the colonial system of France now received as 
great, if not a greater extension than that of 
England ; and hence resulted that unfortunate 
confusion of the colonies of the two nations^, in 
their geographical situations, which has cost so 
much blood, and will probably cost yet more. 
In the West and East Indies, and in North 
America, the French and the English now be- 
came neighbours. Their interests therefore 
crossed each other more and more ; they came 
in contact no longer only in Europe; they found 
each other in every corner of the world. Even 



'' By the peace of Breda, 1667, she obtained the province of New York ; 
and in 1680 William Penn founded his settlement in Pennsylvania. 

' We may add, of the European colonies generally. If there were any 
step which would lead, if not to interminable, at least to lasting peace in 
Europe, it would be the geographical separation of the colonies. This has 
been in great part although not wholly accomplished, by the last treaty of 
peace, which we shall consider hereafter ; the fortunes of the Spanish colo- 
nies will perhaps bring about the rest. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 249 

under the Stuarts this rivahy had displayed itself 
notwithstanding the unanimity of the sovereigns. 
England in 1668 had joined the triple alliance 
against France, in opposition to the wishes of 
Charles II. ; and although in the next war 
(1672) Charles united with Louis against Hol- 
land, after two years the voice of the nation 
forced him to break the alhance. We find, then, 
that at the time of the revolution, the founda- 
tion had already been laid of a national rivalry ; 
it did not therefore owe its origin entirely to the 
policy of Wilham III. 

It does not however admit of a doubt that 
the personal inclinations, and the position in 
which this monarch was placed, tended greatly 
to increase this rivalry, since he made its main- 
tenance a principal maxim of his policy. Even 
in his youth (1672) he stood opposed as the 
champion of the Netherlands, to the great king 
of France ™, to whom he bore a personal hatred, 
which was in turn cherished against him by that 
monarch ; and from that moment he seemed to 
live for the sole purpose of thwarting Louis, 
and became the life and soul of all the alliances 
which were formed against him. When raised 
to the throne of England he had to defend it 
against Louis, who took his rival under his pro- 

™ It is -svell known from the iMemoirs of St. Simon, that this personal 
hatred arose from the refusal of William, when only prince of Orange, to 
accept the hand of ^one of Louis's natural daughters, which was offered 
him by her father. We should be careful however not to lay too much 
stress upon such anecdotes, even when true. The result would have been 
the same had this circumstance never occurred. 



250 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

tection. The war, hastened as it was besides 
by many other causes, became thus unavoidable, 
and it wrapped nearly all Europe in flames, 
(1689—1697,) until at the peace of Ryswick 
Louis found it convenient to acknowledge Wil- 
liam as king of England. 

There is probably no other example of a ri- 
valry between two civilised nations in which so 
many causes of jealousy are to be found, as those 
upon which that between England and France 
was founded. The interests of independence, of 
religion, and of commerce, were involved in an 
extraordinary manner with those of the sovereigns 
themselves. Is it then to be wondered at, that 
such a rivalry should become at the same time 
both violent and lasting ? But it is time to fol- 
low out the consequences which it had on the 
subsequent continental interests of Britain ; we 
shall thus trace the formation of many of the 
threads on which was wrought the whole web of 
the subsequent politics of Europe. 

Alliances on the continent were, under the 
existing circumstances, absolutely necessary to 
England. It was a struggle with a power which 
at sea was about equal to her in strength, but 
which on land was infinitely superior ; and which 
necessarily remained superior until it was disco- 
vered that an addition to the standing army was 
not at the same time a diminution of national 
freedom. England therefore dared not enter 
into a contest with France alone ; and when 
this idea had once gained ground, it continued 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 251 

even in times when its justice might well have 
been disputed, and thus became the governing 
principle of the continental policy of Great Bri- 
tain. 

An alliance therefore with that state which 
as a military power maintained the next rank to 
France, was an unavoidable consequence ; and 
hence arose the close connection between Ensr- 
land and Austria, a connection which may be 
considered as the true foundation of the British 
continental interests, and which, although for a 
time dissolved, was soon again renewed, and will 
probably be from time to time renewed as long as 
the rivalry between England and France con- 
tinues to exist. As long as a branch of the house 
of Hapsburg reigned in Spain, this connection 
could not but lead to an alliance with that coun- 
try, and this the rather as the plans of Louis 
were constantly directed against the Spanish 
Netherlands. But yet more important was the 
influence of the British policy upon the United 
Netherlands, now that their hereditary stadt- 
holder was at the same time king of England ; 
and hence arose the great alliance of Vienna, 
(1689,) in which England for the first time dis- 
played in full force her vast influence upon the 
affairs of the continent. This alliance, and the 
ensuing war down to the treaty of Ryswick in 
1697, gave to the politics of western Europe 
that character by which they were afterwards 
peculiarly distinguished. The alliance of the 
naval powers (England and Holland) with Aus- 



252 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

tria, against that power which had become 
equally formidable on land and sea, forms the 
groundwork of the system, and the interests of 
these states so clearly demands such an alliance, 
that political sophistry will scarcely be able to 
prevail against it. All the states of the conti- 
nent, which had learned by experience that 
Louis was desirous of increasing his power at 
their expense, if not of destroying them entirely, 
could not but see that this was the most natural 
means of defence ; and it is clear from what we 
have above said, that the same applied to Eng- 
land. 

Under these circumstances it resulted from 
the geographical situation of these states that 
the Spanish, afterwards Austrian Netherlands, 
became the centre of this alliance. They were 
in the first place, the chief aim of the policy of 
France : in the next, they were the connecting 
link between England and her continental allies. 
They formed the passage into Germany, the 
means of junction with the allied armies, and 
the conductor, so to say, by which the war might 
be drawn off from the principal countries of 
the Austrian monarchy ; on their independence 
rested that of the United Provinces as well as 
of the German empire ; and with all these points 
was connected the balance of political power in 
Europe. The maintenance of the Belgian pro- 
vinces was therefore necessarily one of the lead- 
ing maxims of the continental policy of England 
— a maxim in the support of which she has re- 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 253 

peatedly and wisely exerted her best energies. 
While England was thus connecting herself on 
every side with the continent, it could not but 
follow that several smaller states should be 
drawn into these arrangements. But those only 
will require mention which were permanently 
involved in them, and amongst these the first is 
Savoy. In 1689 the fatal activity of Louvois 
first compelled the duke Victor Amadeus II. to 
take part in those tragic scenes which were now 
repeatedly acted in Europe ; and the situation 
and condition of his territory, which was at once 
the gate and the bulwark of Italy, necessarily, 
when that country became the scene of action, 
gave this family a degree of importance which 
the political talents of its leaders turned with 
extraordinary dexterity, and still more extraor- 
dinary good fortune, to their own advantage. 
Of the remaining states of Italy, Naples being 
still a province, none was of sufficient import- 
ance to make an alliance with them possible ; 
and with the individual princes of Germany it 
was not necessary to be at any pains, as the 
whole body generally followed its chief, and each 
of the great Austrian wars became a war of the 
empire. 

By means of the war of 1689 therefore the re- 
lations in which England stood to the continent 
were first organised ; and in her subsequent 
policy she merely continued to build on the 
foundation which was here laid. A proof of 
this is to be found in the Spanish war of sue- 



254 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

cession, which followed only four years after- 
wards. By the negotiations which preceded it, 
England had become deeply involved in conti- 
nental politics, and even if Louis XIV. had not 
forced her to war by recognising the pretender, 
contrary to the provisions of the treaty of Rys- 
wick, she would scarcely have been able to pre- 
serve her neutrality. A contest was pending, 
upon the result of which, according to the prin- 
ciples of the policy of that time, whether just or 
not, depended the maintenance of the political 
balance in Europe. 

The connections of England with the conti- 
nent continued then during this war the same as 
during the last, with the exception of the altered 
circumstances of Spain ; although their author 
did not live to see its commencement". But the 
unaltered policy of his successor, Anne, notwith- 
standing the change which took place in the in- 
fluential persons at court, affords the clearest 
proof that in spite of the clamour of parties 
during the reign of Wilham III., the interests 
which he had pursued were not merely his own, 
but those of the nation. The alliance with Aus- 
tria was the great link on which all the others 
depended, since not only the republic of the 
United Netherlands, although it had abolished 
the dignity of stadtholder, persevered in its pre- 
vious policy, but the Germanic empire also took 
an active part in the war, and the duke of Savoy, 

n William III. died March 19th, 1702. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 255 

although at first on the side of France, was soon 
won over by the alhes. But still the war of suc- 
cession in Spain modified the British continental 
policy in more than one respect, and at the same 
time increased its strength and its sphere of ac- 
tion ; and it is necessary that these points should 
be more closely examined. 

1st. The old connections, especially that with 
Austria, were greatly strengthened. The con- 
federacy found (what alone can render any alli- 
ance formidable) chiefs who were capable of 
holding it together and infusing life and spirit 
into it. Where can history produce a duumvi- 
rate like that of Eugene and Marlborough ? And 
when did any thing but success stamp such an 
alliance with durability ? It is true the alliance 
fell to pieces towards the end of the war, but 
still it is an example without parallel that it 
should have lasted so long ; and even that the 
dissolution was but temporary, and the tie was 
renewed as soon as circumstances demanded it. 

2nd. One lasting consequence of that war 
was the close connection with Portugal ; while 
this state trembled, and not without cause, for 
its independence, when a Bourbon ascended the 
throne of Spain, and therefore sought to unite 
itself with the allies, they on the other hand re- 
quired its assistance in order to play their game 
with a probability of success, and to drive Philip 
of Anjou from his throne. This connection, 
however, springing as it did from the circum- 
stances of the moment, would have been but 



256 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

transitory, had it not been strengthened by other 
ties. This was done by means of the commercial 
treaty of the British minister, Methuen (1705), 
which granted a free entrance into Portugal for 
British manufactm^es, especially woollens ; and 
for Portuguese wines into England. It is well 
known that scarcely any other treaty has been 
so advantageous to England, owing to the ex- 
traordinary wealth which this market had de- 
rived at that period from the newly-discovered 
gold mines of Brazil. Thus by the interweaving 
of political with commercial interests, arose that 
connection between England and Portugal which 
has not been broken by the most violent storms 
of revolution. 

3rd. In the war of the Spanish succession, 
England first employed the granting of subsi- 
dies. The wealth of England and the financial 
system founded by the creation of the national 
debt, and the means thus afforded of obtaining 
unlimited credit under William III., must sooner 
or later have given rise to this, even were it not 
the character of great commercial nations to 
carry on their military enterprises, if they should 
be engaged in such to any extent, more or less 
with the aid of foreign troops received into their 
pay. Whether this be done by subsidies or by 
fairly taking troops into pay, the system remains 
in its principal features the same, and the conse- 
quences must be the same also. The Spanish 
war, continued as it unnecessarily was by the 
breaking off of the negotiations in 1709, gave a 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 257 

dangerous example of the facility with which 
such wars may be protracted if the interest of 
the party at the helm of state demands it ; but 
experience has also shown that the injury must 
necessarily recoil upon England itself. 

4th, The conditions of the peace of Utrecht 
necessarily strengthened the continental rela- 
tions of England, without however, except in 
the case of Spain, materially altering them. 
This was occasioned partly by the resignation 
by Spain of her European provinces, partly by 
the acquisitions which England made in America. 
The Spanish Netherlands now became the pro- 
perty of Austria, which thus became the natural 
ally of England ; and when the Italian posses- 
sions were given up, partly to Austria, partly to 
Sardinia, new points of connection arose between 
these states and England, who had already by 
the possession of Gibraltar and Minorca gained 
a firm footing in the Mediterranean. On the 
other hand, the conditions of the treaty of As- 
siento with Spain, and the acquisition of Nova 
Scotia in North America, scattered the seeds of 
future wars ; which however did not spring up 
until the following period. 

From what has preceded, then, we conclude 
that, when the house of Hanover ascended the 
British throne, the continental interests of Eng- 
land were, in their leading features, already fixed. 
The rivalry with France was the foundation on 
which they were built ; and as long as this lasts 
it will remain essentially the same, whatever 

s 



258 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

temporary changes may take place. The friendly 
connection which was formed under George I. 
seemed for a time to put an end to the rivalry ; 
but it was only the consequence of a family dis- 
pute of the Bourbons, and with the dispute itself 
it ceased ; as will appear in the consideration of 
the next period. 

FIFTH PERIOD. 

FROM THE ACCESSION OF THE HOUSE OF 

HANOVER TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 

1714-1789. 

The continental relations of England under 
the house of Hanover became still closer and 
more complicated than they had previously been. 
Our inquiry will therefore lead us more deeply 
into the general system of Europe, and becomes 
proportionally more difficult, although at the 
same time more instructive ; nay, perhaps we 
may add, more meritorious also, since this whole 
period of British history, however rich in mate- 
rials, has not as yet found an historian worthy 
of it. Although therefore what may here be 
offered can only serve as a brief introduction to 
such a work, we shall still find it worth while to 
follow the history of this nation in one of its 
most important aspects, during this its most 
prosperous period ; and perhaps at the same 
time to combat some prejudices which have 
arisen from partial views of the subject. 

I believe that I have sufficientlv established 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 259 

in the first half of this inquiry, that when George 
I. ascended (1714) the British throne, the prin- 
cipal ties between England and the continent 
were already in existence. These however were 
now strengthened and some new ones added to 
them. The first and most important of these 
is generally considered to be the circumstance 
that the family which ascended the throne of 
England was possessed of hereditary dominions 
on the continent. That it is a totally false 
opinion which attributes to this the main found- 
ation of the foreign policy of England, is clear 
from what has preceded ; it certainly had its in- 
fluence, exaggerated as this has been at particu- 
lar periods by British authors, but an impartial 
estimate of its extent requires a more minute 
consideration of the political situation of George 
I. at his succession, as well in reference to his 
position at home, as in his relations to the re- 
mainder of Europe. The internal position of 
England must at that period have given rise to 
closer connections with the continent, even had 
not external circumstances led to the same re- 
sult. Although the house of Hanover was called 
to the succession by the voice of the nation, it 
is well known how divided within itself the na- 
tion was — how thoroughly the parties of whig 
and tory became political factions, and what 
fierce convulsions were the consequence. There 
was a pretender with numerous adherents at 
home and powerful friends abroad. As long as 
he found foreign support, or there was even a 

s2 



260 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

probability that he would do so, it was necessary 
to oppose his endeavours ; and this opposition 
brought on a long chain of political connections 
with the continent. The existence, and what is 
more, the lengthened existence of such a pre- 
tender, who at least might obtain political influ- 
ence, and at particular periods did actually ob- 
tain it, was a piece of signal good fortune to 
England itself as well as to the new govern- 
ment. The continued danger kept the govern- 
ment, as well as the nation, continually on their 
guard, and became one of the strongest ties be- 
tween them. However deeply the conviction 
might be impressed upon the latter that the 
maintenance of their constitution depended upon 
the protestant succession, the great mass of the 
people were still in need of something to re- 
mind them of it ; and what could be better cal- 
culated to secure this object, than the unceasing 
claims of a catholic pretender ? And however 
great may have been the personal qualities, 
however pure the intentions, and however strong 
the attachment to the constitution, in the mem- 
bers of the new reigning family, still nothing 
would serve better than those very claims, to 
keep it constantly in their minds, that it was 
through the constitution, and for the constitu- 
tion, that they were invested with their high dig- 
nity. Thus the king and the nation could not 
but agree in considering the constitution the pal- 
ladium of their freedom to the latter, and of his 
throne to the former ; thus the conviction natu- 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 261 

rally grew upon them^ that the interests of the 
king and the nation were inseparably the same ; 
thus in a word the constitution escaped being 
considered a dead letter, and was impressed 
upon the hearts of the people and their riilers. 
But external circumstances were of yet more 
influence in strengthening the continental policy 
of England, by which it became deeply involved 
in the affairs both of eastern and western Eu- 
rope. 

The west of Europe had just emerged from a 
contest of thirteen years, in which the Spanish 
monarchy was the stake. This war had been 
sustained by an alliance, the soul of which was 
England, and which drooped and ended soon 
after England retired. The peace, in which she 
had secured to herself important advantages, 
however trifling they may have appeared in the 
eyes of the whigs, had been her work, and its 
maintenance was no less her interest. But 
hardly ever was there a more insecure peace 
than that of Utrecht ; for between the two prin- 
cipal parties — Spain and Austria — there was no 
stipulation of peace, even though the distance 
between their dominions and the position of the 
remainder of Europe had really caused a cessa- 
tion of hostilities. The loss of her European 
dependences in Italy and the Netherlands to 
Austria and Savoy, was not forgotten by Spain, 
and she was only waiting for an opportunity of 
seizing them again. The interests therefore of 
England and Austria coincided in the mainte- 



262 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

nance of peace; and the connection between them 
consequently continued and was strengthened. 
But the circumstances which then took place in 
the house of Bourbon, procured for England an- 
other ally on the continent, and that in a nation 
against which all her powers had been but a 
short time before exerted, namely, France. Since 
the death of Louis XIV. (1715) affairs under the 
regency of the duke of Orleans took a very dif- 
ferent turn from what had been expected. In- 
stead of the close connection between the Bour- 
bons of France and those of Spain which had 
been looked for, rivalry and strife arose which 
ultimately led to war. The weak health of the 
youthful king of France excited the expectation 
of a speedy vacancy of the throne of France. 
Who in this case was to be his successor ? 
the regent, or the king of Spain, who had re- 
signed for himself and his descendants all claims 
upon the French throne ? The example of 
Louis XIV. however had shown how far such a 
resignation was binding. But it did not appear 
probable that the regent would suffer the sceptre 
to be wrested from him if the attempt was de- 
layed till the death of the young king. It seemed 
much easier at once to deprive him of the re- 
gency ; and this idea suggested itself the more 
readily to the Spanish minister Alberoni, since 
it agreed with his other plans for recovering the 
provinces which had been yielded to Austria and 
Savoy (especially those in Italy), and even for 
overthrowing the whole political system of Eu- 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 263 

rope, by the elevation of the pretender to the 
throne of England. But the attempt to raise a 
conspiracy against their regent was betrayed and 
failed, and the recommencement of hostilities be- 
tween Spain and France (1719) was the conse- 
quence of its discovery. 

Under these circumstances it was natural that 
a connection should be formed between England 
and the regent ; his interest and "that of England 
were alike involved in the maintenance of the 
established order of things in Europe, as settled 
at the peace of Utrecht. He was compelled, in 
order to provide for his own security, to oppose 
the plans of Spain. On the other hand, how- 
ever extraordinary it might seem that England 
and France should be allied, it is easy to per- 
ceive that no material alteration had taken place 
in the policy of England. Spain, under Albe- 
roni, wished to rule as France had done under 
Louis XIV. ; England was therefore guided by 
the same interest in offering a strong opposition 
to the plans of Spain, as that which had for- 
merly engaged her in war with France. But 
other causes were added in reference to Spain, 
founded upon commercial advantages, which in- 
duced England to oppose that country, and (for 
it amounted to the same thing) to make the 
observance of the conditions of the peace of 
Utrecht the aim of her policy ; and these were 
the great concessions made by Spain in the 
treaty of Assiento. By the provisions of this 
treaty, England obtained the right of furnishing 



264 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

Spanish America with negro slaves for thirty 
years, and of sending annually a vessel of 500 
tons to the great commercial fair of Portobello °. 

These privileges could not fail, on account of 
the smuggling to which they gave rise, of se- 
curing to England the greater part of the trade 
of Spanish America ; and in proportion to the 
increase of profit, the British government be- 
came more anxious to ensure the continuance of 
them, by maintaining the peace. It would be 
superfluous to describe the events which after 
the year 1714 caused the fall of Alberoni, and 
upon it the accession of Spain to the quadruple 
alhance, and thus led to the attainment of this 
object. 

Thus it becomes evident that the participation 
of England in the affairs of western Europe 
during the first half of the reign of George I., 
arose not merely from the personal interests of 
the monarch, but also from those of the nation. 
At that time there were as yet no designs upon 
the dominion of the sea ; the only objects aimed 
at were the security of the balance of power — 
the confirmation of the advantages which had 
been gained by England — and the maintenance 
of the peace of Europe. The colonies however 
now began to exert an influence upon conti- 
nental politics, which must not hereafter remain 
unnoticed. 

" The fair of Portobello was at that time one of the most important in 
the world, as at it the European goods required by the South American 
provinces of Spain were exchanged for the gold and silver of Peru. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 265 

But while the British cabinet was thus active 
in the west, new connections arose in the east. 
The great war which had laid waste the north- 
ern part of this quarter of the globe for one-and- 
twenty years (1700 — 1721) was not without its 
influence on England. George I. has been re- 
presented in almost all the histories of England, 
as having upon this occasion exchanged the king 
for the elector ; and for the sake of his German 
territories permitted himself to be mixed up, as 
king of England, in the strife which took place. 
We ought therefore to attempt what there is no 
longer any reason to prevent, viz. an impartial 
consideration of the question, how far the inter- 
est of the English nation required this inter- 
ference of the king ? how far the interests of 
the nation were the same as those of the elec- 
torate ? and how far the consequences were ad- 
vantageous or the reverse to Great Britain ? 

It has already been shown that England had 
long been no indifferent spectator of the pro- 
ceedings of the northern powers. The trade in 
the Baltic was the cause of this ; and after it be- 
came considerable, the English could remain as 
little indifferent upon the subject as the Dutch, 
with whom they shared it, though at that time 
very unequally. Besides, the geographical si- 
tuation of the Baltic, which can only be reached 
by narrow straits, one only of which, the Sound, 
is perfectly navigable, made it by no means a 
matter of indifference in whose possession this 



266 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

passage, and with it the means of entering this 
sea, should be. 

If any single power obtained the dominion, if, 
as had more than once happened in the times 
of the Swedish monarchy, any single state arose 
with such power as either actually to close that 
entrance, or by the imposition of heavy tolls 
virtually to effect the same object, that branch 
of the commerce and navigation of both Eng- 
land and Holland could not but become in the 
highest degree precarious. The active inter- 
ference of England in the affairs of the north 
commenced therefore during the period of the 
Swedish dominion, when that state began to 
menace Denmark ; and the maintenance of a 
certain balance, or at least the preservation of 
both powers was the object which this inter- 
ference had in view. It is true that besides ne- 
gotiation, England, owing to her situation, had 
no means of giving succour except by her fleets; 
but the position of the two states, which made 
it necessary that a war between them, if under- 
taken in earnest, should be carried on by sea as 
well as land, rendered this kind of assistance 
very important, and might even do what in naval 
expeditions very rarely is the case, viz. make it 
decide the event. The internal disturbances 
which distracted England towards the close of 
the thirty years' war, rendered an active inter- 
vention in favour of Denmark, then menaced by 
Sweden, impossible. Denmark however was re- 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 267 

lieved by the peace of Bromsebroe (1645). It 
was in Cromwell's time however that attention 
was first directed to these affairs : nay, as we 
have previously shown, his designs went even to 
the acquisition by England of possessions on the 
shores of the Baltic. When Charles Gustavus 
of Sweden threatened the total annihilation of 
Denmark (1657) England strenuously took her 
part, and procured the peace of Roschild (Feb. 
26, 1658) ; and when that monarch suddenly 
broke the conditions and besieged Copenhagen, 
not only did England join the confederacy at 
the Hague, but English vessels accompanied the 
Dutch fleet to the Baltic, and by a victory over 
the Swedish fleet contributed much to the relief 
of Copenhagen (1659). The trade with the 
Baltic and the maintenance of the previous tolls 
at the Sound, are the causes assigned for this 
interference in the treaty which was then made p. 
The change which shortly afterwards was ef- 
fected in England by the restoration of the king, 
not only did not diminish, but even increased 
the share which England had taken in these 
affairs. The trade with the Baltic was consi- 
dered to be of such importance, that it was re- 
gulated by new conditions with Sweden as well 
as Denmark, and these continue to this day to 
be the groundwork of the mutual commerce of 
these countries. The treaty with Sweden was 
concluded by Charles II. (1661) with the re- 

P Vide ScHMAuss Einleitimg zu der Staatsioissenschaft, vol. ii. p. 129. 



268 RISE OF THE^ CONTINENTAL 

gency during the minority of Charles XL, and 
altered in some particulars in the year 1666 ; 
that with Denmark not till the year 1671'^. In 
both these treaties it was especially provided 
what articles should be considered contraband, 
in order to avoid any interruption to the trade 
during times of war. But the attention of Eng- 
land was now especially engaged by the constant 
endeavours of Holland to obtain the whole of 
the trade ; and owing to this, the relations in 
which the two states stood to each other, usually 
had their influence upon the north. A clear 
proof of this is afforded by the negotiations 
which took place during the war (1665 — 1667), 
which was ended by the treaty of Breda. Hol- 
land then gained over Denmark as well as 
Sweden, and the entrance into the Baltic was 
to have been entirely forbidden to England '. 
But the peace of Breda (1667) which soon en- 
sued, and the new and more important occur- 
rences in western Europe, when Louis XIV. 
commenced his wars in the Netherlands, altered 
these political relations and prevented any con- 
sequences which the above negotiations might 
have had. 

The ambitious designs of Louis extended them- 
selves even to the north ; and when France suc- 
ceeded in winning over Sweden, Denmark also 



1 They are fo be found in Schmauss Corpus Juris Gentium, vol. ii. pp. 
753 and 2328. 

■■ Result of the treaty concluded at the Hague between Holland and 
Denmark, Feb. 11, 1666. — Schmauss, Staatswissenschaft, vol. ii. p. 178. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 269 

followed ; but the war did not become a naval 
one, and had no reference to commerce. It will 
only be necessary to bear in mind the internal 
affairs of England under Charles II., James II., 
and William III., in order to account for the 
circumstance that her policy was less frequently 
directed towards the north during these reigns. 

But the great northern war, which, after con- 
tinuing twenty years, entirely changed the rela- 
tions of northern Europe, could not fail of en- 
gaging the attention of England. The proof of 
this is found in the peace of Travendal, (1700,) 
which was concluded between Sweden and Den- 
mark through the mediation of England, and 
guaranteed by her. The war of the Spanish 
succession, which immediately afterwards set the 
whole of western Europe in flames, and which 
England carried on by land with a degree of 
vigour and good fortune never before witnessed, 
made it impossible that she could interfere with 
energy in the affairs of the north. She con- 
tented herself with watching the proceedings of 
the Swedish hero, and was only anxious lest it 
should enter into his head to become the ally of 
France, and strike in with the sword in her be- 
half. But when by the peace of Utretcht (1713) 
she was released from this contest, it could not 
but be expected that she should again become 
active in that quarter. 

But it was no easy question for England to de- 
termine what side she should put herself on. All 
the former relations had been changed ; Sweden 



270 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

was exhausted, and while Russia was rapidly 
developing her strength, the balance between 
Sweden and Denmark was no longer the only 
thing to be considered. But in what point of 
view was England to regard this growth of Rus- 
sia in reference to her own interests ? On the 
one side it could not be a matter of indifference 
to British policy, that a power should be form- 
ing itself in the north, which not only threatened 
the independence and existence of all the other 
states, but was even directly bent upon becom- 
ing a great naval force, and thus grasping the 
dominion of the Baltic. On the other hand it 
required no great foresight to perceive, more or 
less clearly, the advantages which would result 
to England from the civilisation of Russia. An 
acquaintance with the arts and the wants of 
luxury in a state of such immense extent, laid 
open an inexhaustible market to the manufac- 
turing and trading nations of Europe ; and al- 
though it could not then be foreseen what a 
preponderance England would afterwards obtain 
by the decay of Dutch commerce, it was very 
clear that she could not be wholly shut out from 
these advantages. But the measures adopted 
did not, as it appears, proceed from such general 
considerations. No care was taken of the fu- 
ture, and temporary relations only were looked 
to. Single opportunities were seized as they 
presented themselves, and thus England became 
involved in the question without having any 
fixed system to guide herself by. The extension 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 271 

of the northern war into Germany, in which 
George I. became concerned, as elector of Ha- 
nover, gave the first occasion of interference. 

Sweden had been deprived by her enemies of 
almost all her German possessions, and of these 
more particularly, the duchies of Bremen and 
Verden, which she had obtained by the peace of 
Westphalia, had fallen into the hands of the 
Danes. Denmark sold these territories to Ha- 
nover, in a treaty which was signed June 26th, 
1715. As Sweden would not recognise this 
sale, nay more, as Charles XII. made it no se- 
cret that his whole efforts were directed towards 
regaining as far as possible the supremacy in 
northern Germany, the implication of Hanover 
in the northern war would have been a natural 
consequence, even if it had not been expressly 
stipulated in the treaty that George I. should 
declare war against Sweden'. This he did in 
his character of elector of Hanover, and it was 
only in this character that he carried it on by 
land ; but at the same time a squadron of eight 
English men of war was sent to the Sound, 
which joined the Danish fleet K It was not 
without cause that Charles XII. complained 
of this last step, which led however to no 
important results ; nor did he in the bitter ha- 
tred which he bore to George I. distinguish be- 

3 The state papers are to be found in Memoires de Lamberti, vol. ix. p. 
229, 

' The British admiral put himself in those days under the orders of the 
Danish commander. Such are the changes which occur ! 



272 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

tween the king and the elector, but sought his 
revenge by no less formidable means than a re- 
volution in England in favour of the pretender ; 
and this his minister, baron Gorz, actually 
planned^ but v^as unable to execute. 

In the mean v^hile the great impediments 
which arose to the commerce of the Baltic 
during the V7ar, afforded England opportunities 
for complaint. No power ever carried com- 
mercial restrictions against his enemies so far 
as Charles XII. did in his regulations'". It is 
true he had extraordinary inducements to such 
a course. It vras according to the existing re- 
lations his chief interest by all means to prevent 
Russia from excelling him as a naval force ; and 
yet it was to this that Peter especially devoted 
himself; and he was able as early as 1716 to 
make his appearance in the Baltic with a fleet 
superior to that of Sweden. The neutral powers, 
and especially Holland, assisted him in many 
ways. The great advantage to be gained by it 
induced them not only to furnish him with all 
other necessaries which he required, but even to 
supply vessels completely equipped, and which 
could be used as ships of war. On this were 
founded the severe measures of Charles, which 
were directed in the first place against the 
Dutch, but which fell also upon the English, and 
would almost have annihilated their commerce 



" See his edicts of Feb. 8, and Dec. 19, 1715. Lameerti, vol. ix. p. 
223. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 273 

with the Baltic had they not protected it by 
armed vessels. The interest of George I. as 
elector of Hanover, was therefore not the only 
cause which induced him to adopt measures 
against Charles, for he had grounds of com- 
plaint also in his character of king of England. 
Nevertheless it is the constant reproach of all 
English writers, that he did not distinguish be- 
tween these two interests ; but that the wish to 
preserve the duchies of Bremen and Verden, by 
which a communication was opened between his 
new kingdom and his German territories, led 
him to implicate England in the contests of the 
northern states. 

It would not be difficult, from what has been 
already said, to find grounds of defence for 
George I. ; but allowing every one to form his 
own judgment upon this point, there remains 
another ground which has not been taken by 
any English historian with whom I am ac- 
quainted, and which is the most important of 
all in the determination of the controversy — I 
refer to the question whether the interests of 
England or Hanover were most nearly concerned 
in the acquisition of Bremen and Verden ? And 
I believe it will not be difficult to prove that the 
former were chiefly involved in it. 

Hanover certainly gained at a sufficiently 
cheap rate two provinces, one of little import- 
ance, the other more so, yet neither remarkably 
fertile, except in those parts which border on the 
rivers. But then, the latter of the two com- 

T 



274 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

mands the entrance into the two principal rivers, 
and consequently the chief commercial ap- 
proaches of northern Germany ; and thus by its 
geographical situation becomes of very great im- 
portance. By the electorate, a country which 
has not one sea-port nor any commercial town 
of moment, which exports comparatively httle, 
and the exports of which, as they are objects 
which are not generally classed among contra- 
band commodities, there could not easily be 
found causes to interfere with, little was gained; 
but this made the advantages to England all the 
greater. From the time that the province which 
commands the mouths of those streams, and with 
them the two principal sea-ports of Germany, 
became annexed to the dominions of her king, 
these roads of commerce were permanently open 
to England ; the communication with Germany 
no longer depended on political circumstances ; 
she had no longer any cause to fear that her ex- 
ports would be either excluded from the conti- 
nent or admitted under the disadvantages of in- 
creased duties ; and a fair prospect was opened 
to her of securing the commerce of the whole of 
northern Germany. 

In order to comprehend the truth of this, we 
must view the case not according to present 
<;ircumstances, but those of that time. In the 
state of alienation which then existed between 
England and Sweden, it was but too certain that 
Charles would seize the first opportunity of ven- 
geance. Let us suppose he had succeeded in 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 275 

recovering himself, — and this, considering the re- 
conciHation which he was on the point of effect- 
ing with Russia, was far from impossible, — and 
had regained possession of his German territo- 
ries, would not these rivers, as well as the en- 
trance into the Baltic, have been closed, either 
immediately or on every future quarrel, and pri- 
vateers have been fitted out for the purpose of 
infesting that as well as the northern sea ? 

But these advantages must have appeared the 
more important to England at that time, in pro- 
portion to the power of the rivals with whom 
she had to cope. England was then far from 
having the greatest share in the commerce of 
Germany, especially upon the Weser and Elbe. 
The Dutch unquestionably still retained the su- 
periority. In order therefore to be able to com- 
pete with them with a hope of equaUing or sur- 
passing them, that acquisition was of the greatest 
importance. It would be easy to point out other 
advantages, such as the power of sending troops 
to and from Germany unimpeded, and the like, 
which were secured to England, the import- 
ance of which depended upon political circum- 
stances as they arose. 

From all this I think it has been made clear, 
— and more was not intended, — that those Bri- 
tioh authors who make the share which George 
I. took in the affairs of the north an occasion of 
reproach, embrace a very narrow view of the 
subject. Still it remains true, that he did not 

t2 



276 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

act on fixed political principles, but that his con- 
duct was the result of circumstances with the 
changes of which he changed also. Charles XII. 
fell in the trenches " ; his minister, his friend ^nd 
counsellor, was compelled to ascend the scaf- 
fold; and with them was destroyed the whole 
fabric of their policy, at the very time when it 
was upon the point of completion. It is known 
that this was founded upon a reconciliation with 
Russia, the equivalent of which was to be ob- 
tained at the expense of other enemies, espe- 
cially of Denmark. The new party who came 
into power would not prosecute this plan, be- 
cause it had been formed by Gorz, whom they 
hated ; but if Charles XII. with his iron arm 
and iron determination was not able to maintain 
himself alone, what could be expected from the 
government which succeeded him ? Nothing 
therefore remained upon the rupture with Rus- 
sia, but to seek assistance from those powers 
against whom it had been intended to turn their 
whole forces ; and the first of these was Eng- 
land. The treaty formed with George I. as 
elector of Hanover, in which Sweden for a sum 
of money yielded up Bremen and Verden, led 
the way to thi^ ; and was shortly succeeded by 
a treaty of alliance ^ with England, expressly di- 



Dec. 1 1th, 1718 ; and as soon after as Feb. 28, 1719, Gbrz was judi- 
cially murdered. 

P Peace was concluded with Hanover, Nov. 20, 1719 ; and on Jan. 21, 
1720, followed the alliance with England. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 277 

reeled against Russia, and in which assistance 
by land as well as by sea was stipulated for, in 
order to set bounds to the devastating inroads 
of the Czar. 

If the consequences of their political errors 
proved so disastrous to the Swedes, the change 
in the policy of England admitted perhaps of 
some palliation, on the ground that she washed 
to repress the fearful aggrandizement of Russia, 
and to uphold the balance of power in the 
north. 

But if this was her object, she embarked in 
an undertaking which she could not accom- 
plish, and even at that early period exhibited 
a proof how little she was able at any time to 
form a correct estimate of her own power, or 
to determine the precise sphere of her influence. 
The only way in which she could injure Russia 
was by obstructing for a time the navigation 
of the Baltic. But this was surely not sufficient 
to retard the growth of its power. And as to 
maintaining the political balance in the north, 
it was now, generally speaking, too late. Be- 
sides, when Russia at the peace of Nystadt had 
effected the separation of the finest lands on 
the Baltic from Sweden, viz. Livonia, Esthonia, 
Ingria, and a part of Courland, what support, 
however powerful, could have sustained Sweden 
in a position to preserve the balance of power 
against Russia ? 

By the peace of Nystadt then, nothing, it is 
true, was definitively settled respecting England ; 



278 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

it was nevertheless the foundation of her con- 
tinental policy in the north. As the conse- 
quences of this peace developed themselves 
slowly, but on this account the more surely, 
in the growing prosperity of Russia ; as not only 
her exports increased in consequence of her 
possessing the principal port in the Baltic, but 
from the spread of European luxury, her inter- 
nal consumption was also augmented, so the 
conviction that this was by no means a ques- 
tionable but in the highest degree an advan- 
tageous result to England, developed itself more 
and more in that country ; the market for Bri- 
tish manufactures becoming thereby so much 
the more extensive, and the trade to the Baltic 
daily more important. On the other hand, the 
augmentation of the British navy caused in turn 
a proportionate demand abroad for the materials 
requisite in ship-building, especially timber and 
hemp, both of which the immense territory of 
Russia offered in the greatest profusion. In a 
word, both countries were becoming every day 
more and more indispensable to each other ; 
not in prosecuting a common war, but in sup- 
plying each other's wants ; a bond of union far 
more durable than any treaties of alliance. 

Under these relations the British continental 
pohcy in the north necessarily assumed more 
of a passive than an active character. The 
good understanding between England and Russia 
was indispensable to both parties ; and there 
was nothing at that time which seemed likely 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 279 

to disturb this amicable connection. Even when 
the occasional re-action upon the north of Eu- 
rope of the political events of the west miglit 
have excited such apprehensions, they passed 
away without any important consequences. This 
state of things lasted till Russia took a direct 
and vigorous part, not only in the affairs of the 
north and east, but also in those of the west 
and south of Europe. This intervention neces- 
sarily gave birth to some new features in the 
British continental policy in the north, as will 
be seen in the sequel of this inquiry. 

The happy influence which the formation of 
the quadruple alliance produced on the west 
of Europe, had not only implicated England 
as closely as possible in the political relations 
to which it gave rise, but one might even say 
that she became and continued the moving 
power in them. The attempt to force upon 
Spain the acceptance of the conditions pre- 
scribed by this alliance did not, it is true, after 
the fall of Alberoni, re-establish any permanent 
peace, but still it restored tranquillity (Jan. 26, 
1720 ;) the points still in dispute were to be 
decided at a general congress. Under these 
circumstances it might be expected that England 
should take a most lively interest in the affairs 
of the continent ; but yet she did not do so 
to the extent anticipated. 

Pohtical activity and negotiation had become 
a necessary resource to George I. It is possible 



280 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

that he was at first led by the ambition of show- 
ing that it was not merely the government of 
a small but of a large state to which he had 
succeeded, and that his growing power enabled 
him to participate in the direction of the com- 
mon interests of Europe ; but once deeply in- 
volved in these interests he could not easily 
have drawn back without compromising both 
himself and his kingdom, even though his in- 
chnation might have prompted him to do so. 
But in addition to this at that very juncture 
(April, 1721) the reins of government were held 
and retained for twenty-one years in succession, 
by a minister, whose disposition, in this respect, 
coincided with that of his master, not it is true in 
evading the war, but in employing every method 
which negotiations and demonstrations could 
supply to avoid it. Such a course of policy 
might have been expected from the long and 
almost uniformly peaceful administration of Pto- 
bert Walpole. 

The continental relations of England always 
require to be considered in two points of view : 
first, as regards their advantageous or perni- 
cious influence on England itself; and, secondly, 
in relation to the whole system of European 
policy. In the British cabinet the first question 
had of course at all times a preponderating 
weight. We shaM therefore contemplate our 
subject-matter first of all in this aspect ; but 
nothing shall on that account prevent us from 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 281 

surveying it likewise in the other, and from 
noting the points of agreement and difference 
which they respectively present. 

It cannot be denied that if we examine the 
British policy in the last years of George I., 
we are unable to trace any fixed plan of pro- 
ceeding. An insular state which takes an in- 
terest in the affairs of continental powers, can 
only do so by virtue of a federative system 
established on sound principles of policy, and 
followed up with firmness. We have seen how 
the links of this connection have hitherto been 
concentrated in England. But at the period of 
which we are speaking, those links were so won- 
derfully complicated, that the principles on which 
they were founded seemed to be forgotten. The 
connection with France was renewed, that with 
Austria dissolved, while the confederacies in the 
north were determined by the influence of the 
combinations formed in the west. The igno- 
rance of the real designs of the foreign states, 
which we so often see occasion to impute to the 
British cabinet, manifested itself at this time in 
a remarkable manner. Justice, however, re- 
quires us also to observe, that the relations of 
the continental pow^ers to each other were not 
the less variable and uncertain, because they 
were for the most part determined by the ex- 
citement of a personal and angry hatred. 

To this cause we must ascribe the wavering 
policy which characterised those times, and which 
could not possibly continue without exercising 



282 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

some influence upon England. Nevertheless in 
all the activity of the British cabinet at that 
period, we discover one dominant principle, 
which was in the highest degree beneficial, not 
only to England, but to Europe at large. This 
principle was the maintenance of peace. The 
only question is whether it always adopted the 
right method to secure this object. 

One result of this policy was the congress 
at Cambray, which began to assemble under 
the arbitration of England and France, in order 
to separate again, after long delays and fruitless 
negotiations, without any decisive issue. Here 
the old dispute between Austria and Spain should 
have terminated ; the recent feuds also, espe- 
cially that about the plaything of Charles VL, 
the Indian company at Ostend, which became 
the object of a general outcry to the other 
commercial states, as soon as their highest in- 
terests became affected by it, ought to have 
been here laid aside ; in a word, the whole evil 
should have been now rooted out. 

But history nowhere affords a more striking 
instance of the truth, that large conventions are 
generally fruitless, nay, often in the highest de- 
gree prejudicial, unless they are directed by 
great men, who know how to raise themselves 
above petty passions, and to view and treat 
every question, whether great or small, with 
strict regard to its merits and proportions. The 
voices of the arbitrators swelled the note of dis- 
cord which was raised about the most trivial cir- 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 283 

cumstance ; the passions were not calmed, but 
excited from the first ; and the congress conld 
scarcely have terminated otherwise than it did, 
even if other circumstances had not intervened 
to dissolve it. 

It is melancholy to observe how much the 
politics of almost the whole of Europe were, at 
that time, determined by the proposed, though 
ineffectually proposed, marriage of a child ; and 
how little was wanting to renew the flames of a 
general war. A Spanish princess, then just 
twelve months old, was fixed upon by the quad- 
ruple alliance, for the consort of Louis XV., and 
had been sent to Paris, where she was brought 
up. The duke of Bourbon, the minister of 
France had, however, private grounds for wish- 
ing a speedy consummation of the marriage of 
the young prince, which, owing to the age of the 
princess, could scarcely have been brought about 
in less than ten years. He was, therefore, anx- 
ious to procure for Louis a consort of a marriage- 
able age, which he found in the daughter of the 
ex-king of Poland, Stanislaus Lescinsky; and 
the Spanish princess was sent back. This event, 
which could, under no circumstances, be other- 
wise than mortifying, produced the highest de- 
gree of rancour and resentment in the haughty 
mind of Elizabeth, who felt herself insulted, both 
as a mother and a queen \ Yet, owing to the 

1 Elizabeth of Parma was, as is well known, the second consort of king- 
Philip v., having become so in 1715, and the legitimate heiress of the 
Spanish throne. Her first object was to secure the succession, which pro- 



284 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

friendly connection between France and Eng- 
land, it would have been the height of rashness 
to hazard a rupture with France, especially since 
a reconciliation with Austria had not yet been 
completely effected by the congress at Cambray. 
Indeed, it was hardly to be expected, from the 
state in which men's minds then were, that such 
a reconciliation should have been accomplished 
at a congress. The consequence was, that a 
resolution was speedily formed in Spain, of esta- 
blishing a direct connection with Austria. 

This attempt was by no means exceptionable 
in itself; it could hardly fail of success, since a 
clear understanding had been arrived at long be- 
fore, during the peace, on some of the main 
points of difference, namely, the concessions 
which were mutually demanded, and no colli- 
sion of interest had occured in other points ; but 
still, neither in the choice of a mediator, nor in 
the general conduct of the proceeding, was a suf- 
ficient degree of caution resorted to. Never, 
since their difference with Austria was virtually 
arranged by the treaty of Vienna, on April 30th, 
1725, and the treaty of commerce, which imme- 
diately followed it, could it have been more essen- 
tially necessary by a provident and careful policy 
to tranquiUise the fears which must have arisen 
among the foreign powers in consequence of 



peily belonged to the sons of the first maniage, to her own children ; in 
consequence of which Spain was precipitated into more than one war. 
The prospect of seeing her daughter on the French throne was a principal 
part of her plan, which was now frustrated. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 285 

this unexpected result. But the busmess of pa- 
cification was committed to the duke of Ripper- 
da, one of the vainest braggarts that ever ex- 
isted'; who, intoxicated by his unexpected good 
fortune, knew so httle how to conduct himself 
in such a change of circumstances, that he very- 
soon brought about his own ruin. The sense- 
less behaviour of this man, who now considered 
himself the first statesman in Europe, his arro- 
gance and haughty bearing towards the ambas- 
sadors of foreign powers, caused a crisis in the 
affairs of Spain, the issue of which promised 
much more of war than peace. 

This reconcihation of Spain and Austria, 
roused all the political energies of George I. 
into activity. Almost the only provision of spe- 
cial interest contained in it was that which it 
had always been the policy of England to pro- 
mote, viz. the complete ratification of the peace 
of Utrecht and a defensive Alliance. But the 
opinion prevailed that it contained much more 
than it really did. The public mind was anxious 
for information about secret stipulations, which 
were said to be especially directed against Eng- 
land, so as not only to secure Gibraltar to Spain' 
and the establishment of his Ostend company to 
Charles VI., but even to place the Pretender on 
the British throne ; for in which of the political 

r He was in fact a native of Holland, whom Alberoni had brought as a 
manufacturer to Spain. After his fall he wandered about as an adventurer 
in Turkey. 

' Spain certainly made claims upon Gibraltar, but Charles VI. had 
only promised his mediation. 



286 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

negotiations of that period could this bugbear 
be dispensed with ? The sequel showed that it 
was a mere phantom which caused the alarm ; 
the British cabinet had not informed itself with 
accuracy as to the true state of things, it gave 
credit to rumours and hearsays ; but the conse- 
quences of its conduct were serious in the ex- 
treme. 

The supposed new Offensive Alhance was to 
be met by a counter-alliance, which George I., 
during his residence in his German territories, 
concluded with France and Prussia at Herren- 
haus (Sept. 3rd, 1725.) Yes! these political 
convulsions extended even to the remotest re- 
gions of the north. Austria succeeded in attach- 
ing to itself Russia, and at first Sweden also. In 
order to have a counterpoise here likewise, the 
allies of Herren-haus obtained Denmark ; and 
Sweden, also, was soon induced, by the promise 
of subsidies, to join their confederation. This 
was truly an era of confederacies ! But far from 
erecting them on the basis of mutual and well- 
defined interests, they founded them on relations 
which could not possibly be durable. England 
separated itself from Austria, the only continental 
power in the south of Europe with which it 
could be connected by any permanent interests. 
It leagued itself with France and Prussia. The 
consequences could not be long restrained. 
Frederic William I. immediately afterwards en- 
tered into various negotiations with Austria; 
from the prospect of private advantage which 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 287 

he saw, or imagined he saw, in the opening of 
the dukedoms of Berg and Juhch, which might 
soon be expected, with the view of procuring 
these possessions for himself. 

In the event, however, war, on an extensive 
scale, seemed likely to be the result of this con- 
federation of Herren-haus. England fitted out 
three fleets, of which one was sent to the West 
Indies, another to Gibraltar, and the third to the 
Baltic. The first two were, therefore, directed 
against Spain, which, on her part, already began 
to lay siege to Gibraltar; the third was designed 
for the support of Denmark and Sweden, in the 
event of any movement on the part of Russia. 
But these hostile demonstrations produced no 
very serious consequences, since some good ge- 
nius still stifled the flame of war just as it seemed 
on the point of breaking out. 

Europe was indebted for this in a great mea- 
sure to the ministerial change which occurred in 
France, 1726. Cardinal Fleury became premier 
when the Duke of Bourbon fell ; and introduced 
into the French ministry dispositions, not less 
pacific than Walpole had infused into the British. 
The negotiations which were more particularly 
directed by papal nuncios, took a favourable 
turn ; and one of the main stumbling-blocks was 
removed, when Charles VI. consented to sus- 
pend for seven years his Ostend commercial 
company. George I. lived just long enough to 
know that the preliminaries of peace had been 
signed at Paris and Vienna, to which Spain also 



288 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

acceded after some difficulty : and in conse- 
quence of which, England recalled her fleets, 
but on condition that Spain should consent to 
raise the siege of Gibraltar* ; and by the treaty 
at Pardo, (a palace near Madrid,) they were 
presently ratified by both powers ^ But a few 
days after the conclusion of those preliminaries, 
viz., on June 22nd, 1727, George I. died during 
a tour in his German territories. 

The foregoing examination, will, it is hoped, 
suffice for forming a general opinion of the con- 
tinental policy of England under George L, and 
for determining with greater precision the effect 
which it produced, as well upon the political 
fabric of Europe in general, as upon England in 
particular. The interference of England under 
George I, was manifestly attended with bene- 
ficial results to the whole political system of 
Europe. The preservation of peace was its ob- 
ject, and peace was either maintained or restored. 
To what protracted and sanguinary wars must 
the execution of Alberoni's project in all proba- 
bility have led, if England had not mediated a 
peace, and maintained it by means of the quad- 
ruple alliance, which it was mainly instrumental 
in constructing! The execution of those projects, 
inasmuch as they involved the reconquest of 
lost provinces, would have been as little a sub- 
ject of congratulation to Europe as it would pro- 
bably have been to Spain itself; which had so 

« June 13th, 1727. " March 6th, 1728. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 289 

repeatedly learned by dear bought experience 
the cost of distant provinces. The war in the 
north had been terminated through the inter- 
vention of England ; and though it was im- 
possible for England to re-establish a counter- 
balancing power in this quarter, Sweden was at 
all events maintained in the rank of independent 
states, from which, without assistance, it would 
probably have disappeared. 

It must be allowed that England itself did not 
acquire any new possessions by its continental 
relations, (though I think it has been clearly 
proved that the acquisition of Bremen and Ver- 
den were important to it,) but it gained ad- 
vantages of another description which were by 
no means inconsiderable. 

In the first place it secured the succession of 
the house of Hanover on the British throne. 
The voice of the nation has proclaimed this too 
loudly and unanimously as the most important 
feature of its returning prosperity to require any 
detailed proof ; the only question which can 
possibly arise, is whether this was a consequence 
of its continental relations ? It may perhaps be 
objected on the other hand, that the attempts to 
re-establish the Pretender on the throne origi- 
nated in the interference of England in the 
affairs of the continent. But as long as the 
Stuarts had or might have powerful friends 
abroad, could the new dynasty safely dispense 
with such aid ? The throne of the Hanoverian 
house was by no means so secure as to supersede 

u 



290 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

the necessity of accepting every available offer 
of support. But it was more peculiarly the 
good understanding which existed for so long a 
period with France, which was of such infinite 
service to them in this emergency. France 
was the principal, perhaps the only power which 
by supporting the Pretender could in any ma- 
terial degree endanger the security of the new 
dynasty. And surely the favourable opportunity 
which was thus presented to the new family of 
negotiating its private interests by means of this 
connection without compromising those of the 
nation at large, was a piece of good fortune not 
to be neglected. Further than this — By the 
active share which England took on this occa- 
sion she maintained that high consideration in 
the political system of Europe, which she had 
acquired during the reign of WilHam and Anne, 
It does not require much sagacity to perceive of 
how much influence the public estimation of a 
state must be in such a system as that of 
Europe. The conduct of others is regulated by 
it, just as we see it among individuals in private 
life. Even fallen states have often for a consi- 
derable time experienced the benefits of its sup- 
port ; as for example, Venice and the Porte ; 
but even a state which is but on the rise cannot 
afford to be indifferent to it. Even though no 
positive advantage should be gained by this 
public estimation, yet the negative effect is in- 
valulable, since no measure of importance is un- 
dertaken without the knowledge of such a state. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 291 

and therefore none can be easily undertaken 
which is opposed to it and its interests. We 
cannot adduce a better illustration of this truth 
than by comparing the RepubHc of the United 
Netherlands with England, at the period of 
which we are treating and still propose to treat. 
The latter state laid it down as a fundamental 
principle of her policy after the peace of Utrecht, 
to keep herself as much aloof as possible from 
all foreign transactions, or only to take part in 
them when absolutely compelled. She continued 
to maintain for some time longer her position in 
public estimation among the states of the first 
order. By degrees, however, she began to sink 
lower and lower in the scale, and experience has 
shown the result to which this eventually led. 

Lastly, the continuance of peace was another 
result to England of her continental policy, and 
assuredly not the least considerable. It not 
only secured to her the quiet enjoyment of the 
advantages derived from her Spanish commerce, 
but also those arising from intercourse with her 
colonies in America and the West Indies, which 
at that very time were becoming prosperous in 
the extreme, and to which the annually increasing 
consumption of West Indian produce, particu- 
larly of coffee, began to impart a value which 
no one could have anticipated. Still the times 
had not then arrived (as they since have) for 
such an increase in the power of England as to 
enable her to carry on her trade, even during 
war, comparatively without molestation. 

u 2 



292 ^ RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

But though all this may demonstrate the 
soundness of the British continental policy in 
general diirmg the reign of George I., it will not 
by any means vindicate every single measure 
which was resorted to in pursuance of it. It 
cannot be denied, that particularly in the last 
six years of this monarch's reign, the interference 
of the British cabinet in the affairs of the conti- 
nent, assumed the character of over-activity 
without at the same time maintaining that sta- 
bility which is the indispensable condition of all 
durable alliances. It cannot be denied, that 
precipitate measures were sometimes adopted, 
particularly those occasioned by the league of 
Herren-haus, which, without a concurrence of 
fortunate circumstances, which were beyond the 
control of England, would in all probability have 
caused disastrous consequences. To this period 
we may perhaps ascribe the illusion that she was 
able by her fleets to accomplish more than the 
nature of things permits ; so likewise the notion 
of deriving great advantages from the subsidies 
which she furnished, was then at least enter- 
tained, though it had not as yet any serious 
consequences. 

Important changes in the ministry were ex- 
pected on the death of the king (1727.) These 
anticipations, however, were not realised; Wal- 
pole, supported by the credit of queen Caroline, 
continued prime minister. It could scarcely 
have been expected therefore, that the spirit of 
the British continental policy should be mate- 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 293 

rially altered during the first years of George 
II.'s reign. But though no immediate changes 
ensued, the alteration which took place in the 
political relations of the continent, caused a cor- 
responding alteration in those of England, which 
ought not to pass unobserved. 

When George II. ascended the throne, the 
amicable relations subsisting between England 
and France remained in all their force. The 
character of the two premiers, Fleury and Wal- 
pole, were too well suited to each other to ad- 
mit readily of a change. Both were intent upon 
the preservation of peace, and their union was 
still more strongly cemented by the brother of 
the British minister, Horatio Walpole, in the 
character of ambassador at Paris. Prussia, the 
other ally of Herren-haus, had, as we have be- 
fore remarked, already entered into separate 
negotiations with Austria ; the republic of the 
United Netherlands stood on a most friendly 
footing with England and France ; accustomed 
as Europe was to see the republic take part in 
all her great confederations, it was now taken 
for granted that no association could be formed 
without its concurrence ; while the republic it- 
self, intent upon the preservation of peace, 
thought it could never employ sufficient pre- 
caution in pursuit of this object. With regard 
to the confederate powers, Spain and Austria, 
negotiations had been opened with the former of 
them, which though at first they appeared to 
take an unfavourable turn, owing to the death 



294 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

of the king, were soon restored to their former 
course, by the continuance in office of the Wal- 
pole administration^ and were brought to asuc- 
cessful issue by the treaty at Pardo. Since the 
scheme of the Ostend company had been sus- 
pended, it appeared as though friendly relations 
might be renewed with Austria likewise ; but, 
new events intervening, this was prevented, or 
at least delayed. 

The British cabinet at that time evidently set 
a much higher value upon the friendship of 
Spain than on that of Austria. The temporary 
advantages derivable from the secure possession 
of Gibraltar and Minorca, the profitable trade 
with Spain itself, and, above all, with its Ameri- 
can possessions, guaranteed as it was by existing 
treaties, seemed to claim a paramount import- 
ance. But this friendship could not well be 
maintained without entering into the interested 
plans of the queen of Spain for the advance- 
ment of her children, and thus hazarding giving 
offence to Austria. However the prospect of 
advantage derivable to England from a separa- 
tion of the two powers, Austria and Spain, over- 
came this consideration. By the conditions of 
the quadruple alliance Tuscany, with Parma and 
Placentia, were secured to the queen of Spain 
for her elder son Don Carlos, as soon as their 
projected opening should be completed — till 
which time they were to remain in the occu- 
pation of neutral troops. But apprehensive that 
obstacles might be thrown in her way, she wished 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 295 

to secure the immediate possession of them, and 
Spanish troops were sent into them as a garri- 
son. England entered into these plans, and 
although they were an infraction of the quad- 
ruple alliance, without consulting or apprising 
Austria, joined with France in concluding a 
treaty with Spain at Seville,'' in which it was 
not only permitted to Spain thus to act, but 
even England rendered itself liable to contribute 
towards sending Don Carlos into those pro- 
vinces with 6000 Spanish troops. The most 
violent indignation on the part of Austria was 
the natural result of these proceedings. But, 
however much incensed Austria may have felt, 
however loudly she protested that she would 
not tolerate any foreign troops in this quarter, 
Walpole nevertheless succeeded in calming her 
resentment. His plan was to endeavour to steer 
his way clear between two rocks, and he suc- 
ceeded. When the more dangerous alternative 
of the two, viz. a breach with Spain, had been 
eluded — his next point was to avoid the other. 
But Walpole knew the talisman by which the op- 
position of Charles VI. might be charmed away. 
Whoever recognised his order of succession in 
favour of his daughter, his Pragmatic Sanction, 
might always calculate upon gaining him over, 
and even inducing him to make a sacrifice of 
his own interest. At this price Walpole, by 
quietly negotiating with Austria as he had just 

" Nov. 9, 1729. 



296 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

before done with Spain, obtained the formal 
abohtion of the Ostend company for England, 
and the promise of the investiture of Tuscany and 
Parma, with permission to send Spanish troops 
thither for Spain ; and the treaty of Vienna was 
concluded on the 16th of March, 1731. 

In any continental state Walpole would with 
such a policy as this in all probability have 
failed. England was now in friendship with all 
the world without possessing a single true friend 
in the political sense of the term. The friend- 
ship of Spain could not be permanent, since a 
growing cause of differences lay hid in their 
commercial relations ; the friendship of France 
was now growing cold in consequence of the 
treaty of Vienna, which had been concluded 
without her participation ; to counteract which 
Fleury not only re-established the good under- 
standing with Spain, but likewise showed his 
skill in strengthening it. The renewed friend- 
ship with Austria required under such relations 
to be severely tried before its sincerity could be 
depended upon. England had engaged herself 
in a tissue of treaties, out of which it seemed 
scarcely possible .she should extricate herself. 
Had she been prepared to fulfil all her engage- 
ments, scarcely a war could have arisen in any 
quarter of Europe in which she would not have 
been implicated, nay, in which she would not 
have been obliged to furnish auxiliaries in seve- 
ral quarters at once. But an insular state has 
certainly in such cases great advantages over 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 297 

every other. Its position gives it in every case 
the best chance of keeping clear of the struggle ; 
and how many resources may not be discovered 
when time is allowed, by which we may extricate 
ourselves from difficulties, without being directly 
unfaithful to our engagements ! It is a sure 
rule, that an insular state, in its connections 
with continental powers, always stakes less upon 
the game than is staked by them in their con- 
nections with it. Probably, however, Walpole 
was not influenced by such considerations as 
these. He was not a man who built his policy 
on general grounds, or who looked very far into 
futurity. His object was the preservation of 
peace ; and he cared not through what obsta- 
cles he had to steal his way towards the attain- 
ment of this object, provided he was only so 
fortunate as to avoid each as it occurred. 

The truth of these observations is strikingly 
corroborated by the events which occurred in 
Europe in the following years. The throne of 
Poland, which had been vacated by the death of 
Augustus IlJj plunged the greater part of the 
continent of Europe into a war, in which the 
occupation of this throne was to the majority of 
those engaged but the pretext of their interfer- 
ence. Charles VI. was guilty of the folly of 
taking part with Russia and Prussia, in favour 
of Augustus HI., in order to obtain from Saxony 
the recognition of his Pragmatic Sanction, and 

y Feb. 1, 1733. 



298 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

thus armed the Bourbon powers with weapons 
which they might wield against himself. At- 
tacked by France, Spain, and Savoy, Charles 
VI. saw himself stripped within the space of a 
year of all his Italian possessions, while at the 
same time the banks of the Rhine became the 
scene of the war in Germany. 

After so many previous negotiations and so 
many connections contracted in every quarter, 
who could have expected that England at such 
a crisis, when her most recent allies were the 
objects of attack, would have remained neutral. 
There was no backwardness on the part of 
Austria in demanding assistance ; but as the 
treaty with this power was only a defensive 
treaty there was not much difficulty in evading 
it. England, in connection with Holland, con- 
fined herself therefore to that which touched her 
most nearly, the maintenance of the neutrality^ 
of the Austrian Netherlands, and generally to 
making proposals of peace which however were 
not accepted. The issue is well known. France 
concluded the preliminaries of the treaty of 
Vienna with Austria without any interruption 
from England ^ It acquired for itself in return 
for the bare promise of recognising the Prag- 
matic Sanction, the dukedom of Lorraine ; and 
the queen of Spain was eventually contented to 
accept the kingdom of Naples and Sicily, in lieu 
of Parma and Tuscany, for her son Don Carlos, 

^ By a treaty with France at the Hague, Nov. 24, 1733. 
« October 3, 1735. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 299 

in hope of recovering also at the first oppor- 
tunity the other ItaUan territories for her se- 
cond son. 

The course pursued by Walpole during the 
progress of these events, was perhaps most con- 
sistent with the momentary advantages of Eng- 
land, but it was not consistent. The very mi- 
nister whose whole energies were roused into 
action the moment that a single twig of the 
political tree was set in motion, now looked 
on with indifference while the whole stem was 
shaken ! How could he any longer hope to 
find a faithful ally ? — he, who was so deeply 
interested in such connections, if he saw his 
most recent and almost his only ally despoiled 
of his most valuable territories, without tender- 
ing him the least assistance. It might certainly 
be a matter of indifference to England who 
continued to sit on the Polish throne, but after 
all that she had hitherto done, was it possible 
that the fate of Italy and the aggrandizement 
of France could be so likewise ? We are far 
from meaning to assert that England ought to 
have taken up arms in every such emergency. 
The presumption of being able to decide such 
points has already cost the world enough ! But 
still I repeat that this conduct in comparison 
with his former policy was not consistent. His- 
tory never presumes to determine what would 
have happened in any given case, but the sup- 
position is at all events not without foundation, 
that if Austria had been at that time vigorously 



300 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

supported, Europe might have been spared the 
whole war of succession. 

Meanwhile the times were approaching in which 
all the anxiety of the minister to maintain peace 
was unavailing, since the nation was unable any 
longer to endure the blessings of tranquillity. 
England was plunged into two wars at the same 
time, the Spanish and the Austrian wars of suc- 
cession, both of which became at last blended 
into one. But they constituted an epoch in the 
British continental policy ; and it is in this point 
of view that they must here be considered. 

The war which broke out with Spain in the 
year 1739, can only be regarded as a remote 
consequence of the continental relations ; so far 
namely as the commercial concessions made at 
the peace of Utrecht, by means of the treaty of 
Assiento, laid the ground for it. But considered 
in another point of view, it is nevertheless al- 
ways of extreme importance, as a phenomenon 
arising out of the developement of the British 
commercial policy, so far as this had always a 
considerable influence on her foreign relations. 
It was the first war which England carried on 
under the house of Hanover, or indeed it would 
not be too much to assert that it was the first 
which she carried on at all, barely for the sake 
of commerce ; and then it must be allowed the 
voice of the nation imperatively demanded it. 
And although the treaty of Assiento and some 
other disputes as about cutting log-wood and 
and others gave occasion to it, yet the cause 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 301 

properly speaking lay more deep. The spread 
of British power in the West Indies, and the 
flourishing commerce of her colonial possessions 
there, could not possibly consist with the claims 
which Spain still made to the dominion of these 
seas ; and the war was from the very first not 
merely a war for the protection of the smug- 
gling trade, but for the free navigation of the 
West Indian seas. The point in dispute could 
not be, and of course was not, whether England 
should carry on its smuggling trade with the 
Spanish colonies, but the question was from the 
first, whether British ships trading to the West 
Indies should in the high seas be subjected to 
Spanish search? The Spaniards had hitherto 
exercised this right as consequent on their do- 
minion of the sea, and regarded it as the only 
means of restraining the smuggling trade. The 
English on the other hand refused to submit 
to that search. Viewed in this light the im- 
portance of this war with respect to its con- 
sequences, will not require any further notice. 

Meanwhile the exertions of the minister were 
wholly and sincerely directed to the means of 
averting the war, if it could only be effected 
without trenching too closely on the interests 
of the nation. He accordingly entered into 
negotiations ; and as he well knew that the 
demand relative to the right of search would 
never be explicitly and unreservedly given up 
by Spain, he sought as much as possible to evade 
it; and eventually succeeded on Jan. 15, 1739, 



302 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

in bringing about a treaty with Spain, which 
was signed at Madrid. It contained, however, 
only a few preHminaries, while the further ar- 
rangements respecting the future security of 
British navigation in the West Indies was re- 
ferred to commissioners appointed on both sides 
for the investigation. However much sagacity 
the minister had shown in these negotiations, 
his whole project nevertheless now miscarried. 
The opposite party prevailed, and he saw him- 
self compelled to declare war against Spain. 
Would it not have been better to have let this 
be done by another, and to have tendered his re- 
signation at once rather than to have submitted 
after a fruitless struggle to be driven from power 
by his opponents ? 

The scene of this war was as might be ex- 
pected in the West Indies. It was the first 
time that a British fleet had sailed to those 
regions of the world ; where only single ships, 
or at most small squadrons, had formerly been 
seen. The growing importance of the colonies 
in connection with their commercial jealousy, 
led subsequently to the result that even their 
colonies became the scene of war between the 
European powers. 

But this war did not long remain the only 
one. The year 1740, in which Maria Theresa 
and Frederic II. mounted the throne, constituted 
an era in the general history of Europe ; and 
likewise in the history of the British continental 
relations. We have seen the fluctuations which 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 303 

took place in the latter diiriog the last fifteen 
years ; we have seen that, although at certain 
periods greater stabihty of purpose might have 
been expected from the British ministry, yet the 
main cause lay in the fluctuating politics of the 
continental powers themselves, and in their 
mutual relations. But the Austrian war of suc- 
cession, which broke out at the instigation of 
France, and had no less considerable an object 
than the dismemberment of the Austrian mon- 
archy, excited a general interest among the 
powers which leagued themselves with France 
for this purpose, viz. Spain, Sardinia, and Bava- 
ria, and though only for a short time and 
for definite objects, Prussia also. The old en- 
mity which subsisted between Austria and 
France, revived therefore in all its vigour ; 
and had the object which the league had in view 
been attained, France would have reigned with- 
out a rival over the whole continent of Europe. 
That the dismemberment of the Austrian 
monarchy would be in two respects detrimental 
to England, as neither the destiny of the Aus- 
trian Netherlands nor the balance of power on 
the continent could be matters of indifference 
to her, was generally agreed upon in England. 
Besides, England had not only guaranteed the 
Pragmatic Sanction in general, but had also 
entered, into peculiar responsibilities for sending 
twelve thousand auxiliaries against Austria", 

b By the treaty of 1731. 



304 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

The honour and interest of England seemed to 
render it imperative upon her to make a vigor- 
ous effort to save Austria. But how this' might 
be effectually done, was another question. 

The relations of Austria and the continental 
relations in general, had been materially changed 
since the accession of George I. to the British 
throne by the growing power of Prussia, which 
even now, in a military point of view, stood in the 
first rank of powers. England herself had few 
points of contact with Prussia ; but it could not 
be a matter of indifference to England, that 
Prussia should join her enemies, and besides 
so long as the interest of Hanover was not 
considered altogether detached from that of 
England, a point of contact of more than ordi- 
nary importance was here presented. The alli- 
ance of Herren-haus seems also to have laid the 
foundation for it. But the desertion of this alli- 
ance by Prussia, and still more a personal aver- 
sion which subsisted between George II. and 
Frederic William I. notwithstanding their near 
relationship, had frustrated these views, and had 
even neutralized every attempt to re-estabhsh 
amicable relations, yet the British cabinet did 
not lose sight of this measure ; and even in the 
very next year after the death of Charles VI. it 
became the favourite project of Walpole to con- 
summate a grand confederation with Austria, 
Russia, and Prussia, which should maintain the 
balance of power against the Bourbon courts. 
But as this was frustrated and the Austrian war 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BPJTAIN. 305 

of succession broke out, hopes were nevertheless 
at first entertained of realising this idea in part, 
since a separate treaty between Austria and 
Prussia was effected, which was to have a defen- 
sive alHance for its sequel. But Maria Theresa, 
who would consent to no sacrifice rejected this 
proposal of reconciliation, chiefly influenced by 
the visionary hopes so absurdly excited in her 
by the negotiations in London ". Considered 
merely in a political view, Walpole's plan would 
have been excellent ; but ministers too often 
forget that political plans are morally imprac- 
ticable, so long as political motives are subject 
to the influence of the passions. How could 
it have been possible to effect a solid union 
between two powers when the principles on 
which it was based demanded the compulsory 
surrender of considerable provinces from the 
one to the other. 

England had therefore no alternative remain- 
ing, but either to leave x4.ustria to her fate, or 
to interpose for her deliverance ; and, notwith- 
standing the unfortunate issue of the Spanish 
war, she chose the latter, which the voice of 



•= The most credible and satisfactory explanation which we have received 
of all the diplomatic relations and negotiations of the British cabinet, at 
that period, derived entirely from public documents, and supported by 
them, first appeared in the two works of W. Coxe. " Memoirs of Robert 
Walpole, 1798, 3 vols, and Memoirs of Horace Walpole, 4to. 1802. I re- 
fer particularly to the last, pp. 211. 224. et seq. What valuable materials 
of every kind, historical and moral, do these works present to the future his- 
torian of Great Britain, under the house of Hanover! They have been 
the first to render such a history of the whole period of the two Walpoles 
feasible. 

X 



306 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

the nation loudly demanded. Walpole, how- 
ever, while he held the reins of government, 
would not renounce his old policy ; he wished 
to administer succour without involving himself 
in the war ; he furnished subsidies and took 
German troops into pay. 

Both these phenomena, subsidies and merce- 
nary troops, especially characterise the conti- 
nental policy of England from this period. It 
is requisite therefore that we should examine 
them somewhat more minutely with regard to 
their nature and their effects ; and indeed the 
more attentively we view them, the more unfair 
and partial will the employment of them often 
be considered, especially in later times. 

The granting of subsidies to foreign states 
was not, as we have already shown above, p. 256, 
first introduced by the kings of the house of 
Hanover, but had prevailed as early as the reign 
of Wilhara III. and more especially in that of 
Anne, during the war of the Spanish succes- 
sion. Upon a general view, it appears a con- 
sequence of the unequal distribution of wealth 
in the countries which formed the complicated 
political system of Europe ; and for that reason 
necessarily extended itself more and more in pro- 
portion as this inequality increased. Since the 
western countries of this part of the globe, by the 
advantage of their position, drew to themselves 
the most extensive commerce, wealth became 
accumulated in specie, and enabled these coun- 
tries to furnish the subsidies of which the others 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 307 

stood in need. Not only England, but France 
and Holland followed this system. But England, 
by reason of her position and her relations, was 
manifestly most frequently placed in a condition 
to adopt it. 

The granting of subsidies may prove a great 
gain, or a great evil, as well to the state which 
furnishes them as to that which receives them, 
accordingly as it may be directed by a sound 
policy, by despicable passions, or by mere politi- 
cal caprice : its effects, if pernicious, may even 
extend to the whole political system. 

Independence and security are more valuable 
than money, and if both of them can be pur- 
chased or maintained for a state itself and its 
confederates by money, such an expenditure 
certainly cannot be without advantage. In a 
system composed of such different elements as 
the political system of Europe, that nicely-ad- 
justed balance of power which can afford the 
only security for the perpetuity of the whole, 
cannot possibly be maintained without recipro- 
cal support. It is clear, however, from the pre- 
ceding observations, that those states which had 
been accustomed to receive supplies of money 
rather than of men, must unavoidably be subsi- 
dised as soon as they themselves experience a 
greater deficiency in money than in men. To 
rich states, therefore, who spared their own sub- 
jects, which they might otherwise have been 
compelled to sacrifice, the granting of subsidies 
became under such circumstances an almost ne- 

X 2 



308 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

cessary condition for the maintenance of this 
balance. But considered in another point of 
view, it is unquestionable that such a resource 
is likely to be scandalously abused, whenever 
blind passion resorts to it for satiating its ani- 
mosity, or even that execrable policy is followed 
which sees its own interest in the protraction of 
war amongst others, and does not shrink from 
making considerable sacrifices in order to com- 
pass its object. The maxims which sound policy 
would dictate in granting subsidies have never, 
so far as I am aware, been made the subject 
of a distinct inquiry. They may, perhaps, be 
most correctly deduced from the expression it- 
self. Subsidies are succours furnished in money 
by one state to another, principally for the pur- 
pose of defending the interests of that state, 
which are indirectly identified with its own. 
This appears to be the main point for considera- 
tion, but which immediately becomes changed 
when the defence of our own interests becomes 
the direct motive of our actions. It is only in 
the first case that any reasonable prospect of 
advantage can be expected ; and a detailed his- 
tory of subsidies would probably lead to the con- 
clusion that great statesmen have pretty closely 
adhered to that fundamental maxim ; and that 
those who violate it do so to their own cost. 
In an isolated case it might certainly be some- 
times difficult to determine whose interests pre- 
dominated ; whether those of the state that fur- 
nished the subsidies, or those of the state that, 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 309 

received them. This, however, could never be 
less doubtful than in the case of the subsidies 
afforded by England at this period to Austria. 
Even the enemies of England did not venture 
to cast any imputation upon her for her con- 
duct. 

The taking foreign troops into pay in order to 
prosecute our own wars, is an expedient closely 
allied to that of subsidies. This phenomenon, 
as we learn from history, is an immediate con- 
sequence of the nature of great maritime and 
commercial states; where there is neither a large 
population, which can be employed in land-ser- 
vice without considerable injury to commerce, 
nor indeed is land-service usually considered 
so honourable as in those which are pecu- 
liarly territorial states '^. But England had be- 
sides an especial reason for having recourse to 
this expedient, which, in her case, could not 
possibly have been avoided ; viz. the objection 
of the nation to any increase of its standing 
army, from a fear that it would prove danger- 
ous to its liberties. We need only retrace the 
parliamentary history of the past century, com- 
mencing with the last quarter of it, in order to 
know how often, whenever an opportunity oc- 
curred, this object became the bone of conten- 
tion between the opposition and the ministerial 
party. Although this distrust was not altogether 

<i I have already shown this at large in the instance of an ancient peo- 
ple, the Carthaginians, Historical Researches, African Nations, vol. i. 
p. 258. 



310 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

groundless, yet there can be no question that it 
was carried too far, and that it might have led 
to very detrimental consequences. While the 
other states of Europe continued to augment 
their standing forces almost every year, even 
an insular state could not entirely avoid doing 
so, where it was not merely an active member of 
the general state system of Europe, but was 
likewise threatened, and not idly so, with an 
invasion from without. From such exigencies 
and obstacles, the system of nations support- 
ing themselves as much as possible by taking 
foreign troops into pay, naturally had its rise. 
Even this might have its good and evil conse- 
quences, according as it was proceeded in with 
moderation, or abused and carried to excess. 
England might by that means spare her men ; 
but on the other hand it might prove a very 
pernicious expedient, if it weakened the con- 
fidence which she ought to repose in her own 
strength, and damped the military spirit of the 
nation. The evil appeared to attach for the most 
part to those nations who furnished troops for 
money. But in the first place, and this is a 
very important circumstance, according to the 
recognised principles of international law in those 
times, the people who furnished mercenary troops 
were not on that account regarded as enemies 
of those against whom these troops were em- 
ployed ; and if we do not take narrow and 
confined views of the subject, it is not difficult 
to show how one side of the question alone was 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 311 

considered by those persons whose declamations 
were solely directed against a market of the 
human species, where slaves are exposed for 
sale. God forbid that these expressions should 
be supposed to recommend the hiring out one's 
own troops for foreign pay as an universally 
excellent maxim of policy. But if countries 
which groan under the burden of a heavy na- 
tional debt, are not only relieved from it by 
this expedient, but are restored to a state of 
public prosperity, and who can be ignorant that 
such is the case ? may it not be truly asserted 
that the troops which enter into a foreign ser- 
vice promote the good of their country in a 
more eminent degree than they could do on 
the field of battle in any cause of their own. 
Here too it is the relations under which the 
circumstance occurred, and the objects which 
might be, and indeed were attained thereby, 
which form the true criterion of approbation or 
censure. Besides, how often has it happened, 
indeed almost invariably in continental wars, 
that the countries, which furnish troops for pay, 
were themselves interested in the war. What 
an advantage it was in such a case, not only to 
devolve upon others the expenses of a war, in 
which they could not have avoided taking a 
part, but also to contribute towards keeping it 
at a distance from their own frontiers ; for which 
object scarcely any sacrifice is too great for small 
and weak states to make. 

England had already, before the breaking out of 



312 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

the war, concluded some negotiations with Hesse 
and Denmark for auxiliary troops. But as an 
active participation in the continental war was 
decided upon when Carteret succeeded Wal- 
pole in office, and as Denmark also renewed 
her treaty, an Hanoverian corps of 16,000 men 
was taken into British pay. How much it con- 
tributed to the successful issue of the war, par- 
ticularly at the battle of Dettingen, is w^ell 
known. Yet never have the measures of go- 
vernment during the whole period of the House 
of Hanover excited a more violent opposition 
than at that time, when the quiet spectator 
would certainly least have expected it. Never 
were the old objections more vehemently and 
unbecomingly re-echoed than at that juncture. 

We shall be disappointed if we expect to find 
in any British historian, so far as I am aware, 
a dispassionate and impartial examination of 
this opposition. The positions from which they 
set out render this impossible. They have the 
interests of England alone in view, and perhaps 
not merely is a disregard of them, of which 
they themselves cannot quote any well-grounded 
proof, an offence in their eyes, but even the 
attempt to identify the interests of England and 
Hanover. 

But, naturally asks the impartial inquirer, had 
your kings then ceased to be electors of Ha- 
nover ? Is it to be supposed that England had 
demanded this from them ? Had they in that 
capacity no duties towards their German sub- 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 313 

jects, for which they were responsible ? Did they 
owe them no protection, so far as negotiation 
and continental connections could afford it ? It 
is scarcely credible how far and in what tone 
such claims have been urged in England. A per- 
son must have read the parliamentary speeches 
of those times, particularly in the upper house % 
in order to form a conception of the furious 
diatribes, full of ebullitions of the coarsest na- 
tional pride, and of the grossest insults, against 
a people which stand connected with them by 
so many ties. Time itself has given perhaps 
too complete a refutation to those fictions of 
projects formed for the extension of the elec- 
torate, which, whenever the slightest step was 
taken, or only presumed to be taken, for the 
advantage of Hanover, were again revived. 

But in order to estimate duly those objec- 
tions, it is necessary to trace them to their 
genuine sources. They originated much less 
in conviction than in party spirit. It was the 
cry of the opposition which succeeded at that 
time, after having put down Walpole, in gain- 
ing over to itself the great mass of the nation. 
Where could they more readily find materials 
for their speeches than here, where they never 

« In the years 1742 and 1743, during the ministry of Carteret, the 
discharge of the Hanoverian corps in the British service is the constant 
topic of the rival speakers. This corps constituted at that time almost 
the half of the allied army, and the consequences of their dismissal may 
easily be calculated. I question whether the whole range of history has 
produced a similar example of the mastery of passion over sound reason 
amongst people who called themselves statesmen. 



314 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

failed, as soon as they set out on mere selfish 
principles ? It is not the design of this disser- 
tation to give an account of that opposition in de- 
tail. Otherwise readers who are not conversant 
with the history of those times, would behold 
with amazement the degree of blindness and 
fatuity to which th2 rage of faction can lead. 

The history of England during the 18th cen- 
tury is as rich as any other, and perhaps richer, 
in instances of great virtues and great achieve- 
ments ; but there is one aspect in w^hich a man 
of right feeling cannot contemplate it for the 
most part without abhorrence. It is not the 
opposition itself, without which no political li- 
berty can exist ; neither is it the ebullition of 
party-spirit, which at certain periods is insepar- 
able from it, with which I find fault. Even that 
disgust which arises from the reiterated and 
incessant clamour frequently raised on the most 
trivial occasions about the impending ruin of 
the state, which never ensued, may be over- 
come. But it is that melancholy and so often 
recurring spectacle, of men, themselves of the 
highest talents and character, who, calling their 
selfishness patriotism, speak in despite of their 
better conviction ; who censure every measure 
of the minister, because it is his measure ; whilst 
in every instance their object is not to promote 
the interests of the state, but to force themselves 
into power. The conduct of the first William 
Pitt, whom England still regards, with justice, 
as the first of her statesmen, while he was in 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN, 315 

opposition against Walpole, a circumstance on 
which he himself afterwards always looked back 
with self-reproach, may be mentioned as an 
example. The true character of the opposition 
is said to be a continual censure of the minis- 
ter. But a censure which only finds fault, and 
is always finding fault, loses its power, and does 
not attain its object. This perverse spirit of 
the opposition is mainly instrumental in giving 
to the government such excessive and increas- 
ing power. The opposition had often prevailed 
in England, and forced the minister from his 
ground, when the evil was already past ; but 
was seldom or never able to prevent the exe- 
cution of perverse measures at the right time. 

The history of the Austrian war of succession 
interests us here only on account of the con- 
sequences resulting from it to the British con- 
tinental policy. As soon as the old enmity 
between France and Austria revived, not only 
was the ancient connection between this power 
and England renewed, but similar connections 
were likewise formed on the continent, as in 
the reign of Wilham and Anne. The king of 
Sardinia was by the treaty of Worms the ally of 
England in Italy, on condition of receiving sub- 
sidies ; the Repubhc of the United Netherlands 
was likewise drawn into the war, and since 
the peace of Dresden, in 1745, England herself 
also entered into a friendly connection with 

Frederic II. 

The course of the inquiry demands from us 



316 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

something more than a passing notice of the 
conduct pursued by that great prince in this 
eventful period. Properly speaking it was he, 
who in this war constructed a new political 
system, since the conquest of Silesia laid the 
foundation of that rivalry, which subsisted be- 
tween Austria and Prussia, and which became, 
subsequently, for more than ten years, the hinge, 
as it were, on which the politics of Europe 
turned. The later history of Frederic may per- 
haps afford more valuable lessons in the arts of 
war and of government ; but in politics, provided 
that his claims to Silesia, which we cannot here 
undertake to estimate, shall be considered jus- 
tifiable, this earlier period will be found most 
replete with instruction. His conduct, if we 
consider, how in 1740 he at first single-handed 
took up arms, how he aUied himself with France, 
and yet so early as 1742 concluded a treaty for 
himself alone ; how two years . later he again 
took up arms ; again allied himself with France, 
and yet after only sixteen months again aban- 
doned her, affords a novel, one may say a start- 
ling, exhibition. But we must take a complete 
survey of the order of his external relations at 
that time, and above all of those with France, 
whose design of effecting the annihilation of the 
Austrian monarchy by no means coincided with 
his own, in order to understand and admire him. 
The art, till then unknown in Europe, of con- 
cluding alliances without committing one's self, 
of remaining unfettered while apparently bound. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 317 

of seceding when the proper moment is arrived, 
can be learnt from him and only from him. 
Indeed this seems to have become lost to pos- 
terity ; yet it could scarcely be otherwise ; for 
his whole policy was in the first place not a 
consequence of the superiority of his genius, but 
of the independence of his character, which cer- 
tainly could not be transmitted by hereditary 
succession. Hence that intrepidity of conduct ; 
that freedom which characterised every move- 
ment; that straightforwardness which was not 
on that account unaccompanied by cunning ; in 
a word, that superiority over his contemporaries, 
which displayed itself not less in the cabinet 
than in the field of action. Hence no trace of 
that base womanish policy which cringes be- 
fore a more puissant adversary, in order occa- 
sionally to defy a weaker, which has no higher 
object than to thread its path through the rela- 
tive circumstances of the day, and which would 
be ready on the morrow to solemnise a thanks- 
giving, if it has but escaped to-day unscathed 
by them. The immutable truth, that independ- 
ence of character is of more value in negotiation 
than brilliant talents, and rises in importance 
proportionately to the eminence of the station in 
which the possessor is placed, no one has more 
strikingly attested by his own example than 
Frederic at that period. 

He understood precisely the nature of his own 
wishes, and retired from the theatre of war as 
soon as, (by the treaty of Dresden, Dec. 25, 



318 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

1745,) his objects were attained. The war was 
continued three years longer by the other lead- 
ing powers, with what view it is difficult to say, 
unless we take into account the passions which 
were excited by events which occurred in the 
interval. France had as little reason to flatter 
herself with the prospect of annihilating the Aus- 
trian monarchy, as of snatching away the im- 
perial crown from Francis I. after he had once 
been elected, and recognised also by Frederic. 
And however brilliant her victories in the Ne- 
therlands were, experience nevertheless showed 
that she could not calculate upon achieving any 
permanent conquests here. All parties eventually 
concurred in a peace ^, because all were exhausted. 
What were the results of this to England ? It 
is notorious that England gained no increase of 
territory by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. But 
it would be great perverseness to seek materials 
for blame in this fact. The war was not com- 
menced with a view to conquest, but to support 
Austria against France. This object was at- 
tained ; and any peace may well be termed a 
good peace, by which the object which has in- 
duced a person to undertake a war is attained. It 
is true that this is not the general opinion, which 
estimates the advantages solely by the con- 
quests achieved. The more rare the virtue of 
political independence is, the more frequently 
do we experience that schemes of ambitious pro- 

f At Aix-la-Chapelle, April 30, 1748, 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 319 

jects are first excited during wars ; and these, 
by their prolongation, then become the scourge 
of nations. This war, however, had attached 
to it other consequences of greater moment to 
the pohcy of England. 

The first of these was the more intricate com- 
plication of the Colonial-Interest with the politi- 
cal relations of Europe. No war which England 
ever carried on, had so extensively affected the 
colonies as this. The war with Spain naturally 
made the West Indies and the American sea 
the scene of her enterprises ; but the East 
Indies likewise became now for the first time 
the theatre of action for the British and French. 
Two of the most extraordinary men. Labour- 
donnais and Dupleix, had already prepared the 
way for acquiring a dominion there, which, if it 
had depended upon herself alone, would pro- 
bably have secured to France the possession of 
India. The jealousy of the British was aroused ; 
hostilities broke out there likewise; and although 
the conquests which had been made were re- 
signed on both sides at the peace of Aix-la- 
Chapelle, the spark of discord remained never- 
theless unextinguished, and in each of the sub- 
sequent wars, India, as well as the new world, 
became the cause as well as the scene of contest. 
In close connection with this, was the supe- 
riority of the navy of England, which afterwards 
became so firmly established. In no previous 
war had this ever risen to any pre-eminence 
above that of her enemies ; but at the time 



320 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

this war broke out the French navy had been 
reduced to the lowest state of decay, by the 
parshuony and supineness of Fleury, and during 
the war was almost annihilated. This supe- 
riority having been once established, gave rise in 
every new war to similar plans, which ultimately 
led to that exclusive dominion of the sea, w^hich 
became an object of envy to other powers, and 
the source of so many calamities to Europe. 

In the next place, the relations of England 
with the continental states seemed now for a 
considerable time to be determinately settled. 
Her newly-revived rivalry with France had given 
rise to the connection with Austria; and the 
duration of the latter seemed likely to be com- 
mensurate with the former. The sources of 
dispute with Spain were not only stopped S but 
the personally favourable inclination of Ferdi- 
nand VI. the successor of Philip V. since 1743, 
gave England power, if not as an ally, at least 
as a friend, in Spain. On a similar footing 
were the relations with Prussia placed. With 
the Republic of the Netherlands, however, they 
had not merely continued the same, but had 
become more close. If the reciprocal connec- 
tion of both powers was before founded on 
their rivalry with France, the revolution in the 
constitution (which took place during this war) 
gave rise to new ties. It is well known that 
in the year 1747 on the advance of the French 

s By the treaty at Buenretiro, October 5, 1750. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 321 

army into the Austrian Netherlands^ the here- 
ditary dignity of Stadtholder in the United 
Provinces^, was revived in favour of William 
IV., the son-in-law of George II. ; and the 
powerful influence, or rather the sovereignty, of 
the house of Orange was again firmly esta- 
blished. After a war which had been carried 
on and terminated in common, the continu- 
ance of the existing connection was in itself 
quite natural, but that which was now de- 
rived from family connections added a new 
link. Lastly, this war had besides strengthened 
the connection with Russia. Maria Theresa 
had succeeded in winning over Russia to her 
side ; and Germany was for the first time visited 
by a Russian army in the year ] 748, in conse- 
sequence of a subsidy-treaty which had been 
concluded with England and Holland. Never- 
theless this first interference of Russia in the 
affairs of Western Europe, was of short du- 
ration ; the age had not yet arrived when the 
maintenance of the balance of power was in her 
hands. 

In the years immediately subsequent to the 
war, especially after definitive arrangements had 
been entered into with Spain, England was 
more engrossed with domestic and financial af- 
fairs than with the transactions of foreign coun- 
tries ; and by the reduction of the interest of the 
national debt, to three per cent, Pelham ^ erected 

•» Pelham and his brother the duke of Newcastle, next or subordinate 
to him, stood at the head of the administration when Carteret went out of 
office 1744, till the death of Pelham 1754. 

Y 



322 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

a more glorious monument to his ministry than 
any victories in the field could have raised. 
Meanwhile, the consequences of the system 
established by Frederic II. by which the main- 
tenance of the balance in the German empire 
between Austria and Prussia was regarded as 
the foundation stone of the balance of Europe, 
began also to develope themselves. It might 
naturally be expected that England would adhere 
to its ally Austria ; and it seemed the more 
natural as the occupation of East Friesland, 
which had been evacuated about this timie, 
and the disputes about the Embden East 
India Company soon after, had produced a 
great coolness between George II. and Frederic. 
But the mode of proceeding then adopted by the 
British cabinet, put arms into the hands of the 
opposition which they knew how to wield with 
great dexterity. Maria Theresa had already con- 
ceived the wish of preserving the regal diadem 
of Rome for her son Joseph, who was yet a 
minor ; and England not only supported this 
scheme, but also dispensed her subsidies with a 
lavish hand among the electors, in order to ac- 
complish it. With the elector of Bavaria, the 
Palatinate, Saxony, and Cologne, treaties were 
either actually concluded or subsidies promised 
them, for the purpose of gaining their votes. 
It is surprising to hear even Pitt himself speak 
in favour of the treaty with Bavaria \ because as 

' Life of William Pitt, i. p, 114. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 323 

he expresses it, that state would thereby be drawn 
awayfrom the French interest. Whether England 
had any reason at all for embroiling herself so 
deeply in the affairs of Germany is a question 
which we need not here determine ; the principle 
that it should, certainly prevailed in the British 
cabinet. But these subsidies, (as Horace Walpole 
so bitterly complains ''), not only failed in their 
object, for Frederic II. knew how to frustrate all 
these plans, but kept open the breach with 
Prussia at a moment when there was the 
strongest reason for avoiding one. It was a 
striking instance of the abuse of subsidies. 

But that great change which was so exten- 
sively preparing at this time in the political re- 
lations of the continent, and which soon actually 
ensued, quickly diverted attention from the elec- 
tion of a king of the Romans to more important 
objects, nor could it fail to effect a change in 
the policy of England. 

The approximation and close connection 
which immediately ensued between France and 
Austria, was an occurrence which seemed to 
mock all the calculations of the politician. No 
step of the French cabinet has been more fre- 
quently and severely censured ; and if we take 



'' An admirable exposition of the British continental relations at that 
period, particularly in respect to these points, will be found in the memoir 
which Horace Walpole at that time, 1751, caused to be laid before the 
Cabinet. Coxe's Memoirs of Horace Walpole, p. 386, sq. Both before and 
after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, he was most zealous in an alliance 
with Frederic II., but to no purpose. He was certainly right so far, that 
it was unwise to exasperate him. 

y2 



324 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

into consideration her next object, the making 
war upon and annihilating Frederic II., none 
was ever more justly censured. But the Ger- 
man writers and journalists, who have so often 
repeated these strictures, ought not to forget that 
they, at least, have had the greatest cause to be 
thankful for it. Was not indeed that prosperous 
period of almost thirty years which occurred, even 
though Frederic II. had come off victorious in 
the struggle, and which, upon the whole, was the 
most prosperous and flourishing that Germany 
had ever enjoyed, to be attributed to the good 
understanding between France and Austria ? 

This connection between France and Austria, 
not only robbed England of her first ally, but by 
reason of the great differences which had already 
arisen with France herself, respecting the bound- 
aries of Nova Scotia, the forts in the back set- 
tlements of the North American colonies, and 
the possession of the neutral islands in the West 
Indies, rendered the probability of war a matter 
of almost absolute certainty ; the object of which, 
as a continental war, would necessarily be the 
abolition of the newly-established balance in 
Germany, by the overthrow of Prussia ; and the 
most important theatre of which, now that the 
Austrian Netherlands could no longer serve as a 
diversion, must necessarily be Germany. George 
II. would have to consider this connection in 
two points of view, as king of England, and as 
elector of Hanover. It would naturally be 
expected than that under this coincidence 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 325 

of relations, the affairs of his German states 
would be first arranged ; it could only be con- 
sidered as a fulfilment of his duties as regent, if 
he first bestowed his attention upon them. But 
how could the interests of England and Hanover 
be more identical than at this time ? It was the 
only state that could now afford to England a 
powerful ally on the continent, Frederic II., and 
what would have been her situation after the 
subjugation of Hanover ? This truth, however, 
though clear as the noonday sun, was far from 
being generally recognised in England. The 
old cry about the Hanoverian interest was 
•again set up. Alas ! even the man who, as 
minister, afterwards maintained the position that 
America must be conquered in Germany, at this 
time arraigned the connection which George II. 
sought to establish on the continent by means 
of the subsidy treaty \ 

The first thoughts of the king were directed 
to Russia. In consequence of the subsidies fur- 
nished to Russia in the last war, the presence 

• Pitt, however, did not speak in general terms. He only censured the 
connection which George II. at that time sought to establish between 
Russia and Hesse. But who would not wish himself to read the very- 
words of such a man on such an occasion : " It is impossible, said he, to 
defend Hanover by subsidies. An open country cannot be protected 
against a neighbour who is able to fall upon it with one hundred 
thousand men, and to send as many more after them. If Hanover, in con- 
sequence of her connection with Great Britain, shall become the object of 
attack, then is it obligatory upon us when peace is restored to provide her 
full indemnification for all the losses she has sustained. But the idea of 
defending Hanover by subsidies is ridiculous and impracticable." Life of 
W. Pitt, i. p. 136. The exaggeration of the statement is best refuted by 
the event. 



326 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

of Russian troops in Germany was no strange 
spectacle, and a treaty was concluded with 
Elizabeth to cover the Electorate against the 
invasion of the French '". It may well be 
doubted whether in the relations of Russia, as 
they soon developed themselves, this object 
would be attained, since the French-Austrian 
party prevailed also in Russia. But Frederic II. 
who understood these relations too well to ad- 
mit Russian troops into Hanover, and was also 
too well aware of the consequences which might 
result from the occupation of that country by a 
foreign power, would not allow himself to be in- 
fluenced by distrust or petty feelings of any kind. 
He engaged himself to protect the neutrahty of 
Hanover; George 11. abandoned Russia and 
united with him °, as well as with several of the 
neighbouring princes of Northern Germany. 

The history of the ever memorable war which 
now broke out belongs not to this place. The 
glorious days of the Frederics and Ferdinands 
are past, and the memory of them is all that is 
left to us. Followed by almost all their heroic 
comrades, they have long descended to the 
shades, in order to make room for a later gene- 
ration, whose history will be more easily learnt, 
from its containing fewer names worth remem- 
brance. 

But to return to England. The administra- 
tion of this kingdom now devolved upon a man, 

"> In the spring of 1755. 

" By Ihe treaty at Whitehall, Jan, 15, 1756. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 327 

William Pitt, afterwards Lord Chatham °, whom 
the nation has never ceased to remember, and 
whom we, if for no other reason, must not omit 
to notice, as he was the main stay of the con- 
tinental relations of England. 

He had entered parhament as early as 1735, 
and had taken office, under the Pelham ad- 
ministration, as paymaster of the forces, which 
he resigned in 1755 p. He had long been a 
member of the opposition against Walpole ; but 
his influence was now become so great, that not 
only could no administration hold together with- 
out him, but even the formation of one was 
entrusted to him, because on no other terms 
would he himself accept of place. Accordingly 
a year had not elapsed before he was called 
upon to form an administration (Oct. 20, 1756) 
as secretary of state, when the king approved 
his proposals for filling up the other appoint- 
ments, which exalted post he retained till Oct. 
5, 1761, when he resigned upon finding that his 
measures were not supported. The five years 
of his administration was the most brilliant pe- 
riod which Great Britain had yet seen. His 
panegyrists have not omitted to enumerate the 
many battles which were won, the ships which 
were captured, the conquests which were made 
during his administration ^ ; for although he was 
not the immediate agent in these victories, it 

° He was born on 17 Nov. 1708, was made Earl of Chatham 1766, and 
died May 11, 1778. 
P Nov. 20. 
<i A list of them will be found in the Life of Pitt, vol. i. p. 198. 



328 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

was through him that they were achieved. His 
real merit may be comprised in two hnes. By 
the greatness of his individual character he called 
up, as by magic, the spirit of his nation. He was 
a man in the fullest sense of the word. In- 
tegrity and independence formed the centre of 
his whole moral system, from which the rays of 
his genius and of his often admired eloquence 
emanated no less than from his sound political 
maxims. In proportion as he relied upon him- 
self, the nation learned to trust to its own 
strength and energies. Thus England be- 
came familiar with, and accustomed to, the 
most daring enterprises ; thus became im- 
proved the discipline of the army and navy; and 
thus, above all, became roused the spirit of the 
nation : the minister meanwhile preserving its 
confidence, by showing himself anxious on every 
occasion to appear as the champion of the rights 
and power of the people, in the constitutional 
sense of the word, rather than as one who 
wished to court the favour of the prince, by 
taking every opportunity to extend the rights 
and power of the crown. It was therefore an 
essential element in the character of Pitt, that 
he should in his general policy show little in- 
clination towards the system of subsidies and 
mercenary troops, inasmuch as it might paralyse 
the self-confidence and independent energy of 
the nation. But he exhibited also a proof that 
great minds do not blindly bind themselves to 
any particular maxims. As soon as he could 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 329 

resort to that system without prejudice to those 
higher interests^, he adopted it; and the pru- 
dence with which he exercised it was as great 
as its consequences were fortunate. 

Never were auxiharies more judiciously em- 
ployed, than those of the alhes at this period. 
Never were subsidies more judiciously furnished 
than those which were granted by Pitt to Fre- 
deric II. It is a singularly interesting spectacle 
to see these two great men united together, each 
trusting in the first place to himself and acting 
for himself, without on that account overlook- 
ing the advantages which might be derived from 
their connection with each other. 

The British continental policy during the se- 
ven years' war, as long as Pitt held the reins of 
government, may, according to my idea, be re- 
garded as the most perfect model from which 
the British cabinet could have drawn (at any 
time) its fundamental maxims in this respect, — 
I speak not of the choice of allies ; this can 
only in part depend upon the cabinet, as the 
relations between the powers of the continent 
are variable, — but of its whole course and method 
of 'proceeding. It adhered very properly to the 
true notion of subsidies. It afforded them to 
those, who under the existing relations were the 
most natural alhes of Great Britain, and with 
whom it had in general a community of interest ; 
not to every one who asked for them. They 
were afforded with the view that those who 
received them might first of all assist them- 



330 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

selves ; and hence it was expected that advan- 
tage vi^ould be indirectly derived to England, 
but not that they should forget themselves and 
first succour England. More was not pro- 
mised than was intended to be given, but what 
was promised was faithfully performed. They 
made the weak strong, while they placed them 
on a secure footing, and supported them there 
by uniting themselves to them. Thus might 
Pitt and Frederic, both equally independent, 
each pursue his own course, without, by so 
doing, destroying the perfect harmony which 
subsisted between them. Pitt has himself in 
one of his later speeches so clearly defined the 
principles on which he acted, and the policy 
which he pursued at this period, that the reader 
would not willingly forego the satisfaction of 
seeing it here introduced \ 

" I have been much abused, my Lords, for 
supporting a war, which it has been the fashion 
to call my German war. But I can affirm, with 
a clear conscience, that that abuse has been 
thrown upon me by men, who were either un- 
acquainted with facts, or had an interest in mis- 
representing them. I shall speak plainly and 
frankly to your Lordships upon this, as I do 
upon every occasion. That I did in Parliament 
oppose, to the utmost of my power, our engag- 
ing in a German war, is most true ; and if the 
same circumstance were to recur, I would act 

»• Life of Pitt, vol. ii. p. 221. The speech was first delivered in the year 
1770 in the Upper House. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 331 

the same part, and oppose it again. But when 
I was called upon to take a share in the ad- 
ministration, that measure was already decided. 
Before I was appointed secretary of state, the 
first treaty with the king of Prussia was signed, 
and not only ratified by the crown, but ap- 
proved of and confirmed by a resolution of both 
Houses of Parliament." 

" It was a weight fastened upon my neck. By 
that treaty, the honour of the crown and the 
honour of our nation were equally engaged. 
How I could recede from such an engagement ; 
how I could advise the crown to desert a great 
prince in the midst of those difficulties, in which 
a reliance upon the good faith of this country 
had contributed to involve him, are questions 
I willingly submit to your Lordships' candour. 
That wonderful man might, perhaps, have ex- 
tricated himself from his difficulties without our 
assistance. He has talents, which, in every thing 
that touches the human capacity, do honour to 
the human mind. But how would England have 
supported that reputation of credit and good 
faith, by which we have been distinguished in 
Europe ? What other foreign power would have 
sought our friendship ? What other foreign 
power would have accepted of an alliance with 
us ? But, my Lords, though I wholly condemn 
our entering into any engagements which tend 
to involve us in a continental war, I do not 
admit that alliances with some of the German 
princes are either detrimental or useless. They 



332 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

may be^ my Lords^, not only useful, but neces- 
sary." Not, as he farther observes, to introduce 
foreign auxiharies into England, which is strong 
enough to protect itself, but into Ireland to de- 
fend it from invasion. 

The connection with Prussia and her allies 
was not, however, the only new feature which 
the seven years' war produced in respect to the 
British continental relations. One other was 
this, that the republic of the United Nether- 
lands, notwithstanding its intimate relations with 
England, had the option of remaining neutral 
in this war, which it had not in any preced- 
ing one. But the connection between France 
and Austria would necessarily affect in some 
degree the conduct of this republic, and weaken 
its connection with England. In the revolu- 
tions of the continent it had only one para- 
mount interest, the continuance of the existing 
condition of the Austrian Netherlands. As long 
as these provinces continued in the possession 
of a distant power, they served them as a bul- 
wark with or without fortified places. Under 
the existing relations these could not become 
as formerly the scene of hostilities ; France had 
by her connection with Austria discarded all 
designs upon them ; and therefore for the re- 
public this connection, viewed in this light, must 
have been a most felicitous occurrence. But 
the advantageous effects of this neutrahty upon 
its commerce, which even excited the envy of 
England, are well known. What an era might 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 333 

this have been for the republic if it had 
not been long afflicted with disorders which no 
remedial measures could now counteract. 

These changes in her relations with other 
powers, rendered it unnecessary for England 
to establish any federal connections in Italy, 
such as it had formed with Sardinia during 
previous wars. It was during the negotiations 
for peace in 1762, that recourse was first had 
to this country as mediator, and that not in 
vain. But England had still remaining another 
ancient ally who was drawn with her into the 
vortex and required assistance — Portugal. 

It has been already shown, in its proper place, 
when and how the connection with this state 
arose, and became established. Since the treaty 
of Utrecht it had kept up a highly advantageous 
connection, in a commercial point of view, for 
England, without any important political con- 
sequences resulting from it during the long 
period of peace which Portugal enjoyed. Even 
the plans of Pombal could not have dissolved 
or materially affected it. But the closer con- 
nection which through the family compact drew 
Spain into the war, was also instrumental in in- 
volving Portugal in it, and in causing her now 
to look for assistance to her ancient ally. 

The celebrated family compact of the Bour- 
bons appeared in the result to confirm the 
fears which had been entertained during the war 
of the Spanish succession, and at the peace 
of Utrecht, Although the crowns of France 



33r RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

and Spain remained separate, yet the interests 
of both powers were intimately united. How 
little, however, hitherto, had the fears, which 
were cherished on that account, been justified 
by the event; Spain would have been unavoid- 
ably obliged to take part with France in the 
war, but this had as yet only served to enable 
England to support herself at the cost of Spain, 
and to keep her sailors in good humour by the 
rich prizes which they captured. This last was 
perhaps the most important advantage which 
she gained. By privateering and plunder, in- 
dividuals enriched themselves ; but no nation 
has ever acquired by such means a single per- 
manent advantage. 

The effects of the family compact' then were 
even already apparent ; England became un- 
avoidably involved in a war with Spain, and 
since Portugal was now threatened with an 
attack from the same quarter, not only were 
British auxiliaries sent to Spain, but also a 
German commander, count William of Lippe 
Biickeburg, one of the heroes of the seven years' 
war. Although it was not in his power to re- 
cast the nation in a new mould, he nevertheless 
stamped the recollection of himself indelibly 
upon it. Who is there even now in Portugal 
who has not heard of the great count. The 
country escaped from the war uninjured ; and 

s Signed on Aug. 10, 1761, but still kept secret. The very first two 
articles of the treaty contained an offensive and defensive alliance, and 
a reciprocal guarantee for all possessions. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 335 

the connection with England had become 
strengthened. 

But one consequence of the family compact, 
though accidental, yet much more momentous 
as regards the continental policy of England, 
was the secession of Pitt from the ministry. 
However secret the conclusion of that treaty 
had been kept in Spain, with the view of gaining 
time, in order to secure to themselves the 
treasures from America, Pitt had nevertheless 
been able to procure intelligence of their pro- 
ceedings. His anxious wish was, as might have 
been expected from a man of his character, to 
anticipate Spain, and immediately to declare 
war upon her, which he saw to be inevitable. 
But he was not believed, and was in consequence 
outvoted. Not accustomed to capitulate when 
convinced he was right he turned his back and 
retired \ 

His prediction was fulfilled, and England 
soon saw herself obliged to declare war. But 
although even now the short war with Spain 
had been prosecuted Vvdth the greatest success, 
the retirement of Pitt had such an effect on the 
measures of the British cabinet, that the whole 
of his system of continental policy, as yet 
scarcely matured, necessarily fell to the ground. 
It ceased, however, to take an active part in 
the continental war, the subsidies to Frederic 
H. were discontinued, and England concluded 

* October 5, 1761. 



336 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

a peace for herself without paying that regard 
to her ally which he might with justice have 
demanded. 

Viewed in the light of a mere temporary ad- 
vantage, this conduct of the British cabinet may 
admit of some vindication ; but on the princi- 
ples of a higher policy it cannot possibly be de- 
fended. It cannot be denied that the assertion 
of Pitt, that Frederic II. if left entirely alone 
would be able to extricate himself from all em- 
barrassment, was now verified ; but if this be 
granted, would it not have been more consonant 
to the principles of sound policy, for England 
to have allowed her connections with Prussia 
to continue as long as the intimate relation be- 
tween Austria and France should exist. Would 
England have obtained a peace on less favour- 
able terms if she had concluded it in conjunc- 
tion with Frederic ? It was only owing to a 
fortunate combination of circumstances that no 
new relations occurred to render his assistance 
necessary for England. His aversion to this 
state was afterwards perhaps too deeply rooted 
to admit of being ever again eradicated. 

England, therefore, after the seven years' war 
stood alone without allies, or at least without 
powerful ones ; and had after the prostration of 
that power which opposed and rivalled her, 
no immediate cause for seeking new connec- 
tions. During the profound peace which the 
west of Europe so long enjoyed, no such exi- 
gence arose. The activity of the nation was 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN, 337 

confined at first to its own domestic affairs ; 
since the well known disputes with Wilkes 
brought questions into agitation which seriously 
affected the rights of the upper house. The 
contest with Spain about the Falkland islands 
(1770) produced only threats but no hostilities ; 
the disputes which commenced with the colonies 
in North America soon engrossed universal at- 
tention. The particulars of the dispute as well 
as the war which ensued is foreign to the pre- 
sent inquiry, except so far as continental rela- 
tions are concerned. The effects which it had 
upon these were manifold. The first was the 
restoration of the subsidy system. From the 
moment it was decided to send an army over 
to America, the need of foreign assistance was 
sensibly felt. The assertion of lord Chatham 
*^ that cases may occur in which connection with 
German princes could not be dispensed with," 
is again applicable here. He certainly had not 
anticipated such a case as the present, and could 
not have alluded to the contest which broke out 
with America on the subject of exemption from 
taxation*. Once admitting however (which I 

' The opinions of Ciiatham respecting America may be gathered from 
the bill which he proposed to the upper House, but without success, 
Feb. 1, 1775, after the disturbances had broken out. It will be found 
in Life of Pitt, ii. p. 129. The colonies were to reinain dependent, but 
to have the privilege of taxing themselves by their provincial assem- 
blies. The congress at Philadelphia, which had already assembled, was 
to settle the division of the taxes among the provinces, and to deter- 
mine the sum which each was to contribute towards the liquidation of the 
National debt in England. Even Chatham could not rise sufficiently high 
to take an enlarged view of the immeasurable advantage, which would 
result to England from the complete liberation of America. 

Z 



338 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

am very far from maintaining) that it was politic 
to attempt the subjugation of America by force, 
there can be httle doubt that mercenary aid was 
the best resource which could be adopted. The 
lives of their own men were thereby spared — 
lives which a state like England could least of 
all afford to lose. 

Further, although this war did not give rise 
to a continental war in Europe, yet it did to 
one amongst the European powers, as France 
took part with America, and Spain, by virtue 
of the Family compact, was also necessarily 
drawn into it. America was merely a secondary 
stage for these powers, the war between them 
was almost entirely a colonial one, for which new 
materials had been accumulating ever since the 
treaty of Paris. One of the greatest evils that 
disturbs the European system is that intermix- 
ture of its colonies, naturally occasioned by 
their geographical position. This was the prin- 
cipal cause of the seven years' war, and, al- 
though the peace which put an end to it, and by 
which France was completely dispossessed of its 
continental possessions in North America", was 
in some measure a remedy for this evil, it never-, 
theless contributed in other respects rather to 
aggravate it. The power of the British and the 
French was now nearly equally balanced in the 
West Indies, but in the East from the time Eng- 
land established herself at Bengal, (1763,) the 

" After that it ceded Louisiana also to Spain, 1765. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 339 

preponderance was clearly in her favour. France 
nevertheless still retained hopes of being able 
to restore the balance, as she had found an ally 
in one of the chiefs of the interior, who, from 
personal interest, was necessarily hostile to Eng- 
land, and had already discovered the means of 
setting her at defiance. The East Indies 
thus became the principal theatre of the war, 
and in spite of every effort they would have been 
lost to England, if a better arrangement in the 
organisation of the East India Company, by the 
concentration of the four presidencies under one 
governor general, and the bill of Pitt, had not 
rendered them politically independent of the 
government. 

The colonial war, moreover cost England 
a political friend on the continent, by the re- 
public of the United Netherlands becoming im- 
plicated in it. England certainly lost nothing 
by this war ; she conquered St. Eustace, Trin- 
conomale, Negapatuam ; the last of which she 
retained to the peace. But this rupture with 
the republic was connected with another event, 
which was necessarily of critical importance to 
England. 

England by this war became involved in a 
contest with all the maritime powers of Europe, 
and was singly a match for them all. It was 
indeed a signal proof of the rapid advance she 
had made since the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle that 
she was now mistress of the seas, although as 
yet she was far from asserting a dominion over 

z2 



340 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

them. But when once her energies were di- 
rected to this object, circumstances naturally 
arose out of her attempt, which exposed Eng- 
land to the danger of being involved more ex- 
tensively with the greatest part of the continent. 
It was not enough to cripple or even to de- 
stroy the enemies' fleets, unless she effectually 
prevented them from refitting and building new 
ones. Their capabilities of doing this however 
depended, for the most part, on their interference 
with neutral powers, from which France would 
be obliged to procure the necessary materials. 
This was one reason for her oppression of neutrals 
and the obstructing of their navigation ; but 
these arbitrary proceedings necessarily became 
extended beyond all bounds as soon as the anni- 
hilation of the enemy's commerce and the endea- 
vour to appropriate it to themselves (two facts 
inseparable from the sovereignty of the sea) be- 
came their avowed object. In wars of earlier times, 
the commerce of belligerent powers had escaped 
under the protection of neutral flags, and al- 
though the celebrated maxim, /r<?e ship, free car- 
go, had always been but doubtfully maintained, 
the dispute could never become of much practi- 
cal importance until some one maritime power 
felt itself sufficiently strong to maintain the con- 
trary. But this unjust oppression, for such 
the conduct of England was felt to be, was not 
submitted to without resistance ; Catharine 11. 
set on foot the armed Neutrality % which the 

x In the year, 1781. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 341 

northern powers, and even Portugal, joined; and 
Holland herself would have acceded to it, if 
England had not anticipated her doing so by a 
declaration of war. 

The armed neutrality was a phenomenon from 
which England might have derived important 
lessons ; but she did not. Submission then was 
absolutely necessary, unless she was willing to 
incur the danger of being involved in a war with 
the whole of Europe ; this submission however 
was made in silence, unaccompanied by any for- 
mal recognition of the principles which had been 
set up. All, therefore, that remained was an 
association which could only be of practical uti- 
lity during the continuance of the war. The 
indispensable need of a maritime law of nations 
was more sensibly felt than ever ; and Catharine 
had loudly proclaimed it by that association ; 
but here as usual the policy adopted was merely 
to serve a temporary purpose ; and of what use 
could a maritime law of nations on paper be 
when the want of it, in time of peace, should 
cease to be felt, and which, it was obvious, 
in time of war would be made subservient to the 
convenience of individual states ? 

But another effect of this war upon the conti- 
nental policy of England was her altered relations 
with the Netherlands. Internal tranquillity was 
by no means restored in that country by the 
peace, and England even found an opportunity 
thereby of maintaining her influence over it. 

It is a remarkable circumstance in the history 



342 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

of the continental policy of England, that al- 
though she was so deeply involved in the affairs 
of foreign countries, yet during the whole period 
of the House of Hanover, (it may be said too even 
of the Stuarts,) in no one of them was the spirit 
of party either fostered or excited thereby. 
What a different spirit had France excited in 
Sweden, and Russia in Poland ! This conse- 
quence may indisputably be ascribed to the 
fact that England required no party aid for the 
attainment of her object, but merely the sup- 
port of the administration ; and in some mea- 
sure to the existing relations of that period, 
which gave little encouragement to party spirit 
in the countries with which England stood con- 
nected. I have no wish, therefore, to pass any 
encomium on the more exalted morality of the 
British minister on that ground ; but I am pre- 
pared to prove that the interference of England 
in the affairs of foreign powers, was hitherto 
much less dangerous to their object than the 
influence of the continental powers upon one 
another. 

The events which occurred in the United 
Netherlands formed at the time we speak of an 
exception. As during the last war this state 
had leagued itself with France, and as that power 
found an opportunity to do her some essential 
services during her quarrel with Joseph H., it 
could not be difficult for the French ministry 
to maintain for itself a party here ; and this 
party, under the name of the patriotic party. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 343 

stepped forward as an antagonist of the House 
of Orange, without knowing, as far as could be 
discerned, any thing more determinate as to its 
real object. 

The moment at which England might pro- 
bably have attached to herself the Republic, 
with less galling, but certainly more lasting 
bonds, as afterwards happened, would have been 
the moment of the peace. But this moment 
was neglected ! When could generosity towards 
an old friend with whom she had only occa- 
sionally fallen out, have been more properly 
evinced than here ? Yet so far was she from 
acting in this spirit, that she forcibly dispos- 
sessed Holland of one of her colonies, Negapa- 
tuam y ; a colony of no inconsiderable import- 
ance ; and was only with difficulty prevented 
from depriving her of another, Trinconomale, 
By this impolitic harshness the Republic was 
driven to conclude a peace through the medi- 
ation of France ; and it was made abundantly 
evident that as colonial aggrandizement became 
the point at issue, no compunction would be 
shown by England in despoiling, even with her 
own hands, her ancient ally ; and that she only 
waited for an opportunity to extend further her 
rapacity. Thus then she deprived herself for 
ever of the confidence of a nation with which 
she had so long been in close and amicable con- 



y In the treaty of peace of May 20, 1784. 



344 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

iiection, in a manner which made its renewal 
impossible ; — what was the equivalent ? 

The ferment at home, however, certainly 
made it necessary for the Orange party to at- 
tach itself to England, since, during the life of 
Frederic II., it found no other supports But 
even this support was of little help to it. The 
British cabinet did not find it advisable to afford 
any efficient assistance, when the prerogatives 
of the hereditary Stadtholder were one after 
another infringed and contracted ; and it be- 
came highly probable that he would have been 
entirely dispossessed of his dignity, if Prussia 
had not adopted a change in her policy. 

It is well known under what circumstances^ 
and with what result, in the autumn of the year 
1787, the commotions in Holland were sup- 
pressed by the entrance of a Prussian corps, 
and the Stadtholder reinstated and confirmed 
in the full exercise of his power. 

England up to the present time had re- 
mained without any considerable ally on the 
continent. But the change which we have just 
mentioned gave rise to another alliance, which 
was not without important consequences to Eu- 
rope. England and Prussia both united them- 
selves with Holland; they had the same common 
object in view, that of supporting her newly given 
or restored constitution, and this common point 
of contact soon brought on an alliance between 
these two powers ^ 

'^ By the treaty of the 13th of August, 1788. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITx\IN. 345 

The connection of Prussia with Holland was 
a consequence of family interest^ the further 
consideration of which would be irrelevant to 
this inquiry. With regard to England the af- 
finity with her was not sufficiently close to allow 
us to attribute to this source the interest which 
she took in the affairs of this country. Al- 
though the reigning houses were connected, 
the motive by which she was more immediately 
actuated in the part she took, was the desire 
of counteracting French influence by the de- 
pression of the patriotic party. But surely the 
moment at which the peace was concluded 
would have been more favourable for this pur- 
pose than the present. England certainly could 
not view the fate of the Republic with indif- 
ference. She necessarily wished to see her 
independence maintained ; but the compulsory 
re-establishment of a form of government, to 
which a great, perhaps the greater, part of the 
nation were vehemently opposed, could not pos- 
sibly be considered as a firm foundation of her in- 
dependence. She united herself in this way 
with the government which she restored, but 
not with the nation. Experience has shown the 
dangerous consequences of such policy. 

By this triple alliance, however, the connec- 
tion of England with Prussia was renewed, 
though the basis on which it rested was not 
formed on so extended a community of interest 
as under Frederic II. The maintenance of the 
Stadtholdership in the Netherlands could not 



346 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

possibly become of sufficient importance to both 
these powers, to form a permanent bond of 
union between them. Chatham, with his prin- 
ciples, would never have concluded the alliance 
which his son concluded ; still less would he 
have approved the consequences which followed 
it. 

These consequences displayed themselves 
chiefly in the east of Europe. The representa- 
tion which we have already given has shown the 
little share England had taken in the events of 
those parts since the peace of Nystadt. Her com- 
merce was carried on there without molestation; 
the growing prosperity of Russia had favoured 
it, without becoming formidable to England. 
In the mean time the most decisive changes 
had taken place in these quarters, such as the 
foundation of the independence of the Crimea % 
the appearance of Russian fleets in the Mediter- 
ranean ^ and even the first partition of Poland % 
without any active manifestation of opposition 
on the part of England. The British cabinet felt 
itself too little interested in them; it had no 
political connection either with Poland or with 
Turkey, and had no engagements to perform 
to either ; the trade with the Baltic, and that 
with the Levant, by no means considerable, was 
not affected ; and those countries in general lay 
beyond the circuit of its political sphere of ac- 
tion. Whether therefore her policy in this re- 

» In the year 1771. '^ In the year 1770. '' In the year 1772. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 347 

spect was exceptionable or not may admit of 
doubt, although an action which set at nought 
the hitherto recognised law of nations could 
not be a matter of indifference even to England, 
Her policy can only be excused on the ground 
that she connived at what she could not hinder. 
But after the triple alliance her former maxims 
of policy were evidently changed, and England 
sought not only to obtain an influence over the 
affairs of those countries, but even assumed a tone 
of dictation. If we may credit French authors ^, 
she was actuated by a jealousy of the treaty of 
commerce, which Russia had concluded with 
France, 1 787, by which France had been greatly 
favoured ; in consequence of this England 
herself felt an inclination to do every thing to 
involve Russia in a war with Turkey, which it 
is well known broke out 1788. The truth of 
this unauthenticated assertion may reasonably 
admit of doubt ; but that the British policy here 
stepped beyond its proper sphere, that England 
had thought herself able to dictate where dic- 
tation was not to be dreamt of — of this the minis- 
try were soon to experience a painful conviction. 
The mediation of England at the congress of 
Reichenbach, 1788, was not without advantage ; 
but when the British cabinet wished likewise to 
dictate to Catharine II. the conditions of peace 
with Turkey, she declared that she concluded 
peaces only for herself; nor was she alarmed 
at the demonstration made by the equipment 

<* Compare Segur, Histoire de Frederic Guillaume, vol. ii. 



348 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

of a fleet ; she actually concluded the peace at 
Jassy® for herself, and on the terms she wished, 
and the British cabinet gained no more from its 
threats than the knowledge that it had threatened 
to no purpose. 

The first object to which the exertions of 
every cabinet should be directed would seem to 
be, to comprehend clearly, and to determine 
precisely, the proper course of action which its 
position and strength point out to it ; and thence 
to deduce the fundamental maxims of its foreign 
policy. This assertion will not be supposed to 
imply that such a theory should be openly pa- 
raded, as it were, and be laid down in public 
declarations; but the fact that every state, how- 
ever powerful, has certain definite limits to which 
its sphere of action should be confined, is an im- 
mutable truth ; and he who would deny the con- 
clusions drawn from it, would be guilty of an ab- 
surdity. Yet if we look into history, how seldom 
do we find this truth kept in view? How many 
unsuccessful plans and undertakings do we dis- 
cover, which it were easy to see beforehand 
could not succeed ? Indeed it would seem to 
require nothing more than sound common sense, 
and a moderate degree of intelligence, to deter- 
mine the sphere of action to which a nation 
should confine itself. But still we must not 
forget to take in account the great influence 

^ The 29th of December, 1790, the empress retained in it the district on 
the Neister ; instead of the old boundary which England had wished to 
prescribe. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 349 

of the passions upon politics, and, above all, 
the exaggerated conception, which every minis- 
ter is prone to form, of the importance of the 
state at the head of which he is placed, in order 
to explain the many disastrous errors from which 
scarcely any state has kept itself wholly exempt. 
Even England did not exhibit at this period the 
only example of this kind. Justice, however, 
assuredly demands of us to remark, that it is 
much more difficult for a maritime and com- 
mercial state to determine the boundaries of its 
interests and its sphere of action, than it is for a 
continental one. Not only the direct, but, still 
more, the indirect points of contact are here so 
numerous, the calculation of how much damage 
may be inflicted on other powers by its fleets, 
is made on no determinate data, and is on that 
account in the highest degree indeterminate. 
The indirect damage is greater than the direct ; 
and the state is so much misled by an exalted 
opinion of its own power, as to think itself still 
greater, and its own influence more decisive 
than it really is, and from its nature can be. 

We have thus far traced the continental policy 
of England up to the period at which, by the 
great revolutions of Europe, not only the triple 
alliance last concluded was dissevered, but all 
political relations were at once violently rent 
asunder, and then forcibly joined together again 
by new ties, which, after such sanguinary con- 
flicts, could not keep together the contracting 
parties for any length of time. 



350 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

How, under such circumstances, could the 
former relations of England be maintained ? It 
was not, however, merely a change in individual 
instances which they underwent, but the whole 
system of her continental policy assumed a dif- 
ferent form. On this account then it is neces- 
sary to pause here awhile in order to review 
some general results, for which the previous 
investigations will afford materials. 

Our statements have shown that England was 
certainly involved in the affairs of the continent, 
sometimes more and sometimes less, without 
ever being entirely disengaged from them. But 
if we make some allowance for the period of the 
Quadruple Alliance under George I., England 
was very far from having ever been, or having 
ever claimed to be, the dominant power in the 
political system of Europe. The internal rela- 
tions of this system were not in general deter- 
mined by England, but England rather deter- 
mined her own conduct by them. This was 
precisely the reason why the continental policy 
of England so seldom proceeded on solid princi- 
ples. How far, however, this should be made a 
matter of reproach to the British cabinet, re- 
quires a close investigation. To settle perma- 
nently the reciprocal relations of the continental 
powers was throughout beyond the capacity of 
England. It would have been a foolish and vain 
presumption to attempt it. For this very reason 
then she could discover no durable and solid 
basis for her federative system, in respect to 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 351 

the choice of her alhes, England was not 
hke France and Prussia, and other countries, 
surrounded by weaker states, which she might 
attach to herself by means of her preponderating 
influence ; she was obhged to seek out allies for 
herself ; and could not even make the ties which 
bound her to the most powerful of all, to 
Austria, indissoluble. England, from her posi- 
tion, can only have allies, which are separated 
from her by the sea. If they are among the 
weaker states, such as Holland, Portugal, and 
Sardinia, they are from their very nature more 
likely to be under the influence of their immedi- 
ate neighbours than hers; if they are among the 
more powerful, as Austria and Prussia, the con- 
nection will only subsist so long as it afford 
some point of common interest. England there- 
fore has not the power to construct a federative 
system as the powers of the continent have. 

But though we cannot with justice cast any 
imputation on England for the change which she 
made in the choice of her allies, (if she erred in 
that, she committed political errors, for which 
she would have to atone,) — the non-perform- 
ance of engagements for which she had made 
herself responsible certainly exposes her to me- 
rited censure. In the three great continental 
wars in which England took part, the Spanish, 
the Austrian war of succession, and the seven 
years' war, she concluded every time a peace for 
herself, or only in connection with Holland, and 
deserted her principal confederates. This con- 



352 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

duct did not originate in any refined policy, 
systematically taken up, nor in a dereliction of 
public faith and confidence ; but in the change 
of political principles, which, according to the 
general spirit of the British constitution, is almost 
inseparably connected with a change of ministry. 
In none of these cases did the minister who begun 
the war bring it to a close ; his successor gene- 
rally belonged to the opposite party, and therefore 
brought with him the opposite principles. The 
influence and power of the premier in England 
does not trench at all upon the personal charac- 
ter of the regent, as it does in unlimited monar- 
chies ; but emanates immediately from the spi- 
rit of the constitution, from the relation between 
the king and his parliament, between whom the 
minister is the connecting link. Without him 
therefore nothing of importance can be done. 
Hence arises, what is certainly a most pernicious 
consequence in respect to foreign powers, that 
the British government cannot guarantee with 
the same assurance as others, the performance 
of its obligation. The periods of Marlborough 
and Chatham exhibit a proof of this. But then, 
again, on the part of continental powers, physical 
impossibilities may occur, from extreme distress 
or total subjugation, to prevent the fulfilment of 
their engagements, a case which can scarcely be 
supposed to occur with respect to England. 

Notwithstanding this one real defect, which 
attaches to the policy of England, her conti- 
nental influence seems upon the whole, through- 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 353 

out this period, to have been highly beneficial 
in a twofold point of view. In the first place, 
Europe was indebted to it, during a considerable 
period, for the maintenance of peace. That this 
was the object of the British policy under George 
I., and continued to be so, as long as circum- 
stances permitted, under George 11. , has been 
already shown. It was therefore anything but 
a hostile influence. In the second place, in the 
great wars in which England took part, she uni- 
formly supported the weaker against the more 
powerful. She connected herself with Austria 
in the early wars, and in the later with Prussia, 
as these monarchies, one after the other, seemed 
threatened to be destroyed by confederated Eu- 
rope. Both might possibly have saved them- 
selves without the co-operation of England ; but 
the merit of England must not, on that account, 
be depreciated. She materially contributed, 
perhaps in a greater degree than any other Eu- 
ropean power, to uphold the political balance of 
Europe. 



SIXTH PERIOD. 

PERIOD OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 

1788—1815. 

We have still to consider the last period of the 
British continental policy, which, though not 
the most extensive, is unquestionably the most 
interesting, both as respects England herself, 

A a 



354 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

and the continent of Europe. In respect to 
England herself, because it is distinguished by 
the most remarkable development of her ener- 
gies ; in respect to the continent;, because Eng- 
land became in it the centre and the only 
unshaken support of the still existing political 
system of Europe ; and because she determined 
and influenced the politics of other cabinets 
much more decisively than she had ever done 
in any former period. Never has the truth 
of the observation with vv^hich we commenced 
this inquiry, "^ that it is a highly advantageous 
circumstance for the maintenance of the liberty 
and independence of a states-system, that one of 
its principal members should be an insular state 
and in possession of a naval force," been more 
strikingly demonstrated than in this period. If 
abridge had been thrown across the Channel how 
totally different might have been the fate of Eng- 
land and of Europe ! We certainly do not enter- 
tain the slightest doubt that England, even in 
this case, would have remained unconquered, or 
that the invasion of a French army would even- 
tually have ended in its destruction ; and simply 
because the warlike energies of the nation would 
in that case have been more generally roused 
and concentrated, and more resolutely displayed. 
But the destiny of the British state, at least, if 
not of the British people, is now so entirely 
identified with the security of the capital, that 
the consequences of its capture, or even of its 
being exposed to any imminent danger of cap- 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 355 

ture, are incalculable ; and who will venture to 
assert, that in such a case its security would 
have remained unendangered, or that even a 
conquest, though perhaps only momentary, could 
have been averted, especially as to this point 
all the powers of the foe would have been un- 
doubtedly directed. 

The relations of England with the continent 
at the period of which we speak, were deter- 
mined by a man, who, in the double capacity 
of first Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, directed the helm of the state 
as premier, and who enjoyed the full confidence 
of his sovereign — William Pitt"^. When scarcely 
arrived at manhood — when only twenty-four 
years of age — he was raised to this exalted post, 
and had already held it six years when the French 
revolution broke out, which soon placed even 
England in a position that would not allow her 



1 William Pitt, the younger son of the earl of Chatham, was bcrn on 
the 28th of May, 1759. He was indebted for his early education to his 
father and the subsequently appointed bishop of Winchester; and for his 
further tuition, especially in classical literature, philosophj^ and eloquence, 
to Eton school, and Cambridge. He entered the lower house as 
early as his 2"2nd year, on the 23rd of Jan. 1781, as member for Ap- 
pleby ; and delivered his first speech on the 26th of February, on the 
better regulations of the civil list, by which he immediately excited 
general attention. He entered the ministry for the first time as early as 
July, 1782, under the earl of Shelburne, as Chancellor of the Exchequer; 
but upon his retirement from oflSce, March 14, 1783, he also resigned ; 
until after the dismissal of lord North and Fox, Dec. 23, 1783, he was 
placed at the head of the administration, as first Lord of the Treasury and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, which distinguished post he retained till his 
voluntary resignation on the 9th of February, 1801 ; and resumed the 
second time from the 25th of May, 1804, until his death, 23rd of January, 
1806. 

A a2 



356 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

to be a mere spectator. At this early period of 
his hfe this extraordinary man displayed not only 
wonderful talents and intelligence, but what was 
of much greater consequence, a maturity of un- 
derstanding and judgment which seemed far be- 
yond his years ; and these qualifications were 
combined with an energy of character equally 
remarkable. Several of his contemporaries, his 
opponents and rivals, might possess more brilliant 
talents, but none could vie with him in clear- 
ness of intellect, in decision of purpose, and de- 
votion to his country. He was a perfect states- 
man, in the noblest sense of the word ; and what 
Plutarch says of Pericles, that he was only to be 
seen when going to the Senate House or returning 
from it, may with the strictest justice be applied 
to him. His policy it will be the object of the 
following inquiry to set forth. According to our 
professed design we are certainly principally con- 
cerned with his foreign policy ; but this never- 
theless stands so closely — so almost inseparably 
connected with his domestic administration, that 
we must be permitted at least to cast an occa- 
sional glance at that. Here, however, alas ! we 
have too much occasion to regret the scantiness 
of our materials''. Of his public parliamentary 



■■ Would it be believed that in a country, so rich in biography, the first 
of its statesmen has not yet met with a biographer in any degree worthy 
of him ? According to the public organs of intelligence we may expect 
to have this desideratum supplied by his tutor and friend the aged bishop 
of Winchester ; by which also it is hoped a clearer light will be diffused 
over the simplicity of his private life. The genuine portrait of this 
great man, in which the clearness, composure, and energy of this master 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 357 

career our information is sufficiently ample, but 
for all that relates to the whole internal me- 
chanism of his financial administration, for all 
that relates to the manner in which Pitt con- 
ducted this, and especially for all that relates to 
the extraordinary simplification of the business 
of the treasury, his eminent services in which 
respect have acquired for him such imperishable 
fame, where can we find any accurate informa- 
tion? The account of his foreign policy, however, 
must be prefaced by one general observation. His 
conduct throughout was uniformly in accordance 
with his own conviction, and this is expressed 
in every one of his speeches in a manner not to 
be mistaken. According to this conviction the 
summum bonum for England was the maintenance 
of her constitution. This is therefore the hinge 
on which his whole domestic policy during that 
most eventful period revolves. But, in the main- 
tenance of this constitution, which involved the 
condition of his whole sphere of action, he had 
in view merely the means for carrying on his 
foreign policy ; and thus both stand in the 
closest reciprocal connection. 

When, in the year 1789, the opening of the 
assembly of the States-General ushered in the 
revolution, the attention of the minister was 
more engrossed with domestic than with foreign 

spirit are so majestically expressed, is rarely to be met with on the con- 
tinent; whilst most of our readers have perhaps seen it a hundred times 
in miserable caricatures. Even the collection of the speeches of the 
Right Hon. William Pitt, in 3 vols. London, 1808, is by no means com- 
plete ; still it is one of our principal sources for what follows. 



358 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

affairs. The relations of England with the con- 
tinent were decisively influenced by the affairs of 
Holland, which, as we have shown above, by the 
restoration of the stadtholdership, occasioned 
a close connection not only with the House 
of Orange, but also with Prussia, who had ef- 
fected this object by open force. The inter- 
ference of England in the affairs of the north, 
which was a consequence of this, though a fruit- 
less one, and the rupture with Russia which 
thereupon ensued, have been noticed above. In 
his domestic administration, after completing the 
new arrangements for the management of the 
affairs of the East India Company, in accord- 
ance with the bill passed in reference to them, 
the minister was chiefly occupied with his finan- 
cial measures for the diminution of the national 
debt, and for the reduction of the interest of the 
4 per cent, annuities to 3 per cent. Convinced 
that the regular payment of the interest upon 
the national debt was not sufficient for the main- 
tenance of the national credit ; but that it was 
necessary to think of paying off the principal, 
he had, three years before, by the institution of 
a sinking fund, thrown out an anchor which has 
since given assumed stability to its credit'. This 
great institution could scarcely begin to operate 
at that time ; the contraction of new debts, 
which a new war rendered inevitable, could not 
therefore enter into the plan of the minister. 

' 26th of May, 178C. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 359 

The observation of a strict neutrality was con- 
sequently the policy adopted by the minister 
during the first and second so called Constituent 
and Legislative Assembhes ; for however imper- 
fect and exceptionable, in many respects, the 
first constitution might be, which Louis XVL 
accepted and pledged himself to, the British 
cabinet, nevertheless, abstained from any inter- 
ference in the affairs of France. But when, in- 
deed, during the session of the second national 
assembly, political principles of a totally dif- 
ferent character were set forth, the throne sub- 
verted, the king with his family cast into prison ; 
when moreover the National Convention, which 
next followed, abolished monarchy and sent the 
king to the scaffold, the relations of the two 
nations were disturbed ; yet still no war ensued, 
though considerations arose which rendered 
other proceedings necessary. 

The question now became one of intervention 
in the domestic affairs of a foreign state: a ques- 
tion which has always had its difficulties and 
was perhaps never embarrassed with greater than 
in the present instance. It was to be decided 
whether this intervention should be general, 
or to what extent it might be carried. It was 
a favourite assertion of the popular leader and 
popular writer of that time, that no foreign state 
ought to interfere in the domestic affairs of an- 
other state ; and even now we hear it asserted, 
that such an interference is to be regarded as 
an attack upon its independence and self-exist- 



360 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

ence. That assertion holds good, so long as 
it is apphed to states, which, by their geogra- 
phical position and political relations, stand se- 
parated. When revolutions occur in China and 
North America, it would be preposterous to as- 
sert that France or Austria are authorised to 
interfere. 

The case, however, is altogether different 
where states are intimately related to each 
other by geographical or political contact, by 
a common union, a confederacy, or a states- 
system, as is the case with the states of Europe. 
Here the domestic concerns of the one are by no 
means always indifferent to the other; and cases 
may occur in which interference may be inevi- 
table. If we begin by taking a survey of the con- 
stitution of the different states, we shall find that 
with all their individual varieties, yet in the sys- 
tem, taken as a whole, either the monarchical 
or the republican principle is predominant. The 
transition from the one to the other in any of the 
leading members of the system, must necessarily, 
by its unavoidable influence upon the whole, ex- 
cite just apprehensions among the others. Thus 
an interest is awakened which may certainly still 
remain unaccompanied by any active interven- 
tion. How intense, however, and how lively 
must this interest be, and how just the appre- 
hension, when the principles promulgated in the 
other states are diametrically opposed to those 
which were formerly received, and altogether 
irreconcilable with them ? Does no common 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 361 

interest here find a place ? Would not there- 
fore an active interference in such a case be- 
come just ? Would not negotiations here be 
allowed ? Would not the revolutionary state 
feel at liberty to reject these, with the con- 
temptuous answer, that it would not allow of 
any foreign intervention ? Then again, what, if 
these principles are not only in their nature 
opposed to others, but at the same time their 
propagation and practical introduction into other 
states shall be expressly determined upon, and 
loudly proclaimed ? Does not the duty of self- 
preservation then step in ? Will it not then be 
requisite even to take up arms in self-defence, 
and to combat those principles ? 

These cases occurred as soon as the French 
revolution took its proper direction. This was 
founded upon the sovereignty of the people ; 
but the sovereignty of the people stands in direct 
opposition to the monarchical principle. Now 
only one sovereign can exist in a state, not two. 
Either the people are the sovereign, and then 
is the state a republic, or the monarch, what- 
ever may be his title. If he ceases to be so, 
then he sinks directly to the level of a mere 
magistrate ; whether he preserve the title of 
king or not. " It is," says Pitt, in one of those 
powerful speeches, from which I shall have fre- 
quent occasion to quote, (and what higher au- 
thority can be cited than that of such a statesman 
at the head of the freest of all monarchies?) **^It 
is a gross perversion of the principles of all 



362 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

political society, to suppose that there exists 
continually, in every government, a sovereignty 
in abeyance (as it were) on the part of the peo- 
ple, ready to be called forth on every occasion, 
or rather, on every pretence, when it may suit 
the purposes of the party or faction who are 
the advocates of this doctrine, to suppose an oc- 
casion for its exertion. It is in those false prin- 
ciples that are contained the seeds of all the 
misery, desolation, and ruin, which in the pre- 
sent day have spread themselves over so large a 
portion of the habitable globe. I have said 
more upon this subject, than I should have 
thought necessary, if I had not felt that this 
false and dangerous mockery of the sovereignty 
of the people is in truth one of the chief ele- 
ments of Jacobinism, one of the favourite impos- 
tures to mislead the understanding, and to flatter 
and inflame the passions of the mass of mankind, 
who have not the opportunity of examining and 
exposing it, and that, as such, on every occasion 
and in every shape in which it appears, it ought 
to be combatted and resisted by every friend to 
common order, and to the peace and happiness 
of mankind *." 

But if this principle were directly opposed to 
the British constitution, a constitution which is 
a pre-eminent example of a free monarchy, how 
much more was it incompatible with the con- 
stitutions of the principal states of the con- 

' Speeches, iii. p. 58, etc. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 363 

tinent, which are either in the class of absohite 
monarchies without democratic influence, or at 
most belong to those in which the higher classes 
exercise in the state-assembly only a certain, 
and for the most part very limited, share in the 
legislation. If in the case of the British state 
a reform in the constitution might possibly have 
been sufficient, (though even this is scarcely 
probable,) an entire change in the constitution 
of those other states must unavoidably have 
ensued, if the French principle prevailed. How 
just, therefore, were the apprehensions which 
every where arose ! Who could determine how 
far a doctrine would spread, which at the same 
time flattered the people, and was set forth by 
its originators as that which alone was pro- 
ductive of happiness ? But these apprehensions 
received a new and formidable increase by the 
decree of the Convention, 19th Nov. 1792, which 
offered assistance from France to all people, 
who, for the establishment of liberty, i. e. de- 
mocracy, should rebel against their constituted 
authorities. Such a summons to a general in- 
surrection is unparalleled in history, and if any 
indulged the flattering hope that such a decree 
would never be executed, it was crushed by the 
new decree of 17th Dec. which enjoined all the 
generals of the new Republic to establish in 
those countries into which they should carry 
their arms, a democracy in place of the pre- 
existing constitutions. 

Thus by this decree was the most sacred pre- 



364 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

rogative which nations possess, that by virtue of 
which they form a state, their constitution, 
threatened with annihilation. In their constitu- 
tion was at the same time involved their inde- 
pendence, because the new constitution was pre- 
scribed to them. Can any thing more be re- 
quired to justify the ruhng authorities, if they 
refused what was attempted to be forced upon 
them ; if they defended their rights ; if they even 
took up arms in their defence ? 

The foregoing remarks apply to all govern- 
ments ; we now return to England to whose 
policy our researches are confined. 

Among the states which formed the first great 
confederacy against France, England was one of 
the last, and cannot therefore be regarded as the 
originator of that confederacy. As long as 
Louis XVI. sat on the throne, all interference 
in the French affairs was carefully avoided by 
the British government. The French ambas- 
sador, Chauvelin, remained as representative of 
his sovereign in London, and was recognised as 
such, as was also the British ambassador in Paris. 
Indeed, even when the unfortunate Louis was 
torn from the throne and plunged with his family 
into prison, the sympathy of England confined 
itself to the private demands of her ambassa- 
dor, whether he could contribute any thing to 
relieve the wants of the unfortunate prince. 
The public relations were not changed till after 
the execution of the royal martyr, and then 
without a war. The British ambassador was 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 365 

recalled, and the recognition of Baron Chauve- 
lin, to whom the Convention had sent creden- 
tials, was withheld ; he soon afterwards received 
orders to quit England. 

These measures certainly not only expressed a 
just abhorrence, which the execution of the un- 
fortunate monarch had excited, but they implied 
likewise a refusal to recognise the newly-consti- 
tuted Republic, and with it the avowal that Eng- 
land would not enter into political relations with 
it. Although the prospects were in consequence 
clouded, no hostilities immediately ensued. It 
is of great importance for the practical purposes 
of politics, to have a clear understanding, that 
the provisional breaking off of relations between 
states does not amount to a declaration of war. 
Negotiations between two states presuppose in 
both a regular system of government. How can 
a government negotiate with a state which itself 
acknowledges that it is occupied in effecting 
a revolution, and wishes first to give itself a new 
constitution, and at the same time a different 
government. 

Other causes, however, soon concurred to 
render the participation of England in the war 
unavoidable. Notwithstanding their disavowal 
of any intention of aggrandisement, the new 
Republic not only assumed the character of 
a conqueror, but even scoffed at the laws of 
nations, which had been hitherto recognised, 
by immediately appropriating to herself the pro- 
vinces of Avignon and Savoy which had been 



366 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

taken from the pope and king of Sardinia. 
But that which more nearly concerned England 
was the Invasion of the Austrian Netherlands, 
which followed in the autumn, 1792. These 
provinces formed, as we observed above, the 
bridge which connected England with the con- 
tinent, and above all with Austria. The partial 
suspension of the embargo upon the naviga- 
tion of the Scheldt, which rested on the faith of 
treaties, was a new specimen of the republican 
code of international law. But that which must 
have most disturbed the tranquillity of England 
under the circumstances of those times, was the 
danger with which the Republic menaced the 
United Netherlands. At the head of this state 
stood the House of Orange, which had been for 
five years past reinstated in its privileges ; with 
this house England, in conjunction with Prussia, 
had concluded the triple alliance, and in the 
same had guaranteed to it its prerogatives. It was 
precisely against this very house, that the attacks 
of France, in her desire to conciliate or maintain 
the support of the popular party, were directed. 
Could a war under such circumstances be 
avoided ? Yet the war was not declared by 
England, but by France. The 1st Feb., 1793, 
was the day on which a declaration of war was 
issued at the same time against England and the 
Stadtholder. 

'''What was," says Pitt, in one of his early 
speeches, ''the state of this country with respect 
to France, previous to the declaration of war on 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 367 

her part ? We then contended, first, that she 
had broken a treaty with our allies, which we 
were bound to support : secondly. That she had 
engaged in schemes of ambition and aggran- 
disement, inconsistent with the interests of this 
country and the general security of Europe : 
thirdly. That she had entertained principles hos- 
tile to all governments, and more particularly to 
our own. In consequence of all these circum- 
stances, you then declared, in addresses to his 
majesty, that if proper satisfaction was not ob- 
tained, a war must be the consequence. But 
while this was in agitation, they had themselves 
declared war, and been guilty of a sudden and 
unprovoked aggression upon this country." 

"Acts of hostility," says the minister, upon 
a later occasion, "had been openly threatened 
against our alhes ; an hostility founded upon 
the assumption of a right which would at once 
supersede the whole law of nations : a demand 
was made by France upon Holland, to open the 
navigation of the Scheldt, on the ground of a 
general and national right, in violation of posi- 
tive treaty ; this claim we discussed, at the time, 
not so much on account of its immediate import- 
ance, (though it was important both in a mari- 
time and commercial view,) as on account of the 
general principle on which it was founded. On 
the same arbitrary notion they soon afterwards 
discovered that sacred law of nature, which 
made the Rhine and the Alps the legitimate 
boundaries of France, and assumed the power. 



368 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

which they have affected to exercise through 
the whole of the revolution, of superseding, by 
a new code of their own, all the recognised 
principles of the law of nations. They were 
actually advancing towards the republic of 
Holland by rapid strides, after the victory of 
Jemappe, they had ordered their generals to 
pursue the Austrian troops into any neutral 
country ; thereby explicitly avowing an inten- 
tion of invading Holland. They had already 
shown their moderation and self-denial, by in- 
corporating Belgium with the French republic. 
These lovers of peace, who set out with a sworn 
aversion to conquest, and professions of respect 
for the independence of other nations ; who pre- 
tend that they departed from this system only 
in consequence of your aggression, themselves 
in time of peace while you were still confessedly 
neutral, without the pretence or shadow of pro- 
vocation, wrested Savoy from the king of Sar- 
dinia, and had proceeded to incorporate it like- 
wise with France. These were their aggressions 
at this period ; and more than these. They had 
issued an universal declaration of war against all 
the thrones of Europe ; and they had by their 
conduct, applied it particularly and specifically 
to you; they had passed the decree of the 19th 
February, 1792, proclaiming the promise of 
French succour to all nations who should ma- 
nifest a wish to become free : they had by all 
their language, as well as their example, shown 
what they understood to be freedom ; they had 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 369 

sealed their principles by the deposition of their 
sovereign ; they had applied them to England, 
by inviting and encouraging the addresses of 
those seditious and traitorous societies, who, 
from the beginning, favoured their vievi^s, and 
who, encouraged by your forbearance, were 
even then publicly avowing French doctrines, 
and anticipating their success in this country ; 
who were hailing the progress of those proceed- 
ings in France, which led to the murder of its 
king : they were even then looking to the day 
when they should behold a National Convention 
in England, formed upon similar principles \" 

After this, the frequently contested question, 2^/^o 
was the originator of the war, requires no fur- 
ther investigation^. Even if France had not first 
declared it, she would notwithstanding have 
been the aggressor ; for this charge attaches to 
those who desire war without provocation ^. 
Thus then England enrolled herself amongst the 
belligerent powers. It is necessary to cast a 
glance at her position at that time with regard 
to the continent. 

Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, and some of the 
German states, and soon after the whole Empire, 

" Pitt's Speeches, iii. p. 97. 

'^ A work, expressly on this subject, appeared from the pen of an English- 
man, Herbert Marsh, upon the causes of the war between England and 
France. Leipsig, 1796. 

y Which party, whether the Girondists, as is asserted, or the violent 
Jacobin party, made the declaration of war, is of no importance in the so- 
lution of this question. And can it be supposed that the last were 
deterred by any other motive than because the time did not seem op- 
portune 1 

B b 



370 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

were already, at this period, in a state of war with 
France. It was easy at the same time to fore- 
see that other states would take up arms, partly 
in self-defence, partly, as was the case with 
Spain, from indignation at the execution of the 
king. But at this critical juncture, the system 
of standing armies had been carried on by the 
principal states of the continent to a degree 
which was no longer consistent with their re- 
sources. These scarcely sufficed to keep the 
great mass of stipendiary forces from mutiny. 
The extraordinary expenses of the war exceeded 
the resources of the states, and rendered it im- 
possible to employ the whole force which they 
had under arms. England, in respect to naval 
power, might with good reason calculate upon 
vanquishing and possibly annihilating the fleets 
of France ; and thus pave the way for the con- 
quest of her colonies. But, however alluring 
these prospects might be, she could not flatter 
herself with the hope of thus bringing the war 
to a termination. Those conquests, however 
well they might have succeeded, could only, as 
Pitt himself expresses it % have a collateral in- 
fluence. France at that period, besides having 
been already by her own fault deprived of her 
most valuable colony, St. Domingo, did not 
attach so much importance to the rest, as would 
have been the case in earlier times. The con- 
test must be decided by a land, and not by a 
naval force, and the formation of a league with 

* Speeches, 1, c. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 371 

the continental powers was the natural con- 
sequence. A series of alliances, from Portugal 
to Russia, followed in the same year, 1793. In 
order to estimate these, and to form an opinion 
of the general conduct of Pitt, we must place 
ourselves in his position. England certainly 
was in a certain sense the centre of the first 
league against France ; but this league remained 
to a certain degree ineffectual : it was not in 
the power of the British minister to direct the 
energies of the allies at his discretion. It was 
ineffectual with respect to a leading power, 
Russia. Although Catharine II. as early as March 
25, 1793, surpassed all the others in her eager- 
ness to conclude an alliance with England ; al- 
though she declared herself in a state of war 
with France ; although her voice predominated 
above all, she still, in spite of all this, did least 
of any. Her views were directed to other ob- 
jects, first, to the renewal of the advantageous 
commercial treaty with England of the year 
1766 ; secoadly, and above all, to the carrying 
into execution her new and unjust design of a 
partition of the too unhappy Poland, which 
was effected in this very summer. Thus the 
certainty of not having Russia for an antago- 
nist was the only advantage which England 
derived from this connection. Among the 
other continental powers, Austria and Prussia 
were naturally those vAih which the first and 
strongest connections were formed ; after these, 
came Spain, Sardinia, Portugal, and some 

Bb2 



372 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

smaller states. Most of these states were in the 
situation which we have already alluded to, their 
finances were greatly disproportioned to their 
mihtary force. The natural consequence was 
that they sought assistance, where alone they 
could find it, in Great Britain. Thus not only 
was the subsidy-system of earlier times renewed, 
but carried to a much greater extent than it had 
been before. The war was for the most part 
carried on at the expense of England. During 
the eight years which elapsed between 1793 and 
Pitt's retirement from the ministry, loans to the 
amount of twenty-three millions sterling, had 
been on the average yearly advanced by the 
minister. The British ministry was certainly, 
on this account, allowed to exercise a great 
influence in the conduct of the war; yet never 
so decisive a one as to have the direction of it 
entirely in their own hands. The plan of every 
campaign had to be jointly concerted ; the con- 
tinental powers moreover had each naturally 
their several interests to be regarded. A mere 
minister of state is not capable, as such, of 
being unconditionally the soul of a large con- 
federacy. It is only when the statesman and 
general are combined, as in Marlborough stnd 
WiUiam III., that this can occur. The wish of 
the minister was to arm, if possible, all Europe 
against France. But it was not in his power to 
accomphsh this on a systematic plan, much less 
to give a permanent and systematic direction to 
the confederacy. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 373 

We must bear this in mind while considering 
the campaigns of 1793 and 1794. The first 
was successful. In consequence of the battle 
of Neerwinden, the French armies were com- 
pelled to evacuate Belgium. This gave Eng- 
land an opportunity of taking an active part in 
the war on the continent. An English-Hano- 
verian army united itself with the Austrian in 
the Netherlands^ and these provinces became 
again what they had often been before, the 
bridge between two allied powers. Even the 
Republic of the United Netherlands, now co- 
vered by the allied armies, appeared as a par- 
ticipator in the common field of battle. But 
the posture of affairs underwent a change in the 
following year. The system of terrorism esta- 
bhshed in France, which left security only in 
the armies, drove every one to arms capable 
of bearing them. Her preponderating power, 
and the new system of warfare which spared 
no men, decided the question : in the au- 
tumn of 1794, Belgium was again in the hands 
of the French. More severe reverses were 
soon to follow. An intense frost covered the 
rivers, the natural bulwarks of Holland, with a 
sheet of ice. The defence of the republic was 
impossible. The house of Orange fled to Eng- 
land ; and the patriot party in expectation of a 
golden futurity received their new friends with 
open arms \ 

» In January, 1795. 



374 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

This conquest of the repubUc had a double 
effect on the continental policy of England. In 
the first place it put an end to the direct parti- 
cipation of England in the war on the continent, 
inasmuch as she had now no field of action on 
which her armies could enter. Henceforward 
therefore she was obliged to confine her partici- 
pation in the continental war to the advice and 
support which she gave her confederates. A 
second consequence was the commencement of 
a dissolution of the league, since one of its 
members had not only seceded from it, but had 
even gone over to the enemy. But this first 
separation was only the precursor of one still 
greater, to which, in some measure, it contri- 
buted. By the summer of 1795, England had 
lost two of her principal allies, Prussia and Spain. 

The secession of Prussia must no doubt be 
chiefly attributed to financial embarrassments, 
which the subsidies of England could not relieve, 
as the main cause lay in the prodigality of its 
financial administration. But it is no less cer- 
tain that false political principles had also a 
material influence upon her. An idea had ex- 
isted from the early part of the reign of Frederic 
II., that Prussia and France were natural allies, 
an idea which France upon every opportunity 
endeavoured to revive. This idea however, 
was manifestly grounded on the earlier relations 
in which France and Austria at one time, and 
Prussia and Austria at another, respectively stood 
towards each other. So long as the rivalry lasted 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 375 

between France and Austria, Prussia was for 
France the most advantageous ally; and after 
Prussia, by the conquest of Silesia, had en- 
tered the field as the antagonist of Austria, 
France was certainly so for Prussia. How Fre- 
deric IL availed himself of this has been shown 
above. This connection rested solely on poli- 
tical relations, which were in their very nature 
mutable, and which had actually changed, since 
Austria and Prussia had become friends, and 
even allies ; from the time that Austria had 
ceased to be annoyed at the loss of Silesia, 
Prussia could no longer be called the natural 
friend of France. But it is a phenomenon of 
frequent occurrence in politics, that political 
feelings are frequently called into play, even 
after the circumstances which gave them birth 
have ceased. Again, by the conquest of Hol- 
land, the position of Prussia in respect to the 
war was geographically changed. Her western 
provinces, protected by few fortresses, lay open 
to every assault. But that which operated most 
powerfully was, the brilliant prospects which 
France displayed before her, of future aggran- 
disement, in the shape of indemnifications ; as 
the limited possessions of Prussia on this side 
the Rhine remained, from the peace of Basle 
till the conclusion of the general peace, in the 
hands of France. Thus England lost one of 
her principal allies on the continent, though not 
by any fault of her own ; for Pitt still continued 
to advance subsidies, even when a zealous co- 



376 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

operation in the war could no longer be ex- 
pected. Prussia now adopted a system of 
neutrality; to which Hanover and the other 
provinces of Northern Germany acceded. 

In the course of the summer, Spain also with- 
drew from the league ; the peace which she 
concluded at Basle, placing her in the condition 
of a neutral state. Her participation in the war 
had been founded less on political than on family 
motives. The Bourbons who were seated on 
the Spanish throne, regarded the ignominious 
fate of their house as an insult offered to them- 
selves. But their animosity had gradually sub- 
sided, or they thought they had been sufficiently 
avenged ; greater facilities too were here offered 
for peace, inasmuch as, at least in Europe, no 
claim had been made to conquest on either side. 
The cession of her share of St. Domingo to 
France was, properly, only the fulfilment of an 
ancient treaty, in which Spain had engaged to 
resign this possession in return for another held 
by France — Louisiana. 

Thus was the first great confederacy, or as it 
was then usually expressed, the first coalition 
against France dissolved. Its dissolution cannot 
be considered otherwise than calamitous, be- 
cause the object of the war had not been as yet 
attained. The articles of the peace of Basle 
were even concluded with the National Con- 
vention, which, in spite of all its protestations, 
could not be supposed to have renounced its 
revolutionary principles. Thus, too, was exhi- 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 377 

bited the first example, that England was by no 
means capable of holding together the league 
which she had formed. Still, after all, the 
league was not altogether broken asunder ; 
Austria, the most powerful ally of England 
on the continent, still remained, and by her suc- 
cessful operations on the Rhine, reanimated 
her courage. Besides Austria she had also re- 
maining South Germany, Bavaria and its other 
states. In Italy she had also remaining Sardinia, 
which from the fortresses of Piedmont was the 
key of that country. She had also Naples, valu- 
able for her sea-ports. In the west of Europe, 
she had still left Portugal, whose political rela- 
tions were determined by her commercial con- 
nections. So long therefore, as the war lasted, 
it might naturally be expected she would earn- 
estly exert herself to draw more closely toge- 
ther the ties which connected her with the other 
allies. As early as the 18th Feb. of this year, 
1795, a new defensive alliance was concluded 
with Catharine II., with reciprocal guarantees of 
possessions held by either party, which, like the 
first, was unproductive of any material conse- 
quences ; on the 20th May, a contract with 
Austria ; these two were the foundations of the 
triple alliance, concluded on the 28th Septem- 
ber ; the conditions of which have not been 
made known to the public. A new loan was 
granted to Austria in the same year. 

The renewal of the connection with Russia 
happened in the same year in which Catharine 



378 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

consummated her designs against Poland, by 
a third and final partition. England abstained 
from any active interference in these proceed- 
ings. Pitt, in his negotiations respecting the 
treaty of Russia with Turkey, had experienced 
how hazardous it was to interfere with the 
designs of Catharine. Whether the British 
cabinet would have manifested this passive 
spirit in more tranquil times, may admit of 
doubt ; that resistance, under the existing cir- 
cumstances, would have disturbed the good un- 
derstanding with her allies, and perhaps, if it had 
been energetic, would have led to a war with 
Russia, is as evident, as it is improbable that any 
resistance could have prevented the dismember- 
ment. Nevertheless, the opposition in parlia- 
!Xient did not neglect to avail themselves of this 
ground for assailing the minister. He an- 
swered them briefly in his speech of May 10, 
1796, in reply to Mr. Fox ^ "Are ministers 
to be blamed," said he, "for not doing what 
it would be hazardous in them to attempt, and 
would it not be hazardous to propose a me- 
diation where both parties were not ready to 
agree ? To have erected ourselves into arbiters, 
could only expose us to difficulties and disputes, 
if we were determined, as we ought to be, to 
enforce that mediation on the parties who refused 

•> Speeches, vol. ii. p. 169. It is a part of the ordinary tactics of the 
opposition to embarrass ministers by reproaches for having suffered this 
or that to happen in Europe. The most recent events of history afford 
evidence of this. The reproaches would have been without doubt much 
more violent in the opposite case. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 379 

to admit it. And what is the great use which 
the honourable gentleman seems to be so eager 
to derive from that peace, if so procured ? Is it 
fit that we should go to war in order to prevent 
the partition of Poland ? In general policy, I 
am ready to confess that this partition is un- 
just ; but it does not go, as is said, to overturn 
the balance of power in Europe, for which the 
right honourable gentleman, as it suits his argu- 
ment, expresses greater or less solicitude ; for 
that country being nearly divided equally be- 
tween three great powers, it can little contri- 
bute to the undue aggrandisement of either." 

It was not compatible with the plan of the 
minister at this time to take up this subject on 
the different and higher grounds, which easily 
and spontaneously suggest themselves. 

The whole energies of England were thus left 
to be directed against France, who in this same 
year obtained a great accession of power by 
drawing Spain from her neutral position to be- 
come her active ally. This she effected by the 
alliance-compact of August 10, 1796, by which 
the weaker state completely identified her for- 
tunes with the more powerful, and which necessa- 
rily paved the way for its subsequent fate. This 
connection became immediately of importance 
to France, inasmuch as it drew into her interest 
a naval power whose fleet she might expect in 
some measure would repair the loss of her own. 
Experience has shown how vain this hope was. 
The war with Spain necessarily became a 



380 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

maritime one ; and, as formerly happened on 
the invasion of the United Netherlands, mate- 
rially contributed to procure for England that 
sovereign command of the sea, which became 
afterwards the subject of so many coQiplaints 
and reproaches. A war with Spain was besides 
generally very popular in England, and parti- 
cularly wished for by the British navy, since it 
promised a rich booty to privateers as well as to 
ships of the line. 

As long therefore as Russia remained inactive, 
Austria continued to be the principal ally of 
England, and at the same time the principal foe 
which France had to encounter on the continent. 
If Austria were conquered or forced to make 
peace, the weaker allies must follow of course. 
The great object of the French government, 
which had been for a short time in the hands of 
the Directory % was to accomplish this object. 
Three armies were to make an attempt on three 
different points to force a way into the heart of 
this monarchy in the summer of 1796, in order, 
if possible, to dictate peace in the capital itself. 
One proceeding from the Lower Rhine under 
general Jourdan, was to penetrate through Fran- 
conia ; a second under general Moreau, through 
Swabia and Bavaria; while another under the 
new general-in-chief, Bounaparte, drove back the 
Austrian force in Lombardy. The unsuccessful 

«= In October, 1795, after the completion of the new constitution and 
the dissolution of the National Convention, the Directory, consisting of five 
members, was established. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 381 

issue of this plan is well known. Austria found 
in her own imperial House (a discovery of in- 
estimable importance for her cause) the general 
and hero who held her enemies at bay. Jour- 
dan, defeated at Amberg and Wiirzburg, has- 
tened back across the Rhine with the relics of 
his army ; Moreau was also obliged to make 
a retreat. These victories, however, had no 
effect on Italy. There the commander-in-chief, 
relying solely upon himself, pursued his own 
course undisturbed. While those events were 
taking place in Germany, he completely esta- 
blished the influence of France in Italy ; and 
this country, which had been hitherto only a 
subordinate seat of the war, was made by him 
the theatre of its great operations. Here Aus- 
tria, and with her, England, had a train of 
allies, among whom Sardinia was in every re- 
spect pre-eminent. Her territories are, by their 
position and their fortresses, the key of Italy. 
The first object, therefore, of the new general- 
issimo was to dissever this connection, and to 
force Sardinia into a separate treaty. A few 
weeks sufficed for the execution of this project. 
By the 17th May, 1796, Victor Amadeus saw 
himself compelled to sign a peace, by which he 
not only renounced Savoy and Nice, but even 
received French garrisons into his principal for- 
tresses. Thus England lost one of her allies, 
who had formed for the last hundred years an 
important link in the chain of her continental 
relations, and Austria a friend who had never 



382 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

been of greater importance to her than at the 
present crisis. They were now both obhged to 
depend on their own resources, for no depend- 
ence could any longer be placed on the other 
states of Italy, which were well satisfied if they 
could obtain by negotiation or purchase an 
armistice or a peace. Austria might now expect 
to be attacked in a new quarter, and, to see in 
the event of her main fortress, Mantua, falling, 
the French armies in her southern provinces, 
that being the only impediment to the advance 
of the enemy. It was invested in July, and no 
wonder she strained every nerve to save it. 
Three armies were raised, vanquished, again 
raised, and after all to no purpose! Mantua, 
on the 2nd of Feb. of the ensuing year, opened 
her gates to the conqueror ; the rest of Italy 
had already obtained peace either by submission 
or negotiation, and an entrance was opened into 
Carinthia and Carniola, as well as into the south 
of the Tyrol; it seemed indeed questionable 
whether the progress of the warrior, who had 
penetrated into the heart of the state, could be 
arrested. Napoleon himself was not insensible 
to the hazard of his situation ; but the new sys- 
tem of politics afforded him a resource, by 
making an amicable arrangement at the ex- 
pense of a neutral state. The preliminaries at 
Leoben on the 18th April, which were after- 
wards transformed with some important altera- 
tions into a definitive treaty on the 17th October, 
at Campo Formio, restored peace to the con- 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 383 

tinent — the republic of Venice being made the 
sacrifice. 

We shall only consider this peace in relation 
to England. There was certainly nothing con- 
cluded in it which immediately affected this coun- 
try, but as the English coalition now ceased of 
itself, the renewal of it was evidently rendered 
more difficult in future, as Austria, by this peace, 
in consideration of the indemnification which 
she obtained, in a large share of the Venetian 
territory, resigned her portion of the Nether- 
lands in favour of France ; the great import- 
ance of which, in the mutual relation of both 
powers, has been clearly demonstrated above. 
The occupation of the Graeco-Venetian islands, 
which those treaties ceded to France, was an- 
other, by no means unimportant, consequence 
of that peace to England, since they were likely 
to affect her relations in the Mediterranean and 
with the Porte. 

Thus the great confederation against France 
was completely dissolved, and at the end of the 
year 1797, England stood alone, unsupported by 
any allies on the continent (with the exception 
perhaps of PortugaP) against France and her 
allies. It now became a great and important 
question, xvhether she should continue the war or 
conclude a peace? The opposition lost no op- 
portunity of inveighing against the ministers on 

•' With Portugal also France had concluded a peace on the 20th August ; 
which, however, after the suspension of negotiations with England, had 
been again formally retracted on the 26th October. 



384 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

account of the continuance of the war. — " That 
it was a war without an object. That they 
combatted principles which ought not to be com- 
batted with arms. That they were wilhng to 
make no peace with the repubhc of France ; 
that they aimed at the restoration of the mon- 
archy, or even of the ancient regime, which 
could not be effected. What had been hitherto 
achieved by the war? France was now much 
more powerful than before the conflict, and 
there was no hope of being able to reduce her 
to her ancient boundaries." Such was the lan- 
guage delivered on every opportunity by Fox, 
by Sheridan, and other leaders of the opposition. 
That the British cabinet was not decidedly 
indisposed to peace, its proceedings had already 
evinced. In October, 1795, a new government 
had been established in France, that of the Di- 
rectory. It must be allowed that nothing could 
then be done till experience had determined by 
what spirit this new body was animated — whe- 
ther the revolutionary principles of the conven- 
tional government, which had made way for it, 
had descended upon it, or whether neighbouring 
states might now dwell near it in security and 
peace. But, however this might be, it was still 
a government, and as such, whatever well- 
grounded apprehensions might at first be enter- 
tained, it was the highest, and only recognised 
authority with which the British ministers could 
treat. However faint might be their hopes re- 
specting the final result, a door of communication 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 385 

seemed now opened, and they might, at least, 
ascertain at what price peace could be pur- 
chased. England had already made two at- 
tempts at negotiation, and she now made a 
third by sending over Lord Malmsbury as am- 
bassador. His first attempt, made at Paris (Sept. 
— Dec. 1796), failed ; what hopes could be en- 
tertained from the beginning of the final result, 
where the parties, instead of proceeding heartily 
and with good faith, began by insisting upon an 
ultimatum ? It was, nevertheless, renewed at 
Lille (July — Sept. 1797, during the negotiations 
for peace between France and Austria), at first 
with a better prospect of success, as a party of 
the Directory anxiously wished for peace ; but 
this party being overpowered by the majority 
and forcibly driven from office, it again fell to 
the ground; and, just as the negotiations with 
Austria were approaching a pacific termination, 
the British ambassador received orders to quit 
France, and England was left alone to struggle 
with the enemy. 

Now again the reiterated attacks of the oppo- 
sition, the loud demands Why he still continued 
the war ? When he hoped to conclude a peace ? 
again compelled Pitt to explain his views of the 
subject. He spoke them boldly and distinctly. 
However desirable the restoration of the mon- 
archy in France might be (no one at this time 
ventured even to think of the reinstatement of 
the Bourbons) it was not insisted upon as an 
absolute condition ; much less the entire resto- 

c c 



386 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

ration of the ancient form of government. Even 
with France as a republic peace might possibly 
be concluded, provided that it could be a secure 
peace. But since the politics of the Directory 
clearly showed that it had adopted the revolu- 
tionary principles in all their force, Pitt resolutely 
adhered to his principle : better no peace than an 
insecure one! "I have never believed," said he% 
" that we could not treat with France as a re- 
pubhc. Whatever I may, in the abstract, think 
of the kind of government called a republic, 
whatever may be its fitness to the nation where 
it prevails, there may be times when it would 
not be dangerous to exist in its vicinity. But 
while the spirit of France remains what at pre- 
sent it is, its government despotic, vindictive, 
unjust, with a temper untamed, a character un- 
changed, if its power to do wrong at all remains, 
there does not exist any security for this coun- 
try or Europe. In my view of security, every 
object of ambition and aggrandisement is aban- 
doned. Our simple object is security, just secu- 
rity, with a little mixture of indemnification. 
These are the legitimate objects of war at all times; 
and when we have attained that end, we are in a 
condition to derive from peace its beneficent ad- 
vantages ; but until then, our duty and our in- 
terest require that we should persevere unap- 
palled in the struggle to which we were provoked. 
We shall not be satisfied with a false security. 

« Speeches' III. p. 85. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 387 

War with all its evils is better than a peace in 
which there is nothing to be seen but usurpation 
and injustice, dwelling with savage delight on 
the humble, prostrate condition of some timid 
suppliant people. We are not in arms against 
the opinions of the closet, nor the speculations 
of the schools. We are at war with armed opi- 
nions ; we are at war with those opinions which 
the sword of audacious, unprincipled, and im- 
pious innovation seeks to propagate amidst the 
ruin of empires, the demolition of the altars of 
all religion, the destruction of every venerable, 
and good, and liberal institution, under whatever 
form of polity they have been raised ; and this, 
in spite of the dissenting reason of men, in con- 
tempt of that lawful authority which, in the set- 
tled order, superior talents and superior virtues 
attain, crying out to them not to enter on holy 
ground, nor to pollute the stream of eternal jus- 
tice- If it be asked whether I am determined 
to continue the war till the republic be over- 
thrown ? I answer, I do not confine my views 
to the territorial limits of France; I contemplate 
the principles, character, and conduct of France; 
I consider what these are ; I see in them the 
issues of distraction, of infamy, and ruin, to 
every state in her aUiance ; and therefore I say, 
that until the aspect of that mighty mass of ini- 
quity and folly is entirely changed ; until the 
character of the government is totally reversed ; 
until by the common consent of the general 
voice of all men, I can with truth tell parlia- 

cc2 



388 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

merit, France is no longer terrible for her con- 
tempt of the rights of every other nation — she 
no longer avows schemes of universal empire — 
she has settled into a state whose government 
can maintain those relations in their integrity, in 
which alone civilised communities are to find 
their security, and from which they are to de- 
rive their distinction and their glory ; — until in 
the situation of France we have exhibited to us 
those features of a wise, a just, and a liberal po- 
licy, I cannot treat with her." 

The Directory itself soon realised the views 
of the British minister. The scandalous pro- 
ceedings at the congress of Rastadt ; the con- 
tumacious bearing of the French ambassadors ; 
the seizure of Ehrenbreitstein in the midst of 
the peace ; above all, the surreptitious attack 
upon Switzerland, and the treatment she re- 
ceived, afforded stronger evidence than the case 
required. Meanwhile England stood alone on 
the field of battle ; the question was : how and 
where she should be assailed ? The earlier at- 
tempts on the West Indies and Ireland had 
failed ; — the Egyptian expedition followed. 

We propose to consider this extraordinary 
and remarkable enterprise only in one aspect, 
as to the influence which it had and must have 
upon the British continental policy. It soon 
assumed a greater and more comprehensive form 
than might have been expected from the nature 
of the expedition. 

The object of this enterprise being the coloni- 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 389 

sation of the fertile plains of Egypt, the result 
which France expected from it was properly 
speaking the acquisition of an important colonial 
possession, which might not only compensate the 
loss of the West Indian islands, but by the altered 
direction which it gave to the whole colonial 
system, might injure the British colonies in the 
West Indies ; and perhaps even operate upon the 
relations in the East Indies. How far these pro- 
jects were feasible or not, may be reserved for 
a distinct inquiry. It is enough that the appre- 
hensions which they excited took such deep 
root in England, that the principle was firmly 
embraced not to lay down the sword until that 
plan was frustrated, — until Egypt was wrested 
from the French. 

Certainly this war appeared by the distance 
of its scene from Europe, to have no connection 
with the British continental pohcy ; indeed from 
its engaging so entirely the attention and ener- 
gies of Great Britain in a different part of the 
world, it rather seemed to produce a relaxation 
in the continental relations. The contrary, how- 
ever, was the result. The Egyptian expedition 
became one of the principal means of bringing 
about the second great confederacy or coalition 
against France, which was directed by England 
— and of which it remained the centre in an 
equal if not in a still higher degree than it had 
been in that confederacy which had been dis- 
solved. 

The expedition to Egypt thus became so preg- 



390 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

nant with consequences and so momentous in 
relation to the British continental pohcy, that not 
only were the ancient cords for the most part re- 
knit together again, but new ones were likewise 
added. Amongst these must be enumerated 
as more particularly important, the connection 
with the Porte. The storm which raged in the 
west of Europe had not yet reached this 
state. Its position, its relations, and its often 
blissful ignorance, had allowed it to remain neu- 
tral. It had been for two centuries and a half 
the ally of France, without however taking part 
in her wars. England had had little connection 
with it. She had wished perhaps, though in vain, 
to take an interest in its affairs before the con- 
clusion of the last peace ; but in this she was 
not actuated so much by a tender solicitude 
for the Porte, as by jealousy on account of the 
growing power of Russia. But now relations 
had changed; — Egypt belonged to the Porte; 
which now also discovered by experience that 
no public law afforded any protection against 
the political code of the revolution. Its oldest 
friend despoiled it, without any provocation, of 
one of its best provinces ; and though this pro- 
ceeding might be inexplicable to them, they were 
quite sensible that an insult had been offered 
them, which a semibarbarous people is of all 
others usually least disposed to brook. The 
means for gaining the divan failed ; their voice 
was raised for war; and under these circumstances 
it could not be difficult for the British cabinet. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 391 

when war was declared, to find in her an ally. 
Both expectations proceeded rapidly to their ful- 
filment. As early as the 12th Sept. the Porte 
issued a declaration of war against France, and 
by the 5th of January, 1799, a league was con- 
cluded, by which was stipulated mutual assist- 
ance, their harbours were closed against the 
French vessels, and they engaged not to make 
peace except with mutual consent, and guaran- 
teed to each other their possessions. The alli- 
ance of the Porte differed only in one respect 
from that of the other powers with England. 
The Porte was the only power which received 
no subsidies, nor even desired them. This con- 
nection was for England, not only of the highest 
importance in regard to her immediate object 
and the present war, but it opened to her a new 
and dazzling prospect of the fortresses in the Me- 
diterranean and the trade in the Levant, which 
had been hitherto in the hands of the French 
and Dutch ; but if it once passed into hers, it 
would not be so easy to wrest it back from her. 
The sequel has shown how these expectations 
were realised ; it was written in the book of fate 
that the fruits of the expedition to Egypt, if we 
except its literary advantages, should not be 
reaped by France, but by England. The im- 
portance of this new continental connection is 
sufficiently obvious. 

But the expedition to Egypt was of service to 
the British continental policy in another respect. 
At the time it was set on foot, the spirit and cou- 



392 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

rage of the continental powers were at a low ebb. 
The haughty tone assumed by the French pleni- 
potentiaries at Rastadt had dispirited and humi- 
liated, as well as exasperated them. A new war 
was considered inevitable ; but all seemed afraid 
to strike the first blow. Exactly at this crisis, 
and in this disposition of affairs, the glorious 
victory of the Nile was achieved by Nelson^. 
This, however did not immediately affect the 
relations of the continental powers, though it 
had an indirect influence upon them. This hu- 
miliation of the haughty, raised the courage of 
the oppressed ; their confidence in England was 
revived ; her exhortations and offers were lis- 
tened to with more attention, and what perhaps 
is almost without a parallel in history, the effects 
of this victory were much greater in a moral than 
in a military point of view. The relations of 
France with Austria were already greatly dis- 
turbed. A new war was felt at Vienna to be in- 
evitable. That country was only looking about 
for allies ; negotiations with Russia had already 
been quietly going on during the interval of re- 
pose ; it could not therefore be difficult for Eng- 
land to find an opening. It was still more easy 
at Naples, where the personal influence of the 
ambassador, or rather of his consort, lady Hamil- 
ton, determined the queen, and through her the 
court, and even excited them to a precipitate 
rupture, the consequences of which were the 

f August 1st, 1798, 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 393 

occupation of Naples and the flight of the king 
and the court to Sicily. 

But a new connecting link in the chain of Bri- 
tish continental policy was formed in Russia. 
The connections with Catharine, as well as their 
inefficacy have been noticed above. She had 
retired from the stage ° and had made room for 
her son and successor Paul. This period is 
not only highly interesting as respects the Bri- 
tish continental policy, but to the whole state- 
system of Europe. With it commences the ac- 
tive participation of Russia in the affairs of the 
west, which Catharine had always studiously 
avoided. And it might be foreseen that this 
could not easily be again withdrawn, whatever 
change might take place in the character and po- 
licy of the reigning prince. A power of the first 
order, having once adopted an active partici- 
pation, cannot easily stand aloof, for any con- 
siderable time, even if she wished it, which it is 
almost absurd to suppose she could do. The 
Egyptian expedition however had an essential 
influence in bringing about the co-operation of 
Russia. The capture of Malta by the French, 
having wrested this island from its ancient pos- 
sessors, the knights of the order of St. John, 
and threatened their order with extermination, 
imposed on them the necessity of seeking a pow- 
erful protector. This they hoped to find in the 
emperor Paul whom they chose for their grand 

? Nov. 16th, 1796. 



394 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

master, and thus drew over to their interest one 
of the most powerful princes of Europe, who, 
flattered by the compHraent, accepted their offer. 
The personal character of this prince, who 
always prosecuted his wishes with vehemence, 
and the desire he now showed to draw into a league 
the whole of Europe, and who indeed concluded 
alliances with Austria, England, (who con- 
sented to subsidies,) Naples, Portugal, and even 
with the old hereditary enemy of Russia, the 
Porte, removed every obstacle. 

These were the elements of the great con- 
federacy against France^ If we measure it solely 
by the extent and population of the allied states, 
it was more powerful than the first. But the 
neutrality which Prussia maintained, and with 
her Northern Germany, left a great chasm 
which could not be filled up. It was not merely 
the want of the military force of Prussia which 
caused this chasm to be sensibly felt, but rather 
the geographical position of this state. The 
half of France, the whole northern half of it, 
according to its line of frontier at that time, was 
covered by this neutrality ; and when after the 
successful progress of the allied armies, an at- 
tack upon the southern half was not impossible, 
it was obvious how difiicult this must be ren- 
dered if France could concentrate all her forces 
here for resistance. 

England thus again united the links of her 
continental policy by this second confederacy, 
as far as circumstances permitted. She con- 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 395 

eluded an alliance with Austria, Russia, Naples, 
and with the Porte. Circumstances did not 
admit of its being extended to Prussia, or to 
Sardinia ; since, immediately on the breaking 
out of the war with Naples, the Directory- 
availed itself of that crisis for robbing its proper 
ally, without the least pretext, of all its pos- 
sessions on the continent, and for banishing it 
to Sardinia. England was, it is true, by her 
subsidies, in a certain sense the centre of this 
second confederacy ; but yet in a less degree 
than of the first. She was less capable of keep- 
ing it together. The Porte received no subsi- 
dies. It might be foreseen that its object went 
no farther than the recovery of Egypt. Rus- 
sia though she received subsidies, was yet by 
her position and power virtually independent. 
But the greatest apprehensions were founded 
upon the personal character of its sovereign ; 
whose policy was rather influenced by caprice 
and momentary impressions, than built on any 
firm principles. But all these things lay beyond 
the control of the British minister. Whatever 
expectations he might have formed of this con- 
federacy, he could not conceal from himself the 
fact that it was but feebly held together. The 
first result, however, seemed almost to surpass 
their expectations. They had the good fortune 
to find great generals ; in Southern Germany 
the Archduke Charles was victorious, in Italy 
the redoubted Suwarrom. Still further, in the 
course of the summer the French armies were 



396 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

driven back across the Rhine and the Alps ; 
Switzerland was left only half occupied by their 
troops. 

But the year was not to end without the 
sky which had thus brightened up becoming 
again overcast ; and the germs of dissolution al- 
ready developed themselves in the confederacy. 
The apprehensions which the capricious policy 
of the Russian sovereign necessarily excited were 
too soon to be realised. What it was which 
disturbed the relations with Austria, whether 
the disasters in Switzerland, or the occupation 
of Piedmont, without its being immediately re- 
stored to its legitimate king, has not been cleared 
up ; those with England were deranged by the 
ill-combined and ill-conducted enterprise against 
the north of Holland''; which afforded the strong- 
est proof that without the co-operation of Prussia 
no effective attack upon France could be made 
from the north. Paul I. withdrew from the 
confederacy, and it was not long before there 
were reasons to apprehend that he would go 
over to the other side. 

The great alteration of affairs in consequence 
of the overthrow of the Directorial government 
and the elevation of general Buonaparte, after his 
return from Egypt, to the post of first consul, 
or regent of the French state, could not imme- 
diately exercise any considerable influence on 
the continental relations of England, The peace 

'' Aug. and Sept. 1799. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 397 

which he offered to England in a letter to the 
king^ altogether at variance with the customary 
forms of diplomacy, clearly could not be brought 
about, for this reason, because it was scarcely 
credible that the proposal made in this manner 
was seriously meant. The relations of England 
with Russia were virtually dissolved ; those with 
the Porte had only reference to Egypt ; those 
with Austria and the states of Southern Ger- 
many were all, as far as regards the continent of 
Europe, she could reckon upon. But even these 
were destined to be torn from her by the cam- 
paign of 1800. The battle of Marengo restored 
the ascendancy of France in Italy ; the advance 
of Moreau through Suabia and Bavaria, and last 
of all his victory at Hohenlinden, opened a pas- 
sage to the Austrian provinces. Austria saw 
herself driven to negotiations, which brought on 
the peace at Luneville, and the breaking off 
of her connections with England, which, without 
this, would have naturally followed, was made a 
preliminary condition of this treaty \ 

Thus with the exception of the Porte and 
Portugal, this second confederacy against France 
was also dissolved ; and England for the second 
time stood almost alone : unconquered to be 
sure as formerly, as inaccessible to assault as 
ever, and with the confident expectation that 
the liberation of Egypt would sooner or later 

' England exempted Austria herself from her engagements Dec. 31, 
1800 ; which, according to the last subsidy and alliance-treaty, June 20, 
1800, would have continued to the end of February, 1801. 



398 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

be effected, of which, indeed, the capture of 
Malta, compelled by famine to surrender '', 
seemed to afford her a pledge. But the impla- 
cable hatred and indefatigable policy of her ad- 
versary found means to set new enemies upon 
her ; and to raise a new storm, of which the al- 
tered relations with Russia formed the materials. 
A league of the northern powers against England 
was now effected. 

The notion of the armed neutrality, which 
Catharine had originated, was not extinct. It 
was in the nature of things that so long as 
peace continued, during which there were no 
enemies, and therefore no neutrals, it should 
slumber, because it admitted of no practical ap- 
plication. But it was obvious that it would not 
be neglected in new wars, in which circum- 
stances should favour a revival of the scheme. 

England had certainly given occasion for its 
restoration : not only were the old subjects of 
controversy renewed, they were even multiplied 
and augmented. The meaning of contraband was 
extended to a degree unheard of before ; even 
corn and provisions were reckoned as such, in 
the vain hope that France might be reduced to 
submission by famine. One of the favourite 
ideas of Pitt was to ruin the commerce, and, 
above all, the maritime commerce, of France, 
because he fancied he had discovered the means 
thereby of forcing her to a peace. The allied 

k Sep. 1801. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 399 

powers readily concurred in his views ; it was a 
standing article in the leagues which were formed 
to close their harbours against the French ship- 
ping. The only alternative, therefore, that 
France had left, was to carry on its trade 
in the ships of neutral nations ; but never was 
England less disposed to tolerate this than at 
the present time. The pressure, therefore, ne- 
cessarily fell on those neutrals which had a traf- 
fic of their own, in which class only the north- 
ern powers of Europe could be reckoned. No 
sooner was the principle once admitted, that an 
enemy's goods in neutral ships was fair booty, than 
the claim to search neutral ships became a direct 
consequence of this admission ; and who could 
fail to perceive what disputes and altercation 
such searches must lead to, whether the pro- 
perty of an enemy should be discovered or not. 

The assertion, that the neutrality of the flag 
protected the cargo, even though the proper- 
ty of an enemy, cannot be proved from the law 
of nature, but rests upon conventional prin- 
ciples of international law, founded either on 
mere custom or positive compact \ The idea of 
neutrality, according to our conception of it, ex- 
tends only to the notion that every neutral ought 
to be at liberty to offer for sale, to belligerent par- 
ties the products of its own country, (so far as 

' In order not to interrupt the thread of the inquiry, I have thought it 
better to investigate the claims of the armed neutrality, considered in this 
point of vievsf, in an appendix to the present treatise; the more so, because 
with the majority of readers, the ideas on this subject can hardly be suffici- 
ently accurate. 



400 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

they are not acknowledged to be contraband,) as 
its own property ; as well again as to fetch, as 
its own property, the goods which he has bought 
of these and paid for, but not to offer them 
for sale to others as the property of the people 
engaged in the war. As far as practical policy 
is concerned, it is most important to observe, 
that the whole question may be of greater or 
less importance according to the different rela- 
tions and the position of the belligerent nations; 
and that it is therefore scarcely to be expected, 
that the conventional policy on the question 
should be always consistent and universally 
agreed upon. Let us consider for example the 
case of a people whose wealth and power chiefly 
depends upon its maritime commerce, and, above 
all, upon an active trade with its colonies ; can it 
be supposed for a moment, that its opponent, in 
case it be powerful enough to hinder it, will 
quietly suffer that commerce now to be carried 
on in foreign ships instead of in its own ? And 
above all will it quietly suffer this trade not only 
to be carried on to the extent which was cus- 
tomary in time of peace, but even to a still greater, 
from the ports of the colonies, which were for- 
merly closed against foreigners, being now thrown 
open by the colonists for the conveyance of their 
products; their own ships being excluded from 
trafficking™. Would a naval power at war with 

■" On the British side, the question is best elucidated by Pitt in his 
speech on the 2nd Feb. 1801. Speeches, III. p. 220, sq. First, on the 
ground of international law, because the admission of the right of neutral 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 401 

Spain, allow foreign ships to convey to her stores 
from Peru and Mexico, without which perhaps 
she would be obliged to give up the contest? 
We are here speaking only of the general prin- 
ciple and the consequences which flow from it ; 
far be it from us to vindicate the abuse to which 
the rejection of it has led. Far be it from us to 
justify it, if more than the goods which upon 
search have been found to belong to the enemy, 
if perhaps even the ship itself has been confis- 
cated, with all its cargo. 

The revival of the project of an armed neu- 
trality was a consequence of the perfect unani- 
mity into which the regent of France had suc- 
ceeded in drawing the then sovereign of the 
Russian empire. The revival of this measure 
might seem the more surprising since it was a 
measure of Catharine II., which Paul I. was 
otherwise certainly not disposed to revive. It was 
now followed up with all the impetuosity which 
marked his character : not only Denmark and 
Sweden, but Prussia also was obliged to accede 
to it, or to run the risk of being treated as an 
enemy. The claims were the same as under Ca- 
tharine, only in consequence of a remarkable 
incident, a new one had been annexed. A Da- 
flags in specific treaties is only an exception to a right recognised as a rule. 
Secondly, on the ground of convenience, because the greatness and prepon- 
derating weight of England as a naval power, and consequently her greatness 
generally rests upon the maintenance of the principle hitherto received ; 
since otherwise her enemies would have uncontrolled supplies of naval 
stores from the Baltic. Thirdly, on the ground of positive compacts 
which are opposed to it. See below in the Appendix. 

D d 



402 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

nish convoy, accompanied by a frigate", was com- 
pelled to undergo a search ; whereas according 
to the maritime laws in force up to that time, the 
convoy of a man of war furnished security, that 
the vessels under her protection had no contra- 
band goods on board. 

By the institution of this league England was 
placed in a state of hostility towards this half 
of Europe. The determination of the question, 
whether the claims of the armed neutrality are, 
on a general view, compatible with the law 
of nations or not, we will leave to theorists ; 
that England, under existing circumstances, 
could not suffer the commerce of its enemy 
to be freely carried on under neutral flags, 
we believe no practical statesman, whose judg- 
ment is unbiassed by party prejudice, will deny. 
Indeed we have no hesitation in asserting that 
an international maritime law will never be esta- 
blished further than on paper, so long as that 
principle shall be maintained in its full extent ; 
the present vast importance of maritime com- 
merce to many of the states will not permit more. 
The just censure to which England was amenable 
in those times does not lie, in our opinion, in 
her refusal to recognise that principle, but in 
the unjust extension which she gave to her 
claims and to her proceedings respecting prizes. 
If she had only confined her claims to the seizure 
of the enemy's goods ; if she had exercised strict 

" The frigate Freja ; she was taken and brought to England. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 403 

justice in every thing else, and treated neutrals 
as neutrals, the whole contest might perhaps 
have been superseded. 

Be that as it may, it was no longer possible 
for England to avoid the conflict. The mea- 
sure which Paul I. employed in seizing upon 
all English ships in his ports, was equivalent to 
an a€t of hostility ; and in politics as well as in 
private life, it is an acknowledged principle that 
a state cannot submit to an affront without de- 
grading itself. A British fleet passed through 
the Sound; the attack upon Copenhagen fol- 
lowed ° ; and perhaps no blood w^ould have been 
spilt if it had been known on the 2nd April 
at Copenhagen what had transpired on the 24th 
of March, at Petersburg. 

The succession of Alexander to the Russian 
throne had the happiest effects on the conti- 
nental relations of England. The northern 
league dissolved of itself (there had indeed been 
only a partial acquiescence in its formation) 
immediately the new emperor offered the hand 
of friendship to England. It fell to the ground 
without leaving behind any permanent traces 
of its existence ; nothing was determined re- 
specting the principles of international maritime 
law ; even the claims of England were, to a cer- 
tain extent, tacitly recognised. She had, though 
not strictly allies, yet at least friends, in the north. 
The armed neutrality now survives only in his- 

" April 2, 1801. 

Dd2 



404 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

tory ; it is scarcely possible that it should again 
exist in Europe ; though it may possibly be re- 
called into being by America. 

The British policy was directed to other ob- 
jects. The time approached when England was 
to retire from the conflict, which she had now 
carried on for nine years without intermission. 
The deliverance of Egypt had removed out of 
the way a main obstacle, and facilitated the 
negotiations ; preliminaries of peace were signed 
in the autumn of the same year^, and its final 
ratification at Amiens was only delayed by the 
determinations respecting Malta to the spring 
of the following year*^. Even on this occasion 
the peace was not concluded by the same minis- 
ter who had conducted the war. WilUam Pitt 
had previously made way for his successor Ad- 
dington ; though not by compulsion as formerly, 
but voluntarily. In full possession of power, 
and of a majority in parliament, he resigned his 
post, because his opinions on Catholic Emanci- 
pation, which was to crown his great and newly 
achieved work, the union of Ireland and England 
into one kingdom, did not harmonise with those 
of his sovereign. And if George III. did not he- 
sitate to accept the resignation of his long-tried 
counsellor and friend, rather than wound his 
conscience, the minister showed no less tender- 
ness for the dictates of his, by quitting office, 
when his measures were no longer approved': 

P Oct. 1, 1801. 1 March 25, 1802. 

'' That this was the real cause, there is not a shadow of doubt. The 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 405 

though poor and in debt, notwithstanding the 
treasures of the world had passed through his 
hands,, he preferred retiring from the glory of 
supreme power into private life^ The peace of 
Amiens, however, may in some measure be con- 
sidered as his peace, inasmuch as it was not 
concluded without his approbation and advice. 
His successor was not his opponent, but the 
friend of his youth ; the ex-minister did not take 
his seat as was usually the case on the opposi- 
tion bench, but on the right hand side, on which 
for so long a series of years he had directed and 
determined the destinies of Great Britain, and 
not unfrequently of Europe. 

By virtue of the peace of Amiens, Great Bri- 
tain ceded all her conquests in the colonies, to- 
gether with Malta, to their former possessors, 
with the exception only of Trinidad and Ceylon, 
which Spain and the Batavian republic were 
obliged to cede to her ; very dear conquests in 
return for a debt of 300 millions sterling, which 
the war had cost* ! But who will take so nar- 

very expressions of the great statesman on the subject, with the tenderest 
forbearance to his sovereign, may be seen in the speech of May 13, 1805. 
Speeches, iii. 420, sq. 

s Feb. 9, 1801. 

' That portion of these sums which went abroad consisted partly of 
loans which England guaranteed — capital as well as interest, and which, 
until their reimbursement, make up a part of the national debt ; partly in 
subsidies, that is, sums granted by virtue of compact for certain services, 
which cannot therefore be reclaimed. Only two loans were advanced 
during the two administrations of Pitt to Austria, in 1795, to the amount 
of £4,600,000; and in 1797, to the amount of £1,620,000. The loan to 
Portugal, amounting to £600,000, was first made in 1809. Hamilton, 
National Debt, p. 133. The whole amount of the subsidies and loans. 



406 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

row a view of this peace ? We have already 
on another occasion given our opinion of the 
criterion by which the value of this peace should 
be estimated ; naraely, how far the object, for 
which the war had been commenced and carried 
on was attained by it. This was not merely 
the conquest of a few islands ; but two objects 
of a much higher character ; the maintenance 
of the constitution and independence of Great 
Britain, and the freedom and independence of 
Europe against the encroachments of France. 

The first of these objects was accomplished ; 
but not the other : the predominating power of 
France was so far from being broken, that it 
was greater than ever ; considered in this point 
of view the peace of Amiens can only be consi- 
dered as a disgraceful one. All that can be 
alleged in vindication of it will be found in the 
speech which Pitt delivered after the ratification 
of the preliminaries " ; his opinion on this point 
is the more impartial because being no longer 
minister he is not vindicating his own measures. 

His main argument is ; " One object we must 
give up, which is no longer attainable ; we are 
disappointed in our hopes of being able to drive 
France within her ancient limits ; but we have 
fulfilled our obhgations towards our allies ; the 

which flowed to the continent on account of the government, is computed 
at £45,800,000. Nebenius.on Public Credit, in German, sect. 13, note, 
I know not from what data ; and I question whether the amount of the 
subsidies admits of being so accurately determined, since it cannot be 
known in what instalments they were really paid. 
" On Nov. 3, \ 801. —Speeches, iii. p. 270, sq. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 407 

glory of the English arms has not been tar- 
nished ; and Great Britain possesses the means 
of opposing France if she should farther extend 
her ambitious views. Further : the re-establish- 
ment of the French monarchy is equally impos- 
sible but we have survived the violence of the 
revolutionary fever, we have seen Jacobinism 
overthrown ; and its new government is only a 
state of transition towards a monarchy ""." 

But, with all that, it is difficult to palhate the 
impolicy of neglecting to make some definitive 
arrangements in the treaty respecting the rela- 
tions of the continent ; and of at once stipu- 
lating for the evacuation of the Batavian re- 
public by the French. England remained vir- 
tually excluded, in a political sense, from the 
continent ; she could no longer interfere in its 
affairs ; she could only look on in silence, while 
France might lay down regulations at her plea- 
sure, affecting the continent from the Tagus to 
the Vistula. The moment she attempted to 
raise her voice, she was met with the con- 
temptuous answer, '* The peace of Amiens, and 

^ Speeches, iii. p. 270, sq. That this and, if possible, the restoration of 
the old monarchy, or at least, of the reigning family, had always been the 
object of his wishes, the minister does not dissemble. It was not without 
the most painful struggle that he could abandon this hope ! 

Me si fata meis paterentur ducere vitam 

Auspiciis et sponte mea componere curas ; 

Urbem Trojanam primum dulcesque meorum 

Relliquias colerem, Priami tecta alta manerent 

Et recidiva manu posuissem Pergama victis ! 
he exclaims with ^Eneas. What would his great spirit have felt if fate had 
permitted him to look for the space of ten years into the future I 



408 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

nothing but the peace of Amiens." The ques- 
tion was, whether such a state of things could 
last? 

This question soon became answered ; in the 
short space of a year the war again broke out ; 
it was declared by England. The first consul, 
occupied with the consolidation of his power, 
and the re-conquest of St. Domingo, could hardly 
wish for it at this moment ! and although some 
of his proceedings might with justice be made 
the subject of complaint, they could hardly be 
considered sufficient to furnish ground for a new 
war. We certainly do not mean to deny that a 
war might also have been wished for by him, 
while he was preparing the steps on which he 
mounted to the great object of his ambition — the 
imperial throne. But, notwithstanding this, it still 
seems certain that he could not have wished it to 
break out so soon. It indeed becomes a ques- 
tion, whether, according to the particular plans 
of the British ministry, the peace was intended 
to be anything more than an armistice, which 
they only wanted for the purpose of collecting 
new forces ; and this question we could scarcely 
help answering in the affirmative, if another, and 
a much more natural solution did not present 
itself. It was not till after the peace that the 
English discovered they had committed an error 
— an error which they now saw with all its con- 
sequences. When the surrender of the con- 
quered colonies as stipulated for was made, only 
one condition remained unfulfilled, the surren- 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 409 

der of the rocky island of Malta, The reasons 
why the evacuation of this was refused will 
scarcely be regarded by an impartial posterity 
as anything more than so many subterfuges ; 
and the true ground can now only be sought in 
the awakened consciousness that more had been 
conceded than ought to have been. This was 
incontestably a political blunder which we are 
not disposed to justify ; although aware that the 
renewal of the war was the only possible means of 
repairing it ; the war, however, would nevertheless 
have been continued if this had never happened. 

England commenced this new contest without 
a single ally on the continent ; and the terror 
of the overwhelming power of France could af- 
ford her but little hope of procuring any, unless 
perhaps the haughty spirit of the French ruler 
should produce them. The occupation of Ha- 
nover, a neutral power, proved the complete 
nullity of the German empire, but was also a 
proof how much the Prussian cabinet of that 
time could submit to, in admitting without hesi- 
tation the army of a conquering power into the 
heart of its states, in order to maintain its pre- 
carious neutrality. 

The first great effect of this war on the conti- 
nent, was the erection of the French imperial 
throne. The formal restoration of an hereditary 
monarchy in France, could not, considered in it- 
self, be repugnant to the views of England; but the 
claims which were involved in this new title, 
were of such a nature, that they defeated the 



410 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

prospect of peace, and must have inspired Eng- 
land with hopes of soon being able again to find 
allies on the continent ; and who, indeed, could 
doubt that every exertion would be made to effect 
this object, when Pitt, for the second time, with 
the same principles, the same powers of mind, 
though not of body, was placed at the head of 
affairs ^. The war itself bore altogether a pecu- 
liar character. Here were two hostile powers 
determined to wreak on each other all the mis- 
chief they could ; and yet, one being strong at 
sea, the other by land, they could scarcely come 
at each other. In France, the popular mind had 
been so accustomed, during the preceding war, 
to the loss of colonies, which had scarcely been 
restored, that the operations of the English in 
this respect could hardly move it. No field of 
battle offered itself on which the British troops 
could disembark. Great preparations, however, 
were made for effecting a descent on England. A 
numerous army was assembled on the opposite 
coast ; a whole fleet of armed and unarmed trans- 
ports were built to carry it over. But that, without 
a fleet to keep open the communication with 
France as well as to cover the passage and landing, 
an invasion was impracticable, or, if indeed ef- 
fected, that it would end in the defeat and cap- 
ture of the invading army, was obvious to every 
one, as was, consequently, that such a design 
could never have been seriously planned ; still 

y On 28th May, 1804. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 411 

there were not wanting political, and even mili- 
tary writers, who believed it ! But on the other 
side, it was not less certain that the threatening 
attitude assumed could not last for ever, nor even 
long ; that the interest of the new ruler of France 
required a new war ; and experience has now 
shown, that the descent upon England was only 
a mask, under which he might prepare for another 
object. 

Its effect upon England, however, was to drive 
the whole nation to arms. The military spirit 
was not only everywhere aroused, but it breathed 
a new power ; a different kind of enthusiasm was 
naturally kindled in the breasts of troops who 
were to fight for their country, their famihes, and 
their homes, to that felt by men enlisted for 
foreign war and conquest. 

The labours of Pitt were not in vain. He 
succeeded in the summer of 1805 in bringing 
about a third confederacy against France. The 
transfer of the left bank of the Rhine to that 
country ; the distribution of all the ecclesiastical 
states, on the German side, among those whom 
she wished to favour ; the powerful movements 
upon Switzerland, and above all, upon Italy, 
rendered it no longer problematical, that with 
this predominating power of France and the use 
she made of it, an independent European state- 
system could not possibly exist. To the aid of 
these sound political considerations, there came 
about this time an event, no less powerful, which 
roused the moral indignation of nearly all Europe 



412 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

— the arrest and murder of the duke d'Enghien 
This was not only, as it has generally been ad- 
mitted, a crime, but unquestionably a great poli- 
tical error, which cannot find an apology in the 
design of renewing a continental war, as that 
might have been effected without it. 

From this moment the sullen spirit of Prussia 
began to work, and, much increased by the con- 
tumelious dismissal and treatment of her ambas- 
sador, communicated itself to the cabinets of 
Austria, Prussia, and, above all, to Sweden. The 
more keen the sense of justice that prevailed in 
the dispositions of those princes, the more deeply 
must they have felt the wound thus given it ; and, 
however undefined the plans of these sovereigns, 
a party from this time soon became formed, not 
only of men, but even among women of the first 
rank, in the courts of Vienna and Berlin, as well 
as of Petersburg, which preferred a renewal of 
the war to a dishonourable peace. Thus, when 
Pitt re-entered the ministry, he found the national 
feeling and cabinets of the continent favourable 
to his designs. How much was done by British 
ambassadors to win over completely, posterity, 
perhaps, will discover, when their official reports 
shall at some future time be entrusted to a se- 
cond Coxe ^ England thus became, in the fullest 

* On the internal relations of the court of Vienna, at that time, and the 
English ambassador. Lord Paget, some interesting information will be 
found in the treatise. Die Franzosen in Weiii, 1805, in Europtische 
A7inalen, 1809, St. 6, the authenticity of which, however, we cannot 
vouch for, as we are unacquainted with the sources from which they 
are derived. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 413 

sense of the word, the centre of the third confede- 
racy against the domination of France, as Russia, 
Austria, and Sweden, entered into a treaty of alU- 
ance with her, upon conditions of receiving certain 
subsidies ; unfortunately, the wavering pohcy of 
Prussia placed the same obstacles in the way as 
had occurred before. The disastrous issue of 
the campaign of 1805, which, after the battle of 
Austerlitz, was followed by the peace of Pres- 
burg % rent asunder the alliance with Austria ; 
that with Russia was prolonged in little more 
than in form ; that with Sweden was rather more 
trouble than profit ; and new relations with Prus- 
sia soon followed, which led to war, or at least 
to a warlike attitude. 

Pitt was destined to live just long enough to 
see his hopes and his plans frustrated. Intelli- 
gence of all these misfortunes, for which the re- 
cent victory at Trafalgar (21st October) could 
not compensate, reached him while yet on his 
death-bed ^. However deeply this may have dis- 
tressed him, he had still two grounds of consola- 
tion left. First — The consciousness that his life 
had been devoted to a good and just cause ; and 
next to that, the certainty that his principles 
would survive in the school of statesmen which 
he himself had formed °. But dismal as were the 



a December 26, 1805. 

•> His death, the 23d January, 1806, happened on the same day of the 
month as that on which he had taken his seat in the House of Commons 
twenty -five years before. 

<= A Portland, Liverpool, Sidmouth, Canning, Perceval, Castlereagh, 
Vansittart, etc. 



414 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

prospects when his eye closed in death, they be- 
came still darker soon after his departure ; and it 
became of the greater importance that his princi- 
ples died not with him. 

A most striking proof of this was afforded by 
the administration which succeeded, and which 
wished to follow a different line of pohcy. This 
was a coalition ministry ; that is to say, one form- 
ed of men of opposite parties and professing dif- 
ferent principles ; a ministry which can hardly 
ever succeed for any length of time in England. 
At its head were placed Lord Grenville, as first 
lord of the treasury, and Mr. Fox as secretary of 
state for foreign affairs '^. By this arrangement 
the foreign policy of England was entrusted to 
one, who, all his life, had been the distinguished 
antagonist of Pitt. Even since the death of both, 
public opinion has been divided in England as to 
which has the higher claim to praise ; a question 
the more difficult to settle, because party spirit 
almost necessarily exercises an influence over all 
who seek to answer it. With all his genius ; with 
all his brilliant talents as a speaker. Fox, never- 
theless, wanted that calmness of mind which is 
indispensable to the great man of business in 
practical life. He saw through the medium of 
his passions, and spoke under their influence ; 
while the steady coolness of Pitt is displayed no 
less in the details of business than in his speeches, 
which, never overcharged, seem only designed to 

J In February, 1806. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 415 

convince. Which of the two took the most cor- 
rect view of the great objects, which, in their time, 
excited so much interest, is perhaps no longer a 
matter of doubt. We may admire Fox as a 
speaker and as an historian ; but who will now 
attempt to rank him beside his great rival as a 
statesman ? Even great good nature in him was 
dangerous, as it inclined him too much to judge 
of others by himself. 

When Fox was placed at the helm of affairs, 
the continental relations of England, with the 
exception of those of the north, were dissolved ; 
in Germany they could not be easily renewed, as 
the southern states had leagued themselves with 
France, and the confederation of the Rhine, which 
was afterwards formed, rendered it altogether im- 
possible. With Spain the war was again renewed ; 
with Prussia the relations were doubtful ^ They 
soon, however, became decidedly hostile, as Prus- 
sia, in compliance with the dictates of France, 
took possession of Hanover. Fox rightly judged 
that such an insult to his sovereign was not to be 
tolerated. The declaration of war which ensued, 
was unanimously approved in Parliament, in the 
address of thanks voted in reply to the king's 



" After the capture of the Spanish galliots, (4th October,) the relations 
of England and Spain have been so diligently investigated by a celebrated 
writer, that I deem it only necessary to refer to them : — Fr. Genz authen- 
tische Darstellung der VerhUltnisse Zwischen Englu7>d und Spanien, 1806. 
I agree with the author, that England was justified in treating Spain as an 
enemy at any time, yet not without a previous declaration of war. The 
more strenuously England contended for the maintenance of international 
law, the more important it became that she should observe its forms. 



416 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

speech. A terrible blow to Prussian com- 
merce. 

Fox was scarcely settled in the ministry, before 
he showed his desire to negotiate a peace ; and 
accordingly he availed himself of the first oppor- 
tunity of communicating his sentiments to the 
enemy. A plan having been formed for the as- 
sassination of Napoleon, Fox sent information of 
it to him, and thus had the opportunity he wished 
for of entering upon negotiations with that po- 
tentate. Their many interruptions and slow 
progress during the whole summer, only served 
to evidence the weakness of the declining minis- 
ter; while, by the overthrow of the German 
empire, the establishment of the confederation of 
the Rhine, and the more and more warlike atti- 
tudes assumed towards Prussia, Napoleon clearly 
betrayed his ulterior designs. Fox continued to 
negotiate, and suffered himself to be put off with 
one proposal after another, which, from their 
very absurdity, ought to have convinced the most 
short-sighted politician that they were only meant 
to delude. A short time before the breaking out of 
the war with Prussia, he expired ^ His adminis- 
tration had merely served as a foil for that of Pitt. 
The war against Prussia and Russia, which was 
terminated by the peace of Tilsit, (July, 1 807,) 
only falls within the sphere of this inquiry, from 
the influence which it had upon the continental 
relations of England opening negotiations with 

f On 16th September, 1806. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 417 

that potentate. The emperor of France suc- 
ceeded in drawing Russia over to his side ; and 
had not Gustavus Adolphus, with untimely per- 
tinacity, which soon cost him Finland, and even 
his throne, adhered to his engagements, every tie 
by which England was still connected with the 
continent, would have been snapped asunder; 
and even this last was soon broken. 

Of all the states of the north, Denmark alone — 
a power both military and naval — had been able 
to maintain its neutrality ; but even this was 
destroyed by England's demanding the surrender 
of her fleet, and enforcing this demand by the 
bombardment of her capital ^. 

Whether or not this transaction was a breach 
of the law of nations, still remains undecided, 
even among the Enghsh themselves. If the 
British ministry had, as they alleged — and in all 
probability such must have been the case — posi- 
tive intelligence, that, by express stipulations in 
the late treaty, Denmark was to be forced into 
the war, and that Copenhagen was to become 
the rendezvous of the naval and military forces 
of the north, could it be an infraction of the law 
of nations to anticipate this event, especially as 
England only required the surrender of the 
Danish fleet, on condition that it should be re- 
stored at the end of the war, and did not proceed 
to enforce its surrender till this had been refused ? 
The course of events will always bring on cases 



s September 7, 1807. 

E e 



418 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

respecting which nothing has been determined in 
any code of international law. Those proofs, how- 
ever, have not been made public ; and even if they 
were, who could blame the Danish government 
for refusing to comply with such a demand ? 
Who, indeed, could blame that nation for regard- 
ing the attack as a violation of the law of nations ? 
Be this, however, as it may, it would have been 
more noble for England to await the attack on 
the open sea, the theatre of her glory, especially 
as there could be no possible doubt as to the 
issue. 

Thus the celebrated continental system of Na- 
poleon might be said to be realised against Eng- 
land, who was now shut out from every port of 
the continent, from Petersburg to Cadiz. An 
armed neutrality was now no longer the question, 
for, generally speaking, neutrality was no longer 
tolerated, but that great commercial war was 
set on foot against England, which gave rise 
to a tissue of decrees, every where characterised 
by passion and hatred. These, in the end, had 
no other result beyond that of warning politi- 
cians, that if they listen to any voice, save that 
of reason and reflection, they must expect the 
blow, intended for others, to fall, at last, with 
increased force, upon their own heads. Napo- 
leon's continental system, which was to exclude 
the English from every port, had eventually the 
effect of re-opening them all to her. 

As in the physical, so in the political world, 
no unnatural condition can last for ever : and if 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 419 

Napoleon had not hastened the catastrophe by 
new deeds of violence, it niust^ in some way or 
other, however tardily, have come to pass at last. 
The designs upon the Spanish peninsula were the 
first, and those against Russia the second step 
towards it. In the former, England had, if not 
an ally, at least a friend, in Portugal. Though it 
was impossible to save this state, yet here, never- 
theless, the British continental policy celebrated 
its first triumph by its success in persuading the 
court to emigrate to Brazil-, and found a new 
kingdom on that side the Atlantic. A greater 
triumph, however, awaited it. The ill-treated 
Spain was roused by her injuries, and a new kind 
of league was formed, not with a cabinet, but 
with a nation ^, which, notwithstanding the fre- 
quent vicissitudes of fortune, could not be dis- 
solved. In Spain, the first abyss opened itself, 
which swallowed up the stores and the armies of 
Napoleon ; a second still more terrific he himself 
prepared in Russia. It would be superfiuous to 
recount the history of those great events, which 
rendered it possible for armies advancing from 
the Tagus and the Volga to combine and co- 
operate in the heart of France; which hurled 
the despot from the tottering but imperial throne, 
and brought about that which Pitt had expressed 
as the obiect of his wishes, though no longer 
of his Li^rs — the restoration of the ancient dy- 
nastv to the newly-erected regal throne of France. 
Let us rather be permitted to conclude this 

i XiTsnbs- 30, 1807. ' JaniiarT 14. 1809. 

Ee2 



420 RISE OF THE CONTINENTAL 

treatise with some general observations on the 
co-operation of England in the re-establisliment 
of the European state-system, and on its present 
relations with the continent. 

After the inquiry which we have instituted, no 
one will dispute the title of England to the glory 
of having taken the greatest and most effectual 
part in the liberation of Europe, and the restor- 
ation of an independent state-system to our part 
of the globe. Her share, however, has often been 
much exaggerated, particularly by Englishmen. 
England certainly achieved much ; but England 
did not, and, as repeated experience has shown, 
could not, achieve it alone. It was utterly im- 
possible for her to do so, without the co-operation 
of continental allies, such as Spain and Portugal, 
Germany and Russia. 

After the catastrophe in Russia which took 
place, without the participation of England — 
when the oppressed began to burst their bands 
asunder, — it was perfectly natural that the old 
allies of England should again rally around 
her ; and history will never forget the almost 
incredible exertions which she made from the 
years 1813 to 1815 '', which plainly prove that 
she did not think the liberation of Europe could 
be purchased too dearly. 

Even Pitt, had he survived the glorious triumph 
of his principles, could hardly have done more ! 

^ The aggregate of the loans advanced in the three years, amounted to 
no less than £142,000,000 according to the real, and £222,000,000 ac- 
cording to the nominal value. — Nebenius iiber den credit. Anhang, § 5. 



INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. 421 

Yet^ all this could only succeed by a uniting of 
the various powers ; for what could gold, how- 
ever indispensable, do alone ; iron, after all, was 
to decide the contest. 

England certainly prides herself, with justice, 
on being the only power that never bowed her 
neck during the whole course of that tempestuous 
period. But England should not forget that she 
is mainly indebted for this to her insular position. 
During that political storm, which periodically, 
as it were, desolated the countries of the conti- 
nent, she alone could assure to herself that inter- 
nal tranquillity, without which those peaceful 
arts, from which alone she derives resources 
for her great exertions, could not have been con- 
tinued with such unexampled vigour and pros- 
perity. Besides this, it was undoubtedly of pe- 
culiar advantage to all Europe, not only that the 
wooden walls of England rendered her impreg- 
nable, but th'at she was precisely the state, above 
all others, fitted by her constitution to keep ahve 
those political opinions, the decline of which could 
never have been more injurious and lamentable 
than at this particular period. By this, too, was 
prepared the amazing influence which England 
has had, since the struggle for constitutional 
governments has become general in Europe. Her 
. example was held forth, not in order that her 
constitution should be adopted as a general model, 
(which heaven forfend,) but as one from which 
proper notions might be formed of liberal institu- 
tions of this kind: such were now introduced 



422 CONTINENTAL INTERESTS, ETC. 

into France, the Netherlands, and several Ger- 
man states. 

England is now ranked as one of the five lead- 
ing powers who determine the relations of the 
European state-system. It has connected itself 
with them without any surrender on its own 
part ; it has therefore reserved to itself the power 
of stepping forward as a mediator whenever it 
may be necessary. A continental policy like the 
last, founded upon loans and subsidies, can hardly 
ever occur again, at least to the same extent ; 
but if this, as we think we have shown it to be, 
was, on the whole, beneficial for Europe, are we 
not thereby justified in hoping, that she will be- 
come still more, in future, the mediating power. 
Thus, then, we think we may conclude this 
treatise, without exposing ourselves to the impu- 
tation of blind partiality, with a wish for Britain, 
which is, at the same time, the best we can form 
for the continent and for our native country. — 

ESTO PERPETUA ! 



APPENDIX 

(p. 340.) 

An Examination of the Questions respecting the claims 
of the Armed Neutrality, 

The claims of the armed neutrality embrace four 
questions, which must be kept quite distinct, if we 
wish to examine them properly. The first is : 
Whether free ships make free cargoes ? The se- 
cond is. The determination of what are called 
contraband or forbidden wares ? Thirdly, Whether 
a convoy is a protection from search ? Fourthly, 
When are ports to be considered in a state of 
blockade ? We shall proceed to examine each 
separately. 

I. Whether Free Ships maJce Free Cargoes ? 

This celebrated maxim, which may be regarded 
as the basis of the new maritime code, which the 
armed neutrality wished to introduce, involves 
two distinct propositions. First, that neutral 
ships may carry their own wares (provided they 
are not contraband, of which below,) to all ports, 
whether belonging to neutral or belligerent par- 
ties, provided they are not in a state of blockade. 
By virtue of this principle, therefore, the neutral 
powers wished to have the free navigation and 



424 APPENDIX. 

conveyance of tlieir own products, (with the 
above restrictions,) not only to the ports of all 
neutral states, but also to those of France, Spain, 
Holland, etc. But what was of still greater con- 
sequence, they desired also, in the second place, 
free permission, not only to carry to those coun- 
tries their own wares, and to bring away what 
they had purchased there, but also to convey, 
where and how they pleased, the goods of the 
belligerent parties ; thus, for example, freely and 
at discretion to take in French wares and French 
property, without let or hindrance from British 
ships or privateers ; and British wares, without let 
or hindrance from the enemies of England. 

The great practical importance of this question 
wall become apparent at once to all who bestow 
the slightest reflection upon it. Were it generally 
recognised by maritime powers, maritime wars 
would no longer exercise any very considerable 
influence on the trade and commerce of nations. 
It is true, a war might, perhaps, hinder the belli- 
gerent powers from continuing their trade in 
native vessels, unless, indeed, sufficiently strong 
at sea to protect it ; but this evil would be easily 
remedied, as neutral vessels would naturally has- 
ten in sufficient numbers to their ports, in order 
to transport their merchandise to whatever part 
of the world it might be destined. Instead, 
therefore, of a maritime war being, as it is now, 
extremely prejudicial to neutrals, from the many 
annoyances it occasions them, it would, in this 
case, be advantageous to them, as they could not 



APPENDIX. 425 

fail to be employed in the transport of merchan- 
dise, and consequently to draw a large share of 
the carrying-trade to themselves. 

From this it will readily be perceived why 
England, in her present position, was so deeply 
interested in withholding her assent to this prin- 
ciple. England is powerful enough at sea to 
protect her own commerce, and to carry it on, 
even in the midst of war, without any considerable 
interruption. Her enemies are notoriously too 
weak to do the same, consequently in war their 
trade is almost annihilated. Had England, then, 
recognised this principle, the trade of France, 
Holland, etc., would have immediately revived, 
which England, who naturally regards her com- 
merce as the mainspring of her power, is, for that 
very reason, anxious to repress. Those coun- 
tries, it is true, would not have been able, had 
England given way, to carry on their trade in 
their own bottoms ; but they would have carried 
it on in the ships of neutrals, or under neutral 
flags. 

The extent, as well as the importance of this 
principle, being then sufficiently obvious, let us 
now see what may be determined respecting it ; 
whether it is founded on the principles of natural 
law, upon the tacit agreement of civilised nations, 
or, finally, on express stipulations between the 
now contending powers. 

The law of nature, as apphed to war, or pure 
military law, recognises no further principle than 
" I injure my enemy wherever I can," and in this 



426 APPENDIX. 

is comprised, '■' I take from him his property 
wherever I can." The principle of free ship, 
free cargo, in its full extent, that is, if it means 
an enemy's goods are to be free in neutral ships, 
is, therefore, not recognised by pure military law. 
It would be difficult, therefore, to prove from the 
law of nature, that if Englishmen and Frenchmen 
wage war with each other, they are, notwith- 
standing, obliged to spare each other's property. 
This does not, however, imply, that if an Eng- 
lishman finds the goods of an enemy in a neutral 
ship, he is immediately justified in taking posses- 
sion of the ship, for the mere conveyance of an 
enemy's wares, obviously involves no act of hos- 
tihty towards him ; but it cannot, with any truth, 
be asserted, on the principles of natural law, that 
he is bound to let the property of an enemy 
escape free. 

But why this appeal to the law of nature ? It 
is, happily, now universally understood, that this 
is no longer admitted as a rule in modern warfare. 
It is one of the fairest fruits of civilisation, that 
states only war with states, not with private in- 
dividuals, to which, unhappily, privateering (and 
that, viewed in the most favourable light, is no- 
thing better than piracy on a limited scale,) still 
forms an exception. It is, therefore, evident, 
that in determining this question, we must not 
have recourse to the law of nature, but to con- 
ventional law or express compacts. 

The next question, therefore, is, whether the 
principle, " free ship, free cargo," has ever been 



APPENDIX. 427 

generally observed ? this ever being limited to 
what has been introduced among the civilised 
nations of Europe in the two last centuries. In 
order to determine this, we need only cast a 
glance over the history of the wars since the 
treaty of Westphalia, and we shall find this ques- 
tion answered in the negative thus far : Neutrals 
have certainly generally laid claim to it, but bel- 
ligerent powers, during war, have never been 
willing to recognise it. 

In the great war which Louis XIV., in 1688, 
commenced with almost the whole of western 
Europe, the right of neutral flags was expressly 
denied on the side of England, while William III. 
went so far as at once to forbid all communica- 
tion with France. It was also in vain that the 
Dutch, who were the greatest sufferers, made 
representations to him respecting it. He gave 
the most suitable answer which could be given 
to these representations — " Let this be the canon 
law." 

In the eighteenth century, the question re- 
specting the rights of neutral flags was not agi- 
tated till after the close of the war of the Spanish 
succession. It was first brought forward in the 
great northern war which still continued. That 
it did not arise during the Spanish war, was ow- 
ing to the peculiar situation of the parties ; in 
the west of Europe there were no neutrals, and 
the eastern powers had enough to do amongst 
themselves. Another and a stronger reason was, 
that Holland, during the war, though hostile to 



428 APPENDIX. 

France and Spain, still carried on a tolerably ex- 
tensive trade with these two countries, which 
England either could not, or would not, hinder. 
But the trade which the Dutch, as neutrals, 
carried on in the Baltic, soon brought the mat- 
ter to a crisis. Charles XI I. refused to recognise 
the right of neutral flags ; the Swedish privateers 
captured indiscriminately all vessels bound to 
ports of the enemy, so that Holland and England 
were obliged to send, 1715, a combined fleet to 
the Baltic for the protection of their commerce. 

On the breaking out of the war between Spain 
and England in 1739, and the war of the Aus- 
trian succession in 1740, in which Holland re- 
mained neutral as long as she could, the dispute 
was again revived. The English having captured 
a great number of Dutch vessels, on their way to 
Spain, the latter complained, and appealed ex- 
pressly to the commercial treaty of 1674, in 
which England had recognised the principle of 
^'^free ship, free cargo," in respect to them; but 
nothing of any consequence was settled. 

No further progress had been made, when, in 
1743, the war between Russia and Sweden broke 
out. The latter power again refused to concede 
to the Dutch the right of neutral flags, and the 
latter were once more compelled to send a fleet 
to protect their trade in the Baltic. 

The seven years' war had scarcely broken out, 
in 1756, before the Dutch renewed their old 
complaints against England. Desirous to turn 
their neutral position to account, and that under 



APPENDIX. 429 

the protection of the neutral flag they might be 
allowed to carry on the trade between France 
and her colonies, more especially the West In- 
dies^ the latter again appealed to the commercial 
treaty of 1674. But the English, admitting their 
claims just as little as before, made prizes of 
their merchantmen whenever they found them 
bound to an enemy's port, or laden with an 
enemy's goods. 

Thus matters went on till the breaking out of 
the American war. During its course the com- 
plaints about the oppression of neutral shipping 
became again very loud. An armed neutrality 
was negotiated in 1780, by Catherine 11. , the 
basis of which was the maxim, "free ship, free 
cargo." England certainly did not formally re- 
cognise this principle ; but she tacitly submitted 
to it, as she felt herself obliged to succumb to 
the circumstances of the time. 

This survey, we think, will make it quite clear 
that this principle was very far from having been 
ever generally recognised in the course of the 
war by tacit agreement, though it certainly was, 
once and again, by separate treaties between 
individual powers, but concluded, for the most 
part, in time of peace. BiiscJi, in his Geschichte 
der Zerriitung des Seehandels, {History of the 
Obstructions to Mafitinie Comme?'ce,) has taken the 
trouble to enumerate these singly, and has found 
thirty-six treaties for, and only fifteen against, this 
principle. But what remedies did these treaties 
provide ? No sooner did a war break out, than 



430 APPENDIX, 

the nations who had contracted them, felt them- 
selves at liberty to violate their obligations, and 
made such partial arrangements as suited their 
own interest. This was done, not only by Eng- 
land, but by most of the other states, zohen- 
ever they felt themselves sufficiently strong to 
do so; and who can say that the like will not 
happen again ? 

Let us now address ourselves to the second 
question, which is closely connected with this. 

II. What is Contraband ? 

When two states are at war with each other, 
it is scarcely possible for any obligation to arise 
out of it aifecting a third party in respect to its 
commerce, so as to preclude it from selling cer- 
tain articles, even though they should be directly 
intended for carrying on the war, provided it 
supplies them fairly to the highest bidder. But 
supposing the said state should be willing to sell 
them to one state and refuse them to another, 
this would expressly indicate a disposition to 
favour one at the expense of the other ; and the 
state thus acting could no longer be regarded as 
a neutral power. According to the principles of 
natural law, therefore, nothing contraband, under 
the above-stated condition, can exist. This, how- 
ever, is not the place for investigating this question 
further ; it is, besides, a matter of perfect indif- 
ference what opinion may be formed respecting 
it, as the conventional law of nations has long 
since decided otherwise respecting it. In this, to 



APPENDIX. 431 

wit, an important difference is established be- 
tween various articles : I. Those directly used 
in warfare, such as ammunition, arms, and all 
kinds of ready-made weapons. II. Those which 
only indirectly serve for that purpose, such as 
unwrought iron, copper, ship-timber, etc., from 
which must be distinguished. III. Those which 
have properly no reference to the war, such as 
provisions, fine linen, cloths, etc. 

All treaties of commerce, without exception, 
which have been concluded during the last few 
centuries, between European states, and have 
contained definitions of what is contraband, agree 
in this, that the articles. No. I., are interpreted 
as such. The agreement in this is so general, that 
the more precise definition of it, or the enu- 
meration of the several articles, has become a 
standard formulary, which always recurs totidem 
verbis, as may be seen in the various acts of neu- 
trality which have been published. Consequently 
it is a generally recognised principle of positive 
European international law, that all articles di- 
rectly used in warfare, attempted to be conveyed 
by neutrals to nations engaged in war, imme- 
diately become contraband. 

But however general the agreement may be, 
that these articles are interdicted, it is by no 
means so generally agreed that they are exclu- 
sively so. It has more frequently happened, 
indeed, that the European powers, especially on 
the breaking out of a war, have interpreted as con- 
traband whatever they thought proper, and have 



432 APPENDIX. 

consequently made No. IL, and even No. IIL so, 
just as it might happen to suit their convenience. 
The Enghsh, it must be confessed, were not be- 
hind hand in doing this ; but then it must not be 
supposed that they did it alone. Others, as for 
example, Sweden, have gone as far, or even far- 
ther ; butj, as they had not the same power to 
enforce their views as the Enghsh had, the incon- 
venience resulting therefrom was not so sensibly 
felt. 

Several circumstances, and particularly the 
following, have contributed to extend the mean- 
ing of contraband : First, It is quite natural that 
a belligerent nation should feel sore in seeing 
articles conveyed to its enemies, which, though 
not yet wrought into arms and implements of 
war, may soon become so, and in all probability 
are designed for that purpose. Secondly : It is 
well known, that in the present day, the western 
maritime powers obtain the greatest part of their 
ship-timber from the northern and eastern coun- 
tries of this part of the world. In naval wars, 
the aim for a long period has been, and never more 
so than at the present moment, not only to an- 
nihilate the enemy's fleets, but to obstruct as 
much as possible the building of new ones. The 
ardour with which England has pursued this 
object, is known to every one. For this reason, 
therefore, ship-timber is one of the articles which 
England insists upon being included in the list of 
contraband goods ; while, on the other hand, the 
northern powers are especially interested in 



APPENDIX. 433 

having it omitted, as it forms the bulk of their ex- 
ports. If to this we add (as was the case in the 
war of the Revolution,) the endeavours made to 
embarrass the enemy by impeding the conveyance 
of provisions, or generally to weaken him by the 
complete annihilation of his commerce, without 
respect to the losses which neutrals may thereby 
sustain, it will easily be perceived that^ even- 
tually, every thing will be reckoned as contraband 
which is not ballast, and, consequently, that all 
trade with an enemy's country will be virtually 
suspended. 

Whatever opinions may be formed as to the 
legality and good policy of this proceeding, the 
following points we think will now be clear : In 
the first place, according to the generally re- 
cognised international law of Europe, only the 
immediate necessaries of war can possibly be 
regarded as contraband ; and if, in the second 
place, other articles should also be interpreted 
as such, this must be settled, as an exception 
to the rule, by express treaties between the seve- 
ral nations, unless mere force is to supersede 
right. 

These principles appear to be at present ac- 
tually recognised by both parties. For not only 
is the restriction, which the existing special 
treaties of individual powers exhibit, expressly 
recognised in the act of neutrality, in the defi- 
nition of contraband ; but, on the other hand, 
the minister in the debates of the British par- 
liament, appeals also expressly to the existing 

Ff 



434 APPENDIX. 

treaties of commerce with the northern powers "". 
An analysis of these^ therefore, can alone afford 
us a deeper insight into the question. 

The treaties of commerce quoted in parhament 
were that with Sweden of 1661 ; that with Den- 
mark of 1670 ; and that with Russia of 1793. 
The continuance of these was expressly asserted ; 
whether it was recognised on the other side or 
not, is irrelevant to the question, which entirely 
turns upon the stipulations which the treaties 
contained. 

In the treaty with Sweden ^ the following 
articles are those which require to be noticed : 

Art. V. " The ships, goods, and ships' crews of 
either nation, shall, under no pretence, either 
publicly or privately, either by general or spe- 
cial command, be laid under arrest, detained, or 
in any way treated with violence in the ports of 
either country." 

Art. XL '' Although it has been settled be- 
tween the two powers, that neither shall succour 
the enemy of the other, this is not to be so un- 
derstood as that all commerce and traffic with 
the enemy of a belligerent party shall be inter- 
dicted to a neutral ally. It shall only be decided 
that no wares which are contraband, and of 
course no gold, provisions, arms, (here follows 
the usual form,) shall be conveyed to the enemy 
of the other ; otherwise, if they should be cap- 

a Vide the speech of Pitt, February 2, 1801, in Speeches, iii. p. 229. 
*> It will be found at length in Schmauss, Corpus Juris gentium Acade- 
micum, p. 2302, and in the other well-known collections. 



APPENDIX. 435 

tured, they are to be considered lawful booty. 
Neither of the contracting parties is to support 
the enemy of the other, either by selling or lend- 
ing him ships ; yet each of the parties shall be 
at liberty to trade with the enemy of the other, 
and to convey to him wares of every description, 
with the exception of those above specified, 
without molestation, excepting to harbours and 
places in a state of blockade." 

Art. XII. " But in order that an enemy's goods 
may not be concealed under neutral names, ships, 
as well as stage wagons, shall be provided with 
passports and certificates (the formula of which 
is inserted at length). If in this case the ships 
of neutral powers shall fall in with the ships of 
war or privateers of the others, the first shall 
only be required to produce their papers, without 
being liable to further search or molestation. 
Should they not be provided with papers, or if 
otherwise there should be any urgent cause for 
suspicion to warrant the searching of the ship, 
(which is only to be permitted in these cases,) 
then, if an enemy's goods shall be discovered, 
these shall be lawful prize, but the rest shall be 
immediately restored." 

If, then, this treaty was recognised as the basis 
of the maritime law between England and Swe- 
den, by both these powers it will follow : 

First. That the principle, " free ship, free car- 
go," had not, between England and Sweden, the 
extent which was conceded to it in the armed 
neutrality. It must be admitted, certainly, that 

Ff2 



436 APPENDIX 

Sweden is allowed to cany on a free trade in 
neutral property (not contraband) to an enemy's 
port, which is not blockaded ; yet not to con- 
vey an enemy's property. Sweden would not 
dare to convey French or Dutch merchandise 
under her flag. 

Second. The definition of contraband admits 
this further extension, that besides the direct 
necessaries of war, money also and provisions 
are included under it ; but not the indirect ne- 
cessaries of war ; not the principal products of 
Sweden, iron, copper, and ship-timber. Sweden 
would certainly at the present time readily ac- 
quiesce in this extension, because she wishes to 
check the export of specie, and is no longer in 
possession of the rich corn-lands about the Baltic, 
which she had in 1661. 

Such, then, are the relations between England 
and Sweden, according to those treaties : now 
follow those between England and Denmark. 
They are founded, according to the speech of 
the minister in parliament, on the treaty of 1670. 

In that, the commercial treaty which was con- 
cluded between Charles II. and Christian V., 
the articles X. XI. contain the definition of 
what was contraband. But we need not go back 
even to that source, for by a later convention, 
which was signed on 4th July, 1780, (a few days 
before Denmark acceded to the first armed neu- 
trality,) an explanation of that article has been 
given, which here follows " : 

"= Vide Marten's Recueil, etc. etc., ii. p. 102. 



APPENDIX. 437 

"But in order to leave no doubt respecting 
what is understood by contraband, it is agreed 
that this designation comprises nothing but arms, 
as cannon, etc. etc., (here follows the usual for- 
mula,) as well as timber, pitch, copper in plates, 
sails, hemp, cordage, and, in a word, every- 
thing which serves for the equipment of a ship ; 
yet with the exception of unwrought iron and 
planks. As for the rest, it is expressly declared, 
that under the designation of contraband shall 
not be comprehended any kind of provisions, 
such as fish, flesh, corn, etc. etc., the convey- 
ance of which to hostile ports, if not under 
blockade, is always to be allowed." 

Now, although Denmark, as early as 9th July, 
1780, acceded to the armed neutrality, yet this 
document was not abolished nor infringed, since 
in that convention the definition of contraband 
was expressly referred to the existing treaties 
between the several powers ; so again the ac- 
ceding to the second armed neutrality did not 
abolish it, since, notwithstanding the general 
restriction of contraband to immediate necessa- 
ries of war, yet the annexation of this proviso_, 
without infringing the existing compacts between 
the several powers, leaves it in full force. It is 
obvious, therefore, that Denmark, by her com- 
mercial contracts with England, was, with regard 
to contraband goods, so far bound more strictly 
to consider every thing which has reference to 
the building and equipment of ships as comprised 
in the definition ; but not, on the other hand. 



438 APPENDIX. 

provisions and money, which Sweden had recog- 
nised as such. 

Lastly, as regards Russia, the British minister 
referred in his speech to the convention of 1793. 
This convention is the treaty of alhance which 
Catharine II. at that time concluded with Eng- 
land against France '^. It contains. Art. XL, the 
definition : " That not only all kinds of supplies 
and provisions are to be regarded as contraband, 
but that they will also, on both sides, generally 
injure, in every possible way, the French com- 
merce," so that the idea of contraband is certainly 
here taken in its widest extent. 

After this investigation there still remain to be 
considered the two other points which formed 
the subject of controversy, viz. : 



III. Are Neutral Ships under Convoy liable to Search 
or not ? 

This question was, as is well known, affirma- 
tively answered on the part of England, and 
negatively on the part of the other states ; and 
although Denmark promised in the last contest 
not to allow her ships, for the present, to convoy, 
she nevertheless refused, in any way, to recog- 
nise the principle of search. The whole tone of 
the proceeding rather showed that the Danish 
government regarded the assertion of the oppo- 

«' Politisches Journal, 1793. 



APPENDIX. 439 

site principle as a main point, on which not only 
the interests of commerce, but also the honour 
of her flag, and, indeed, in some degree even 
the independence of herself as a state, was con- 
cerned. 

But in order to exhibit this subject in its true 
light, it is necessary to explain first somewhat 
more distinctly what the idea of convoy involves 
in maritime affairs and in maritime law. 

A convoy is well known to be a guard of one 
or more men-of-war, which the state grants to a 
number of merchant vessels for their protection. 
It is not, therefore, a private, but a public affair. 
But the granting of a convoy according to the 
received maritime law, involves the following : 

I. When the state grants it, then only armed 
ships in the service of the state can be used for 
that purpose, in which case it is however of no 
consequence to what class they belong. There- 
fore, privateers, which perhaps are bought for 
the purpose, or even other armed vessels, which 
private persons cause to be fitted out, would have 
no legitimate claim to the privileges of a proper 
convoy. II. When the neutral state grants a 
convoy, it immediately gives security that the 
merchant vessels contain no wares, which, ac- 
cording to general maritime law, or specific 
treaties with particular powers, are contraband. 
In short, the merchant vessels before they are 
taken under convoy, must be previously subjected 
to a strict examination of their papers, which 
must be conducted by the commanding officer 



440 APPENDIX. 

of the convoy. In Denmark, probably also in 
Sweden and Russia, the commanding officer 
himself is even made responsible for it. III. It is 
not, therefore, every ship which can, at its own 
discretion, obtain convoy even if its papers are in 
perfect order. The state does not readily mider- 
take the responsibility for foreign ships. It is 
more usual for each state to allow only its own 
ships to convoy. Agreements, however, may 
easily be entered into, especially where several 
powers bind themselves to an armed neutrality, 
which may occasion deviations from the rule. 

Hence it will be clearly seen why this disputed 
point is regarded, especially by neutrals, as a 
question of honour. The search of a convoy is 
tantamount to a refusal to accept the given secu- 
rity, and the pledged word of honour of a state, 
and the denial of a right which has been hitherto 
conceded to every independent state as such. 
The correspondence which passed between the 
Danish government and the British Charge- 
d'AfFaires at Copenhagen, perhaps exhausted 
every thing which can be said on this subject. 

Some readers will perhaps ask whether some- 
thing has not been determined on this point in 
the commercial treaties. But in no single known 
treaty, and not even once in the acts of the 
armed neutrality of 1780, has there been the 
slightest mention made of it ; doubtless because in 
the European maritime law which existed before 
that time, the freedom of a convoy was taken for 
granted. That is to say, it is obvious that the 



APPENDIX. 44 1 

opposite claim could never be preferred by any 
European power which is not possessed of a simi- 
lar decisive preponderance at sea to that which 
Great Britain has at present. 

IV. When are Harbotirs to be considered as BlocJcaded. 

In the earlier treaties nothing was decided on 
this point, because the answer was self-evident: 
when they are really blockaded. But England gave 
to the phrase an extension of meaning which few 
will be prepared to justify, that the bare decla- 
ration, ' that a port is blockaded, at once con- 
stitutes a blockade.' Indeed this was then ex- 
tended even to the whole line of coast. In 
consequence, the Act of Neutrality contains this 
just definition. Art. III. '' That the name of a 
blockaded port belongs only to that which is 
blocked up by a number of ships of war lying 
before it and stationed sufficiently near, that the 
entrance cannot be hazarded without manifest 
danger; and that the vessel which steers its 
course in that direction shall not be regarded as 
acting in opposition to the convention until it 
makes the attempt to effect an entrance, either 
by force or stratagem, after it has been apprised 
of the condition of the harbour by the com- 
mander of the blockading squadron." 



THE END. 



OXrOHD : PRINTED EY TALBOYS AND BROWNE. 



ERRATA. 

7, " informed," read "uninformed." 

10, " clas," read "class." 

22, " Papau," read " Passau." 

36, " counsel," read " counsels." 

49, " rival king. Christian II," read " rival, king Christian II.' 

54, " Evangelists," read " Protestants." 

64, " and will," read " and can." 

75, " Emualtion," read " Emulation." 

97, "while the," read " while by the." 
162, " Verguenes," read " Vergennes." 



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